Wesley Buckwalter and Stephen Stich (2010) suggest that gender differences in philosophical intuition helps explain the gender gap in philosophy, and that further research concerning such differences is of great importance. I argue that whereas Buckwalter & Stich are right about the importance of exploring differences in philosophical intuition, they are wrong to focus on gender differences. If there are gender differences in philosophical intuition, and that remains to be seen, they are of a kind unlikely to sustain Buckwalter and Stich's argument. It is informative to look at another area where supposed gender differences led to a change in theory. On the basis of findings of gender differences in ethical intuitions, Carol Gilligan (1982) agued that traditional ethics reflect a male orientation, and argued that the female orientation to ethics constitutes something like an ethics of care. Despite the later finding that differences in intuition did not track gender, but the nature of the moral situation, the ethics of care remains an important contribution to our understanding of everyday morality and ethical theory. The psychological literature also shows that gender differences in cognitive abilities are rare and very minor. It is therefore surprising that Buckwalter & Stich would pursue such an unpromising avenue. I present a diagnosis of why it is so compelling to look for gender differences in philosophical intuitions and theory in particular. This diagnosis warns us that the differences that we observe most likely are effects of the situation, not of any inherent characteristics of the persons who have the intuitions. I end with a recommendation for how to pursue the exploration of differences in intuitions.

It is advisable, though not required, to read Buckwalter & Stich's paper "Gender and philosophical intuition" ahead of time

It's accessible online at: SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1683066