A Cognitive Rhetorical Approach to Basque Proverbs: Analogical Mappings in Coordination

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Abstract*,**

In this work, different occurrences of the connective “and” in some Basque proverbs gathered in the 16th and 19th centuries are studied. “And” appears in grammatically definable types of constructions beyond pragmatic ambiguity; the environments where “and” occurs show a fixed pattern linked to a conceptual structure. This work focuses on the less fixed pattern of the typology “A and B is Y”, where the first term mentioned “A” is defined in terms of the second “B” demonstrating the important role played by analogy. There is also a complex variety of coordinated proverbs, which link two seemingly independent proverbs; in these proverbs “and” provokes a shift in point of view of the fictional utterer. The evaluative string (Y) poses the question of the directionality of the proverb, when there are variants of the same proverb, one of them lacking the string, what the presupposition range of the given cultural milieu is, from Honeck’s (1997) “Generic Ideals” to Kay’s (1996) “context proposition”. The methodology is based on Turner and Fauconnier’s Blending Theory (1998) and Conceptual Integration Networks (Turner & Fauconnier 2001), and on contemporary Rhetoric of Argument (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca). The simple type of proverbs falls either under the category of “one-sided shared organizing topology” or under the category of “unfilled shared topology network”. In the complex type of proverbs, two asymmetric spaces are linked, but analogously to the simple type, the second part of the proverb constrains the meaning of the first part. Two alternative space configurations for proverb understanding are provided.

* For Ana, my dearest friend. And for Doctor Michael Marcuse, from whom I learned the ethics of a true scholar.
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1. From coordination to Analogy

In this paper, I demonstrate and explain one of the many linguistic constructions characteristic of proverbs, and the cognitive operations involved in understanding proverbs and their use. The proverbs I cite are shown out of context and without any situational settings—they come from several corpora. One possible way of exploring cognitive mechanisms in corpora is to perform a formal search for some recognizable retrievable pattern. Because proverbs are traditionally recognized by their concentrated expression, "and" can predictably be used as one of the main linguistic tools to prompt meaning. I chose the occurrence of "and" as part of a retrievable pattern, because it is used in constructions that, besides being regular, are rich for semantic-pragmatic interpretation. "And" is flexible enough to occur in a variety of contexts, allowing for different pragmatic interpretations (Sweetser 1990), and also occurs in highly sophisticated grammatical constructions that provoke a wide variety of meaning patterns (Fillmore, Kay & O'Connor 1998). From these constructions, it is possible to extract certain general cognitive rules. It should be noted that the abstract strategy of coordination is not restricted to the use of "and", nor is coordinating the only function of "and".

The proverbs have been selected from two corpora, the 1596 Proverbs (Refranes y Sentencias, RS), and Bonaparte's manuscripts. While I was teacher of Basque as a second language at the University of Deusto, I edited RS into Standard Basque for pedagogical purposes. I follow this modernized version, which may be subject to criticism, but, I hope, not in ways that are relevant to this study. My edition does not fulfill any scholarly eccdotical requirements: it is the result of practical requirements. I used proverbs for teaching Basque, because I consider that proverbs reveal a part of the language difficult to teach through regular grammars; this intuition has been recently confirmed by construction grammar approaches and second language acquisition approaches (Lewis 1993). Proverbs demonstrate the constructions involved, and also how (and why) to break the norm while still being grammatical, in addition to other aspects of the language still not adequately explored (see my discussion below on the proverbiality of the language).

With regard to the sixteenth century proverbs published in Pampelune (RS), I have followed mainly van Eys' edition, and, some years later, I have also consulted Lakarra's scholarly eclectic edition; nonetheless, any remaining errors are my own.  

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1 Full title: REFRANES y SENTENCIAS/ comunes en Bascuence, declaradas en Ro-/mance con numeros sobre cada palabra, para que se entienda/ las dos lenguas. Impresso con licencia en Pam­pelone/ por Pedro Porralis de Ambros, 1596. [Proverbs and Sentences/ common in Basque, declared in Ro-/mance [language] with numbers on each word so [they] are understood/ [in] both languages. Licensed Printing in Pam­pelone/ by Pedro Porralis of Antwerp, 1596].

The exemplar I have been using was a photocopy Doctor Alfonso Irigoien gave me; he had received a copy from R. M. Azkue who, in his turn, had inherited it from Lacombe, as it is clear from the ex-lib­ris mark. This limited edition was prepared and published by van Eys (1898).

There is also an eclectic critical and comparative edition (Lakarra 1996). Apart from Lakarra's intro­duction to his edition, a brief but highly informative history of the text can be found in Jabier Kalza­korta (1996). Kalzakorta includes a very interesting addendum of a list of 19th century proverbs gathered by Aizkibel.
The nineteenth century proverbs I present here, the Ispazter proverbs (Ip), were first published in 1992, as part of a larger corpus of manuscripts from Prince Louis Lucien Bonaparte's collection.2

The two corpora have been amalgamated and so are undifferentiated, giving an output of 240 proverbs. The connective "and" occurs in 37 proverbs, recurring at least once in each of them, out of the corpus of 240 proverbs —these 37 proverbs constitute the backbone of this study. Nevertheless, in certain occasions I went back to the entire corpus regardless of the connective, as when studying the Great Chain Metaphor in Basque proverbs.3 Occasionally, when I make an observation based on the "backbone corpus", I also extend the test to Garate's corpus (1998), but when I refer to Garate's corpus, it is always explicitly stated.4 I therefore also test the significance of the retrieval of "and" in Garate's body of proverbs. In Garate's test body of over 12,000 proverbs, over 3,000 use the connective "and", i.e., over 25%, which compares to roughly 20% of the proverbs in my corpus.

1.1. Analogy and polarity between objects

In a previous paper (Garai 2000a), I observe that a primary strategy in proverb formation is to bring together two or more types of "objects" (events, statements, etc.) in an under-specified relation to each other, sometimes with the addition of a guiding evaluative statement. I also find that the abstraction necessary for understanding the target of the evaluation is pursued via analogy between these objects; that is, the cognitive work prompted by these two objects is directed towards finding similarities (analogy) or contrast (polarity) between the objects. The new category defined by these means (the target of the evaluation) is unstable enough to be reconstructed depending upon the target conversation situation, which selects the level of abstraction that is needed each time.

Polarity is a term used by Lloyd (1966) in relation to systems of thought based on opposites in ancient Greek philosophy: e.g. wet versus dry and hot versus cold in medicinal manuals. The philosophical Greek schools made "ancient" beliefs or folk theories explicit in a systematic way. However, folk theories are not systematic in the sense that they are not closed systems, as the Pythagorean "Table of Opposites" presented by Aristotle may be (see below, Turner 1991). In other words, the tendency to polarize elements, rather than being particular to any philosophical school, may follow a general human strategy of clarifying concepts by contrasting two particulars that are believed to inhabit the extremes of the concept to be explained. The partic-

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2 R. M. Pagola et al (1992; pp. 177-ss).This edition was not truly a first edition since Resurrección María de Azkue included some proverbs in his 1947 edition. Azkue is well-known for 'correcting' the materials he collected, and we lack philological research comparing both versions.

3 I have excluded the "Excursus" from this article where they were initially studied, since it has been recently published in Basque (Garai 2002).

4 Garate's huge effort in gathering the materials has not been yet evaluated from a philological perspective, as it should. The heterogeneity of sources is increased further by the uneven transcription of proverbs due to his lack of fixed philological criteria. A critical edition of these materials would need a team of researchers.
ulars of the belief refer to each cultural context, but the strategy can be regarded as general to conceptualization: opposites are simple and descriptively powerful. The degree of contrast or polarity may vary; the degree of analogy does too:

Symmetry, in the wider sense used in this analysis, is ubiquitous throughout histories and cultures, and we might have taken up such symmetry in the parallelism of Hebraic writing, the symmetric arrangement of ancient Near Eastern, Presocratic, and Classical representations of the cosmos, or Anaximander’s understanding of equilibrium as a consequence of symmetric arrangement, and his metaphoric conception of justice in the universe as compensatory repayment according to the assessment of time. Symmetry is the basis of the Pythagorean conception of world harmony as a balance made of numerical relations. Oppositional symmetry is the basis of the classical adversary system of jurisprudence, of Aristotle’s conception in the Ethics that goodness of soul is equilibrium of soul and moral virtue is the tendency to choose golden means between opposing qualities (Turner 1991: 94).

The idea of equilibrium linked to the experience of symmetry is very common in Basque proverbs (as it may be in proverbs around the world), for example:

1. Aldats gorak aldats behera. “Up the hill [erg.] Down the hill [obj.]”.

The link between symmetry and equilibrium shows a correlative mapping between experience and episteme, in Grady’s terms (Grady 1997). Proverb 1 demonstrates a possible underlying meaning of the ergative as cause, which also matches apparently the usage of ergative in the Georgian language. In Basque, ergativity does not always and exclusively convey the idea of cause, as it seems to in Georgian, but it may also be its primary and basic meaning. When the lexical item of the verb is lacking in this type of Basque proverb structure, the ergative expresses cause. The subject causes its object (cf. the idea of adjacent in topics). The general grammatical mapping for this type of proverb can be depicted as follows, based on Fauconnier (1997):

![Diagram of Ergativity and Blending](image_url)
Mark Turner (1999; also in 1991 and 1988) considers analogy to be linked to the categorization process in various places. The claim of analogy is to challenge an old category and to propose the creation of a new one. The difference between an existing category and an analogical claim is a matter of entrenchment. As the analogical mappings get entrenched through use, the new category loses its original impact. Notice also the preeminence of the role played by the background knowledge needed in both cases—analogy and polarity.

An interesting path of research can be developed if we draw a parallel with Kay's (1983) semantic approach to what he calls “hedges”. The “hedges”, like “technically speaking” or “loosely speaking”, recruit meaning from folk theories about language. Consequently, folk theories about language are essential in explaining the semantics of these expressions. Analogously, the polarization between objects as shown by a given language conveys something about the semantics of the construction where these objects occur; the polarized objects build the terms and frame in which the element to be defined is included. To give an example:

2. Andrea, sua eta itsasoa guztiz gaixtoa. “Woman, fire and sea, [all are] totally bad”.

This misogynistic proverb was collected in the Basque Country in the sixteenth century—note that Lakoff entitles one of his books Women, Fire and Dangerous Things (1987) after an aboriginal Australian proverb in the Dyirbal language. It is interesting to consider which terms are defined among these three. In fact, Lakoff says that Dyirbal “has a category, balan, that actually includes women, fire, and dangerous things” (op. cit. 5).

In Basque, in most cases either the first or the third term is defined, as explained below in the final section. There are two possible approaches to Proverb 2: one would follow the traditional method of searching direct ideological influences, assuming that polarity belongs only to the realm of scientific thought, i.e. following philological transitivity. The other approach, assuming that polarity is a common mental operation, would try to explain similar experiential settings for common or parallel outputs. I think that this second approach, through cognitive analysis, explains ideological causality, whereas the first approach, which is philological, can only account for possible ways of transmission and be used to hypothesize an influence.

If we think of polarity as a general categorizing mechanism in human thought, essentially related to analogy and the connection of counterpart elements, without contrasting it exclusively to its historical particular instantiations, and if we see it as an open system based on folk common places as opposed to a “scientific” hermetically closed approach, we could account for the proverb as follows. The proverb shows a polarized system, the poles being “fire” and “sea”, and the middle ground “women”. There is still another objection to this interpretation—that these are just examples of implacable, dangerous forces. Actually, the objection works only at the

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5 By “folk common places” I mean the set of presuppositions from which arguments are draw in a community.

6 I owe this objection to Doctor Joseph Grady, from his notes to one of my drafts.
surface, as I attempt to show how we can reach the idea of a defining abstraction that may include all three elements. The question is: what is our cognitive basis in reaching the conclusion that the sea and the fire are similar and in some respect shared also by the woman? We might think of a characterization of women based on properties prototypically assigned to the poles in that culture as the reason why the middle term is given first in the sequence (the term to be defined), before the poles (the limits of the frame).\(^7\) In short, the cognitive process of opposition as a powerful, but not extensionally exhaustive description is more interesting for the study of proverbs than the transmission of features extracted from historically extant objectified and fixed dualistic systems. Polarity, then, is a type of analogy built upon the perception of our bodies as symmetric.

On a theoretical level, I propose that the cognitive view supersedes the philological problem of influences. There is no need to prove direct (textual) transitivity if a form-meaning pair is generally available to a given community of speakers. Instead, what is on offer is an explanation of how a given community has acquired any given concept or category, through the analysis of certain linguistic constructions available at a given historic moment that signal conceptual integration.

1.2. Integrating Objects

In a lecture delivered at the Collège de France —“L'imagination et le cerveau”— Mark Turner (2000) linked the human ability to invent with the ability to build new concepts, which simultaneously relies upon the mental operation known as “conceptual integration”. Turner and Fauconnier (1998) propose that the basic machinery of conceptual integration is as follows:

Table 1: Integration Basics

a) Mental spaces
   i) Input spaces
   ii) Generic Space
   iii) Blend

b) Cross-space mapping of counterpart connections
   i) Counterpart connections
      (1) Between frames and roles
      (2) Identity connections, or representation or transformation
      (3) Metaphoric connections

c) Selective projection
d) Emergent structure
   i) Composition
   ii) Completion
   iii) Elaboration

Mental Spaces are small packs of meaning built for local purposes of discourse and reasoning, which may recruit information from different conceptual domains as needed. Mental Spaces are linked to each other in an array of connections and may

\(^7\) But see 3.10.2 section below.
A COGNITIVE RHETORICAL APPROACH TO BASQUE PROVERBS: ANALOGICAL MAPPINGS...

configure a complex web. Meaning is built on-line. Traditionally, the model has two (or more) input spaces, another space called generic space, and the blend, which is where integration takes place. The input spaces are interconnected by cross-mappings with a variety of connectors. Therefore, the blending of two or more mental spaces results in conceptual integration; the new blended space has an emerging structure of its own. The process by which the blending space acquires its own emerging structure is completed in three steps: 1) by composition of the elements from the input spaces, 2) by completion, following a pre-existing structure available to the speaker, and 3) by further elaboration of the structure. For the conceptual integration to occur we first need to establish a relationship between two input spaces; that is, we need an initial mapping or partial projection between the input spaces. This projection uses relations of identity, analogy, similarity, causality, change, time, intention, space, role, part and whole, or representation (ib. above).

If the proverb brings together two (or more) objects, it is easy to imagine that each of the objects could belong to a different input space. Because they are joined together by the proverb (together with an evaluative statement, see below) there must be a relationship between the two. It is generally accepted that this relationship is predominantly based on analogy. The objects being opposed or equated in proverbs are often linked by “and”. In this paper, I investigate the nature of the initial partial projection and the relation between the input spaces holding the objects brought together by “and” in proverbs. Let us see an example,

3. Ondo eta asko, usoak hego. “A lot and well, the dove flies. / The Dove flies long and far”. 8

The speaker is showing the incompatibility of doing a lot of work and, at the same time, doing it well. How do we know that these two skills are incompatible? Birds have the ability that humans have always desired — the ability to fly. In this sense, the proverb is linking skills or capacities with nature. If the doves can do something we cannot do, the argument may also run in the opposite direction: what we cannot do, can be done by doves.

![Source Input](source_input.png)

![Target Input](target_input.png)

Figure 2: Flies (dove)

8 Both editions, Azkue and Garate, read “hegan” instead of “hego”. The modernization makes the proverb clearer, but it looses the rhyme.
Notice that there is an initial analogical identification with the dove. The source input is the dove space; the target input is the human domain. The human-dove blending cancels further fusion, since the blend imports from the human space human's incapacity to fly. This image-schema violation maps back onto the human space, extending the incapacity to any human activity. There is another backward projection from the blend onto the dove space, attributing to doves' ability the qualification of quantitative and qualitative high performance.

1.2.1. Set and explanation proverbs using “and”

While examining occurrences of the conjunction “and” in Basque proverbs and their symmetric and asymmetric values, I categorized proverbs that would fall into the so-called symmetric interpretations of “and” (Culicover & Jackendoff 1997). The pattern I followed was to distinguish between simple and complex: I called “set” proverbs the simple cases and I called “explanation” proverbs a complex type. The example I have just discussed belongs to the simple type. In the “set” type, a mental space is created by blending either two elements of different polarity to point toward a counterfactuality in the speaker’s reality, or two compatible terms sharing parallel frame topology and thus, defining the pursuable ideal world. Therefore, the type of items being conjoined is of different polarity in the following sense:

A) Either blending antithetical elements as NPs: Rain and Sun, the weather of March type, or any other two parallel grammatical constructions,

B) Or blending compatible elements that define the set or mental space to be built in a converging direction. For example:

4. Aita zaharra eta betse etena ez da gerena. “An old father and a broken shoe are not dishonoring”.

The apparent heterogeneous nature of the entities mentioned by the proverb forces the reader to examine their relationship to each other and the category in which the two of them might be included. If we leave aside the evaluative part — “X is not dishonoring”, which relates to Honeck’s Generic Ideals or a deictic anchorage into the doxa (see below) — there are two phrases, which can be represented as follows:

![Figure 3: Father R Shoe](image-url)
In order to explain what is in the generic space, the relationship between both "objects" and their qualities needs to be extracted in two directions: across the spaces (father-shoe) and inside each of the spaces (substantive-adjective relation). How is a father like a shoe, and why should a shoe be evaluated as dishonorable? The substantive terms recruit background information to build their meaning from cultural embedding.

The background in proverb 4 is available to be recruited from the input spaces when needed. The following may be an approximation: The father-shoe mappings refer to protection, caring, and usefulness. The modifiers "old" and "broken" refer to a past, to a transformation through time—a diminution of original properties. Notice that we imagine the past moment when all the properties were in their prime. The input spaces are already fused from prior stages. The fusion process occurs prior to the input space; fusion is a way of recruiting and integrating internal connections called upon by the relationship father-old and shoe-broken. In the article “Conceptual Integration Network” cited above, Turner and Fauconnier observe the following:

In general, when two spaces are related by both counterfactuality and temporal distance, we have the chance to compress these spaces and their vital relations into a single “change” blend. These two networks, “change of state” and “change of location” have, as metaphor theorists have noted, served as inputs to a further blend in which the change of state is blended with the change of location, as in “the water is coming to a boil (1998, web version, 29).

Furthermore, the absence of father and/or shoes in a particular culture might signify dishonor—‘father’ refers to an origin of social status and shoe refers to economic status, and both were useful and provided care in the past. The past therefore redeems the unfortunate present because of the essence of these entities—a substantive that had a value in the past, even if it has been heavily used (and because it has been heavily used), keeps its essential properties through time.

Symmetric uses of “and”, indicate that the order given to the coordinated elements is apparently irrelevant. However, even in the simplest subtype of “set” proverbs, these made up of two objects, this is inaccurate, as the first element does in fact bear the focus, and is defined in terms of the second object:

The rubric of target-first and source-second may be a consequence of a larger and more controversial hypothesis about the relationship of language and thought, specifically the relationship of word order to meaning. This more general hypothesis, which concerns the way we expect sentences to communicate, is called “functional sentence perspective”. Functional sentence perspective is described oversimply as a principle of word order: the subject of the communication is presented first, and the comment on the subject is presented second (Turner 1991: 145).

1.2.1.1. Explanation proverbs

The second type of coordinated proverbs—the “explanation” type—brings together two quasi-equivalent proverbs. The second part of these complexes constrains the meaning of the first part, reminiscent of an answer by someone who does not accept the ethical authority of the original proverb. An example is:
5. Aho itxian ez doa sartu eulia, eta aldi guztietan ez da eder egia. "A fly does not usually go into a closed mouth, and the truth is not always beautiful".

The proverb has two parts: the first part tells a narrative, a mini-parable, and the second part shows a rather abstract explanation, the moral of the first part. The narrative is this: there is a fly, and there is a closed mouth. The negative form relating the closed mouth and the fly prompts us to build another space where the fly can get into the mouth.

Figure 4: Mouth R Fly

This compels us to build hypothetical spaces: there is an open mouth, and the fly can get into it. Two possibilities arise: the fly enters, or it does not, highlighting the arbitrariness of the fly. Arbitrariness is linked to the trajectory of the fly; indeed, it is linked to the image-schema of uncontrolled or unmotivated movement, lack of volition, lack of plan, and so on. Volition is understood in terms of direction. Controlled agency is linked to a straight trajectory, with the corollaries of rightness and rigidity: uncontrolled agency or arbitrariness is linked to a zigzag trajectory, with the corollaries of a curve linking with softness and indulgence, or crime, deceit, or a mistake. Another reinforcing prompt of the arbitrariness is the “sartu doa” (lit. ‘enter[ing] goes’), which is an old iterative aspect of the Basque verb. The idea of iteration stands at a level of generality allowing holes at the level of particularity for exceptional instantiations to happen.

The accepted (stipulated) meaning of “keeping your mouth shut” is to remain silent. Likewise, a fly entering someone’s mouth is understood to be an unfortunate consequence of speaking. Therefore, this side of the proverb advises the receiver to remain silent.

9 This observation is based on research about Marguerite of Navarre’s Glass of the Sinful Soul (Garai 2000b). In addition, there is a motivated etymology in right, direct, straight, rights in Spanish, French and English, whereas in Basque “right hand” seems to be a derivation of hand, offering an available conceptual structure for the development of the Law following the Roman manu. A through and through semantic analysis of hand, right and law is much needed.
According to the explanatory part, there is a moment when the truth is not beautiful. Beautiful might stand for appropriate. Accordingly, the receiver builds two spaces, one for the truth as beautiful and another for the truth as not beautiful.

![Diagram showing the relationship between truth and mouth openness.](image)

**Figure 5: Mouth R Truth**

In order for the fly to enter the mouth, the mouth has to be open. Having a fly enter your mouth is an unpleasant and undesirable situation. Truth is identified with utterance, and utterance with an open mouth.

Therefore, even if we have two hypothetical counterparts—one for the truth being beautiful and the other for the truth not being beautiful—there is still, in both cases, an open mouth; this assumes that the receiver has not followed the piece of advice given in the first part. The truth is unpleasant when the fly enters the mouth, that is, when hearing the truth is inappropriate.

Notice that the mapping is held between the counter-ideal space—the open mouth and the possibility of the fly entering into it—and the negative evaluation of the explanatory part of the proverb—the open mouth uttering the inappropriate truth. Although at a logical level they are both counter-ideal spaces, what the proverb actually mentions is an ideal in the narrative (shut mouth, no fly) and a counter-ideal in the explanation (open mouth, inappropriate truth). That is, the proverb links an absence with a presence. To put it in other terms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPEN MOUTH</td>
<td>Utterance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLY</td>
<td>adverse circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLY ENTERING MOUTH</td>
<td>bad consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLOSED MOUTH</td>
<td>no utterance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"When there is no action/utterance there are no (bad) consequences to fear"

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10 Insects and mice in proverbs may stand for diseases, or the result of the natural order being broken. (Garai 1999).
Table 3: Fly and Truth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>TARGET in the proverb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPEN MOUTH</td>
<td>truth(1) and truth(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLY ENTERING THE MOUTH</td>
<td>truth(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If, as I suggest, we read "beautiful" as appropriate, keeping in mind the idea of "decorum", we can reinforce the idea of suitability to a given set of circumstances. Beauty and truth has been a commonplace opposition for debate: appearance versus essence. The essence may have or may not have a beautiful appearance — the typical folk commonplace conclusion is that a beautiful appearance is deceiving, and therefore false. So, an inappropriate truth is assumed to provoke bad consequence, represented by the fly entering the mouth. It could be an inherent property of a truth (per se) — a truth that is hurtful to the hearer.

In conclusion, the entire proverb relates two opposing pieces of advice: firstly (stressing the first part of the proverb), not to say anything, or secondly (stressing the second part of the proverb), to accept that the right thing to do is to tell the truth, whether your audience likes it or not.

Another example of this type of proverb is the following, which concerns the effective value of time:


Notice, by the way, the causal inversion in this proverb in the second segment; the time is provided with animacy. The cause (or whatever is felt to be the cause) often times is represented by the subject.

1.3. The discursive function of "and" in explanatory proverbs

"Explanation" proverbs, even without a connective linking the two segments, might also be considered to include examples such as the following:


Honeck studies the interpretation by English speakers of the English equivalent of the first part of the proverb “A rolling stone gathers no moss” (Honeck 1997, among other places). His argument is based on the interpretation of the substantive element “moss” (Gibbs, Strom and Spivey-Knowlton 1997). Depending on the way in which the element “moss” is evaluated (polarized), the proverb tells us either to speed up or to settle down; these were the two interpretations Honeck collected among undergraduate students.

Consider now the underlying image-schema of “rolling stone”. Its underlying picture is a stone that rolls down a slope; the stone does not follow a straight path and has no control, hitting every corner, and bumping along. This element, “rolling”, is absent in the Basque version; rather, what is present is an inanimate object that has acquired agency of its own. An inanimate object provided with
agency or motion may convey the idea of uncontrolled agency. Nevertheless, the Basque version has another reinforcing image: the frightened bee. The term "frightened" is evaluated negatively. The movement suggested by the frightened bee parallels that of the rolling stone: not following a straight path, but a zigzag path.

The comparison of both "explanatory" proverbs, the fly-truth proverb and the moss-hive proverb, indicates that they share the characteristic of being built up out of two seemingly independent proverbs. Technically, the fly-truth conceptual web is asymmetrical—the first input provides most of the structure to the blend—while the stone-bee proverb is symmetrical. However, they also differ in a very important feature, which might be ascribed to the role played by "and". The fly example gives two options, two contrary pieces of advice; the moss example repeats the same message, giving a parallel example to disambiguate the first proverb. This is one of the pressures in optimality candidates in Fauconnier and Turner (1998): "Non-ambiguity: Do not create ambiguity in the blend that interferes with the computation. This makes the superposition schema in the blend ambiguous".

We may therefore hypothesize that one of the (most important) roles of the connective "and" in this type of explanatory proverbs is to allow for the possibility of a shift in the point of view or deictic direction of the speech, linking two asymmetric mental spaces.

Ricardo Etxepare points out some interesting comments about the possible functions of "and". Here are some of his examples. There is the attested proverb:

8. Unaiok samur zitean, gaztaioik ager zitean. "The cowboys went angry, the cheeses appeared".

as opposed to this made up one:

9. Unaiok samur zitean eta gaztaioik ager zitean. "The cowboys went angry and the cheeses appeared".

It does not seem that "and" makes a big difference in this case. Now here are some other examples:

10. (i) Arrats gorri goiz euri. "Red afternoon, rainy morning".

as opposed to:

11. (ii) Arrats gorri eta goiz euri. "Red afternoon and rainy morning".

which sounds simply wrong.

11 Even the idea of soul develops out of the need to explain motion without a cause. Humans understand cause as mechanical or body contact and, in folk view (Mechanicism), the motion can only be transmitted, not generated. The "animate" beings have acquired "motu proprium" or self-propelling quality because they have a piece of the substance of a Higher Cause or soul. Crucially, self-motion is linked with volition, and a thing that has not volition cannot move by its own means. We therefore have the idea of uncontrolled motion.

12 I need to thank him for his notes to my drafts, especially for this one. See also section 3 below. I have recently learned about Larrington's (2002) in depth study of this problem. From what I know, his conclusions are close to mine.

13 Actually the version I knew was the other way around, "Red morning, rainy afternoon".
Ricardo Etxepare relates these cases with others that clearly show a conditional function "do X and you will get Y", or temporal or spatial functions.

Reflecting on Etxepare's suggestions, while I was examining the proverb "The fox cannot lift his tail but the blacksmith mallet; even if strength is a good thing, wit is best", I was forced to make my claim more flexible, in the following sense: some proverbs have other speech direction markers, such as prosody. Sometimes the relationship between the first phrase and the second phrase (since the verb is "elided") is the same as between Subjects-adjuncts in classical treatises of topics. Some other times the linkage is made explicit, as in the case of [cause[erg]] [consequence[object]], already mentioned in proverb (1) similar to: Ustrail onak ardo ona “good barrel[erg] good wine[caused object]". The functions are clearly related not to a simple conjunction, but to the speaker's point of view, the enactment, the narrative, the way the hearer is supposed to handle the identification with the story being told, the different types of projection, and so on. Bakhtin's theories on speech genre can be used to shed some light on some of the problems that arise with the use of "and" in connection to the shift of viewpoint. Some points are discussed below.

1.4. "And" as Speech marker in proverbs

Each proverb cited in this paper is extensionally defined; all are historical proverbs. More specifically, at one time or another, some editor has considered each of them to be a proverb since s/he has included them in a collection of proverbs and published them as such, in collections that carry that name. This method of collection results in a problem in trying to identify the target situation in which they may be used —this is why I make no distinction and mix them in a single list. My own Basque dialect is closer in both, time and space or number of isoglosses, to the nineteenth century proverbs, so I am more familiar with these proverbs from the nineteenth century than the sixteenth century. The world of beliefs the proverbs describe is also "strange" in some cases and "familiar" in others, which flags a problem in source recognition: we may recognize some sources, but not others. In order to study the problem of familiarity in connection with that of proverb recognition consider the following case:

12. Abade hadite, alhabahaieteke. “Become a priest if you can/shall”.

What does this piece of advice convey? Why should we become priests? The cultural target is the job/rank domain. Hypothesizing that in nineteenth century Basque society most of the jobs are centered in physical work, the advice to become a clerk/cleric is a way of avoiding physical (= hard) work. Moreover, the modality in the second segment of the proverb also conveys something about the nature of the job itself —why "if you can?". This reflection points toward the problem of basing the recognition of proverbs in whether they carry figurative meaning or not (see 3.5 below). If figurativeness does not help in recognizing the ontology of the proverbs what does?

14 In this particular case with the aid of the container as cause. Turner 1987. Death is the Mother of Beauty.
1.4.1. Proverbs as perceived speech/literary genre

Having the proverbs predefined as such by the editor did not exclude the possibility of disagreeing about their "proverbiality". In fact, many paremiologists have based their work in arguments from definition: they first provide a definition of the proverb, and then follow with scrutiny of some of the available collections, deciding which segment does not belong to the category of proverb they have previously made up. Although these types of reflections are valid, they need to be restricted as they only indicate that one (very experienced) speaker of the language, namely the scholar him/herself, perceives the proverb to be one. These authoritative categorizations do not say anything about the proverb; rather they reflect the scholar-speaker's perception and linguistic experience.¹⁵

On one hand, the speaker recognizes something like a proverbial genre, something parallel to the literary genre, as shown by Arora (1984). Some proverbs are felt by the speakers to be "more proverbial" than others are, better examples of proverbs according to prototype theory.¹⁶ Some genre highlighting features are felt to be more central to the nature of the proverb than others. Therefore, when we hear a proverb, we recognize it as a proverb depending on how it matches our idea of a prototypical proverb. Defining a proverb a priori is as vacuous as trying to define the novel a priori. Even worse, generalizing a genre a priori can be misleading, in the sense that it is possible to overlook other features particular to only certain subtypes of proverbs, not shared by other proverbs, but yet very important in other language products. The mistake could lead to generalizing in the wrong direction, and not extending the analysis to other language situations where its features might be relevant.¹⁷

Some of these features can be seen to vary from language to language. Litovkina shows that for Hungarian students the perception of proverbiality is tied to the figurativeness of the proverb, as Seitel proposed (see 4 below), rather than features like rhyme or prosody (Litovkina 1997). Certainly, this perception of proverbs is linked to the language, so it would be a good idea to relate perception of proverbs to language typology studies. In fact, I think Litovkina's experiments reinforce Arora's claims. Therefore, we can think of it as the "proverbiality of the language", acquired along with the language itself. If the proverb genre's highlighting features change from language to language, so does the perception of proverbs, and thus the proverbiality of the language. We can define proverbiality as the way in which proverbs break the norm of the language. When we acquire a language, we also acquire a perception of how proverbs "break" the norm.

¹⁵ I take Jabier Kalzakorta's (1996) statement that some of the sentences included in RS are not "true" proverbs along these lines.

¹⁶ Pfeffer 1997 sketches Schmarje's work, replacing the substantive "proverb" for the adjective "proverbial" as "complex of more or less related genres": 1) The bound proverb, 2) The narrative proverb, 3) The proverbial discourse, 4) The proverbial commentary, and 5) The proverbial expression, which includes a) the proverbial phrase, b) the proverbial modifier, d) the proverbial combination, e) the proverbial comparison, and f) the proverbial metaphor.

¹⁷ For instance in Laztanetz eta apa? "With hugs and kisses?", from the Ipazter Collection. Obviously there is no interrogation, but following Kay's analysis of idioms, many aspects can be clarified along the lines of "Him be a doctor?".
A language norm is not simply the middle step between *langue* or abstract structure, and *parole*, or concrete individual instantiation. It is not only what is usual for a given community of speakers, as defined by Coseriu (1952), but also, I would add, the set of linguistic constructions to which the speakers of each community have ready access. A delimiting example of what I understand by a norm is a construction that, despite not being used in everyday conversation by a community, is nevertheless not felt to be foreign by that community. Different dialects may share a norm in this sense: when two mutually exclusive language items are used with the same meaning in each of two communities, and yet, each community understands perfectly well what the member of the other community means; that is, when a given construction feature has a complementary distribution. A trivial illustration could be the term *subway* versus the term *underground* as used by a British speaker in front of an American audience, and vice versa. A contrary example is to look at texts going back in time until texts still using the same "language" do not share the norm of the receiver, i.e., the constructions used in the texts are not available. Obviously, this relates crucially to our linguistic experience, and the possibility to enlarge it by means of, for instance, literacy and/or exposure to different dialects and contexts of use.

Therefore, the problem of the genre is not confined to its recognition. Proverbs as a literary genre are interwoven with proverbs as a speech genre, in the Bakhtinian sense—the types of utterances, relatively stable regarding their content, style and compositional structure, that belong to a specific human activity sphere. Proverbs use a multiplicity of speech genres for different purposes. We can find enactment in a proverb, which brings us close to mini-dramatic instances; we can find mini-narratives in an exemplary way, which bring us close to fables and parables, and so on. Moreover, even though utterances reflect the specific conditions and goals of each human sphere through their thematic content aspect, style, and compositional structure, proverbs do use causal clauses, conditionals, temporal and modal clauses, and other constructions found in everyday conversation, albeit with a heavy constraint in speech length. In short, the problem of the literary genre shows at least two sides: the genre is a recognizable pattern that constrains and shapes the linguistic material it contains in several ways (Jamieson 1975); and the linguistic material is already organized following grammatical constructions and speech genres.

I have recently made a discovery concerning the evolution of popular poetry with proverb prosody and its variants. In the 16th century RS Collection we find this proverb:

13. Oparinak nengian behargin, alperretiak auzikin. "Need made me a hard-worker, and laziness [made me a] litigant".

Guided by the rhyme,18 -*gin* with -*kin*, we know there are two hemistiches, and the syllables are 10/8. There are few chances of finding this proverb in current use, for various reasons. For instance, the verb shows the old aorist aspect, lost for the most part in modern Basque, and yet translatable as past perfect if needed. However, I heard the following at home from my mother:

18 The rhyme is also in this case a form-meaning pair, that is, a construction. Moreover, despite their appearance both are manifestations of the same suffix: *-gin* "deet".

“To induce” “eragin” is the causative of “egin” ‘to do/make’. The problem of the aorist we foresaw is solved —it is not even relevant. However, there are at least two relevant conclusions from the comparison. First, although the second part of the original proverb is lost, the twofold nature is kept as question and answer, bringing with it the dramatization of what I am hypothesizing is one of the functions of “and” —the shifting of the speaker’s point of view or change of voice. Secondly, the rhyme is also maintained, even reinforced: \(e\)-\(a\)-\(gin\)/\(e\)-\(a\)-\(gin\), and because the number of syllables has decreased, this changes it to 7/8, as the stanza preferred by the community. The shortening of the syllables goes from 10/8 to 8/7.

Bakhtin (1953) distinguishes (and relates) sentence and utterance in a number of ways. The utterance is the real unit of speech communication; while sentence would be one of the conventional units of language, and the expression of a complete thought. I am most concerned with his insights about the utterance boundaries. The boundaries of the utterance are determined by a change of speakers. The speaker makes room (“relinquishes the floor”) for another speaker to take her turn, that is, the speaker makes clear through varied means that she is finishing —much like the end of a Jazz solo tells the other musicians to intervene.\(^{20}\) This is what Bakhtin calls the “quality of completion”, and it opens up the possibility of assuming a responsive attitude toward the utterance. What guarantees such a possibility of a response is determined by: 1) the semantic exhaustiveness of the theme, 2) the speaker’s plan or speech will, and 3) the typical compositional and generic forms of finalization.

In short, I am hypothesizing that in the “explanation” type of proverbs, “and” serves as utterance boundary of two fictitious or apocryphal utterances included in the same proverb. Apparently, the “explanation” proverb represents two rejoinder’s utterances. I suspect that this is related to the ancient Basque verse-line structure, where, occasionally, the last member of the line was repeated as the first member of the next line: (A, B / B and C). In this case, the “and” is not the speakers hint to the audience to participate, but the collection of the last utterance of the previous speaker by the audience’s response.

1.5. Proverb space configuration

Because I am also proposing a general space configuration for this explanation type, the hypothesis would be that if both sides of the proverb are equivalent they should have the same generic space structure. Nevertheless, if I am right in ascribing this perspective-shifting capability to “and”, then “and” links two asymmetric spaces, and this asymmetry may be interpreted as a marker of fictive utterances included in the same proverb.

\(^{19}\) In order to count the syllables correctly it has to be pronounced “sek ñiñ saixtús beargiñ? Bear ñaaak eragiñ”.

\(^{20}\) A similar line of analysis is pursued by Baranov (1997) according to the following abstract: “M. M. Bakhtin’s (1979) notion of genre & J. Lakoff’s (1996) concept of prototype are fused in a theory of ‘cogniotype’, conceived of as a mental-linguistic frame of declarative and partially procedural data facilitating genre-specific activities”. Another interesting tool concept to add to this type of analysis could be that of linguistic gestalt.
Up to here, I have been working with a simple space configuration for the complex type of proverbs (see diagram). In the last section, I develop it into a more complex representation of the conceptual integration network.

![Figure 6: 1st Proverb Space configuration](image)

### 1.6. Summary

The conjunction "and" has different functions when used in proverbs, one of which is to prompt the receiver to make connections between the statement or noun phrases, and attributions. These connections follow several patterns subsumed under analogy. Polarity is a type of analogy built upon the perception of our bodies as symmetric. Following the degree of complexity of the elements linked by the conjunction, I distinguish between simple or set proverbs and complex or explanation proverbs. In complex proverbs, "and" shifts the fictional utterer and narrators; consequently, the two proverbs stand in asymmetric spaces. The function of "and" is parallel to that of perceiving the boundaries of an utterance in regular conversation, and it is also related to the perception of the proverb by the speaker of the language. Language is a dynamic set of interacting constructions, and a norm is a matter of accessibility to these constructions; consequently, so-called literary phenomena, such as prosody and rhyme, are also part of these constructions. There is evidence for this in the way that proverbs and oral poetry are interconnected (probably via the constructions used by the proverbs).

### 2. Objects of Agreement in Proverbs: Evaluation and persuasion

The proverbs studied in this paper are of the type of construction: X and Y is [+/-good]. However, this study would be incomplete if I did not address the evaluative part of the construction. In fact, the evaluative part of a proverb compels us to look for coherence between X and Y, and is linked to the proverb's ethical persuasive force.
In this section, I study the persuasive force of the proverb and its ability to create mind-adherence, both because of the elements integrated and the argumentative mechanisms involved. Before these major themes, and to introduce them, I briefly discuss proverbs’ persuasion in relation to their authoritative voice.

2.1. Authority: communal ethos

The persuasive force of the proverb can be described in general terms as Aristotle did. He divided \textit{pisteis} or the means of persuasion into three appeals, based on: the arguments themselves (\textit{logos}), the audience’s emotions (\textit{pathos}), and the speakers’ authority (\textit{ethos}).\textsuperscript{21} The persuasive force of proverbs can also be grounded in these three means of persuasion. Even if proverbs argue from authority, Aristotle does not exclude them from the artful topics.

Arora (1984) studies the authority of the proverbs together with the definition of the proverb and its perception by Californian Spanish speakers (see below). Most of the definitions given by Californian Spanish speakers link the perception of proverbs with authority acquired through time, tradition, or the experience of the utterer, the elder. Proverbs are felt to be traditional, and based on wisdom acquired through experience. Consequently, we may think of proverbs as arguments from authority:

15. \textit{Anbiolako Supitak, Egiak. “Old sayings, truth”}\textsuperscript{22}

This proverb is close to Aristotle’s advice about who should use proverbs and tales: the use of maxims is more appropriate for older people, as is storytelling and, Aristotle adds, giving advice “on matters in which one is inexperienced is silly and shows lack of education” (1395a, 9; 1991: 184). Aristotle thus refers to the allotted authority of the speaker: an important feature of the perception of proverbs is the authorial (communal) voice allotted to them (Lanser 1992).

Goodwin and Wenzel (1981) have studied, among other types of arguments (see below), the way proverbs also use argument from authority, dividing them into proverbs that accept authority and these that do not. The proverbs that accept authority are either (1) these that admonish people to ‘take and heed counsel’, or (2) these that point out that others’ experience is valuable, and that second-hand knowledge is often less painful. Proverbs that do not accept authority include proverbs that teach listeners to be skeptical, or proverbs that point to a lack of impartiality, base motives, perceptual difficulties, or failure in managing affairs, and so on.

A Basque example of a proverb that directly challenges authority would be \textit{Guraso-asaboi utzi eta garen gu on beti}, “Let’s leave aside parents and ancestors and let’s just be ourselves”.

Authority based on tradition can be contested because there have always been a variety of traditions—as Ricoeur synthesizes the debate between Gadamer and Habbermas—

\textsuperscript{21} But see George A. Kennedy’s footnote 40 to his translation (1991) of Aristotle’s \textit{Rhetoric} (see Bibliography).

\textsuperscript{22} The hapax legomena “anbiolako” might have some relation to modern “behinolako” (once upon a time) as suggested by Lakarra 1996: 259 (apud Mitxelena \textit{SHLV}: 708).
and arguments from authority can be transformed into arguments from circumstances, following Weaver (1953), which would account for apparent contradictions between proverbs and for a possible philological and genetic link with common and oral laws.23

2.2. Mind adherence: objects of agreement and doxa

In order to establish a relationship between meaning and persuasion, it is also critical to study pathos and logos in proverbs. See the following examples: “Barkatzea eta ahaztea, mendekurik onena” “to forgive and to forget, are the best revenge” (Garate 1998) or “Idi txilin gabea eta ahuntz adar gabea, soroan ez dira onak” “the ox without a bell and the goat without horns are not good in the fields”. We are obliged to make sense —although in a different cognitive fashion in each of the cases— of the pair “forgive-forget” and of the pair “ox-goat”, precisely because the evaluation links both objects.24 At the same time, the implicit or explicit evaluation is based on opinions held by the community using the proverbs —in Krikmann’s words:

It also appears to be obvious that a proverb cannot order, interdict, advise anything without qualifying previously as good or bad (or axiologically irrelevant) either the suggestable or forbiddable activity or attitude itself or something linked to this activity or attitude, e.g., its ends, means, degree of intensity, speed, time, place, etc.; and if the proverbs put forward appraisals, these appraisals are in turn, likely to be founded on some cognized truths, laws and regularities (or current opinions, beliefs, or at least prejudices) (Krikmann 1985).

Krikmann is subordinating the pragmatic effect of the proverb, that is, its capacity to stimulate or inhibit certain conducts —its persuasive force— to the evaluation implicit or explicit in it, noting that these evaluations are, at the same time, rooted in shared rules and opinions. Krikmann’s objects of agreement (see below) belong to two different types of entities: rules or argumentative operations, and sets of beliefs or commonplaces. I make the assumption that these sets of beliefs are collapsible into the Aristotelian doxa, and that the doxa is, in turn, at least partially identifiable with what in cognitive linguistics has been called “background knowledge”. I also assume that argumentative mechanisms are of a cognitive nature. Proverbs bring together the development of a generating principle —parallel to Turner’s concept of “Figure” (Cacciari et al. 1998)— and they make use of sets of beliefs along the lines of arguments. If what in cognitive science is known as background cognition corresponds to Aristotelian doxa, or sets of beliefs, proverbs do take subject-matter from these sets while using basic argumentative operations. Con-


24 I am not implying that proverbs lacking an explicit evaluative part provoke any interpretation problem (as I shall explain below, the evaluation may be explicit or implicit), but that it is easier to look at proverbs with an explicit evaluation.
versely, because of their capacity to provoke belief, proverbs are a special field in
which to study persuasion as mind-adherence, along the lines of Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, in relation to meaning building.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca establish a correlation between arguments and
audiences, that is, the way a given audience associates itself with a certain argument
while other audiences do not, and call this correlation “mind-adherence”. Operating
a distinction in the argument (i.e., dissociating entities or concepts) also operates a
correlative dissociation in the audience.25

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca base mind-adherence on what they call “objects of
agreement” and distinguish two kinds of objects of agreement: (1) the class concern­
ing the “real”, that is, utterances showing a claim to universal audience validity
—facts, truths and presumptions— and (2) the class concerning the preferable, which
bears claim to particular audiences —values, hierarchies, and lines of arguments or
loci. The newspaper’s front page bears a claim to the universal audience, while an opin­
ion article in the same newspaper bears a claim to a particular audience. An opinion
article is trying to convince the reader, and the type of objects it uses is the values of
that particular audience, the place these values take in a hierarchy and the loci or lines
of arguments (quantity versus quality and the like). The loci, topics or places are the
following: 1) the Loci of Quantity: what is good for many is better than what is good
for a few; 2) the Loci of Quality; 3) the Loci of Order (first come first serve basis); 4)
Loci of Existence: the real over the possible; 5) the Loci of Essence: the best is the clos­
er to the prototype; and 6) the Loci derived from the Person.

After dealing with the elements of agreement, the treatise follows what the tra­
ditional manuals would define as narration (choice of data, and presentation). The
third part of the book deals with argumentation itself. In this part we have:

1. The association schemes:
   a. Quasi-logical arguments, compared with formal thought, allegedly fol­
      lowing a formal model from which they draw authority:
      i. Following a logical model:
         1. Contradictions
         2. Identity
         3. Transitivity
      ii. Following a mathematical model:
         1. Part-whole
         2. Smaller and larger
         3. Frequency
   b. Arguments based upon the structure of the real (The Nature of Things)
   c. Arguments that aim at establishing a new order in the real (analogy
      and counterfactuality)
2. The dissociation schemes
   a. Modifications into notions

25 Adherence is an interesting cognitive problem that has to do with the four “key terms of human
rhetorical potential”: memory, attention, evaluation and classification (Oakley 1999).
This system therefore distinguishes between the object of agreement and line of argument whereas the classical tradition contained both in one body. The object of agreement and line of argument are actually more closely related in Aristotle’s disputatation than in Cicero or Boethius’s, since Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* distinguished three parts: presuppositions, forms of proofs and common topics. So he defined first what would be the background for credibility, then the expected form that arguments would take (enthymemes or paradigms), and then the lines of arguments where both values and hierarchies (in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s terms), i.e., *doxa* would be combined.

We are therefore faced with two interconnected issues in proverbs: the evaluation, and the persuasive force linked to it. We need to discover what the link consists of. Let us assume that the only way an evaluation can be persuasive (i.e., the only way an audience can adhere to a proverbial evaluation that shows a claim to a universal audience) is for the proverb to use some of these “objects of agreement”. This is how I understand Aristotle when he explains maxims or gnome—some of which include proverbs—and points out: “to speak in universal terms of what is not universal is especially suitable in bitter complaint” (1395a, 10; 1991: 184). In other words, the proverb’s validity primarily concerns the preferable, but it presents itself as universally valid, or, in Aristotle’s words, “one speaking a maxim makes a general statement about preferences” (1395b, 16; 1991: 186).

According to Aristotle, an audience prefers two types of generalities: (1) when someone in a general observation hits upon opinions that the audience itself has about a particular instance and (2) things said in general terms that the audience happens to assume ahead of time in a partial way. In other words, we could understand Aristotle’s claims as 1) a ratification of the audience’s beliefs and 2) a generalization based on folk theory. Therefore, there is some room for manipulating the doxa based on the levels of generality and specificity each object of agreement is mapped by the receiver. In the following paragraphs, I triangulate the level of generality vs. specificity with that of projection.

### 2.3. Generic ideals and context proposition

Honeck’s Extended Conceptual Base Theory-2 deals with the problem of evaluation (and, implicitly, persuasion) from a cognitive perspective (Honeck 1997: 152). The second extension of the Conceptual Base Theory (ECBT) adds to the previous model (CBT) the “cognitive ideals” hypothesis. The “cognitive ideals” hypothesis

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26 In fact, the very tone and the way it imitates our understanding of the world (a conceptual variation of the *mimesis physeos*) of the intended universal address is part of the proverb’s persuasive force. The easy answer to this problem would be to state that we recognize the structure of such addresses, but then we would have to face the multiplicity of forms used in universal addresses.

27 There is only one instance where the speaker should go against folk assumptions “one should also speak maxims that are contrary to popular wisdom whenever the speaker’s character is going to be made to seem better”. See, for instance, the Biblical “you have heard from your parents that… but I am telling you that…” where there is a confrontation of authorities.

28 This extension of the CBT model also brings uses some neuroscientific data, by adding the DARTS model. The CBT will be discussed below.
proposes an evaluative and taxonomic tool for distinguishing between ideal-confirming proverbs and ideal-disconfirming proverbs. Ideals are the means by which a particular society judges what events should occur. Honeck distinguishes two types: generic and specific ideals. Generic ideals are instantiated by the specific ideals manifested in the proverbs. Honeck’s claims about generic ideals are the following (Honeck 1997: 144):

Table 4: Generic Ideals
1. Generic ideals describe a mentally created state of perfection
2. Generic ideals are universal and common to most cultures
3. Generic ideals can be instantiated in different ways at the generic level
4. Generic ideals motivate and constrain specific ideals without over determining their content
5. Specific ideals are more culture and individual specific
6. A generic ideal can result in two kinds of proverbs, those that affirm the ideal and those that express a deviation from it
7. Because ideals are either attained or not, in discrete fashion, proverbs often use contrasts to allude to them
8. The generic ideal underlying a proverb partially determines its exhortation and pragmatic effects.
9. Generic ideals provide the rational motivation for a proverb’s pragmatic force
10. Proverbs are created and produced to satisfy a generic ideal.

According to Honeck, the application of the “cognitive ideals” hypothesis yields several implications. One implication affects the comprehension of proverbs: proverbs give “information that arouses thoughts about generic ideals, and these ideals provide a basis for assembling an understanding of the proverb” (Honeck 1997: 141). In the examples I am studying, there is either an explicit X is bad/good/[pertinent adjective] —or there is an implicit presupposition censoring the proverbial statement. For instance:

16. Atean uso, etxean otso; hala bizikidea gaixo. “Dove at the door, wolf at home; a mate like this is a bad thing”.

In this proverb, the judgment is made explicit —“a mate like this is a bad thing”— and from this, we can conclude that the Basque society censors such behavior —being docile outside the home, while behaving aggressively at home. The judgmental piece would be the specific ideal of Basque society —the instruction is to behave the other way around— aggressive outside, in the public sphere, and docile inside, in the private sphere. Predictably, in other variants of the same proverb the evaluative part would be omitted, since the ideal has its generic counterpart in the background knowledge of that community. And this is the case, as we find shortened

29 Another implication is the explanation of the high frequency of opposition in proverbs; that is, the same proverb can express both ideals, the positive and the negative, through opposition. About this see the comment below on Goodwin and Wenzel.
variants of the same proverb in Garate's corpus: "Kanpoan uso, etxean otso" 'outside dove, at home wolf', or "Kanpoeder, etxe otso", 'façade beauty, home wolf', or "Etxean hartz, kanpoan azuri", 'At home bear, outside lamb' (Garate 1998). The question should therefore be to what extent the omitted string can be assimilated to Kay's concept of "context proposition". Context proposition is the proposition supposed by and/or prior to the uttered text proposition.\(^{30}\)

Generic ideals are part of intuitive or tacit memory, as opposed to semantic memory, which is declarative or proposition-based. Intuitive memory maintains beliefs, facts, and generic ideals, so when we hear a proverb, we feel a certain familiarity with it (Honeck 1997). The reason a proverb gives the impression of not saying anything new is that we recognize the beliefs involved in it. As Aristotle points out: "Because they are common, they seem true, as though everyone agreed" (1395a, 11; 1991: 185). From here, we can conclude that if the evaluative string is not expressed, the direction of the advice can still be deduced because the string lacking is somehow already stored in intuitive memory.

Still, there must be another step between the generic ideal understood as omitted context proposition, and the generic ideal understood as Aristotle's koina or premises —1) possible vs. impossible, 2) factuality in the past vs. factuality in the future, and 3) the magnitude of the event— and the generic ideal understood as Aristotle's common topics presupposition or argument lines. Specifically, I consider there to be general (universal?) methods of framing discourses,\(^{31}\) and preferences, including Aristotle's presuppositions or argument lines, decreasing in the degree of universality down to the idiosyncratic. At the same time, occasionally the omitted presupposition string (see below enthymemes) is unmistakably held by the participants of the conversation: occasionally communication is lost because the presupposition has been lost. Of course, I am only referring to these aspects when it is possible to study audiences to produce a scale in generalities. Examine the following proverb:

17. Behar haut eta gera hakit, behar ez haut eta ken hakit. "I need you and stay by me, I don't need you and go away".

We can see that much of this proverb is lost if we do not realize the implicit criticism against the behavior enacted or depicted by it which underlies it. For an English speaker this proverb might be the description of the perfect friend, who comes when needed, and who knows when to leave. But a native Basque speaker knows that the first person corresponds to the general case,\(^{32}\) and that the conjunction bears a causal reading at speech-act level (Sweetser 1990), so to say: "the reason why you are with me is

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\(^{30}\) Altube (1929: 5) proposed the distinction several decades before Kay, as a means of studying the theme/rheme relationship in Basque morphology (stressed pronouns, for instance the use of "me" as subject) and syntax (so-called massive scrambling). Cf. elemento inquirido or inquired element. Fillmore (1997).

\(^{31}\) The universality of this "discourse framing" may be linguistically explored through verb aspect conceptualizations in distant cultures. The connection between verbal aspect and event framing seems straightforward. The reason of the linkage is not linguistic but conceptual.

\(^{32}\) In Turner (1991: 193): "The first person perspectival cue, as in "My mind to me a kingdom is", can be taken as indicating the general case, "Each person's mind is a kingdom to that person".
because you need me; otherwise you would not even remember me”. This proverb can motivate a proposal for ranking the judgment made explicit in the proverb and the implicit presupposition that holds with diverse degrees of specificity in the cultural milieu at hand. It also poses the question of the difference between generic and specific ideals in Honeck’s system, and the possibilities in the middle. How universal are the generics? The proverb shows a claim to the universal audience, but that does not mean that the aspects involved are of a universal nature. That an event can happen in the future, that it has happened in the past, or that it might happen at some point, seem a universal way to frame any discourse. But something seemingly as obvious as “it is better more good and less bad than its opposite”, has the constraint of the appraisal of the few over the abundant, as a general cognitive mechanism for (adjectival) superlatives. For instance, “Asko eta txarra baino, ona eta guxi hobe” ‘Better than many and bad is good and few’ as opposed to “Eztia ausarki eta gogo onez beti, eztena bortxaz eta ahal bezain guti” ‘Honey always in abundance and willingly, sting only by force and as little as possible’. As an aside, we find the following proverb among Gracian’s aphorisms, also expressed very persuasively: “Lo breve si bueno dos veces bueno” ‘The brief if [it is] good, [then] twice as good’. Notice that we could in fact reformatulate it without losing persuasive force as “The brief if [it is] good, [then it is felt to be] twice as brief”. The game here consists of the factuality and the subjective interpretation (and evaluation) of that factuality. The problem is to decide whether Gracian’s aphorism challenges Aristotle’s argument line, or is merely included in it.

2.4. Entailment and projection

In On Rhetoric, Aristotle says that a maxim or gnome is an assertion of a general sort, about things that involve actions, i.e. things that are to be chosen or avoided concerning action. He places maxims in deliberative discourse, concerning the possible, the impossible and future acts, since possibility and future are most appropriate to deliberative speeches. He also places maxims or gnomes in between two forms of proof. He first enumerates the types of proofs: enthymemes and paradigms, and then, since “induction is like a beginning” he explains the paradigm. Because maxims are placed in between the paradigm and the enthymeme, we can conclude that in Aristotle text they occur on the path from a particular case to a generalization or formal structure. A further symbolic sequence can be described as: case to rule, case to case, rule to case. Perhaps Aristotle had analogy in mind as the basic arguing operation of maxims when he placed maxims between enthymeme and paradigm.

33 All cited from Garate 1998.
34 This textual twist has been one of the bases for the debate about whether inductive thought is paradigmatic, and this is a non-trivial debate for studies on metaphor. I assume this is so, but then, granting that all metaphoric projection is paradigmatic (which is not always the case, but a radical approach of this kind could be interesting), our ‘RAM’ memory had to be huge in order to invoke the paradigm in each case. This problem is elegantly solved by the concept of mental space.
Aristotle also claims that many times one of the propositions of the enthymeme is a maxim or gnome, and he includes proverbs in one of his four types of maxims. Maxims with supplements are those that need demonstration because they say something paradoxical or disputable, and then they are either a) part of an enthymeme, b) or enthymematic but not part of an enthymeme. Maxims without supplements may not need them a) because they are already known or b) because they involve no paradox.

Enthymeme is the rhetorical counterpart of syllogism. The enthymeme requires a particular case and a general rule, and an entailment relationship linking them. However, since rhetoric does not have to prove anything at the necessity level, often one of the propositions, the "supportive proposition" in Toulmin's terms, is left unexplained or omitted. For example, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal. In the same way, the data supporting the general rule or supportive proposition is taken for granted and also omitted. The assimilation I make from Toulmin's study between the particular case (Socrates is a man) and the data supporting the general rule (every man up to now has died) seems straightforward. The problem would be then to explain how we can project a future (Socrates will die) or reach a general rule (man is mortal) from a particular case (Socrates is a man, every man up to now has died) (Toulmin 1958).

The persuasive force of the maxims is related to the human capability to project or generalize from particular cases, as Mark Turner suggests in the first chapter of the *Literary Mind* (1996). Fables often end with a moral, a maxim, or a proverb; Turner uses parable in an essential and radical way. He takes Aristotle's opposite direction, from fables to proverbs, following the study of narrative as small spatial story. Turner places proverbs as minimal parables, and parable as projection. The moral of a fable is another type of selective projection (embedded in the fable). Radically, projection occurs in the enthymematic environment, from the starting case through the selection of the general rule to the consequence; projection occurs in the paradigmatic environment, from case to case through the locally built restrictive mapping; and projection occurs when a proverb is understood in context, as we shall see in the following sections. The following Basque proverb illustrates enthymematic entailment:

18. Jaio haiz, hilko haiz. “You were born, you will die”.

The difference between the two is a difference in aims: logic works with necessity (necessarily true), while rhetoric does it with probability or generality — "for the most part". Something could be true, or could have appearance of truth. Following Boethius (Stamp 1988), a proposition can be (1) necessary and readily believable ("If it rains, the street will get wet"); (2) necessary and not readily believable ("If one leg measures 3 whatever, and the other four, the hypotenuse is going to be 5 of the same unit"); not necessary but readily believable ("nothing good happens after midnight"); and neither necessary nor readily believable ("I am the King of France"). Philosophers and demonstrators (in Geometry, for instance) work with propositions necessarily true, be they believable or not. In Dialectics and Oratory, arguments are readily believable, be they necessarily true or just probably true. The last type is considered sophistical; i.e. try to prove that I am the King of France, or that Napoleon did not exist.

Toulmin's basic motivation was that the premises were not supported by more fundamental propositions and/or data.
The entailment relation is causal; the fact that you were born causes your mortality, just as the fact that Socrates is a man causes his mortality. The general rule—the genus—is difficult to verbalize in the proverbial example. Likewise, if we did not have such a long philosophical tradition making explicit the "every man is mortal" of the enthymematic example, we could collapse the general rule with the presupposed background knowledge of the proverbial example, and causality would be applied from the first proposition to the second. The un-verbalized general premise would be part of the set of commonly held presuppositions. Folk causal linkage with a presupposed background premise is different from assuming an implicit or explicit behavioral pattern in the proverbs and, therefore, also different from the generic and/or specific ideals.

2.4.1. Shared operations: Topics and proverbs

I have presented the problem of logical persuasion or mind-adherence within two main objects of study: commonplaces linked to the substantive elements of a proverb, and argumentative operations or shared rules of projection. "Topic" can refer to either of these two aspects.

The classical rhetorical tradition understood loci or topics as the "seat" or foundation of an argument, limited to a finite list. That is, in its technical sense, topics can be understood as (1) aspects from which we can draw an efficient argument, because these aspects are based on commonly held beliefs (many of them encapsulated in and structured by basic conceptual metaphors), and (2) ways of thinking about any question.

In the first sense, one way of describing topics is to design cultural models along the lines of the Great Chain Metaphor (see 5.3); another way would be to point out the common experiential bases of usually correlated concepts in a given culture. In the second sense, if we have a question (legal or philosophical, concrete or general), e.g. we are lawyers or philosophers, and a possible customer or an antagonist philosopher presents us with a case to be defended or a puzzle to be solved, we could look for ways in which to think about it. Boethius says that "Whatever is in doubt in any question will be made certain by arguments taken from the things that make up the question or drawn from without or discovered on the border". In other words, arguments can be drawn from the thing directly connected with the question, or from a relationship that is not felt as direct, or is partly direct and partly extraneous to it.

Topics were previously considered as strategies to find arguments from case commonplaces and structured information. Following these lines, the working distinction I am using here between rules and content is only in order to keep the subject as clear as possible. The reality is that "content" is not an object to keep in mind, but a pattern. The information it conveys is not essentially substantive but mostly relational. Turner links rhetorical arrangement with Blending Theory and Construction Grammar in "Figure", as mentioned (Cacciari et al. 1996), but to the extent that lexis is not only a matter of disposition but of choice and argument (Ricoeur 1975), inventio also has to have a substantial correlation with conceptual integration.
My original plan included finding the meeting points of both proverbs and topics at two levels: the level of common opinion or subject matter, and the level of universal argumentation processes or topics. Rather in a general way, supposing that classical dialectics exhausted the possibility of thought about any subject from a general perspective toward persuasion, and given that the Space Grammar intends to account for the basic cognitive operations involved in understanding any utterance, aren't these two approaches related in a radical fashion? On the one hand, Space Grammar offers powerful machinery to describe the cognitive processes involved in building the meaning prompted by utterances. On the other, the classical rhetorical tradition understood *loci* or topics as the seat of an argument. As far as the common rules or analytic are concerned, the study of topics, in this technical sense, constitutes one of the central concerns of the Blending Theory as I understand it. Common content can be compared with Fauconnier's concept of Mental Space as small packs of meaning. Most importantly, there is a clear parallelism between the relations between these mental spaces in building meaning (e.g. the "speaker's reality" space and the "counterfactual space"), and the way audiences "adhere" to certain arguments. A large part of the topics in classical rhetorical theory corresponds, *mutatis mutandi*, to the different connectors between mental spaces. Specifically, I consider the relations between the spaces in Turner and Fauconnier's Blending Theory to be essentially the cognitive counterpart of this theory of argumentation, understanding topics not as common beliefs but as "seats of argument". To what extent, and which type of topics might be explained through the relations cited above is a matter for deeper cognitive investigation.

2.4.2. Shared operations: Proverbs as social argumentation

In their article "Proverbs and Practical Reasoning: A Study in Socio-Logic", Paul D. Goodwin and Joseph W. Wenzel (1981) follow a treatise by Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede,38 whose purpose was "to examine proverbs in terms of rhetorical strategy". Their solution to the problem that language presents because of its twofold nature—as social institution and as radically psychological—is to suggest that the meaning of "human rationality" is grounded in "a kind of socio-logic—a socially developed sense of practical reasoning". Their intuition concerning proverbs is that proverbs follow a socio-logic by which humans reason, since proverbs are (more or less) immediately intelligible. Moreover, they say that the ultimate source and sanction of the motive and techniques of reasoning is "the experience of a community of persons thinking and acting together over time". (Notice that the terms "source" and "sanction" paraphrase the two branches of dialectics: invention and judgment).39 It would be misleading, however, if we made a parallel between the implied proverb logic and a textbook, because the set of rules underlying proverbs could be taken as something


39 Classical Rhetoricians distinguished between dialectics and rhetoric. In fact, this is an oversimplified affirmation: Plato distinguished between dialectics (a dialog in search of truth) and rhetoric. Aristotle said that rhetoric was the *antistrophos* or counterpart of dialectics. Cicero divided the science of discourse (*ratio diligens dissersendi*, translated as 'systematic treatise of arguments') in invention and dialectics, the judging of the proofs. Boethius called it *logik*, and Ramus again dialectics, including the search of proofs as invention, and the judgment of them as analytic.
immanent, something “out there”, outside the human mind. It is unrealistic and misleading to try to gather the whole body of language in a book, because language is creative, just as proverbs are. In fact, Mark Turner demonstrates the essential cognitive nature of literature, and the need to approach literature from a fundamentally human perspective, understanding the object only as it acquires a meaning through the human mind (Turner 1991). Nevertheless, accepting the parallelism with the textbook only as a working metaphor without further implications — my concern is not to infer “society-working-logical-rules”, but a comparison with a fixed text — Goodwin and Wenzel propose the following hypothesis. Folk logic would reflect:

1) an implicit typology of patterns of legitimate reasoning,
2) rules to guide correct inference, and
3) cautions against specific fallacies.

The logical categories to be found in proverbs are (1) substantive arguments, (2) authoritative arguments, (3) motivational arguments, and (4) general rational arguments.

Substantive arguments include arguing from sign, from parallel case, from analogy, from generalization, from classification, and from statistics. Goodwin and Wenzel conclude that proverbs (1) reflect an implicit typology of patterns of reasoning or argument, (2) illustrate and comment upon legitimate patterns of inference and (3) caution against general and specific fallacies. In addition, they sum up the following corollaries: (1) proverbs offer a general set of rational strategies for deliberating about life’s problems; (2) proverbial wisdom may help to illuminate the ordinary person’s understanding of the nature of popular argument; and (3) there is some correlation between proverbial principles and notions grounded in philosophical analyses.

Arguments from sign signifies advising or preventing drawing too risky generalizations or predictions based on signs. Most arguments begin with some perception of the outward appearances of phenomena. Such perceptions are signs of something and draw conclusions accordingly, they reason from sign. Most of the proverbs reasoning from sign have to do with potential fallacies; for instance character and other human capacities may be misjudged from outward signs.41 There is a certain underlying contrast in proverbs: appearance versus essence, outward show versus inner reality (“philosophical pairs”, according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca). Goodwin and Wenzel state that “many proverbs teach by example that a shrewd attention to contrasting concepts may save the reasoner from faulty inferences based on merely accidental connections”. Another typical contrast is the one between word and deed: what is announced versus what is done. Often proverbs give clear instructions to base sign reasoning on firm grounds: 1) look beneath the surface; 2) seek the essence of things; and 3) place more reliance on what persons do than on what they say. Sign reasoning is based on the understanding of the nature of things or the necessary connections among species; in this context, we can apply Turner & Lakoff’s (1989) the (Extended) Great Chain of Being Metaphor. Then, with regard to proverbs, we may have either 1) proverbs that illustrate the pattern or 2) proverbs that legitimate sign reasoning, or 3) proverbs that warn of potential fallacies.

40 See the incisive and synthetic approach by Hernadi & Steen 1999.
41 Aristotle’s topic number 23.
Arguing from cause raises many difficulties, for example, that cause entails many things, not only effects, but causal extensions—for instance, many “signs” are effects of what they signify. Sign reasoning draws an inference from the regularly recurring connection between two phenomena. Proverbs show reasoning from effects to causes, or causal relations in a more abstract way (every effect has a cause), or warning against fallacious causal reasoning, although there is usually little scope for general cautions.

An argument from generalization “moves from observations about a number of specific instances to a conclusion”.

Although some proverbs warn against risky generalizations, in dealing with people, proverbs tend to favor generalization: Lukikume, Azeri; “Puppy fox, [is a] fox”.

Classification is a simpler way to deal with the old part-whole/genus-species twofold dichotomy: “what is true of a class will also be true of the individual members of that class”. Goodwin and Wenzel suggest that this argument in proverbs take the form of identifications, which would lead me to consider them under the light of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s identification. But, they are actually referring to another type of identification, that takes place between the discourse’s actors and events in the hearer(s)’ real life surroundings, which could be linked to Fauconnier’s identity (and analogical) connectors. A special case of classification is the relationship between name and agent—again, analyzable using Fauconnier’s role-value relationship. When the name that people make for themselves determines others’ attitudes toward them, we have what Burke calls the actor-deed or identification and transformation (Burke 1989: 179-191).

The motivational proof consists of appeals based on audiences’ values, motives and desires, which appeal to what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca called the elements of agreement: presuppositions, hierarchies and values. Goodwin and Wenzel especially stress the passion-reason dichotomy as basic human motivation. In their view by including cautions against giving the passions free rein and by pointing out the dangers of being carried away by the emotional appeals of others, these proverbs are evidence that emotions and desire are strong influences. The proverbs are warnings against the power of unreason, and against hasty or ill-considered actions and against allowing emotions to overrule reason. On the other hand, people’s opinions have much to do with other people’s actions. So we may find proverbs that show incisive comments on specific cases, for instance the use of flattery. Motives and values are addressed in a more specific and substantive fashion by these proverbs that comment on the good and bad objects that humans strive towards.

Goodwin and Wenzel categorize under the General Rational Principles these proverbs that articulate general principles about intelligent or reasonable behavior. Proverbs commenting on features of human psychology include statements concerning reasoning, or the danger of wishful thinking, or caution against unseemly haste, or the pitfall of mistaking the symbol for the thing. In short, proverbs that follow General Rational Arguments “call one’s attention to specific situations as the pragmatic grounding of reasoning, and thereby insist on attention to the material context in which an inference is made. One consequence is the need to qualify one’s...
conclusions”. Overstated claims are faulty. The solution is to follow sensible caution in drawing conclusions.

2.4.3. Back to projection

Among the various types Wenzel and Goodwin discuss, “parallel case” is the closest argument to Aristotle’s paradigm. Again, Goodwin and Wenzel find that proverbs fulfill the three-step move: some proverbs illustrate the parallel case type; others illustrate legitimate grounds for comparison (as in family affiliation), and some caution against the pitfalls of such arguments. According to Goodwin and Wenzel, “What makes these arguments legitimate is the ability to assign the items compared to the same class at an appropriate level of judgment”. But there are two caveats for the parallel expressed in the proverbs: 1) the general objection to ill-founded parallels, and 2) the ‘sign reasoning’, “a close attention to essential characteristics rather than appearances as the proper basis for comparison”.

Unlike direct comparison, which underlies parallel cases, analogies are based on a four-part resemblance of relationships. Goodwin and Wenzel refer to the original use of the term by Aristotle, “a term first used to denote geometric proportions”. They argue that there are “important connections between analogical reasoning and proverbs in general. Proverbs entail analogical reasoning. An implicit inferential pattern underlies the utterance of most proverbs. They are more often metaphorical and the logical structure underlying metaphor is analogy”. Goodwin and Wenzel point out the centrality of analogy in proverb reasoning. In Turner’s XYZ construction, for instance, “Vanity is the quicksand of reason” and “Adams Morgan is the Greenwich Village of Washington, D.C.”, the elided term here is the W, which is solid ground and New York, respectively. The following Basque proverb also instantiates this:

19. Gaztainak zura, arbiak lurra, nik ogia gura. “The Chestnut, the wood; the turnip, the soil; I want the bread”.

Figure 7: Nut R Wood :: Turnip R Soil :: Human R Bread

43 This is what Lakoff & Turner (1989) investigated in depth under the basic conceptual metaphor Generic is Specific. In fact, in working with proverbs we will inescapably end up with this metaphor—all the more since, following the problem posed by the invariance constraint, we have to resolve the problem of abstraction, which is the basis of assigning a relevant meaning to proverbs.

44 We could also identify it with Boethius’s topic of proportion. See Chadwick (1998).
Since the lexical item in charge of detailing the exact relation between these elements is unspecified, we can compare it with the cognitive work involved in the XYZ construction (Turner 1998: 52-55). This proverb is especially illuminating because we have a third element, which informs us of the relationship between the enigmatic former elements. Once we reach “I want bread”, the relation floats to the two other spaces. However, the relation suffers a heavy constraint—the other two elements are not volitional objects; the Great Chain Metaphor acts, asking us to reach a more general structure or induced schema to pass over the other two spaces. My wanting is like the turnip’s X toward the soil, or like the chestnut’s Y toward the wood. The proverb shows an extended XYZ complex structure.

![Figure 8: XYZW :: a R b]

Table 5: volition :: direction :: source matter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X=Chesnut, Z=wood</th>
<th>Y=the turnip, W=Soil</th>
<th>a=myself, b=bread</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aÆb=volition</td>
<td>YÆW=direction</td>
<td>XÆZ=source matter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notice that this is an exercise in pattern completion, and the “answers” given above are not the meaning of the proverb, but the completion of the proverb itself. The “meaning” of the proverb would be that everything has a tendency toward what is considered to be essential to that thing or has a very important relationship with it.

2.4.4. Nature of Things as content

Let’s go back to our working dichotomy: general arguing operations or topics and a set of beliefs or commonplaces held by a community—common argument rules and common argument content. Regarding the common content, the focus of the

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45 Presuppositional Float (Fauconnier 1994: 87).
46 I need to thank Doctor Craig Hamilton for this exact wording.
Basic Conceptual Metaphor theory has been, crucially, to make explicit the “structure of the doxa”; the way we look for (the seats of) arguments responds to our conceptual structure. More specifically even, the cultural model of the Great Chain by Lakoff and Turner (1989) provides a fixed characterizing and evaluative scale for interpreting proverbs; that is to say, it provides a hierarchy of commonplaces.

Lakoff and Turner (1989) have described the Great Chain of Being Metaphor as a generic level metaphor. The need for a model that can constrain possible interpretations for proverbs comes from their view of proverbs as instructional poems; in other words, the proverbial instructions are metaphorically addressed —higher order questions are answered in terms of lower order descriptions. Therefore, a variety of interpretations are available within the boundaries provided by a frame, with the Great Chain providing the frame of interpretation.

The Nature of Things and the Great Chain are commonplaces frequently found in proverbs. The most pertinent and productive parallel in rhetoric is Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s tandem values-hierarchies, with the Great Chain as a scale of metaphoric conceptualizations of objects surrounding human environment: inanimate objects, plants, animals, and the cosmos. The Great Chain can be identified with a type of object of agreement.

The Nature of Things presupposes not only a store of concepts (cf. semantic and intuitive memory) but also a universal mechanism; that is, there are not only commonplaces, but also cognitive operations or topics. In the Nature of Things, we ascribe several abilities to our surrounding objects based on their forms. That is, from forms and shapes we generalize behavior patterns. Things have physical and chemical properties, plants have trophic processes and life, animals have instincts (understood via personification), and humans/gods are intelligent. It is understood that these properties are ascribed by the way we conceptualize them, independently from their “true” nature. In the metaphor “Achilles is a Lion” we already have conceptualized the lion, projecting onto this animal human attributions. Attribution is linked to relational patterns (Gentner 1988). The prediction about the behavior of our environment comes from a metaphoric projection from shapes and forms to functions. Within Lakoff & Turner’s (1989) theory, through this mechanism we state the hierarchy of things in the Great Chain. The Great Chain is thus a cultural model of our hierarchical understanding of things; it is an understanding of things as a scale of forms.

2.5. Summary

In this section, different problems were examined related to the evaluative string that many proverbs carry. The evaluative string may give rise to questions when the string is presupposed, lacking, or the instructing direction of the proverb is based on different kinds of presuppositions, from universals to the ones shared by the community. Presupposition and projection are two sides of the same coin when making inferences.

The objects of agreement shared by these communities include elements linked by the conjunction “and” in the proverb. In fact, when I pursued a search in Garate’s corpus using “good” and/or “bad” as keywords, most of the proverbs in the outcome used the conjunction “and”.
In addition, I have reduced the evaluative and pragmatic aspects of proverbs to two mechanisms shared by the community using them, namely, topics or common argumentative operations (or socio-logic in Wenzel and Goodwin terms) and common-places or shared background knowledge (also identifiable with the generally available information within a given domain or the information source when a mental space is built). That is, I maintain a working distinction between 1) the shared cognitive and argumentative mechanisms, and 2) the shared information and content structure.

3. Some functions of “and” in proverb context

As mentioned in the introduction, the connective “and” recurs at least once in 37 proverbs out of my corpus of 240 proverbs. I have studied the 37 occurrences informally in some detail one by one, under the spirit of Unification Grammars (Kay 1997), in order to extract a general classification; however, the result is too rich to allow one clear-cut classification. Nevertheless, without claiming that my study is exhaustive, I found the following salient functions in the proverbs using “and”:

1. Enactment and Speech-Act Causality
   Enactment Frequency Icons
2. Deliberative Maxims: Future projection
3. Adversatives
4. Rhetorical Retreat/Precision
5. Temporal Deixis in negative exempla
   Temporal / Modal Deixis in negative exempla
6. Correlative and Prescriptive Conditionals
   Undesired Correlatives
7. Caused Correlative Scales
8. Causation by Consecution
9. Category Builders
   Evaluative Category Builders
   Category Builders by Enumeration
   Consecutive-Opposites Category Builders
   Descriptive Categories by Opposites

3.1. Enactment and Speech-Act Causality

Although “enactment” is a concept close to “iconicity”, the term enactment stresses the dramatic nature enclosed in the utterance. I include in this category proverbs in which the behavior to be positively or negatively evaluated is depicted by enacting an utterance considered representative of that behavior. Notice that there is a double metonymy: the fictive utterance stands for the behavior, and the behavior stands for the person, corresponding to the dramatization of the language. To provide an example:

20. Behar haut eta gera hakit, behar ez haut eta ken hakit. “I need you and stay by me; I don’t need you and leave me”.

The depiction of the person and, therefore, the behavior to be avoided is achieved by enactment, by using the representative utterance, since the depiction of the person stands for the depiction of his/her behavior, and vice versa, or the utterance
stands for the behavior and the behavior for the person. In this case, the depicted behavior is criticized.

Nevertheless, to understand this proverb as criticism we need to understand “and” as causal. The conjunction links two clauses; the first is the cause of the second, but at the speech-act domain—the cause of my command is that I need you. Putting together these two opposites without a transition forces us to think of a manipulative person-behavior; there is an implicit general implicature.

I have treated the two terms as opposites, not only because of their different polarity, but because of the negation of the first term by the second. According to Fillmore and Kay (1996), this mechanism is an incongruity:

We will argue that, as a part of the grammar of English, the What’s X Doing Y? construction, like the How Come Question construction, directly encodes, in addition to a request or demand for an explanation, the pragmatic force of attributing what we call incongruity to the scene or proposition for which the explanation is required (Kay & Fillmore 1996: 4).

The contiguity compels the receiver of the proverb to generalize beyond what may happen at a given moment; for the receiver to grasp the concept of contradiction, the fundamental idea is that the events happen at the same time, that’s the way the incongruity to the scene may surface. From the concept of contradiction we can ascertain a person’s general behavior. There is a unique enactment, represented by the generality level allotted to the apparent contradiction shown by the terms. The cognitive steps go from opposition to contradiction and from contradiction to generalization. The generalization indicates that we are not attempting to represent punctual intentions of coming and leaving, but general behavior.

3.1.1. Enactment Frequency Icons

This category is related to the former one, but with a conjunct amplification of the type “he kept laughing and laughing”. For instance:

21. Zeurea egin artean, mantso eta mantso; zeurea eginez gero zantzo eta zantzo. “Until you are done with yours, smooth and smooth; once you’ve done yours, loud and loud”. / “Until you get what you want [you behave] smoothly and smoothly, once you have got what you wanted, [you go] loudly and loudly”.

The proverb has four parts, the first parts of each of the members (until you do... once you are done...) present two moments, prior and after a given event. The consequent member depicts in a pseudo-enacting way the behavior of the agent of the first member.47

There is an interesting question concerning the way in which the terms “smooth and smooth” and “loud and loud” are related to the set of actions they stand for, in short, to what extent this construction is enactment at all. We would easily agree that the presence the term takes in the text plays the role of augmentative or auxesis.

47 “Member” in the sense of Saint Augustine Doctrina Christiana.
However, I would like to take it a step further by proposing that this type of repetition is pseudo-enactment. "Mantso eta mantso" 'smooth and smooth' is not only the meaning of the adverb, it does not even mean 'very smooth'.

Let us look at the following constructions, since show different shades in the realm of iconicity:

i. Saltoka eta saltoka [jumping and jumping]
ii. Salto-saltoka [jump-jumping]

I propose to give an enactment or performance value to the second construction (ii), while a mere augmentative value to the first (i). The construct (i) increases the meaning of "jumping", whereas (ii) conveys a degree of dramatization. It appears that different degrees of iconicity are possible.

Proverb 18 shows asymmetrical characterization: "smooth and smooth" shows an overall perception by others of that person's behavior, while the second depiction, "zantzo" and "zantzo" refers to the typical action of the person afterwards.

The conjunction, then, reduplicates the term to express frequency or modality (again, auxesis or augmentation), but is presented as a speech-action of the depicted behavior.

3.2. Deliberative Maxims: Future projection

It can also be read either as enactment or as a plan of action. For example:

22. Aita-asaboi utzi, eta garen gu on beti. "Leave parents and ancestor aside, and let's be ourselves".

An abstract interpretation would be something like "forget about the past, and look ahead". This coordination can be taken as mere sequence of events, that is, tem-

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48 Although a plain grader such as "very" is available in conversational Basque, repetition of the term to be augmented is more frequent, i.e. instead of "very high", "high-high" is common. This feature is probably available in many languages, including Spanish and French. In English "goody-goody" could be seen as affective alternative of "very good". In Spanish the Basque cook Arginano is well known for his famous "rico-rico". When I was a child in France they used to call me by my second name Jule, "Jou-Joule" to show affection. Nevertheless, a native speaker of Basque speaking Spanish can be recognized for the extended use of this type of repetitions, and, conversely, I can tell a native speaker of Spanish speaking Basque as second language for the extended use of "very". So, the feature is not unknown to these languages, but the frequency of use is different. Conversely, diminutives do not necessarily mean small in size, as Coseriu (1993) explains about the difficulties of translating Le petit Prince into Spanish as El Principe vs. El Pequeño Príncipe. We also need to investigate to which extend reduplication is conceptually connected with "Song of songs" type of constructions (that is the profiling of an element out of the same role category via genitive), on the one hand, and with partitives and superlatives, on the other.

49 I am using "construct" as opposed to "construction" in the sense explained by Kay & Fillmore (1996). In general, for this entire section, I would need many more examples of "constructs" with the same "function" I am allotting to them in order to extract the "construction".

50 "Zantzo" means "trace". However, in the western dialects, to which this proverb belongs, it also means the same as the common Basque "irrintzi" (lit. the cry of the horse): it was one of the ancient war-calls, also used in festivities to communicate joy. The polysemic of the two words (horre cry and trace) is interesting, not only from a historical perspective, but from the perspective of a theory of motivation in modern uses. For a theory of lexical formation for the case "irrintzi" vs. "arrantza" a possible research path can be proposed parallel to the Binyam in semitic languages as pursued by Mandelblit (1997). The "i*i-a*a" vowel pattern is very much alive in nowadays Basque language, but restricted to certain onomatopoeic usages (piisti-plasta, firin-faran, etc.); I wonder to which extend this is the rest of an older and generalized lexical item generation pattern.
poral iconicity —first forget about the past, and then "be good" (lit.)— or the first sentence can be taken to be the cause of our being good later.

It is a deliberative maxim; that is, it shows a resolution for future acts. It is not a pure temporal iconicity, because there is a proposed plan of action expressed in its communal voice (Lanser 1992).

Despite its apparent simplicity, the proverb conveys a lexical complexity: the contrast is held between the ancestors (past tense) and our possible existence (present subjunctive) —the plan to be ourselves necessitates a break with the past. The ancestors, and tradition, are felt to be a future burden. The stress on the verb to BE ("garen") shows a contraposition of (taking into account, or keeping in memory) the existence of the ancestors with our own existence or realization. It is not because the verb is in first position that a contrast is provoked, as imperatives are normally constructed this way in Basque, but the sequence "utzi eta garen" 'leave and let us be'. The sequence conveys the order in which the events have to happen.

In some other cases, commented on below, the sequence could instead be taken as conveying a conditional function: "do that and this will happen to you" (cf. lay down with dogs and...). The correlation of tenses in such coordinated conditionals is (prescriptive) present and future. The construction could be hypothesized as "[imperative] and [future]", and be rewritten as conditional in realis space (Brugman 1996).

Likewise, in our proverb, the fact that the second clause shows a tense closely related with the future cannot be by chance.51 Both future and subjunctive tenses are daughter spaces in Fauconnier's (1997) terminology. Why choose the subjunctive instead of the future? The choice is probably because the sequence does not intend to give negative advice, as in the case "Do X and you will get Y", but to propose a plan of action. As a result, the consequence is not closely tied to the condition or first action, but built up in a virtual space.52

In presenting the proverb in conditional terms, the causal semantic force of the first clause is reinforced: in order to be ourselves we must cut with the (family) obligations of the past. The obligations are not directly related to our actions, that is, they have not been acquired by us, but by our parents. The conjunction then links two consecutive actions to be taken: the reading should be epistemological, first, and then temporal, in Sweetser's terminology. At episteme level, the conjunction links the possible causality (thus, a type of conditional); while at root level the sequence links two actions that have to take place in the described order. To understand the root dimension of the sequence we need to pass through the conceptual interpretation first, otherwise we would not accept the "truth" of the proverb.

3.3. Adversatives

The structure would be [X, and not Y] as in:

23. Ahal dagigun legez, eta ez nahi dugun legez. "As we can, and not as we like".

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51 The first person imperative, both singular and plural, is usually built out of the present subjunctive in many languages.

52 I am aware that there in another general explanation needed in this particular instance as the relationship between first persons of subjunctive and lack of first persons imperative in circundant romance languages.
The proverb compares two idioms, almost in quotation marks. The coordination links “X and not Y” where the second element, rhetorically parallel to Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor’s “Let alone case”, redefines the boundaries of the first element by contrast—an absolute comparative—which could be rephrased as “not Y but X”.

As suggested by the parallel with the “Let alone case” (Fillmore, Kay & O’Connor 1988), a possible trend of investigation is to take them to be scalars. The two parts of the proverb contrast possibility with volition—the possibility may be just a part of the volition. Thus, if we change the order of the direction, the scale changes too. The context proposition is given after the focus, reinforcing its contestant nature. See for instance the next example:

24. Azeriak buztana jaso ezin eta bai gabia, handi den arren indarra nagusi jakiteria. “The fox cannot lift its own tail but [he can lift] the blacksmith’s mallet; strength is a big thing but wisdom is on top [is better]”.

This second proverb shows “and” in the opposite direction to the previous one. In the English translation it has disappeared under the “but”. The Basque proverb says, “it cannot… and yes (it can)…”. The rhetorical pattern is identical to the one above. The difference is the recognizable “metaphoric nature” of this second one, due in part to the background knowledge of fables. The “correlation”, in Seitel’s terms, already stands at the imaginary situation. Notice also that while we do not need to import any information to imagine a fox with its hanging tail, we do have to recruit some other element from outside the “fox” scene in order to imagine the fox lifting the mallet.

There are two input spaces: in one of them, the fox cannot lift its tail, and in the other, the fox has lifted the mallet using some ability. The element expressing the means by which the action has been carried out is absent; therefore, the proverb requires completion of the pattern.

The cross-space mapping shows that the ability (means) used unsuccessfully in the target input cannot have been used in the first input space. Previous knowledge

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53 I need to thank Ricardo Etxepare for this remark. Personal communication.
54 See below a discussion on Seitel 1969.
about the objects—a foxtail and a mallet—are required to deduce the relevant properties, in order to extract the ability or means used by the fox in the two spaces.

Table 6: Fox Tail R Mallet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAIL</th>
<th>MALLET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ornament</td>
<td>Useful (&quot;skills&quot; in the background)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Heavy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The weight is highly relevant. The unsuccessful strategy used in the first space cannot float to the target because the mallet is heavier than the tail. The explanatory second part blocks the utility of the mallet versus the ornamental feature of the tail, because it picks only two abilities in context.

The emergent structure of the blend has been used to constrain the relevant features in the cross-mapping between the objects, tail and mallet. The blend recruits information about our folk knowledge of foxes and establishes by elaboration the ability by which the fox might possibly lift the mallet: through wisdom. Because this proverb belongs to the "explanation" type, the second part restricts the interpretation of the first part by making explicit the ability appraised, and the comparison with the other ability is presupposed too.

3.4. Rhetorical Retreat/Precision

Among the coordinated proverbs, the type of proverbs in which the second element points to a constraint in the scope of the first element or to a restriction in the situation described by the first element is closer to subordinate interpretation (Cullicover and Jackendoff 1997).

In the next case "clear water at the spring..." (26), syntactically we have the element "ere" 'too', translated in this context as 'even', which demonstrates an asymmetric relation between the two sides similar to "X and still Y".
The restriction also relates to the group of "explanation" proverbs because they are restricted in the interpretation of the first gnomic proposition. By extension, the cognitive operation should be similar in both types in the extraction of the inner relations, held by each of the elements in a binomial proverb, to the generic space. However, the restriction in the following case is not brought by the connective, but by the prosody. The connective is in the second half and acts as plain category builder (see below).

25. Adinon da bost ume: alaba bi eta hiru seme. "Good measure (= savoir faire) is having five children (five children is the ideal number), two daughters and three sons".

The proverb establishes a background in the first position (sixteenth century family planning), and then adds a specification. Kay's context proposition would be the term "good measure", and Kay's textual proposition would be the second part. The second part of the proverb specifies the scope of the first; sometimes this specification can be read as ironic reversal of the first member. The irony comes from the following questions: what and under which conditions would someone need to define 'good measure'? Why should good measure be defined in terms of number of children? And especially, how could be the sexes of the children in 16th century Basque society be a matter of choice or a matter of prescription?

The coordination marks an inequality depending on the sexes of the elements. The appraised world is male. Nevertheless, second thoughts may occur observing the rhetorical precision: choosing the sexes of our descendants is not under our control —traditionally, it may be possible to choose the number of children, but it is not possible to choose their sex. Yet, every proverb, because of its gnomic nature, belongs to deliberative discourse. Therefore, in this respect, the second part of the proverb is ironically respectful of the first part. Good measure is not a matter of chance, but children's sex is (was).

Another example:

26. Iturrian ur garbia, eta hau ere ohi denean. "Clean water [only] at the spring, and even this [just] when it happens". / "[You find] clean water only at the spring, and even that just when it happens".

The first clause states the topic: since there is no verb to mark the focus, the first term acquires relevance: "Iturri-a-n" 'at the spring' (lit. spring-the-at/in), while the second term, "ur garbi-a" 'clean water' (lit. water clean-the) is the topic of conversation.

The traditional linguistic school in the Basque Country promotes the syntactic interpretation over the prosodic interpretation I offer above. In this school, the focus is on the element directly in front of the verb. The generative school, currently very strong in the Basque Country, captures this insight also for the utterances where there is no verb on "the surface". They hypothesize not only the actual lexical item and its position, but also a more general order of items in the language in general —a "neutral" previous order. Basque language would be a SOV (Subject-Object-Verb) language in some of these accounts. In short, under the surface of "Iturrian ur garbia" (in the spring clean water) these schools hypothesize something like "Iturrian ur garbia dago" (there is clean

55 The "inquired term" in Altube (1929). I mention this work in connection with Kay's concept of context proposition.
water in the spring), as opposed to “Iturrian dago ur garbia” (there is in the spring clean water) or “Badago ur garbia iturrian” (there is indeed clean water in the spring) and so on. Rather, I think that because we all agree that the verb is the main focus marker in Basque, its surfacing or omission in the clause should also be of some relevance. A clause with a verb apparent does not equal a clause with a verb “silenced”.

The discussion about the focus is important to understand the utterance, because in the second clause there is an indexical term that must be established: “and THIS too when it happens”. THIS refers to the event of finding clean water at the spring. The element “too” (ere) acts like “even”, adjusting the range of the first statement. Notice that we are in front of a clear formal antimetabole: Inesive-Absolutive and Absolutive-Inesive, typical of Basque Proverbs (see 34), reinforcing the extremes as foci.

Apart from the theoretical perspective, another argument to support my choice comes from pragmatics. Why is it worth pointing out that clean water springs from a spring? A possible interpretation could be to consider this informative irrelevancy as highly relevant, perhaps taking it as a parallel to the Spanish “pedir peras al olmo”. At the spring, you cannot find anything else but only clean water; do not expect white wine.

Another interpretation could be to read the irrelevancy as not being ingenuous: to say that what springs from a spring is clean water would be new information (focus) only if the general opinion were that what comes from a spring is white wine, and then the utterance would show our mistake. But it is not news that clean water comes from a spring. So, taking the term used by Altube in its original intention (the inquired term answers the implicit question) I would rephrase the proverb as: “Clean water? Only from the spring, and not always, just if you are lucky enough”.

I can imagine this hypothetical context: I would use this as an answer to someone complaining for the quality of a service or of something I am selling or offering. Clean water stands for a product of better quality than the one I am offering. With this utterance, I am saying two things: I can’t do it better, and, if you want a better one go find it yourself. Therefore, the new information is “go find it yourself”, that is, “at the spring”. Springs are not easily reached — they are up in the mountains, and hidden in hard places.

3.5. Temporal Deixis in Negative Exempla

For instance:

27. Behin Maria elizara, eta bertan ipurdia aldarrera. (Lit.) “Once Mary to church, and then with her bottom to the altar”. “Mary went just once to church, and on that occasion she was turned around [=not showing any respect]”.

The conjunction links an aspect of a narrative presented in the first portion of the proverb with a consecutive action, “once… and then…”. The difficulties translating

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56 This is clearly a matter where rhetoric and linguistics come together as disciplines. See Turner’s discussion on Quintilian’s explanation of “figures” (Turner 1998).

57 As background knowledge I should point out the Basque popular song “Maritxu nora zoaz”:
—“Where are you going beautiful gallant Mary? / —To the spring Bartholo, if you would like to come with me. / —What is it in the spring? / —White wine. / —We will both drink it as much as we want”.

58 Again, supporters of the traditional syntactic school may prefer this other one: Do not expect white wine from the spring, just plain water, and not even always clean.
(and interpreting) this proverb lay on the folk assumption that since you go only once to some place that you should go more often, the least you can do on that occasion is to make an effort to behave yourself. The cultural explanation clarifies that, in Basque culture, showing (giving) the back signifies lack of respect; the back has as its worst representative the bottom.

The element "bertan" (then/there) stands for the occasion, and therefore, in exemplifying the particular temporal instance, it rules out the possibility of interpreting it as part of an "and then" narrative temporal nexus of consecution. "Once" is a space builder (Fauconnier 1997), and "then" is a deictic anchorage into that pre-built space. The conjunction links the statement with its amplification or explanation. Nevertheless, there are some implicatures linked through this conjunction: the fact that she went just once should have caused one behavior, but instead the proverb presents what is felt by that community to be perverse. A similar proverb with a parallel meaning structure but lacking the temporal deictic elements, is:

28. Jagi zedin nagia, erre zezan uria. "The lazy got up, s/he burnt the (entire) town".

The surprise is that the lazy person got up, but once that happened his/her actions surpassed everyone else’s actions, and the consequences are negative. In fact, this proverb is rather closer to the next type.

3.5.1. Temporal / Modal Deixis in Negative Exempla

The following is a variant of the previous proverb, but the anchorage linked by the conjunction affects different aspects. The pattern is: "once... and then...", the last deictic element refers to the "once". The way temporal and modal "deixis" differ from correlative and prescriptive conditionals is that deictic proverbs tell a narrative, or an ironic exemplar action. For example:

29. Itsuak behin ikusiko, eta hala uste. "The blind will see once, and (s/he will) believe that way / and that is what s/he will believe".

The proverb asks us to believe the starting paradox is mitigated "once"—the blind will see, just as in a discussion we may be asked to allow a false premise for the sake of the argument: "let’s admit just for this time that...". In the proverb, the element "once" has been moved to the paradoxical member; that is, we are not only being asked to accept a premise just "once", but also "once" is the occurrence index of the action to be admitted.

In Basque, from an exclusive formalist perspective, the future is built by means of the aspect: the locative -ko is suffixed to the main verb, while the auxiliary can either be in the present tense ("ikusiKO[fut] Dut[pres.]" I will see), or in the past ("IkusiKO[fut] NueN[past]" I would see), or in an eventual tempus for hypotheses and conditionals.

With thanks again to Ricardo Etxepare, who proposed this remark.

In this commentary, whenever I say “tense” I mean “tempus”, that is, the formal morphological features: Du (has) ZuEN (had) baLu/LuKE (had/would have).
In Mental Space Grammar, any utterance in a tense or mood different from that of the speaker creates a daughter space (Fauconnier 1997). Likewise, for any utterance in Basque, two separate space building capabilities are allotted to the tense and a different one to the aspect—the morpheme for past, subjunctive, and relative clauses is the same in Basque -(e)n (zuen, dezadaN, duEN gizona), and is probably derived from the genitive. This polysemy of the morpheme can be productively studied if we think in Sweetser’s terms (1990),61 that is, if we try to explain the motivation compelling the evolution of the relational morpheme -(e)n: what do all these uses have in common? I would argue that its main function is to show a certain distance from the speaker’s reality, in the case of past and subjunctive, and of linkage in the case of genitive and relative clauses. They are explicit daughter space builders.62 Therefore, a hypothetical diagram for any utterance in regular conversation in Basque might be as follows:

![Figure 11: Tense vs. Aspect](image)

61 Although I do not agree with her “stambaumtheoretic” view of Indo-European (proto)language, her book is fundamental in that she found a systematic approach to account for many semantic and pragmatic facts that, up to then, were seen as mere contingencies, at least in the Continental tradition. Her exigency of realism is a valid working tool, as valid as the belief on the existence of an Omega text could be in neoLachmannian textual studies. The data are similarities across languages, and convergence and divergence in language results that we tend to identify with sibling metaphors (Turner 1987). There is a demographic problem to solve, though, if we are to derive any Romance language from Latin, and that is only for historic times, regardless of Indo-European. I prefer a “Wellentheoretic” approach and the inclusion of another fruitful working tool like the Isoglosse. In this fashion we project space onto time, without committing ourselves with the entity (see Michelena 1963). Thus, we can also include Basque data, as well as Finno-Ugric languages, as their linguistic distance from the Indo-European family does not obviate their geographic proximity.

62 I have no doubt about their space building function, but the historical roots need deeper study, since we need to account for the aorist too. In any case, this change has happened in early modern times, and is easily traceable.
Initially, proverbs will naturally avoid auxiliaries since proverbs promote short expressions. Taking the diagram above into account, the tense builder is absent, and the aspect connector underdetermines the meaning. Assuming that the future is an aspect (and not a tense), and granting that in Basque this aspect usually acts either from the past or from the present, we will need a prior base space from which we can project the event to the future (just as we need a main clause to build a subordinate subjunctive in Spanish and French). This would not happen in the case of the past tense, even being a relative tense, since it is anchored directly to the speaker’s reality and the speaker’s reality does not need to be explicitly stated.

In this fashion, the future builds a hypothetical space, not a space inside the (Aristotelian premises of) past actions or future actions, but virtual actions (the possible and the impossible in Aristotle’s terms). Therefore, because there is no auxiliary, there is no way to establish the space with respect to any reality.

If correct, while the morpheme -EN is a daughter space builder, the future -KO is an instruction to project the event but anchored in a previous space.

The second verbal phrase shows only the nominal part, to which we cannot even add the aspect marker.63 Predictably, the second segment of these proverbs, both deictic and correlative, will be even less specified than the first segment. Thus, the second segment stands in a daughter space relative to the space created by the first segment of the proverb.

The proverb plays with two concepts of our culture — seeing, and believing or having an opinion. Based on the presuppositions of this proverb, believing should be a more complex an operation than seeing, that is, we need to see many times before believing or holding an opinion.

The blinds have a disability that prevents them from seeing, so, if they have a single opportunity to gather data, that data will be the basis for her/his belief or opinion. “Blind” in Basque, and probably in most European western languages (for it follows Knowing is Seeing), is also a highly polysemic word. It includes physical blindness, but also obsession with an idea, thoughtlessness, and so forth.

The situation for usage can be exemplified as follows: the utterer of the proverb has more experience or knowledge than the receiver, and s/he is trying to convince the receiver about something for which more experience is necessary. The blind is mapped onto the receiver, the seeing of the blind onto the limited knowledge of the receiver following the knowing is seeing metaphor, and the belief or opinion of the blind onto the misconception or argumentation of the receiver. The negative polarity of the belief or opinion of the blind is based on the assumption that in order to have an opinion or to hold a belief (or extract conclusions), we need a wide range of (visual) data.

63 There is an extensive family in Basque of these types of verbs, where the verbal segment conveys a minimal meaning expressed by the nominal part: “lo egin” ‘to sleep’ (lit. ‘to do sleep’, egin = to do/make), “hitz egin” ‘to talk’, hitz = word).
3.6. Correlative and Prescriptive Conditionals

[Do X and you will get Y]. For instance:

30. Haiz adinon eta haiza on. “Be wise (measured) and you will be good”.

This proverb can be rewritten as “if you are... you will be”. The fulfillment of the condition causes the apodosis. The aspect-tense correlation is as follows: the first term is the present imperative tense, “haiz”, and the second side shows the old future, “haiza”.64 The substantive elements, in both terms, are ambiguous enough to be polysemic: “adinon” might mean ‘good measure’, ‘good age (?)’, ‘wise’, ‘prudent’. “Good” is broad enough to be specified by the context: be happy, stay in the safe side, and so on. Another example:

31. Zagozke isilik eta entzun ez dagizu gaiztorik. “Stay quiet and you will not hear anything evil”.

In this proverb, there are two consecutive futures —“zagozke” is the future imperative, ‘you shall be quiet’, and “dagizu” is the old aorist form with future sense.65 The second clause is considered to have the first clause as condition. From a modern perspective, we are not that sure about “the truth” of the proverb, because we no longer believe in a cosmic balance. The extant structure —the one matching counterparts with each other and counter actions— is relevant when interpreting this type of proverbs. In Basque culture, hearing someone talking against oneself is felt to be caused by oneself talking against someone in the first place. There are many proverbs following this idea of balance, and using just two NP in consecution: “esale, entzule” ‘Speaker hearer ‘too much X, too much Y’ (especially related to weather or health), and the like. Another trend of interpretation is the conversational setting; the proverb is warning against not only indiscrete but also infelicitous comments that can carry undesired responses. Notice that the second term is in a negative form, so the fulfillment of the first clause prevents the otherwise inevitable second clause from taking place.

Another example:

32. Hartu egik entzute ona eta hatza lo. “Get a good reputation and go to sleep”. English equivalent: “Win a good reputation and sleep at your ease”.

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64 Old Basque also had a future imperative “haizate”, -ie was the morpheme for future that has evolved to mean “can/could” or potential meaning, including the apodosis of hypothetical conditionals. Lakarra 1996 offers a different explanation, deriving it from the subjunctive and lost of nasal (haiza(n)), but then this proverb is hard to explain.

65 In modern times, it has become the present subjunctive, especially in western dialects as “dagizun”, and, since the early 20th century, the present indicative “zin dagit” ‘I swear’ —although this new use is not common in everyday conversation (Irigoin used to say that in 16th century proverbs they had future meaning, so “zin dagit” meant “I will swear”).
The conjunction correlates two actions, but in a certain order of accomplishment. In fact, had the order been changed (sleep first), the consequence would be the opposite from what is intended (you would not win a good reputation). The only order where they are not contradictory is the one given in the proverb. Compared with Proverb 31, the causation force of Proverb 32 is less and the conditional is more salient—it is a matter of allowing the second event to happen, not an automatic consequence. The opposition stands at the other level too: that between the reality and the surface. The important part is the appearance: the reality, as long as it does not contradict the structure of the surface, is allowed to be quite different from the appearance. A further example is:

33. Tamal edukiok txiroari eta sorotsi haren oparinari. “Pity the poor, and succor them in their need”.

This example differs from the ones described previously in this section, in that the entire proverb has a prescriptive intention. In fact, it is very close to the deliberative maxims with future projection, also closer to law than to advice. Up to now we have seen that in order to get the desired consequence (to sleep at your ease) there was some prior action to be taken (get a good reputation). This proverb seems to prescribe a desired pattern of behavior in its entirety. The coordination tells us that it is not enough to pity the poor, but that a second more effective action has to be taken. There is a summing up of actions.

3.6.1. Undesired conditionals

The negative variants of the prior proverbs are the undesired conditionals. In this type of proverb, the consequences offered by the second half of the proverb are undesirable. For instance:

34. Astcagaz hadi kirolean, eta deik buztanaz bizarrean. “Play with a donkey, and he will hit you with his tail in your beard”. / English equivalent: “If you lie down with dogs you’ll get up with fleas”.66

66 For “deik” there are two possible interpretations, both of them conveying the sense of future, nowadays lost, as explained by Alfonso Irigoien. The lectio facilior would be “degik” conjugate of “egin” to do/make, with a typical lenition. This verb has lost much of its meaning, since it was and is used as an auxiliary for subjunctives. The lectio difficilior is more suitable, an archaic form of “to give”, also used as auxiliary. This second interpretation is conceptually related with Spanish “dar una patada”, “to give a kick” meaning to kick or to hit someone. Similarly in French “t’en veux dans ta tête, toi?”. In short, “to give” was a good candidate for an auxiliary verb, because it offers the possibility of arranging three arguments. Likewise, in languages that do not keep concordance between all three arguments (subject-object-dative), but with two, two good candidates were “to do/make” and “to have”. Under this perspective, lexical entries are not considered chunks or frozen pieces of language, but constructions: cognitive approaches are useful for historic linguistics. See Goldberg’s (1995) comments on lexis.
The cross-mappings show a straightforward relationship between subjects (you and the donkey) and between actions (play and hit). There is a deep relationship between these explicit relations, even at the morphosyntactic level. In the target input, there are two metonymy relations between you and the beard, and between the donkey and the tail. These metonymies symbolically stand for something else, which we have to deduce by applying the cultural model of the Great Chain Metaphor onto the human body. The beard stands for authority, power and pride, and the tail for the opposite. Looking to the square part of the figure, we can see that the grammatical relationships are repeated in the second part (reinforced by the assonance):

- with the donkey/ with the tail; comitative-instrumental
- in the beard/ in the game; inesive (=locative)

The relationship between the donkey and its tail is the same as the relationship between you and the donkey, the instrumentality. This maps back again: the expression “in the play/game” is parallel to “in the beard”, though the game is a competition among equals, whereas the beard signifies hierarchy. These entire mappings highlight an “equality” element with an “inequality” element.

The instruction is reinforced by the transition from intransitive [be] to transitive [hit] and by the inversion of agents: the companion in the first half becomes the unique subject in the second half. The abstract meaning can be formulated as follows: to engage in equality with the unequal can cause the inversion of the hierarchy.

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Biscayan comitative -gaz/-kaz may very well be explained out of the old article -aga, for the singular, and -aga for the plural, plus the general instrumental -z. A secondary analogical form could have been developed for the indeterminate cases.
3.7. Caused Correlative Scales

Two scales are mapped via linking the first parts of comparatives: the more X the more Y. In Basque, typically, this two “first parts of comparatives” are linked by the conjunction “and”: “the more X and the more Y”. The first segment “produces” the second segment. For instance of a cause correlative scale:

35. Gehiago edukiago eta nahiago. “The more [you] have, (and) the more [you] want”. English equivalent: “Much would have more”.

Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor (1988) present these types of sentences in English as “Unfamiliar pieces unfamiliarly arranged”. In Basque, as in English, “...-ago eta ...-ago” has become a grammaticized construction to map two correlative scales: the degree of the first element is mapped onto the degree of the second element. At the epistemological level, the first term causes the second one. Arguably, this would be a clean cause clause, without conditional rephrasing.

3.8. Causation by Consecution

The structure is [X and Y], where the variables are events whose temporal semantics allow them to be occurring consecutively, and, therefore, seen as cause-effect. For example:


The first term is the cause of the second term —time is projected onto the logical level and it yields causation. A general reading could say that “marry” stands for every action that cannot be undone, a non-returning path, and the consequence is repentance or nostalgia. The causation corresponds to both syntactic and logic levels: syntactic, because the cause is given before its consequence, and logic, because in
order to repent we need first to act. Causation by consecution and caused correlative scales are hard to distinguish; the difference may be the presence or absence of a correlative scale.

3.9. Category Builders

As in the next example:

37. Andrea eder eta aberatsa, edo ero edo zarata. “Beautiful woman and rich, either fool or noise” (noise means ‘fake’).

The coordination brings together two modifiers that are felt to be contradictory, shown by the following disjunction “either X or Y”. Folk reasoning links beauty with the apparent, and whatever is apparent with vanity—as form opposed to substance. This mechanism is the result of another one. We are told not to rely solely on appearance, we need to reach the deep truth, because it is hidden under a dissembling surface. If the surface does not show what is inside, it lies—if it lies, a beautiful face is linked to a foolish or false person.

I mentioned above the argument from sign (following Wenzel and Godwin), nevertheless, the interesting aspect of this case is that the connections are so entrenched that we do not need to do any conscious reasoning.70

In the sixteenth century Europe, women were objects of trade. In trade settings, the lie is implicit. For the trade to happen we need to have two contrary intentions: buying and selling. We assume that one wins and the other loses. If the object were good in absolute terms, why would the seller want to give it away? Since the object has to have some imperfection to be given away, the buyer has to discover it and the seller has to hide it. However, the object has many parts, and some of them are very good. The buyer needs to get as many good parts as possible, even those parts that the seller did not realize existed. For a beautiful woman (an object), there was no need to pay a high dowry, since there are many buyers willing to acquire the object. In the European sixteenth century, the dowry added honor to the woman for it showed the economic power of the “producing” house or origin. Nevertheless, to pay a very high dowry for a beautiful woman showed the willingness of the seller to give away the object.

The disjunction is about the utterance, that is, about the truth-value of the first clause. By “truth-value”, I do not mean what is understood in post-Fregean semantics. Notwithstanding, folk belief considers that such a thing as truth exists. In fact, that is the reason why we keep on trying to communicate with others. In other words: in folk theories, one of the forces compelling speakers to communicate is based on the illusion about language that language and objective world are closely related or even interchangeable. Simply, the objectivistic view is held and necessary at the folk theory level. If answers like “exactly” or “false” were impossible, the utterances would be irrelevant for the speaker, and interaction would be avoided.

70 A conversation heard in the bus between two female teenagers, supposedly friends, went “your boyfriend has to be a very good person”, the implication being that he was very ugly.
Notice that the subjects of the modifiers in the disjunction are left unspecified. Logically “zarata” (noise) refers to the utterance, but the term “ero (ish) needs a human agent, the describer, to be applied. Therefore, either the utterance is false or the describer is a fool (and therefore the utterance is false). In the tandem “either fool or fake”, each of the predications requires a different object of application. False or fake is the value conferred to the utterance, and fool is applied to the agent uttering. Notice also that the first part of the proverb stands for a representation of another utterance previously said. The proverb is a reply.

Another example:

38. Idi txilin gabea eta ahuntz adat gabea, soroan ez dira onak. “The ox without bell and the goat without horns are not good in the fields”.

The evaluative part establishes a frame or context in which the evaluation is valid: the actively worked field. In that context, two modified objects are not good. The hearer has to guess whether they are not good because they are modified, or, conversely because the context makes them “out of place”. Notice that the objects mentioned without modification do belong to the context “field”. So, our attention should be directed to what is exceptional about the modifiers. I have two lines of interpretation that should be further tested: the first one brings together what horns and bells have in common: the warning, the announcement of the presence. So, a presence without warning is felt to be an undesirable thing. The second focuses on the relationship between the substantive elements and their own modifiers: what the bell is to the ox, and what the horns are to the goat seem to be essential properties of these elements. Therefore, an object without its essential properties is considered undesirable.

Proverb 39 is another example of this:

39. Baratza eta usaregi, aberasgarri. “Orchard/vegetable garden and dovecote [are] enriching”.

It is striking that at first glance this proverb does not convey any new information. However, if we look at the cultural embedding, we realize that the dovecote was a right of the lower aristocracy, in other words, the minimum required to be considered an aristocrat socially. The proverb brings together the minimum for a “decent” status in the sixteenth century—the dovecote by itself is not enough to ensure a living, and the orchard, the food supply, does not ensure any possibility of social improvement. We have a further clue for this future projection in the suffix -garri—I read “enriching” over “riches” capturing its agency semantics. Also, note the spatial situation of the “elements”, earthy and airy.

Another example is:

40. Basoa eta ibaia auzo, hau ez duen etxea gaixo. “Woods and river [as] neighbors, the house that has not this [is] bad” / “Wood and river close by; a house that has not this [is] pitiful”.

The conjunction brings together two communal properties of Basque land distribution: woods and a river. There is a word game *in absentia*: "auzo" means neighbor as well as neighborhood —neighbor contrasts with the self, that is, the other, the next (*proximus*); and neighborhood contrasts with one’s own house, equivalent to the market, the *agora*, or public space. For instance in the next proverb heard to my grandmother:

41. Bahea gakoan eta itina auzoan. "The sieve hanging and the floor in the neighborhood".

It signifies that while the means are not used the goods are not at home. The beauty of this proverb comes from its usage in conversation —it is a formulaic answer to "baina" "but" in western dialects. In western dialects "but" and "sieve" are pronounced the same "baia" or "baie".71

Moreover, this proverb assumes some familiarity with the proverb lexicon (not necessarily with this specific proverb) in the following sense. The hearer has to know that neighborhood is opposed to home —if something is in the neighborhood it is not at home. On the other hand, there is an emergent structure, the "but, but, but..." in conversation is a kind of excuse (to act) or protest against admonitions from the speaker. It is a kind of final defense. The person admonishing replies with the proverb, meaning "no excuse", or rather, "while you are making excuses you are not achieving the goal". The mapping then is between the means (sieve) to achieve the goal, which involves effort, work or striving, and the excuse (but).

Going back to Proverb 40, at the conceptual level the proximity of the communal goods is characterized as possession by the verb "to have". At the descriptive level, the Basque traditional hamlet used to have woods in the upper part (as the Basque Country is hilly). Down the slope and before the hamlet itself there would be a river, and then, further down, the house and the vegetable garden. The animals would graze in the woods; but the woods would be a (communal) wood supply for the winter (and for construction materials). Since woods and river stood for the shared goods of the community, the interpretation might be that a house without intercourse with its socio-natural environment is pitiful.

Another example:

42. Bihotza eta zentzuna guduan dira beharra iskiluak baino. In war, heart and sense are needed more than weapons.

This proverb shows a comparative, the unexpected term is appraised over the expected term; in this case, human faculties are promoted over technical implements. Asking why human faculties are better than hardware means asking for the supportive argument underlying the proverb (Wenzel and Goodwin).

However, within one of the compared ends, the coordination links two elements usually opposed to each other in western cultures: sense and heart. Generally in Western culture, heart stands for feelings, emotions, will and courage, among other

71 With a possible trace of a former nasalization: “baie gakuen ta aruné auzuen”.
things. Conversely, sense is the contention, the measure, and the like. If we consider
the basic conceptual metaphor *People are Machines*, the “on” button is the heart, and
the “regulating” button is the sense—in other terms, the action and the reflection.
Linking these elements, we grasp the idea of human balance. War has a human proto-
type setting, a setting of the two sides of human power relations. This proverb pro-
motes humans over human techniques, from an extreme case, because it promotes the
timing of starting and the regulation of action over the possession of technical matter.

The proverb can also be seen from another perspective, taking into account the
comparative construction: better X than Y, of the type *sapientia melior auro*. The com-
parison has been one of the basic methods of ascribing the category of proverb to
many *sentential*, but I think it is more important to ask why we accept (how persua-
sion works) the proposition itself: human faculties versus weapons.

43. Egia, latz eta labio. “Truth [is], rough and short-sighted/short-tailed”.

In Proverb 43, the two modifiers allotted to truth characterize it. The qualifica-
tion, ‘short-sighted’ (or ‘short-tailed’, this is an out of use archaism) stands for not
seeing the consequences, not seeing whom it is said to, the rank of the person to
whom truth (supposedly not always pleasant) is said. A further example is:

44. Aita zaharra eta betse etena ez da gerena. “An old father and a broken
shoe are not dishonoring”. (See above).

3.9.1. Evaluative Category Builders

45. Eguzkia eta euria, Martiko eguraldia. “Sun and rain, the weather of
March”.

In Garai 2002 I mentioned the debate as to whether weather proverbs are proverbs
at all, and concluded that they are, that is, they may provide a variety of mental spaces
and their connections from a familiar source domain may be mapped onto other tar-
ggets, mostly via personification. In Proverb 45, the weather of March is characterized
not by a disjunctive *(either...or...)* but by a conjunction linking two apparently con-
tradictory terms. We have to consider that March happens between seasons, and that
this characteristic of being neither one nor the other, is a source for virtual worlds. For
the mappings via personification I have already mentioned it before: The sun can be
mapped onto the laugh, and the rain onto the tears. Another example is:

46. Kukuen kantatzean, euri eta eguzki. “When the cuckoos sing, rain and
sun”.

This proverb is a variant of the one discussed above, at least in the source domain.
Cuckoos sing in March. The underlying literary context is the folk belief that if the
cuckoo sings when you have money in your pocket, you will have money for the rest
of the year; however, if the cuckoo sings when your pockets are empty, you will be
stuck in poverty for the entire year. This superstition has its basis in the conceptual-
ization of March as in between seasons, and typically, humans ascribe deterministic
powers to transitions: the transition is a moment where the next moment is fixed (see
upper note about change of state space). The popular tale tries to control the input. The basic metaphor underlying this entire conceptualization is the view of time as cycle, which is based on the People are plants metaphor (Lakoff and Turner 1989).

The birds are also connected with the future as messengers, and the word spoken by a seer or prophet contributes to the realization of the event already spoken of.72

We would not be able to apply this proverb to the same target as the one before, “X and Y the weather of March”, because the background of luck is stronger in this case on account of the cuckoo. Rain and sun are the two possibilities that may happen meteorologically—they exhaust the casuistic. Weather is traditionally linked to Fate. The Cuckoos announce chance; weather is a matter of chance and change. A further example:

47. Dagonileko euria, ardoa eta eztia. “August rain [is? brings?] wine and honey”.

The evaluation is achieved via the identification of “liquids”. Another version of the proverb reads: saffron, wine and honey. Wine and honey reminds us of Homeric libations. Predictably, we could also find ambrosias or similar “products” mentioned in other cultures. It is identification: the rain of August is as precious as the gods’ food and drink. Of course, contrary to what I am holding in this work, a typical analysis of this proverb would be to ascribe a descriptive use to the proverb, supposing that in our latitude the rain of August produces wine and honey (as well as other products).

3.9.2. Category Builders by Enumeration

The evaluating string in the ‘category-builders’ type of proverbs may act either to deny the possibility of such a category, or to admit the possibility but evaluate it positively or negatively.

1) Category
   a) Impossible
   b) Possible
      i) Positive evaluation
      ii) Negative evaluation

For instance:

48. Txitak, grisolak eta urdaia, maiartzeko mahaira. “Young chicken, testicles and ham, to the table of May”.

72 “Congratulations” in Basque is said etymologically “good birds” “zori-onak”, although it is not longer identified as such by the speaker. This is not an ethnographic curiosity, it was common all over Europe, not only the birds flying around Odysseus, either from the left or the right, but also in several Romance languages – Adieu, Adios, had a previous stage of “Augur” (modern Basque “Agur”, goodbye). I am told by Charlotte Kemp that in Romanian congratulations/happy birthday is “auguri”.
Since we have no ergative, the elements mentioned in the first part are plain objects to be "brought" to the table of May. In other words, someone has to bring them to the table. In another type of analysis, admitting elision of verbs as a working hypothesis, and taking into account that the second part of the proverb is a PP, since a directional PP falls either in the "come-go" realm or in the "bring-take away" realm, I conclude that the elided verb has to be transitive, because the elements mentioned have no agency of their own. The objects are not agents, for they show no volition —this excludes the possibility of intransitivity. Therefore, they are objects of some other agent, thus, the verb has to be transitive.

I have no clue to interpret this sixteenth century proverb other than the reference to May. May is the expecting month, that is, the month of hunger. "Table" is a metonymy for meal, and 'meal' for what is going to be eaten through that month. If in May the last stored foods are eaten, this proverb is counseling which should be or are these last foods. Following this path of interpretation, ham is a type of meat that lasts long because of it has been elaborated for that purpose.

The other two elements are harder. Notice that in the other cases of enumeration there were two possibilities, either the element to be defined was the first one or the last one, while the other two elements set the frame of interpretation. I am too far culturally to interpret this proverb. In any case, The conjunction of young chicken and testicles points toward the future at the epistemic levels; the property of being young, and the property of pro-generation, whereas the third one belongs to another level of conceptualization. I do not dare further than that.73 Another example:

49. Andrea, sua eta itsasoa, guztiz da gaiztoa. "Women, fire and sea, very bad [things]."

The basic cultural metaphor working in this proverb concerns fluidity. The elements are stable or unstable depending on whether they have fixed shapes or not. The earth is solid, and therefore shaped: the air, sea or fire are the three elements that lack fixed form. Woman is ascribed to the unshaped (prior to the shape or form, following Mircea Eliade’s usual analysis),74 because of the cycles (felt to have a relationship with the sea tides; also, giving birth is felt to be a new form coming from an old form cf. Genesis, and “God separated the waters…”). The adjunction of properties depending on the characteristic "element" that is felt to be close to the entity is part of the conceptual transference common in Hemocranite Europe. Air or water were linked to instability or lack of "fixed" will, as it can be seen in for instance, "la donna e mobile qual piuma al vento", where the feature of changeability is transferred from

73 Kemp also proposed this reading, parallel but more clear than the one I offered: "It seemed to me that ham is stored —preserved through the winter— and young chicken and testicles refer to what is newly on offer in late spring —the chickens aren’t old yet (born March?) and cattle are castrated (waste not want not!). So what is available is a mixture of new and old, and making the best of things.

74 Eliade (1949, 1952, 1956). Unfortunately we tend to keep rediscovering the Mediterranean once and again, as in Sweetser (1995), in which none of Eliade’s work is mentioned. It is interesting, though, that someone analyzing basic conceptual metaphors ends up close to people analyzing religions from a symbolic perspective, for which both deal with cross culturally entrenched nets of concepts. Nevertheless, a successful attempt with Geertz work is pursued by Turner (2001). Another researcher that has called my attention is Sørensen (2002).
the wind to the woman. Trade is also and always intercourse, change of state, and there are some functional projections extracted from the attributions:

When an element in one state is later in a different state, we can compress this into a space in which the element undergoes a 'change of state.' When an element in one location is later in a different location, we can compress this into a space in which the element undergoes a 'change of location.' In general, when two spaces are related by both counterfactuality and temporal distance, we have the chance to compress these spaces and their vital relations into a single 'change' blend. These two networks, 'change of state' and 'change of location' have, as metaphor theorists have noted, served as inputs to a further blend in which the change of state is blended with the change of location, as in "the water is coming to a boil" (Turner & Fauconnier 1998).

The interesting projection jump here is how fluidity is linked with change of state, since, in fact, it is only change of shape. Therefore, from change of shape we project onto fluidity, and from there onto change of state and, consequently, onto inconstancy. These attributions of the water are then allotted to the people in contact with them. This commonplace, transmission by contact, has other complex experiential bases that I shall not analyze here. Other examples are:

50. Herriko hiru gauzarik onenak: etxeko iturri hotsa, herriko ezkila eta jaun erretore ohia. "The three best things about town: the sound of the fountain at home, the bell of the village and the ex-preacher" (Garate 1998).

51. Herriko hiru gauzarik txarrenak: zakarraren azpiko zorria, laino azpiko eguzkia eta emakume mustatxduna. "The three worst things of town: the louse from beneath the garbage, the sun under the clouds, and the woman with a mustache" (ibid.).

In both cases, the element to be defined is the last one. The polarity between the two first elements is spatial: from the bottom to the top, in the second case, and from the inside to the outside in the first example.

3.9.3. Consecutive-Opposites Category Builders

For instance:

52. Maiatz iluna eta bagil argia, urte guziko ogia. "Dark May and clear June, bread for the whole year".

The second part of the proverb is the evaluation or predication of the first double NP. The coordination links two NPs —there are two definite descriptors that mark

75 Likewise, in Pierre de Lancre’s *Tableaux de l'inconstance*... Basques are defined as inconstant, and the Basque Country as the realm of Devil because —among other reasons, including the political situation of not being defined by a single administration, say Spain, France or Navarre— the contact with the sea and the main economic activity of its inhabitants was trading. Note what he says about Native Canadians not wanting to trade with people who didn’t speak Basque! Of course, this is also a clue regarding witchcraft.
each NP: ilun-A and argi-A. The months are consequent in time: the modifiers are opposed though.

Looking at the year in the context of farming, May refers to the last month of winter, just as June is the first month of summer. The stored food has to last until May, also depicted in Basque proverbs as “the long May”. Winter means waiting; summer is the time for harvesting. The cosmic order should follow with bad weather in winter and good weather in summer. The idea of cosmic symmetry appears again. The proverb is not saying something as “rain” in May, and “sun” in June, but describing a more general (= epistemic) pattern: obscurity and enlightenment. If the cosmic order is altered the consequences are to be paid, and the most feared event is famine. About the evaluation, it is obvious that food in general is prototypically referred to as bread (which stands, sometimes, for wheat or corn too).

3.9.4. Descriptive Categories by Opposites


A contrast is made between appearance and (inner) reality. The inside is exemplified by eating, getting inside the body because the body is seen as a container, while the head is the visible, uppermost, apparent part of the body. Notice that the proverb does not say head but hat, otherwise other contradictory mental structures could have been imported. The linking of the elements provokes the opposition and forces us to induce a more abstract rule. The evaluative part is missing, because it is inferred from the disposition of opposites, and because it stands for a description or criticism of someone whose behavior should not be followed. Another instance is:

54. Gorua gertian eta gogoa kirolean. “The distaff upon the waist and the mind upon the game”.

![Diagram of Distaff R Mind](image)

Figure 13: Distaff R Mind

76 “buruko” lit. ‘heading’, buru = head, -ko = ‘s, of.
The proverb mentions a mismatch between act and thought. In reality, the conceptual symmetry should have shown the game and the distaff at the same level on the one hand as activity, and the mind and the waist on the other as place or mini-scenario. Instead, the symmetry at the morphological level highlights the terms in contrast, with both PPs showing the same inesive (locative) case:

- gerri-a-n, waist-the-In/On
- kirol-(e)a-n: game-the-In/On.

Compare it with the example about playing with the donkey, and notice the way morphology is leading the mappings across spaces. The conjunction here is showing some kind of contrast between both pieces: A and B.

The background clues to interpret the proverb are of different kinds. The distaff stands for (woman's) work. Work is prototypically physical effort. The opposition is held between the mind (will, inner, true desire, thought, freedom, not tied to a physical reality), and the body (obligation, outside, work, physical effort, restricted in time and space). Through the mismatch between the apparent (the work) and the “true desire inside” (the game) the proverb might be showing a broken causality link—the scene previously described, distaff-waist, does not keep the attention of the mind, and this might convey a negative evaluation for inconsistent attitude. I understand the conjunction as causation bringing an incongruity to the scene.

I may be over-interpreting about the negative evaluation, since the same idea is recurrent in other folk literary instances, e.g. obligation of one domain versus the freedom of the imagination, e.g. the split of the self into physical and mental attributes:

Solano nagonean / eguzki berotan / nire pentsamendua / lekurik askotan.78 “When/while I am in the fields / under the hot sun / my thoughts are / in many places”.

Again, my bodily situation, my limitation, contrasts with my thoughts’ ontology (which are the definition of human beings indeed).

3.10. Summary

In this section, I have attempted a realistic analysis of “and” in my corpus. “And” appears in many constructions whose components must be further specified, without restricting the analysis to one of their components, that is to “and”. There is also a need to include tools typically restricted to literary analysis of narrative or dramatization. The intersection of these tools yields a more complete description of the constructions that use “and”.

77 It should be noted that this image recurs in most of the confessions of the witches in the 16th century. The “confessions” where elicited against the Maleis Maleficarum (following Morales 1999); that is to say, there is a transformation between the primary confessions and the final outcome in the witches words. However, this image of the woman spindle in hand, right before attending the Sabbath is not found in that book. In these confessions, apparently women used to meet with each other taking spinning as excuse before heading the akelarre.
78 Maia Ugarte Arrikutz (Oñati); gathered by Bittoriano Gandiaga and Jabier Kaltzkakotta, in Tapia, Ordorika & Martinez 1997.
I have seen that the functions I have studied here interact smoothly with each other, as Fillmore & Kay (1996) point out. Interestingly, these functions can be collapsed into fewer and broader categories: enactment or quoted dramatization, temporal or modal anchorage, range précising or rhetorical retreat, correlation in prescriptions and conditionals, and category builders. My study concerns only these last functions. Unfortunately, the data available to me belongs to a very particular type of proverb, that is, weather proverbs, for which the necessary assumptions before analysis are too costly. There is a further distinction that should have be made in these proverbs, namely, the distinction between proverbs that present coordinated elements in the evaluation, and the ones that build the category to be evaluated, and the interactions between them.

4. Processing the proverb

In this section, I will explain some relevant theories related to meaning-building in understanding proverbs and idioms. Certainly idioms and proverbs are not the same, because proverbs may or may not show different idiomatic strategies (Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988); however, researchers working on idioms often try to address the issue of meaning in proverbs.

4.1. Linguistic analysis of the meaning in idioms

Glucksberg proposes three types of meaning for idioms (Cacciari 1993):

- the meaning of the sentence itself, or literal meaning (available for any speaker of the language),
- the stipulated idiomatic meaning or the special meaning of that particular construction (available only to those familiar with the idiom itself),
- and the allusional content, or the meaning that the idiom might have acquired in context use, which involves analyzing the communicative intention of the utterer by the receiver.

The first type is identified with the literal or linguistic meaning, for which understanding a linguistic processing is proposed, and the second type with the idiomatic or stipulated meaning, for which a linguistic parsing is not enough. Glucksberg places the relation of meanings between the constituent word and the whole idiom as follows: if there is a connection between the two, then we have a motivated meaning —the individual words contribute to the overall figurative meaning. The third type is the meaning the idiom acquires in context. As Glucksberg summarizes:

In all cases, the linguistic and stipulated meanings of idioms are always generated and must be integrated within the discourse context to provide an interpretation of the speaker’s intended meaning (Glucksberg 1993: 23).79

As I understand it, Glucksberg’s interests are linked to the interrelations between two possible processes of idioms: a lexical and linguistic process on the one hand, and

79 See below discussion on Seitel.
a direct “look-up” of the fixed arbitrary meaning of a given construction on the other. The parallels with Goldberg’s Construction Grammar are obvious. In Goldberg’s system, the three mechanisms at play are (1) the semantics of the argument structure, (2) the lexical semantics, (3) and the syntax. The meaning of the argument structure of a construction is the same as the “stipulated” meaning of an idiom; and the “literal meaning” in Glucksberg is the lexical semantics and syntax in Goldberg’s view.80

Glucksberg also works with two valuable concepts: the lexical flexibility of the idiom and the semantic productivity of the possible variations inflicted intentionally to it. However, we may risk confusing lexical semantics with aspects of the idiomatic conceptual structure. Sometimes we may think we are merely changing a word of an idiom in order to rest its lexical flexibility and/or semantic productivity when in fact we are manipulating the source (or the target) domain of the idiom. See, for instance “melting the ice” as a more or less acceptable variant of “breaking the ice” in the expression “At last that evening the wine melted the ice between them”. A native speaker tells me that this “sounds terribly raunchy”. So, my English is poor but my test is right; This is so because we have manipulated the source domain, and its image schema. It is not a matter of changing one lexical item, it is not a matter of linguistic substitution, but the consequences this change carries at conceptual level.81

Cacciari’s article (1993) discusses the different senses attributed to the word “literal”. She calls an expression defined in terms of semantic autonomy nonmetaphorical literality (1993: 29-30). A given expression is literal if it does not import meaning from a different domain, that is, if “it does not derive any of its meanings from conceptual metaphors”. Although I do not agree with her view of idioms as frozen metaphors, it does appear that motivation and metaphoricity are somehow related concepts in idiomatic expressions. I agree with the view of proverbs as always-metaphoric expressions, because even in the most discursive cases, there is at least a projection to a situation in which the proverb can be applied.

4.2. Context as clue for meaning

Peter Seitel offered an insightful approach to proverbs many years ago, many of his findings should be reconsidered from a cognitive linguistic perspective. I will highlight two main insights: the recognition of the proverb based on its figurativeness, the heuristics of proverb-use and the concept of correlation.

Seitel is concerned with the semantic fit between the meaningful parts of the proverb and the cultural context in which it is used (Seitel 1969: 144). The goal is therefore to explicate the meaning of a proverb through describing the cultural context in which it is normally used. The assumption is that proverbs are a strategic

80 They both have probably reached parallel conclusions because they have been looking at parts of the language traditionally considered as peripheral (Goldberg 1995).
81 Studies on metaphor were already aware that metaphor does not operate at word level (Ricoeur), nor even at a phrase or sentence level, but at conceptual level (Lakoff & Johnson). Idiom analysis —and even the more, proverb analysis—, should not be different from metaphor analysis.
social use of metaphor. This assumption is linked to the way the hearer may identify a proverb in context—the proverb is recognized by “the abrupt shift in subject matter” (ibid. 126).82 This shift is included in one of the features of the definition of a proverb by Seitel as “out of context statement” (ibid. 124).83 The fact that the proverb is out of context—that it breaks the norms of conversation in some acceptable ways (breaking, for instance, the principle of no variation of subject matter unless explicitly announced)—makes the proverb a social metaphor.

There are other interesting aspects in Seitel’s article; namely, the description of the heuristic model of proverb use (ibid. 127). Seitel distinguishes the context from the situation, and again the imaginary situation from the social situation. The social context refers to the contexts in which the proverbs are spoken. In order to describe the context we may need to take into account several factors, such as the age of the participants, the kin relationships among them, the communicative intention of the speaker, the occasion in which the proverb is used, and so on. By contrast, the situational realm includes imaginary and social situations, and they share a metaphoric relationship.

i) Context
ii) Situation:
   1 Social situation
   2 Imaginary situation

The imaginary situation is the one built by the proverb itself, and the social situation is the future/hypothetical/real-but-cancelable situation for which the proverb is intended because of its deliberative nature (see cognitive environment in Honeck’s system). Seitel calls this (double) mapping correlation:

By correlation I mean the manner in which the speaker ‘matches up’ the terms in the proverb with the people in the social situation and possibly in the social context” (ibid. 128).

Another interesting concept explained by Seitel is the concept of strategy:84

a plan for dealing with the situation which the proverb names. (…) …the proverb is an attempt to resolve the personally felt conflicts which arise from perceived contradictions in a social situation’ (ibid. 130).

This issue of personal (guilt and otherwise) feelings embedded in/and protected by socially sanctioned answers is also addressed by Francis Steen and Paul Hernadi within an evolutionary account (Hernadi & Steen 1999).

4.3. Great Chain Metaphor

Up to this point, it appears that even when we are dealing with a purely literal proverb (in the third sense given by Cacciari, that is, literal as nonmetaphorical)

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82 But see our discussion on proverbiality in the starting section: Arora vs. Litovkina.
83 This “out of context” placement is the starting point for many scholars, including Honeck.
84 Seitel does not call it "strategy". I take the term after Burke (1989).
there is always a metaphorical correlation between the proverb and the social context, and an analogic correlation between the imaginary situation and the social situation. Lakoff and Turner (1989: 161) explain these mappings by regarding proverbs as instructional minimal poems to “understand the nature of our beings”. In other words, the direction of a proverb is not a description or statement, but crucially a prescription or piece of advice addressed specifically to human concerns, regardless of the source domains of the proverbs. The conceptual machinery involved is:

- alternative schemas that can be evoked by a given word,
- extensions of these schemas,
- alternative cultural background knowledge,
- assumptions about context,
- the full range of conventional metaphors and metonymies, and
- the capacity to form one-shot image-metaphors. (199, bulleted is mine).

The proverb has a source world, it encapsulates a short story, and can be applied to a number of target situations. Both targets and sources are specific. The mapping particular to particular is pursued via the Generic is Specific metaphoric projection. Generic is specific brings two ideas to the scene: the categorization ability, and the idea of prototype. In the prototype, one representative of the category stands for the category itself. Both, Great Chain —Basic (GCM) and Extended (EGCM)— and Generic is Specific are concerned with the problem of categorization: the former is a cultural model and the latter a cognitive operation.

The Great Chain of Being Metaphor is a cognitive mechanism that shows fixed information and content structure shared by a given community —the Nature of Things and the Great Chain— and a generic-level metaphor Generic is Specific as a cognitive rule with huge consequences. This hierarchy specifies the level of generality where the pertinent information is held, along with the conversational maxim of quantity. The Maxim of Quantity is a conversational strategy by which both hearer and speaker agree to use only relevant information —the higher degree of information cancels the lower interpretation. This strategy, applied to the Nature of Things plus the Great Chain of Being, cancels the possibility of misinterpretation by making the lower degree type of information irrelevant. In short, the Great Chain Metaphor stands for the sum of a metaphorical projection of the type Generic is Specific, and a cultural model against which the projection is made. The Great Chain Metaphor’s explanatory power involves:

Table 7: Great Chain Metaphor

- Evocation of the schema,
- Choice of the relevant aspects of the schema,
- Picking up the generic-level structure of these aspects of the schema,
- Preservation of that structure in the mapping that is constrained by the great chain.

85 By applying Fauconnier’s Mental Spaces theory (1994) we can translate this principle to the presupposition float principle, so we have a devise that allows us to specify the information apt to be transferred to the Generic Space.
The GCM is the combination of four elements, which I will try to reduce to two: 1) the scale, which comprehends both a cultural model and pragmatic constraints, and 2) the procedure, which comprehends choosing the elements and the metaphoric projection.

4.4. Conceptual base theory

Honeck (1997) explains the Extended Conceptual Base Theory (ECBT and ECBT-2) within a problem-solving general frame. When the proverb is uttered, its literal meaning does not fit the conversation, and, therefore, we need second thoughts to solve the problem of its meaning. The language user and the language interpreter both share certain background conditions or a cognitive environment, which decide their access to the source domain of the proverb: 1) culture, 2) language, 3) interpersonal knowledge, and 4) knowledge about the topic. In the communicative situations —which are the same as context for Seitel— the proverbs are “bizarre” because they mention things that are not part of the cognitive environment —the abrupt shift of subject matter in Seitel’s explanation. In Honeck’s view, understanding the proverb occurs in three phases:

- “The literal transformation phase”,
- “The figurative meaning phase” and
- “The instantiation phase”, also called the “revised meaning phase”.

As Honeck explains, when we first hear a proverbial utterance, we elaborate a literal meaning model, which is the understanding of the source domain. Then, we understand that there is no immediate referent and that the utterance is stated in gnomic linguistic form. The second step is the appraisal factor, where we decide whether the utterance is worth reconsidering. The two variables in this appraisal factor are:

- the cognitive efficiency, or judging the worth of the utterance, and
- the social payoff by which we are taught that an utterance addressed to us should be somehow answered.

Thus, we have the linguistic form that tells us that the utterance is a proverb, and the appraisal factor that compels us to look for a meaning in “another level”. Then, we use the Ostension Maximization Principle, by which the hearer will pursue an abstraction process. The meaning built through this process is the meaning that makes proverbs equitable to each other even if they have a very different literal meaning, or, to repeat it in my terms, even if they come from very different source domains.

The instantiation of what Honeck calls figurative meaning —to which I shall refer as generic meaning— brings up the Connection Problem, or pattern matching: how can an utterance connect with the topic? The figurative meaning involves a process by which the meaning of the proverb changes somewhat as it is actualized within a given situation. The constraints effecting the match are 1) Situation, 2) Topic, 3) Literal Meaning, 4) Figurative Meaning, and 5) Occasional hints.86

Honeck also says that the proverb and the topic match at the ideational level, not at the level of perception (since the representational format for the figurative mean-

86 Compare it with the mapping explained by Lakoff-Turner (1989: 177).
ing is non-imagistic and non-linguistic). Accordingly, the Extended Conceptual Base Theory has developed the Conceptual Base term—the abstract medium where the matching between the figurative meaning and the target situation takes place.

4.4.1. Concordances and disagreements

Reflecting on Honeck's overall approach to proverbs as a problem solving model, we may consider the fact that other theories have also stressed the therapeutic properties of the proverb. The proverb may be uttered when there is an affective or epistemic need for indirect speech (in cultures and/or situations where indirection and allusional content is valued). This means that if the conversation is already set in what we could call an interpreting mood, the literal phase could be skipped.

Certainly, several correspondences can be drawn between this model and a variety of approaches. Even outside the cognitive sphere, it can be compared with, for instance, Krikmann's "degrees" in the scale of "proverb functions": 1) statement, 2) evaluation, and 3) prescription. Incidentally, there may also be a correspondence with Oakley's (1999) cognitive rhetoric, as he explains four key elements of the human rhetorical potential: attention, value, categorization and memory. On the one hand we can draw a loose analogy between Oakley's key elements of the human rhetorical potential and the speaker's faculties of classical rhetoric—invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. Most interestingly, on the other hand, if we allot to all four concepts (attention, value, categorization, and memory) a sequential descriptive force in cognition, the analogy can be drawn this time with Honeck's description of the process of proverb understanding. Especially worth considering might be the correspondences between Oakley's "value-analogy" and Honeck's "literal transformation phase", with its two principles: the appraisal process and the Ostension Maximization Principle.

I also see a problem in Honeck's account in the distinction between literal and figurative meaning, since sometimes it can be difficult to tell whether or not an expression has figurative meaning. For instance, "I want to make clear that..." certainly is a metaphoric expression, based on the metaphor Knowing is seeing (Sweetser 1990); however it does not seem to need reprocessing in order to understand it; it

87 The Dual Coding Theory (Walsh 1988; Paivio 1986, cited in Honeck 1997: 162-172) is based on the double coding of mental representations: imagens are the coding mode for concrete concepts while abstract concepts are coded in logogens. Concrete words have a dual coding, a) phonically; associations (logogens) and b) images. That is to say, meaning is a set of images and associations between logogens.

88 On the one hand Basque partially follows the general "Indo-European" metaphor: "begi-bistakoa" 'obvious' lit. eye-sight-of-the, or "azaldu" 'explain' as "bringing to the surface-skin", parallel to common "ex-plain" or unfold. On the other, it also partially keeps another (older?) system: "aditu" means to smell, to hear, to see and to understand, doubtfully from Lat. auditum. In addition, the modern definition of "ulertu" is "to understand", but it was used in the past to mean, "to smell", for instance in Iztueta's nineteenth century texts. "Asmatu" means to predict or come up with the right answer (Old Castilian "asmar"), but it is also a lower level of consciousness in hearing in contexts like "did you hear me coming last night? I didn't hear you but I felt you". In this sense Iraide Ibarretxe's analysis of perception verbs in Basque is very much needed.
could not be stated that a receiver has been led up a 'garden path' in this case. The resort to *catachresis* or "dead metaphors" leaves other language "coincidences" or systematic aspects of the same metaphor unexplained, for instance, "Enlightenment", "obscure theory", "evident and obvious", "bright and brilliant student", "point of view", and so on. In short, I do not agree with the distinction between literal and figurative, but I agree with his concept of matching situation and proverb at the ideational level.

There is also another crucial divergence between Honeck's approach and the BCM model; Basic Conceptual Metaphors are already available connections, not an algorithm with input and outcome, as the Base Conceptual Theory seems to propose.

So to speak, Honeck's model raises the question of boundaries. By "question of boundaries" I mean two types of incertitude: 1) it is unclear at which step a second processing is taking place, and 2) it is also unclear whether a second processing can be always and systematically ascribed to the understanding of proverbs. The second time processing happens when the speaker has trouble comprehending and tries to solve incomprehension by double-checking several aspects of the utterance. However, double-checking happens not only at the conceptual level but at the level of perception also: "did I hear blah-blah?". I ignore to what extent the theories dealing with perception include a double-checking process in their core explanation of how we perceive. The garden path idea is plausible, but it runs the risk of being a false *panacea*, or cure-all.

The proverb may also bring a familiar background with it, but not necessarily a familiar interpretation (as also suggested by Glucksberg and Cacciari, mentioned above). In this case double-checking is hard to hypothesize. An example of a proverb that brings a familiar background but not a clear interpretation is provided by proverbs created after the last line or moral of fables. In this case, the instantiation work is left open to a certain degree for the receiver to do it, but the background meaning is quite fixed and directed. Consider the following quote from Seitel.

From a personal account, I have the fact that among certain Swahili-speaking cultures on the coast of Tanzania a proverb used to a child is usually accompanied by a story to "explain" the meaning of the application of the proverb. What these seem to suggest is that the metaphorical reasoning employed to understand proverbs is thought to be acquired by a process of developmental learning, and, also, that cultural concepts in the system of metaphorical proverb use (the proverb terms) must be invested in the child’s mind with proper cultural meanings (Seitel 1969: 134).

For instance, consider the following proverb:

55. Gizona gizon otzaratik ere. "The man is man even from inside a basket".

Garate (1998) gives the following folk tale in which it is embedded as a valid meaning of the proverb. Once upon a time, there was a couple living in a Basque hamlet. The man was a complete disaster, being useless and stupid. After several passages where the man's stupidity and the consequent danger to the household are clear
(including another embedded proverb), the woman decides to get rid of him. So she
puts him in a basket and she goes up the mountains to throw him down some cliff
(notice that the tale does not question the physical strength of the woman). But the
dog follows them, barking endlessly. The woman commands the dog to go home, but
the dog keeps on barking and barking. Finally, after several unfruitful attempts by the
woman, the man said from inside the basket “go home!” The dog obeys right away.
The woman reflects, and turns back home: the man is a man even from inside a basket.

In a quick comparison between the proverb by itself and the tale, it may seem that
the only puzzling element in the proverb is the basket, so the tale may provide the
meaning of the c-element “basket”. However, “basket” has to be interpreted as
metaphoric for the reduced abilities of something essential. We know that because the
tale provides not only the source for c-elements (Krikmann 1985) or substantive elements
(Seitel 1969) but also the pertinent relations between them. This is not to say that the
proverb has no constructional mechanisms of its own, independent from the tale. For
instance, the identification “the man is a man” is not a naive tautology, if such a thing
as tautology exists in natural language at all; the tautological repetition of ‘man’ indi­
cates essentiality and thus authority. If there is some double-checking, it has to be at
the level of instantiation—the mapping between the substantive or c-elements in the
proverb and the relations that hold between them, and the situation in which the
proverb is uttered. The tale only provides the source to build the meaning, not the
meaning as a fixed datum. That is, the tale provides the background knowledge of the
proverb, but the proverb’s meaning potential surpasses the meaning of the tale; in the
cases where we have a story connected to a proverb or aphorism, it is a mistake to inter­
pret the fable as the meaning of the proverb. A parallel can be drawn between the rela­
tionship of fable-proverb and the way children extract grammatical productive
constructions out of a variety of pragmatic situations for certain types of idioms (Fill­
more, Kay & O’Connor 1988), as the set of situations in which a certain proverb is
used can provide the source or background knowledge of the proverb. Therefore, the
hypothesis would be that the tale and the infinite situations to which the proverb
applies are somewhat symmetrical, or, at least, they maintain symmetry at the relevant
level of abstraction, and therefore, the abstraction of the n-situations in which a
proverb is used provides the basic schema of the proverb.

Crucially, I have been proposing to interpret Honeck’s figurative term as generic
meaning or meaning at the generic space level in Blending Theory. Honeck’s Osten­
sion Maximization Principle may be parallel to the Generic is Specific Metaphor in
Basic Conceptual Metaphor Theory. In addition, the BCMT theory may be rewritten
in terms of Generic Space within the Mental Spaces Theory—the Generic Space
would preserve the generic level structure of both inputs, source and target domains.
Generic meaning would correspond with the bare bones of the meaning or back-

89 This tale also embeds another “explanation” for a different proverb. “May will come, and will take
away everything from us”, meaning that May is a “waiting month” until the harvest is in, and
resources have to be hoarded.
90 See role-value relations in Fauconnier (1994).
ground schemata, in Kay's sense. In Kay's approach, the background schemata is the experiential setting of an event; that is, "schemata as structures in semantic memory that are employed on particular occasions to build scenarios that constitute an envisionment" (Kay 1987: 203).

4.5. Basic metaphors and images as meaning organizers

Gibbs, Strom and Spivey-Knorton (1997: 85) maintain that conceptual metaphors provide part of the link between proverbs and their figurative meaning. I have already used their work in the starting section, in demonstrating the mental imagery underlying the complex Basque version of the proverb, "the rolling stone gathers no moss". In the Basque version, the mental image suggested by the first part of this proverb correlates with the second part, "The walking stone [erg] no moss, the frightened bee [erg] no hive", and it is consistent with the image-schema by which we represent agency and control as a straight line, and opposed to a curve or line with angles (lack of volition or agency).

This observation takes ground on Gibbs et al.'s experiments since, as they point out, the mental images describing idioms produced by the speakers "are not simply representative of the idiom's figurative meanings but captured more specific aspects of the kinaesthetic events suggested by the idiom" (p. 85). The general hypothesis they propose is that "an individual's understanding of his or her mental images for proverbs is strongly constrained by the conceptual metaphors that link different source and target domains" (86). This seems to suggest that a person's mental imagery influences their comprehension and memory for proverbs and metaphors. The question would then be to test the strength of such an influence —do conceptual metaphors completely explain the understanding of the proverbs, or just part of it?

What seems clear is that Glucksberg and Cacciari were right in proposing some kind of motivation in idiom meanings, because if the figurative meaning of proverbs were stipulated and arbitrary then there should be significantly less uniformity in participant's mental images in Gibbs et al. experiments. In addition, the hearer would recognize only these idioms stored in memory, and would have no access to unfamiliar idioms —this was my concern with Cacciari's and Glucksberg's work. On the contrary, participants showed higher degree of agreement upon proverbs than literal phrases or definitions. The results of the study demonstrate that people have more consistent mental images for proverbs than they do for either literal phrases or figurative definitions of proverbs (96).91

This higher degree of consistency is not due to their familiarity with the figurative meanings of these phrases, but can best be attributed to the conceptual metaphors that motivate why proverbs mean what they do (97). People have "similar mental images to proverbs, more so than for literal phrases, precisely because of the constraining influence of conceptual metaphors in how speakers make sense of

91 Again, this shows that language researchers should actualize their folk view of memory as storage.
why proverbs mean what they do” (89). Yet, not all of the figurative meaning of proverbs can be explained by understanding the source-to-target domain mapping that emerges in pre-existing conceptual metaphors (103).

To summarize, everyday language employs basic conceptual metaphors in this way, as do proverbs. Consequently, the images underlying basic conceptual metaphors structure and constrain the interpretation of proverbs in quite a detailed way.

I think the leap between the rigidity of basic conceptual metaphors and the variety of circumstantial interpretations a proverb may acquire (including misinterpretations) is due to the ability to project the proverb. The projection is restricted at one end (the image-schema) but it can be restructured when applied to a variety of contexts. This restructuring can be best described by Blending Theory.

4.6. Blending Theory

In Blending Theory, accounting for creativity at diverse levels focuses on one mental mechanism, the conceptual integration. This model is based on Fauconnier's Mental Space theory (1994), but adds the concept of middle spaces (Fauconnier & Turner 1994). Mental spaces are small packs of meaning built locally for specific purposes, and they are highly malleable. Whatever the two (or more) input spaces have in common is the content of the generic space. The conceptual integration happens in the blending space, following different processes: complementation, completion, and elaboration, which are the processes by which the information brought from the input spaces is reorganized to produce a new concept (Turner 2000).

Proverbs structure reasoning for local purposes, but not in a static fashion —people do not have a permanent category of honorable things that includes old fathers and broken shoes (see section 1). From Turner (1996) we can conclude that projection is involved in narrative thinking and future predicting. Therefore, the very status of proverbs as small deliberative narratives conveys projection as a central aspect of using proverb, and since projection typically involves conceptual integration, we must again conclude that conceptual integration is involved in proverb understanding.

Since I identify Honeck’s “figurative” meaning with “generic” meaning, I have to conclude that the abstract structures Honeck calls figurative are at the generic space level in the Blending Theory; that is, Honeck’s figurative meaning is the abstract patterns that both input spaces have in common. Consequently, I am claiming that the type of information encoded in the generic space is of a relational nature. I am proposing that, at least in the case of proverbs, what we have at the generic level can be identified with the basic relations, i.e. the organizing patterns are deducible from figures, in the rhetorical sense, and from the thematic roles, argument structures, and constructions in construction grammar, in the way described by Fillmore, Kay, and Goldberg. However, there are some inner theoretical problems with the assimilation I propose. This quotation from Lakoff may present an objection to my proposal:
Should it turn out that generic-level structure is exactly image-schematic structure, the invariance principle would have enormous explanatory value. It would obviate the need for a separate characterization of generic-level structure. Instead it would itself characterize generic-level structure... (Lakoff 1993: 235).

Once we have brought together the pieces of information into the blending space (complementation), the information is arranged following available patterns of meaning: completion. Some of the extant structures by which the information brought to the generic space is initially arranged may be identified with the Basic Conceptual Metaphors. This arrangement is one of the functions I am allotting to the generic space. The inner theoretical question is what the generic space is needed for — since the proverb-topic “matching” happens in the blend, the functions filled by the generic space might overlap, in my understanding, with one of the faculties of the conceptual integration process. To my knowledge, the generic space has not attracted much attention at the theoretical level in Blending Theory, since efforts are directed to describe the blending space. Therefore, a claim about the nature and function of the generic space might risk becoming obsolete in the near future, as the theory develops.

4.6.1. Conceptual integration

In this subsection, I reorganize my initial proverb space configuration proposal in the light of the taxonomy of cross-space mapping of counterfactual connections provided by Fauconnier and Turner (1998), “cross-space mappings operate and transfer inferences by extracting or creating common schematic structure”. This is my main point in dealing with the A+B is X type of proverbs (ibid.). The theoretical problem I pointed out in the previous section reflects the development of the theory itself. Because the study of cognitive aspects of language started with metaphor and analogy, much effort addressed the problem of solving event topology mapping. However, conceptual integration is a mechanism that includes, but not exclusively, metaphor and analogy or cross-space mapping in general. Cross-space mapping is considered only a minimal part of conceptual integration. Rather, in this sense, the description of conceptual integration is concerned with building and constructing new concepts and with dissociating old ones. Turner and Fauconnier (1998) argue that cross mappings “operate not just between a source and a target, but more generally between the various spaces of a conceptual integration network, including generic and blended spaces” (op. cit., n. 1).

In the same place I have just quoted there are other findings relevant to this work: they make the claim of non-compositionality of analogy, which does not fall under Glucksberg classification of “direct look-up” or meaning direct retrieval from memory, since direct retrieval does not account for emerging structure. The second finding about analogy is that mapping is not merely structural, but that depends upon the specific content of the domains. This affects the working or pedagogical dichotomy between commonplaces and topics, or beliefs and shared argumentative rules I have kept throughout the paper; although implicitly and explicitly I have stated that this is only for the sake of exposition, since conceptual metaphors and GCBM partly structures the content of proverbs. The third finding is about the distinction
between the several products of conceptual projection and integration: it seems to be a matter of degree, rather than a clean-cut outcome.

The first alternative to the proverb configuration I offered in the starting section is based on the possibility of extracting inferences directly from the blending space, instead of applying the common structure gathered in the generic space as I have proposed in the starting section. The advantages of this approach will be, apart from economy of spaces, that the diverse evaluation of the proverb by the user will affect the extraction of the relevant structure. In fact, since the blend is not the "final product" anymore, as shown by the double-scope integration (Turner 2000), backward projection is also available; that is, the blend, with its newly emerged structure, can work as input again. This means that there is no single given directionality in projection (say, from inputs to blend), but that the general restrictive principles are associated with information access, viewpoint, and base (Fauconnier 1997). For my purposes, this means that I do not need to postulate a double configuration, one for the proverb and the other for the matching in conversation, and, again, a double generic space. However, at the same time, even if there is no need to do it, there is still the possibility of doing it. In other words, the generic space can work as input in the web.

These are the kinds of conceptual integration explained by Turner and Fauconnier (1998):

Table 8: Shared Topology

1.1. Frame network
   1.1.1. Frame Topology TF
   1.1.2. Specific Topology TS
      1.1.2.1. It specifies values of roles in the organizing frame
   1.1.3. Incidental Topology TI
1.2. One-sided networks
1.3. Two-sided networks
   1.3.1. Asymmetric two-sided networks
2. Unfilled shared topology networks
   2.1. Two-sided unfilled shared topology networks
   2.2. Single-framing networks
3. Metonymy (Metonymy projection constraint)
   3.1. One-sided shared topology network with metonymy projection
   3.2. Two-sided shared topology network, symmetric with metonymy projection
   3.3. Two-sided shared topology network, symmetric with metonymy projection and additional frame recruitment

In my reading of Turner and Fauconnier (1998), all types are subsumed under the shared topology. Shared topology means that all four spaces share the same structure. If the same shared structure organizes all four spaces, then we have a frame network. Depending on which space exports more structure to the blend we will have either one-sided or two-sided shared topology network. The topology may belong to the
frame (frame topology or TF), or it may be specific to one or some of the spaces (TS). To be specific does not mean that it cannot be exported to other spaces, but it does not have the power to structure the content of that receiving space.

A proverb structure might be thought of as a shared organizing topology. That shared organizing topology would become a frame network if the proverb were used in the same "literal" cognitive environment. Otherwise, it is better to think of it as a one-sided shared topology; that is, the topology the user extracts from the proverb is mapped onto the conversation topic, which is reorganized in the blend. For instance, one scholar is telling another colleague how s/he is helping a newcomer to his specialty, the second scholar knows that the first scholar might not be in a too secure position and says:

56. Arbola zaharraren ondoan ipintzen denean landarea, behera behar du laster arbolak. “When you put a plant next to an old tree, the tree must fall down shortly”.

In the blend, the scholar helper is the tree, and the plant is the newcomer. The organizing structure is imported from the proverb space. The generic structure will contain the relationship between the strong and the weak, specified as mentoring in the target and as plant substitution in the proverb space.

Another possibility is the unfilled shared topology network, at least for the proverbs that I have labeled category builders by opposition. The idea is that the generic space does not inherit any common structure from the inputs, but the inputs present contradicting or incompatible relations. For instance, a father complains about the moody instability of his teenager daughter to his partner, and his partner says “Rain and Sun [is] the weather of March”. In the blend the weather is the mood, and March is the teenager, the idea of instability is extracted from the incompatibility of the terms rain and sun, and because they are mapped onto crying and laughing respectively.

Accordingly, I shall restate the starting proverb space configuration including the reflections I have discussed above in the following way. My starting configuration assumed that meaning was built (only) in the blending space, whereas, as Turner and Fauconnier (1998) describe, meaning can be built on the web, in the configuration of the spaces involved. According to my prior calculations, the “meaning” of the proverb resides in the proverb blend, but that was of no use for understanding the meaning of the proverb in conversation. The types of proverbs analyzed are exercises in pattern completion; the completion of the exercise, which I located at the blend, is of no use, but the extracted rule is. Imagine the following series of numbers: 2, 4, 6, 8… the answer is 10, but the rule is 2; “2” is what applies to the conversation topic, and “2” is located at the generic space. In the case of “category builders by opposites”, that is, the weather of March mapped onto the mood of the teenager, it is not only the instability induced from the incompatibility that is being mapped onto the conversation topic, but also rain with tears and sun with smiles. Therefore, we need a fuller access to the relevant spaces involved in the proverb configuration.

The square around the proverb web symbolizes the web itself, through which access is available for any of the spaces in the topic. In this way, I solve the problem of valuable incidental topology.

It seems clear to me that this study has supposed some kind of transparency in proverbs. The transparency was intended to contest some hermetic approaches to literary and language phenomena drawn from the exoticism characteristic of old fashioned romantic studies of “ethnic” phenomena. Nevertheless, we have to admit that human beings are able to make sense even in cases where the proverb itself is too opaque. The way we build meaning in these cases is to call on the context, bringing a new proverb configuration model to this work. In these cases, both the inputs of the proverb and the input of the context share the same generic space, and the same blending. The context input works as source input, but once the proverb has acquired a stipulated meaning, the order of spaces can be inverted.

5. Concluding comments

In this work, I present various interpretations of different occurrences of the conjunction “and” in proverbs. The results show that “and” appears in many different types of constructions, and not only in pragmatically ambiguous environments. Many environments where “and” occur are indeed constructions; that is to say, they show a fixed pattern with a conceptual structure. However “and” by itself is not enough to fully characterize most of these constructions. From these many different types of constructions, I have chosen the ones in which coordination involved analogy or cross-mapping between the items linked.

Among the simplest types, I found that the order of presentation of the linked items was important. When two objects are linked in the statement part of the proverb (not in the evaluative part), the first element is the one to be defined. I call these simplest coordination proverbs “set proverbs”.

Among the type of set proverbs, there is a special case; instead of two elements linked, there are three. In these cases, the element to be defined is always presented...
in a stressed position, be it at the beginning or at the end of the sequence. The other two elements create the frame topology in which this third element is to be understood. These two elements are often seen as poles or boundaries where the element to be defined is located.

There is a complex variety of these coordinating proverbs, which I called “explanation proverbs”. In this explanation type, two seemingly independent proverbs (which are opposed to a certain extent) are interconnected. “And” marks the boundary between the direction of the two pieces of advice. In the cross-mapping, there is one element upon which both pieces pivot. The spaces are asymmetric because the first space brings the topology to the blend space, the second operates the pertinent restrictions in the evaluation of that element. In these complex proverbs, “and” shifts the fictional utterer, shifts narrators, and consequently, the two proverbs stand in asymmetric spaces.

The function of “and” is parallel to that of perceiving the boundaries of an utterance in regular conversation, or linguistic gestalt, and it is also related to the perception of the proverb by the speaker of the language. Language is a dynamic set of interacting constructions, and a norm is a matter of accessibility to these constructions; consequently, the so-called literary phenomena of prosody and rhyme are also part of these constructions—the proof is the way proverbs and oral poetry are interconnected (probably via the constructions used in proverbs).

To sum up, among the types of proverbs that use “and” as pure coordination involving analogy, the set type builds a frame, while the explanatory type operates with a one-sided unfilled shared topology.

In the second section, I addressed the issue of the evaluation in proverbs. Many proverbs show the typology of \([a + b \text{ is good}].\) However, we may encounter variants of the same proverb lacking the evaluative string. The evaluative string poses the question of evaluation when the string is presupposed, lacking, or the instructing direction of the proverb is based on different kinds of presuppositions, from universals to these shared by the community, which can become smaller and smaller in scope. This poses the question of the directionality of the proverb, how much the given culture where it is being used presupposes, and how universal the different appraisals or demotions can be, from Honeck’s generic ideals to Kay’s context proposition.

Using Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s concept of mind-adherence, I have reduced the mechanisms by which a proverb can create belief to two: argumentative operations and commonplaces. Among the argumentative operations, I have studied entailment and projection as part of Aristotle’s description of common proofs. The claim I am making is that in both types, enthymematic and paradigmatic reasoning, projection takes place. The projection can be studied in these cases as a transspatial operation or cross-space partial mappings. Presupposition and projection are two sides of the same coin when making inferences.

The second degree in generality of argumentative rules is what might be included in a *topica* or social use of logic along the lines of Goodwin and Wenzel. At this level also, we may place the frequent use of proportion in proverbs, and Turner’s con-
cept of schema or figure as a pattern of form-meaning pair. Commonplaces are hard to reduce to pure subject matter, because, most importantly, they are organized information. Therefore, we do not grasp only the information, but the way this information is organized or encoded. These organization patterns can be further extended to instances other than the commonplace itself.

In the third section, I studied all the occurrences of "and" in my proverb corpus, yielding an outcome of fifteen functions. Most of these functions appear in constructs that can be generalized to constructions extending the study to other language instances. My work has only pointed to the potential direction of study. There is also a need to include tools typically restricted to literary analysis: as narrative or dramatization. The intersection of these tools yields a more complete description of the constructions that, among other things, also use "and". I have seen that the functions I have studied here interact smoothly with each other, as Fillmore and Kay (1996) point out. Interestingly, these functions can be collapsed into fewer and broader categories: enactment or quoted dramatization, temporal or modal anchorage, range précising or rhetorical retreat, correlation in prescriptions and conditionals, and category builders.

From these fifteen functions, the last five involve inducing a frame topology, what I call "category builders". These include what I called set proverbs in the starting section: 1) Category builders by enumeration; 2) Consecutive-opposites category builders, where the two terms brought together are members of a sequence, and hence there is a type of opposition between them; 3) Descriptive category builders by opposites, where the two terms brought together are felt to be opposites in order to highlight what is also felt to be a contradictory behavior.

Unfortunately, the data available to me belongs to a very particular type of proverbs, that is, weather proverbs, for which the assumptions prior to analysis are too costly. There is a further distinction that should be made in these proverbs, namely, the distinction between proverbs that show the coordinated elements in the evaluation, and those that build the category to be evaluated, and the interactions between them.

In the last section I have designed a theoretical journey that gathers relevant aspects of meaning building in proverbs. I start by what I have called linguistic approaches, where the relationship between the lexical elements integrating the idiom and the meaning organized by the argument structure of the idiom-as-construction unit is studied. This is interesting, since it poses the question as to what extent a single word of an idiom is essential to the construction upon which the idiom is built in Goldberg's unification account. At the same time, we need to answer the inconsistency that some idioms are flexible or admit a creative use, and others do not, as in Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor (1988). I then address the issue of the social context and the social situation of the proverb. The social situation of the proverb and the imaginary situation presented by it are linked by analogy or cross-space mapping in Seitel's account. Seitel calls this correlation, and it brings us closer to the type of mappings we are studying. I also describe the Great Chain Metaphor as a mechanism for understanding proverbs in that particular mapping to the human environment or social situation.
I have used an overview of the conceptual base theory in order to triangulate the reference-point I am concerned with: matching at the ideational level of the instantiation phase. I propose the interpretation of Honeck's figurative meaning as generic meaning or meaning in the generic space.

Gibbs et al. (1997) is informative for the study of how we may arrange information at the generic level. I observe that much of organizational work is achieved through image-schemata, basic metaphors, and the way images can arrange and govern the mappings through the invariance principle.

Lastly, I went through the mechanism of conceptual integration using the taxonomy provided by Turner and Fauconnier (2001) to propose different types of mental space arrangements, yielding an alternative mental space configuration for proverb using coordination and analogy, and designing the way this configuration may vary.

The first alternative to the proverb configuration I offered in the starting section might be based on the possibility of extracting inferences directly from the blending space, instead of applying the common structure gathered in the generic space as I propose in the starting section. The advantages of this approach are, apart from economy of spaces, that the diverse evaluation of the proverb by the user will affect the extraction of the relevant structure. In fact, since the blend is not the "final product", as shown by the double-scope integration (Turner 2000), backward projection is also available; the blend, so to speak, with its newly emerged structure, can work as input. This means that there is no single given direction in projection (say, from inputs to blend), but that the general restrictive principles are associated with information access, viewpoint and base (Fauconnier 1997). For my purposes, this means that I do not need to postulate a double configuration, one for the proverb and the other for matching in conversation, and, again, a double generic space. However, at the same time, even if there is no need to do it, there is indeed the possibility of doing it. In other words, the generic space can work as input in the web.

As far as proverb matching in conversational situations, a proverb structure might be thought of as a shared organizing topology. That shared organizing topology would become a frame network if the proverb were used in the same "literal" cognitive environment. Otherwise, we may better think of it as a one-sided shared topology; that is, the topology the user extracts from the proverb is mapped onto the conversation topic, which is reorganized in the blend.

Another possibility, still according to my reading of Turner and Fauconnier (1998), is the unfilled shared topology network, at least for the proverbs I have labeled category builders by opposition. The idea is that the generic space does not inherit any common structure from the inputs, but the inputs present contradicting or incompatible relations.

This study has presupposed some kind of transparency in proverbs. Intended to contest some hermetic romantic studies of "ethnic" phenomena. Nevertheless, human being is able to make sense even in cases where the proverb itself is too opaque. In these cases, both the inputs of the proverb and the input of the context share the same generic space, and the same blending space. The context input would
work as source input, but once the proverb has acquired a stipulated meaning, the order of spaces can be inverted.

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