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Commission proposes major corporate tax reform for the EU

2016-10-27

Re-calibrated as part of a broader package of corporate tax reforms, the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) will make it easier and cheaper to do business in the Single Market and will act as a powerful tool against tax avoidance.

First tabled in 2011, the CCCTB was designed to strengthen the Single Market for businesses. While Member States made considerable progress on many core elements of the previous CCCTB proposal, they were unable to reach a final agreement. Having sought the views of Member States, businesses, civil society and the European Parliament, we are today bolstering the pro-business elements of the previous proposal to help cross-border companies cut costs, red tape and to support innovation. The re-launched CCCTB will also create a level-playing field for multinationals in Europe by closing off avenues used for tax avoidance.

Two further proposals aim to improve the current system for dispute resolution on double taxation in the EU and to bolster existing anti-abuse rules. Taken together, these measures will create a simple and pro-business tax environment.

Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis said: “Tax policy should support the EU’s goals of economic growth and social justice. Today’s proposals aim to boost growth and investment, support enterprise and ensure fairness. The current corporate tax system treats debt financing of companies more favourably than equity financing. Reducing this debt-equity bias in the tax system is an important element of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan and underlines our commitment to deliver on this project.”

Pierre Moscovici, Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs said: “With the rebooted CCCTB proposal, we’re addressing the concerns of both businesses and citizens in one fell swoop. The many conversations I’ve had as Taxation Commissioner have made it crystal-clear to me that companies need simpler tax rules within the EU. At the same time, we need to drive forward our fight against tax avoidance, which is delivering real change. Finance Ministers should look at this ambitious and timely package with a fresh pair of eyes because it will create a robust tax system fit for the 21st century.”

To encourage swift progress, the CCCTB has been broken down into a more manageable, two-step process. The common base can be quickly agreed to unlock key benefits for both businesses and Member States. Consolidation should be introduced soon afterwards and would allow all the benefits of the complete system to be reaped.

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Bizkaiko, Gipuzkoako eta Arabako Ogasunen zerga bilketa %2,1 hazi da irailararte

2016-10-26

Bizkaiko, Gipuzkoako eta Arabako Foru Ogasunek 2015ean baino 186,4 milioi euro gehiago bildu dituzte; guztira, 9.112 milioi euro. Lurraldez lurralde, %0,6 igo da Bizkaian, %4,7 egin du gora Gipuzkoan eta %2,7, berriz, Araban. Azken hiru hilabeetan gehiago hazi beharko du Finantzen Euskal Kontseiluak urte amaierako aurreikusitako %3,3ra iristeko.

Bizkaia izan da portaera ahulena izan duen lurraldea, zerga bidezko diru bilketa %0,6 bakarrik igo baita. Guztira 5.706,3 milioi eurok bildu ditu Bizkaiko Ogasunak, aurreko urtean baino 30,5 milioi gehiago. PFEZrean ondoriozko diru sarrerak %3,8 hazi dira, baina sozietateen gaineko zergaren ondoriozkoak, berriz, %24 jaitsi dira. BEZari dagokionez, zerga bilketa %1,3 behera egin du.

Gipuzkoan, 2015ean baino 120 milioi euro gehiago bildu dira. Eragin positiboa izan dute PFEZak, Sozietateen gaineko zergak eta BEZa. Lan atxikipenen atalean 23 milioi gehiago jaso ditu Ogasunak, %2,3 gehiago. Sozietateen gaineko zergaren atalean, kuota diferentzial garbiaren sarrerak 33,7 milioitan hazi dira: sarrer gordinek 12,4 milioi egin dutu gora, eta itzulketak 21,4 milioi eurotan murriztu dira. Foru Aldundiak kudeatzen duen BEZari dagokionez, zerga bilketa metatua %,3,4 igo da.

Ramiro Gonzalezek, Arabako ahaldun nagusia, Foru Ogasunak 2016ean 2.054,5 milioi euroko bilduko dituela adierazi du. Hau da, iaz baino %3,1 gehiago. Dena dela, gorakada hori ez da aurreikusitakora (%5,5) heltzen.

Iturriak:

1.Iturria

2.Iturria

3.Iturria

4.Iturria

Comisión Arbitral: Decisión 1/2016, de 1 de Agosto, en relación con la “Proposición de Ley sobre la Organización Institucional Interna de la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco”

2016-10-25

José Luis Etxeberria Monasterio

Letrado jefe de la Diputación Foral de Bizkaia

En la presente nota se pretende recoger las declaraciones generales de mayor intereses que realiza la Comisión Arbitral, para seguidamente recoger el análisis de cada uno de los preceptos impugnados y determinar si en aplicación de la doctrina previamente expuesta deben entenderse o no conformes con la distribución de competencias entre las Instituciones Comunes de la CC.AA. y los Órganos Forales de los TT.HH.

Dicha Proposición de Ley en su articulo 1.1 establecía su objeto, “regular la organización institucional interna de la Comunidad Autónoma, en desarrollo de lo dispuesto en su Estatuto de AutonomíaPor lo tanto: La proposición de ley pretendiendo aparentemente la reforma de la conocida como Ley de Territorios Históricos (1983), buscaba y realizaba una  verdadera modificación de la organización institucional del País Vasco, Por ello es de suma importancia el pronunciamiento de la Comisión Arbitral que estatutariamente (art 39 EAPV) tiene atribuida la decisión sobre los conflictos de competencia que se puedan suscitar entre las Instituciones de la Comunidad Autónoma y las de cada uno de sus Territorios Históricos. No estando sometidas a la Jurisdicción Contencioso administrativa el conocimiento de las Decisiones o resoluciones dictadas por la Comisión Arbitral a que se refiere el artículo 39 del Estatuto de Autonomía del País Vasco.

La Decisión de la Comisión Arbitral 1/2016, de 1 de Agosto de 2016, estima en lo sustancial las cuestiones de competencia 1/2015, 2/2015, 3/2015, 4/2015 planteadas, respectivamente,  por la Diputación Foral de Bizkaia, Juntas Generales de Araba, Diputación Foral de Gipuzkoa y Diputación Foral de Araba,  en relación con la  “Proposición de Ley sobre la Organización Institucional Interna de la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco”.

En la misma se tratan dos partes claramente diferenciadas. 

En la primera la Comisión Arbitral expresa su posición sobre las cuestiones generales planteadas que agrupa en los siguientes enunciados generales:

  1. a) El marco general de garantía del núcleo intangible de la foralidad
  2. b) La proyección de la garantía del régimen foral privativo en la delimitación de la competencia legislativa del Parlamento Vasco
  3. c) La competencia en materia de Haciendas Forales y del ejercicio de la tutela financiera de los municipios
  4. d) El acercamiento al marco competencial en relación con la cooperación intergubernamental a la que se refiere el capítulo 2º de la Proposición de Ley.

En la segunda se pasa a analizar cada una de las impugnaciones concretas dirigidas contra los distintos preceptos de la proposición de ley.

Decision 1_2016 de la Comisión Arbitral

 Analisis decision 1-2016 de la Comisión Arbitral

Fiscal policy, inequality and poverty in Iran: Assessing the impact and effectiveness of taxes and transfers

2016-10-21

Using the Iranian Household Expenditure and Income Survey (HEIS) for 2011/12, we apply the marginal contribution approach to determine the impact and effectiveness of each fiscal intervention, and the fiscal system as a whole, on inequality and poverty. Net direct and indirect taxes combined reduce the Gini coefficient by 0.0644 points and the headcount ratio by 61 percent. When the monetized value of in-kind benefits in education and health are included, the reduction in inequality is 0.0919 Gini points. Based on the magnitudes of the marginal contributions, we find that the main driver of these reductions is the Targeted Subsidy Program, a universal cash transfer program implemented in 2010 to compensate individuals for the elimination of energy subsidies. The main reduction in poverty occurs in rural areas, where the headcount ratio declines from 44 to 23 percent. In urban areas, fiscally-induced poverty reduction is more modest: the headcount ratio declines from 13 to 5 percent. Taxes and transfers are similar in their effectiveness in achieving their inequalityreducing potential. By achieving 40 percent of its inequality-reducing potential, the income tax is the most effective intervention on the revenue side. On the spending side, Social Assistance transfers are the most effective and they achieve 45 percent of their potential. Taxes are especially effective in raising revenue without causing poverty to rise, indicating that the poor are largely spared from being taxed. In contrast, since the bulk of transfers are not targeted to the poor, they are not very effective: the most effective ones achieve 20 percent of their poverty reduction potential. The effectiveness of the Targeted Subsidy Program could be improved by eliminating the transfer to top deciles and re-allocating the freed funds to the poor.

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Do tax credits increase charitable giving? Evidence from Arizona and Iowa

2016-10-21

The majority of U.S. states have implemented tax credits that encourage donating to specific clases of nonprofits. However, the effect on the nonprofits themselves is unknown. This paper estimates the causal effect of two of the costliest programs. Arizona’s Working Poor Tax Credit (WPTC) and the Endow Iowa Tax Credit (“Endow Iowa”) provide stark contrast for analysis. The WPTC, the largest tax credit for charitable giving in terms of tax expenditure, provides a broadly targeted 100 percent credit with a cap of $200 per person. Endow Iowa provides a sharply targeted 25 percent credit with a cap of $300,000 per tax-payer. A model of donor budget constraints and preferences suggests that Endow Iowa has greater potential to induce large increases in contributions to its targeted charities than does the WPTC. Using synthetic control methods to construct counterfactuals, I estimate a 125 percent increase in contributions to community foundations in Iowa. In contrast, I find no evidence that the WPTC increased contributions to the targeted Arizona nonprofits. Evidence suggests that the growth in contribution levels in Iowa included increases in both the number of community foundations and the level of contributions per foundation.

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