1. Introduction

Hovav & Levin (1995) distinguish between morphological operations which affect the argument structure of verbs and morphological operations which affect the lexical representation of verb meanings. Morphological operations which affect lexical meanings either alter the aspectual template associated with a predicate or the pairing of names with aspectual templates. I argue that what is known as out of control in the Salishan literature provides crucial evidence for the existence of morphological operations which affect lexical verb meanings by either altering the aspectual template associated with a verb or the pairing of a name with an aspectual template.

I first examine the restrictions that out of control morphology in St'át'í'mcets (Lillooet Salish, henceforth ST) imposes on the interpretation of the predicate to which it affixes. When the out of control morpheme ka...a is affixed to either an unergative or a transitive verb, it suppresses the control of the agent over the action denoted by the verb, yielding either of two readings. When the verb denotes an activity, it yields an “able to” reading (e.g. I am able to work); when the verb has a causative meaning, it yields an accidental reading (e.g. I accidentally hit him). Under the scope of certain operators (such as the progressive or negation), this accidental reading is lost and the ability reading obtains (e.g. I can't hit him).
Crucially, out of control morphology also applies freely to unaccusative predicates, yielding a suddenly/accidental reading (e.g. *I got hit suddenly/accidentally*). Under the scope of certain operators (such as the progressive or negation), this reading is lost and the ability/capacity reading surfaces (e.g. *I couldn't get hit*).

I argue that the range of readings that out of control yields in ST' can uniformly be derived from two proposals. First, unaccusatives and causatives share the same underlying semantic representation as argued by Chierchia (1989) and Pustejovsky (1995) among others. Second, out of control is the equivalent of a passive defined on the lexical semantic representation of a predicate.

The analysis developed here is based on the generative model of lexical representation proposed by Pustejovsky (1989, 1991, 1995). Within a model where the aspectual properties of verbs—and ultimately sentences—are configurationally and compositionally defined in terms of recursive event structures, out of control can be defined as the equivalent of a passive on the lexical meaning of a predicate.

Hovav & Levin define passive as an operation that affects the number of arguments that a predicate has without affecting its lexical meaning. Conversely, I define out of control as an operation that affects the lexical meaning of a predicate without affecting the number of arguments it has. Whereas passive suppresses an external argument position (or the agent role in the thematic grid of the verb), out of control in ST' suppresses either the initial subevent in the event structure of a predicate, or the name (the constant) that is associated with this subevent. That out of control yields precisely either an ability reading, an accidental reading or a suddenly (spontaneous occurrence) reading follows from this hypothesis.

The assumption that causatives and unaccusatives share the same underlying semantic structure will explain why a morphological operation that suppresses agent control and also productively applies to unaccusatives, should or could exist in the first place. It further explains why out of control yields an accidental reading with both causatives and unaccusatives but an ability reading with unergatives. Finally, it explains the "spontaneous occurrence, suddenly, all at once" reading that out of control applied to an unaccusative yields. If the analysis proposed here is correct, then out of control provides very strong evidence for the claim that unaccusatives have underlyingly causative semantics, as proposed in Chierchia (1989), Levin & Hovav (1995) Pustejovsky (1995) and Reinhart (1991) among others. This result is all the more surprising in a language where unaccusatives are morphologically 'primitive'—that is, in a language where all transitives and unergatives are morphologically derived—as demonstrated by Davis (this volume) (see also Hale & Keyser, this volume, for related discussion).

2. Agent Control

In this first section, I briefly present two important aspects of the morphosyntax of Salish languages. We will first see that transitive and unergative predications are morphologically derived in ST', as established by Davis (this volume). I then turn to a phenomenon know as Control in the Salishan literature (Thompson 1976, 1985). We will see that morphology on the predicate in ST' can
mark the degree of control of the agent over the action denoted by the verb: an agent can be either in full control or out of control. The problem of control is further compounded by the fact that so-called out of control morphology can be applied to an unaccusative predicate yielding basically the same range of meanings as out of control applied to a predicate with a causative meaning.

2.1. Internal arguments

As Davis (this volume) demonstrates, Salish languages exhibit a fundamental asymmetry between internal and external arguments. Internal arguments are entailed by the meaning of the root, as illustrated below with examples from ST'. A bare root such as \( ~k'ac \) ‘dry’ or \( ~sek \) ‘hit’ in (1) is invariably interpreted as an unaccusative predicate: it selects an internal argument.

\[
(1) \begin{align*}
(a) & \quad ~k'ac \quad \text{ti} \quad s-ts'wan-a \\
& \quad \text{dry} \quad \text{DET} \quad \text{NOM-salmon-DET} \\
& \quad \text{‘The salmon dried’ or ‘The salmon is dry’} \\
(b) & \quad ~k'ac \quad \text{ti} \quad sqaycw-a \\
& \quad \text{dry} \quad \text{DET} \quad \text{man-DET} \\
& \quad \text{‘The man (got) dried’ or ‘The man is dry’} \\
(c) & \quad ~sek \quad \text{ti} \quad sqaycw-a \\
& \quad \text{hit} \quad \text{DET} \quad \text{man-DET} \\
& \quad \text{‘The man was hit (with a stick or a whip)’} \\
(d) & \quad *~k'ac \quad \text{ti} \quad sqaycw-a \quad \text{ti} \quad s-ts'wan-a \\
& \quad \text{dry} \quad \text{DET} \quad \text{man-DET} \quad \text{DET} \quad \text{salmon-DET} \\
& \quad \text{‘The man dried the salmon’}
\end{align*}
\]

The ungrammaticality of (1d) demonstrates that a bare (unsuffixed) root in ST’ is intransitive: it licenses a single argument. (1a-c) demonstrate that a bare root in ST’ is unaccusative: the single argument of that a bare root licenses is an internal argument. For instance, the sole argument of either \( ~k'ac \) ‘dry’ in (1b) or \( ~sek \) ‘hit’ in (1c) cannot be interpreted as an agent but only as a patient or theme.

2.2. External arguments

All unergative and transitive predicates are derived via morphosyntactic operations; see Davis (this volume) for an extensive discussion. Unergative predicates are derived by suffixation of an “intransitivizer” to the root. In (2a-c), we see that suffixation of either the active intransitivizer (ACT) \(-cal\) or the middle (MDL) \(-Vm(')\) derives an unergative predicate denoting an activity. I refer to predicates suffixed with either \(-cal\) or \(-Vm(')\), as derived unergatives.

\[
(2) \begin{align*}
\text{Derived ACTive Unergatives} \\
(\text{b}) & \quad [\text{~k'ac} - cal] \quad \text{ti} \quad sqaycw-a \\
& \quad \text{dry} \quad \text{ACT} \quad \text{DET} \quad \text{man-DET} \\
& \quad \text{‘The man dries (stuff)’} \\
(\text{b}) & \quad [\text{~sek} - cál] \quad \text{ti} \quad sqaycw-a \\
& \quad \text{hit} \quad \text{ACT} \quad \text{DET} \quad \text{man-DET} \\
& \quad \text{‘The man hits (people)’}
\end{align*}
\]
There is, however, a small set of bare roots that are interpreted as unergative predicates (roughly 75 roots out of 2000), as illustrated in (3). Thus, whereas the unsuffixed root *√sek* ‘hit with a stick or a whip’ selects an internal argument (as was illustrated in (1c)), the unsuffixed root *√alkst* ‘work’ in (3) selects an external argument. Note that the set of unsuffixed unergatives corresponds roughly to the set of unergatives in English (e.g. *√matq* ‘walk’, *√n’as* ‘go’ or *√q’ilhil* ‘run’ — see Davis (this volume) for an exhaustive list). Davis demonstrates that these unsuffixed unergative roots are in fact concealed (lexicalized) middles and as such do not invalidate the generalization that bare roots in ST’ are unaccusative. He then concludes that unergative predicates are uniformly derived from bare roots by suffixation of either an overt intransitivizer as is the case in (2) or a zero (null) intransitivizer as is the case in (3).

Finally, a transitive predication is constructed by combining a root (e.g. *√sek* ‘be hit’ or *√k’ac* ‘be dry’ in (1)) with a transitivizer. There are two primary transitivizers that I will discuss here: the causative (CAU) and the directive (DIR), as illustrated below.

2.3. Agent Control

Note that both the causative transitivizer -s and the directive transitivizer -Vn(‘) combine with an unaccusative predicate to yield a predicate with an inherent causative meaning. In particular, applying either the CAU or the DIR to the root ‘(be) hit’ in (1c) yields *x caused y to be(come) hit* - that is, *x hit y*, as illustrated in (4a) and
(Sa). Applying either of these transitivizers to the root ‘(be) dry’ in (1a) yields ‘x caused y to be(come) dry’ —that is, ‘x dried y'; cf. (4b) and (5b). Finally, applying the CAU or the DIR to the root ‘fall’ yields ‘x caused y to fall’ — that is, ‘x dropped y'; cf. (4c) and (5c). What then is the difference between the CAUSative in (4) and the DIRECTive in (5)? The difference lies in the degree of “conscious (mindful) control” (Dixon 1993) of the agent over the action denoted by the predicate. The directive transitivizer is said to yield a control transitive (cf. Thompson 1985): the subject of a directive has full control over the action denoted by the verb. Thus, (5a) cannot be used to report that the boy inadvertently hit the ball. Likewise, the ACT and MDL intransitivizers yield control intransitives: the referents of the subjects in (2) are human participants to which we ascribe conscious (mindful) control with respect to the situation denoted by the verb. They are neither hitting nor hunting inadvertently.

In contrast, the CAUSative yields a neutral control transitive: the subject of a CAUSative either lacks control or need not have control over the action denoted by the predicate. In van Eijk’s own words,

(6) In the above cases, -s- [= CAU] is used only where we do not have full control of the subject over the action. However, as we shall see in 18.8, -s- is not a ‘non-control’ transitivizer but rather it is indifferent (or neutral) with regard to control; N [= DIR] is definitely used to mark full control of the subject over the action. (van Eijk 1985: 134)

To summarize, the subject of a DIRECTive is an agent in full control over the action, whereas the subject of CAUSative is an agent that need not have control over the action: (4a) can be used to report that the boy inadvertently hit the ball; (5a) cannot. Note that this difference in degree of agent control between the CAUSative and the DIRECTive explains the shift in lexical meaning between (4c) and (5c): applying the CAUSative to the root ‘fall’ yields ‘drop’ whereas applying the DIRECTive to the same root yields either ‘drop’ or ‘throw’.

At first glance, it might seem that we could reduce agent control to volition or intentionality. For instance, we could stipulate that the subject of a directive is assigned the role volitional actor whereas the subject of a causative is assigned the role +/- volitional actor. This analysis however is untenable. There are at least three reasons for rejecting it.

First, volition is not inherent to the meaning of agent but merely a diagnostic for agentivity. Thus, although we can impute an intention or ascribe volition to the subject of a control predicate, this by no means entails that every sentence with a control predicate describes a volitional action. That volition or intentionality are merely diagnostics for agentivity is emphasized by Dowty (1979) in his discussion of active vs. stative sentences. Dowty argues that in the sentence John is being rude, John is not inadvertently rude. Crucially, however, this sentence does not entail that “John is intentionally rude but merely that the property of being rude is under his control, is something that John could avoid doing if he chose”. Dowty (1979) —for whom the notion of AGENT is built into the meaning of a higher predicate DO— then concludes that,
The meaning of DO cannot be equated with the notion of intentionality or volition. ...we call this reading volitional because we impute responsibility and purpose to the subject of an active sentence ...Thus, state under the unmediated control of the agent may be the best phrase for describing DO. (Dowty 1979: 118)

Thus, as Thompson (1985: 393) himself states “The traditional notion (non)-volitional covers only part of the semantic sphere represented and fails to capture the generalization.”

2.4. ‘Out of Control’

The second problem is that control cannot be reduced to a single binary opposition, as our discussion of the distinction between the full control directive and the neutral control causative should have already established. Indeed, control is a three way distinction: control vs. neutral control vs. out of control. In particular, Salish languages have what is called an out of control marker “...which emphasizes the absence of control over some state or event” (Thompson 1985: 401). As we shall see in the next section, when the out of control discontinuous clitic ka...a in ST’ is affixed to a verb with an external argument, it suppresses agent control, yielding either an ability reading or an accidental reading.

Finally, the third reason for not reducing control to an opposition between a volitional vs. non-volitional agent is that out of control applies freely to predicates which can never be under the control of an agent in the first place since they lack an external argument altogether. That is, it applies to unaccusative predicates, yielding a suddenly/all at once, accidental reading. I will argue that the assumption that causatives and unaccusatives share the same underlying semantic structure explains why a morphological operation that productively applies to unaccusatives —but also suppresses agent control whenever there is an agent— should or could exist in the first place. The distribution of the out of control readings in ST’ is summarized in the following sections.

2.4.1. The ability reading of ‘Out of Control’

When the discontinuous morpheme ka...a combines with either a zero (bare) unergative or an overtly derived unergative, it suppresses the agency of the agent, yielding an ‘able to’ reading. That is, once ka...a has been affixed to the verb, the sentence no longer describes an action or an event, but rather the ability or the capacity of the subject to perform the action denoted by the verb; compare (8a-d) with (2-3) above.

(8) Zero-unergatives

(a) ka álktst - kan - a
    OOC  - work  - 1SG.SUB- OOC
    ‘I am able to work’
Classification of Derived ACT unergatives

(b) \(ka\) - sek - cál - a ti twéw’w’et-a
   OOC - hit - ACT - OOC DET boy-DET
   ‘The boy is able to hit (people)’

(c) \(ka\) - k’áč - cal - a
   OOC - be dry - ACT - OOC
   ‘S/he is able to dry’

(d) \(ka\) - túp- - cal - a
   OOC - punch - ACT - OOC
   ‘S/he is able to punch’

Derived MDL unergatives

(e) \(ka\) - pix - em - a
   OOC - hunt - MDL OOC
   ‘S/he is able to hunt’

(f) \(ka\) - áts’x- - em’ - a
   OOC - seen - MDL - OOC
   ‘S/he is able to see’

Note that out of control can also yield a ‘managed to’ reading (e.g., I managed to work). I will not treat this reading as a third distinct reading but merely as the past of the ‘able to’ reading. In other words, I analyse I managed to work as I was able to work. —cf. van Eijk (1983: 17) who gives the following entry for \(ka...a\) “suddenly, unexpectedly, by accident, (finally) able to do it”.

2.4.2. The accidental reading of ‘Out of Control’

When \(ka...a\) combines with either an unaccusative or a causative, it does not yield an ‘able to’ reading. It yields an accidental reading, as illustrated in (9) and (10). In particular, note the parallel between (9a) and (10a), (9b) and (10b) or (9c) and (10c).

(9) Unaccusatives

(a) \(ka\) - kwís - a ti k’ért’ - a
   OOC - fallen OOC DET rock DET
   ‘The rocked dropped accidentally’

(b) \(ka\) - tség - a ta- qmút - s- - a
   OOC - torn OOC DET hat- 3SG.POSS -DET
   ‘His hat got torn by accident’

(c) \(ka\) - múł - a i n - silhts’ - a
   OOC - immersed OOC PLDET 1SG.POSS shoe - DET
   ‘My shoes got put in the water by accident’

(d) \(ka\) - guy’t - a
   OOC - sleep - OOC
   ‘He fell asleep by accident’

(e) \(ka\) - tsiq - kán - a
   OOC - stabbed - 1SG.SUB OOC
   ‘I got stabbed by accident’

(2) Note that neutral control transitives can also give rise to a ‘managed to’ reading (without out of control morphology, cf. Thompson 1985). Clearly, much more needs to be said about the distribution of this reading since it can also arise with neutral control causatives. However, since I have not as yet established its distribution, I set aside the issues that this reading raises in this paper.
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(f) \( ka - \text{tseg} - a \) \( n - \text{piph} - a \)
OC - torn OC 1SG.POSS paper - DET

‘My paper got accidentally torn’

(g) \( ka - \text{jáw} - a \) \( tí \) \( lóp - a \)
OC - hung OC DET rope-DET

‘The rope got hung up by accident’

(h) \( ka - \text{cúk’w} - a \) \( tí \) \( szik - a \)
OC - be pulled - OOC DET log - DET

‘The log got accidentally dragged’

(e.g. hooked on a truck)

(10) Causatives

(a) \( ka - \text{kwis} - (t)s - as - a \)
OC - fallen - CAU -ERG - OOC

‘He dropped something by accident’

(b) \( ka - \text{tseg} - s - as - a \)
OC - torn - CAU -ERG - OOC

‘He tore it by accident’

(c) \( ka - \text{mul} - s - as - a \)
OC - immersed - CAU -ERG - OOC

‘He put it in water by accident’

(d) \( ka - \text{mat’} - s - kan - a \)
OC - mixed - CAU -1SG.SUB - OOC

‘I mixed it up accidentally’

(e) \( ka - \text{sek} - s - ás - a \) \( tí \) \( sq’úm’ts-a \) \( tí \) \( twéw’w’et-a \)
OC - hit - CAU ERG OOC DET ball - DET DET boy - DET

‘The boy hit the ball (accidentally)’

* ‘The boy is able to hit the ball’

Finally, out of control morphology cannot co-occur with the DIRECTive transitivizer (recall that the DIR signals a full control transitive):

(11) *\( ka - \text{vísék} - en - a \) *\( ka - \text{vápqw7} - an - a \)
OOC - hit - DIR - OOC OOC - scared - DIR - OOC

(3) Interestingly, van Eijk notes that “Many cases of \(-s\) [= causative] seem to have a momentaneous aspect... , while N [= Directive] often refers to a continuous action.” (van Eijk 1985: 153).
or more aspectual processes”. For instance, the root √qəw ‘break’ does not surface unsuffixed, it surfaces as either ka-qəw-a ‘break suddenly’ or as z-qəw ‘broken’ (with the stative prefix s-).

(12) (a) ka - pāq7 - l̓hák̓n - a
OOC - scared - 1SG.SUB - OOC
‘I got scared suddenly’
(b) ka - pāq7 - s - kán - a
OOC - scared - CAU - 1SG.SUB - OOC
‘I accidentally scared him’
(c) ka - qam’t - a
OOC - hit - - OOC
‘to be hit suddenly (accidentally)’
(d) ka - qam’t - s - kan- - a
OOC - hit - CAU - 1SG.SUB - OOC
‘I accidentally hit someone’
(e) ka - t’al - a
OOC - stop OOC
‘to stop accidentally, suddenly’
(h) ka - lhéxw - a
OOC - come up - OOC
‘to break, shatter all of sudden’
(f) ka - nem’ - a
OOC - blind - OOC
‘to go blind suddenly’
(i) ka - lwès - a
OOC - break - OOC
‘to appear all of sudden’
(g) ka - hál’h - a
OOC - roll down - OOC
(He appeared,’ or ‘He was born’
‘to roll down suddenly’

Can we make sense of the fact that out of control yields either a suddenly or an accidental reading when applied to unaccusative predicates that denote either a simple state (e.g. √nem’ ‘blind’) or a change of state (e.g. √xléq’ ‘to roll down’)? I believe we can in so far as both these out of control readings focus on the inception of the state or the change of state specified by the predicate.

Dowty (1986: 50) argues that “an adverb like suddenly will cancel the pragmatic inference that the state obtained earlier...[yielding] an inceptive interpretation of the stative”. This is precisely the effect of out of control when it applies to a root such as √pāq7 ‘scared’ or √nem’ ‘blind’: it focuses on the inception of the state, on its sudden, spontaneous coming into being. As for the accidental reading, it is also an inceptive reading. As Smith (1983: 489) notes, adverbs “which relate to control” such as accidentally occur freely in inchoatives where they are associated with the inception of a change of state by an unnamed agent. In sum, out of control signals either that a (change of) state came into being suddenly, spontaneously and/or accidentally. In Thompson’s (1985: 420) words: out of control in Salish suggests “the spontaneous happening or result of some unspecified agent’s act”.

To conclude, out of control raises three major questions. First, recall that a neutral control transitive and an out of control transitive both denote events which are not under the unmediated control of an agent. What then is exactly the difference between a neutral control transitive and an out of control transitive?
Second, what is the generalization (if any) that explains the distribution of the ability reading and the accidental reading? Thirdly, why can the same morphological operation suppress agent control when applied to a predicate with an external argument and at the same productively apply to predicates which lack external arguments—that is, to predicates denoting actions which are never under the control of an agent in the first place. Finally, what is out of control? In particular, why does it yield precisely the readings that it yields and how do we formally and uniformly derive these readings?

3. Causation vs. Accidental Causation

Recall that both the out of control causative in (13a) and the neutral control causative in (13b)\(^4\) can be used to report a situation in which Bucky inadvertently breaks the window.

(13) (a) The ‘Out of Control’ Causative
\[
\text{ka - sek’w - s - ás - a ti nk’wan’ústen-a s-Bucky OOC - broken - CAU - ERG - OOC DET window-DET NOM-Bucky ‘Bucky broke the window (unintentionally)’}
\]
(b) The Causative
\[
\text{sek’w - p - s - ás ti nk’wan’ústen-a s-Bucky broken - INC - CAU - ERG DET window-DET NOM-Bucky ‘Bucky broke the window (unintentionally)’}
\]

What then is the difference between a simple causative and an out of control causative? As the following paradigms illustrate, these two types of causatives differ in one fundamental respect. The causer in an out of control causative must be a human agent: substitution of the event nominal ‘the wind’ or ‘the storm’ for ‘Bucky’ in (13a) yields an ungrammatical sentence, as shown in (14).

(14) The ‘Out of Control’ Causative
(a) *\text{ka - sek’w - s - ás - a ti nk’wan’ústen-a ti k’úxem-a OOC broken - CAU - ERG - OOC DET window-DET DET wind-DET ‘The wind broke the window’}
(b) *\text{ka - sek’w - s - ás - a ti nk’wan’ústen-a ti qyl-alh-úmicw-a OOC broken - CAU - ERG - OOC DET window-DET DET bad-CON-land-DET ‘The storm broke the window’}

In contrast, there is no such restriction on the subject of a causative: the causer can be either a human agent such as ‘Bucky’ in (13b), or an event nominal such as ‘the wind’ or ‘the storm’:

(4) The root \text{sek’w} is in fact a bound root: it never surfaces unsuffixed. Thus, in (13b) and (15) (as well as (19a), (15c), (47), (63a) and (67b) below in the text), it surfaces with the inchoative suffix -p. In (13a), the root surfaces suffixed with out of control ka...a. Note that the inchoative marker is in complementary distribution with the out of control marker. It is also incompatible with the active intransitivizer -cał, as shown by (19e).
The Causative

(a) sek’w - p - s - ás ti nk’wan’ústen-a ti k’éxem-a
   broken - INC - CAU - ERG DET window-DET DET wind-DET
   ‘The wind broke the window’

(b) sek’w - p - s - ás ti nk’wan’ústen-a ti qvl-alh-tmicw-a
   broken - INC - CAU - ERG DET window-DET DET bad-CON-land-DET
   ‘The storm broke the window’

In order to understand what this asymmetry signifies, I will first interpret it in terms of Jackendoff’s (1990) decomposition of the traditional notion of Agent into two independent roles: extrinsic instigation and willful agency (on the notion of Agent see also Minkoff, this volume).

(16) (a) One sense of Agent, “extrinsic instigator of action” is captured by the role “first argument of causer”... However, a second sense is “volitional actor”. This appears in the well-known ambiguity of Bill rolled down the hill, where Bill may or may not [emphasis added] be performing the action willfully. Generally, it seems that any Actor, if animate is subject to this ambiguity...” (Jackendoff 1990: 128-129)
   “The possibility of willfulness arises from the fact that an event of causation can be reanalyzed as an actor performing an action... . Willfulness or intentionality is an optional property of an actor...”
   (Jackendoff 1983: 176)

(b) Extrinsic Instigator
   The wind rolled the ball down the hill

(c) Willful Agency (+/- volitional actor)
   Bill rolled down the hill

The causative and the out of control causative thus differ in one crucial respect: an extrinsic instigator such as the wind in (16b) or the storm in (14-15) is never the subject of an out of control causative. I conclude that only a participant that is capable of willful agency can be out of control. Out of control morphology signals that the action denoted by the verb is not under the control of this human agent: Bucky in (13a) acted accidentally or unintentionally. Crucially, only participants capable of willful agency can accidentally bring about the occurrence of an event, as illustrated in (17) were we see that adverbs of control (accidentally or deliberately) are illicit in sentences with event descriptions in subject position:

(17) (a) *Flyod’s singing accidentally/deliberately broke the window
(b) *The cold accidentally/deliberately froze the lake
(c) *A change in the molecular structure accidentally/deliberately broke the window
   (adapted from Partee quoted in Parsons 1990: 113)

We can thus identify out of control causation as accidental causation. This generalization explains the restrictions that out of control imposes on the external
argument of a predicate: (14a-b) are ungrammatical because they can only have the illicit interpretation in (18a'-b'), respectively. The wind and the storm do not do anything—hence, they cannot accidentally break the window.

(18) (a) *ka sek'w - s - ás - a ti nk'wan'ústen-a ti k'éxem-a
    OOC broken - CAU - ERG - OOC DET window-DET DET wind-DET
    (a') *The wind broke the window accidentally'
(b) *ka sek'w - s - ás - a ti nk'wan'ústen-a ti qvl-alh-tmlcw-a
    OOC broken - CAU - ERG - OOC DET window-DET DET bad-CON-land-DET
    (b') *The storm broke the window accidentally'

We can now answer our initial question: what is the difference between a neutral control and an out of control transitive? Since both specify causation of a change of state which is not under the unmediated control of an agent? A neutral control causative merely specifies causation—whether the resulting event was accidentally/deliberately caused by a human agent, or non-accidentally caused by an extrinsic instigator. In contrast, an out of control causative only specifies accidental causation. The subject of an out of control causative must be a human participant because only participants capable of willful agency can accidentally bring about the occurrence of an event. As we shall see in section 10, the hypothesis that out of control is the equivalent of a passive defined on the event structure of a predicate will explain why out of control transitives can only be used to describe events that were accidentally caused.

4. The distribution of the ability and the accidental reading

I now address the question of which generalization underlies the distribution of the ability and the accidental reading of out of control ka...a.

4.1. Inherent Aspect

Recall first that when ka...a combines with either a causative or an unaccusative, it yields an accidental reading, whereas when it combines with either a zero unergative or a derived unergative, it yields an ability reading. I give two paradigms illustrating all the relevant readings derived from the root sek'w 'broken'.

(19) (a) sek'w - p ti nk'wan'ústen-a
    broken - INC DET window-DET
    'The window broke.'
(b) Adding out of control to an unaccusative
\[ ka - sek'w - a \ ti \ nk'wan'ústen-a \]
\textit{OOC\ broken - OOC\ DET\ window-DET}\textit{\‘The window was accidentally/suddenly broken\‘}
\textit{\‘The window is able to/can break\‘}

(c) Deriving a \textit{CAusative} from an unaccusative
\[ sek'w - p - s - ás - a \ ti \ nk'wan'ústen-a \]
\textit{broken - INC - CAU - ERG\ DET\ window-DET\‘He broke the window’ \‘x cause y to be broken’}\n
(d) Adding out of control to the derived \textit{CAusative}
\[ ka - sek'w - s - ás - a \ ti \ nk'wan'ústen-a \ ti \ sqáycw-a \]
\textit{OOC\ broken - CAU - ERG\ DET\ window-DET\ DET\ man-DET\‘The man broke the window accidentally.’}
\textit{\‘He is able to break the window’}

(e) Deriving an unergative\textsuperscript{6}
\[ sek'w - cál \ ti \ sqáycw-a \]
\textit{broken - ACT \ DET\ man-DET\‘The man breaks (things in general)\‘}

(f) Adding out of control to the derived unergative
\[ ka - sek'w - cál - a \ ti \ sqáycw-a \]
\textit{OOC\ broken - ACT\ DET\ man-DET\‘The man breaks (things in general) accidentally’\‘The man is able to break (things in general) accidentally’}

The ability reading arises when out of control is affixed to an unergative predicate, as illustrated in (19f). In contrast, the accidental reading arises when out of control is affixed to either an unaccusative as in (19b) or a \textit{CAusative} verb as in (19d). The difference between these two classes of predicates is aspectual: a (derived) unergative denotes an activity —that is, an atelic or unbounded event (an event that is ongoing, that has no culmination or natural end point). In contrast, both unaccusatives and causatives denote telic or bounded events (events that culminate when the change of state specified by the lexical meaning of the root comes about— e.g. when the \textit{window} in (19a) or (19c) comes to be broken. The following preliminary generalization emerges.

(20) The accidental reading obtains in sentences describing telic (bounded) events. The ability reading obtains elsewhere (i.e. in sentences which describe atelic (unbounded) events).

In the following section, I will provide crucial support for the generalization in (20) by examining the effect of VP-external operators on the distribution of out of control readings.

\textsuperscript{6} Recall that unergatives are morphologically derived from unaccusatives by suffixation of an intransitivizer; see Davis (this volume), the discussion in section 2.2 and also footnote 15.
4.2. VP-external Operators and the distribution of the accidental reading

I have argued that the accidental reading arises when out of control morphology is applied to a telic verb. This reading, however, is lost when either the combination [out of control + causative] or [out of control + unaccusative] occurs under the scope of certain operators such as the progressive auxiliary. As shown by the minimal pairs in (21), only the ability reading obtains under the scope of the progressive:

(21) The progressive auxiliary
(a) \(ka\ - sek'w\ - s\ - ás\ - a\ ti\ nk'wan'ústen-ati\ sqáycw-a\)
    OOC broken -CAU -ERG -OOC DET window-DET DET man-DET
    ‘The man broke the window accidentally’
    *‘He is able to break the window’
(a') \(wa7\ ka\ - sek'w\ - s\ - ás\ - a\ ti\ nk'wan'ústen-ati\ ti\ sqáycw-a\)
    PROG OOC -broken- CAU -ERG -OOC DET window-DET DET man-DET
    ‘The man is able to break the window’
    *‘The man is breaking the window accidentally’
(b) \(ka\-sek-s-ás-a\ ti\ sq'úm'ts-a\ ti\ twéw'wet-a\)
    OOC-hit-CAU-ERG-OOC DET ball-DET DET boy-DET
    ‘The boy hit the ball (accidentally)’
    *‘The boy is able to hit the ball’
(b') \(wa7\ ka\ - sek\ - s\ - ás\ - a\ ti\ sq'úm'ts-a\ ti\ twéw'wet-a\)
    PROG OOC -hit - CAU -ERG -OOC DET ball-DET DET boy-DET
    ‘The boy is able to hit the ball’
    *‘The boy is hitting the ball accidentally’
(c) \(ka\ - kwís\ - a\ ti\ k'éth'-a\)
    OOC -fall -OOC DET rock-DET
    ‘The rock accidentally fell’
(c') \(wa7\ ka\ - kwís\ - a\ ti\ k'éth'-a\)
    PROG OOC -fall -OOC DET rock-DET
    ‘The rock can fall’

The distribution of the out of control readings in (21) follows from the generalization in (20), given the well-known similarities between progressive event sentences and statives. In particular, for Dowty (1986), a progressive sentence is aspectually stative (no matter what the aspectual class of its lexical verb) because it has the criterial property of statives — namely, the subinterval property. The accidental reading is lost when the out of control-transitive occurs under the progressive marker \(wa7\) because a sentence with the progressive no longer describes a telic event: it focuses on an interval in the temporal structure of the verb that leads up to but does not include its culmination point. Thus, when out of control is applied to a causative under the scope of the progressive, the ability reading obtains because the sentence describes an open ended event (a process).

(7) According to the subinterval property, if a states holds for an interval, it does so at the smallest subinterval of that interval. Thus, Max was running is classified as stative because if Max was running from 1:00 until 2:00 PM, then he was running at all (or most) subintervals of this interval.
The accidental reading is also lost when either an out of control unaccusative or an out of control causative occurs under negation as in (22b-c) or under the adverb 'always' as in (22d-f).

(22) Negation and adverbial quantification
(a) ka-sek-s-ás-a ti sq'úm'ts-a ti twéw'w'et-a
   OOC-hit-CAU-ERG-OOC DET ball-DET DET boy-DET
   'The boy hit the ball (accidentally)'
(b) kw-7aow kw-s ka-sek-s-ás-a ti sq'úm'ts-a ti twéw'w'et-a
   NEG DET-NOM OOC-hit-CAU-ERG-OOC DET ball-DET DET boy-DET
   'The boy is not able to hit the ball'
   *'The boy is accidentally not hitting the ball'
(c) kw-7aow kw-s kwis- a ti k'et'h'-a
   NEG DET-NOM OOC - fall - OOC DET rock-DET
   'The rock can't fall' ('There's no way that rock can fall')
(d) papt sek-s-ás ti sq'úm'ts-a ti twéw'w'et-a
   always hit-CAU-ERG DET ball-DET DET boy-DET
   'The boy always hits the ball'
(e) papt ka-sék-s-as-a ti sq'úm'ts-a ti twéw'w'et-a
   always OOC-hit-CAU-ERG-OOC DET ball-DET DET boy-DET
   'The boy is always able to hit the ball'
   *'The boy is accidentally always hitting the ball'
(f) papt kw-s ka-gúy't-a ti sk'úk'wm'it-a
   always DET-NOM OOC-sleep-OOC DET child-DET
   'The child always goes to sleep/ is always able to sleep'

Once again, the distribution of the out of control readings in (22) follows from the generalization in (20). The accidental reading is lost in (22b-c) because it can arise only in sentences which describe (telic) events and negated sentences do not describe events: (22b) (with or without ka...a) asserts that no hitting event occurred at some contextually salient time. Indeed, it has often been suggested that negation has the effect of converting a sentence describing an event into a state description (e.g. Max didn't die entails that Max is alive). (20), thus, correctly predicts the unavailability of the accidental reading under negation. Likewise, the loss of the accidental reading in (22d-f) where the verb is under the scope of the adverbial quantifier papt 'always' is not surprising if,

(23) [Q]uantificational sentences behave very much like sentences which describe states (In fact, this is one of the reasons why quantificational sentences are sometimes classified as state describing).
   (Kamp & Reyle 1993: 638).

Thus, (22e-f) do not describe the occurrence of an event but a generic or characteristic property of the subject. For concreteness, I assume that when the universal adverb of quantification papt applies to an event denoting predicate, it yields an individual level predicate (cf. Demirdache 1996). The sentences in (22e-f) are, thus, aspectually stative and an accidental reading is consequently unavailable.
Finally, the accidental reading is lost when an out of control causative occurs under the scope of a modal operator (e.g. *kelh ‘will, might’ or *k'a ‘apparently’).

(24) **Modality**

(a) \(ka - sek - s - as - á \) \(kelh ti sq'um'ts-a ti twéw'vet-a\)
\(OOC - hit - CAU-ERG - OOC MOD DET ball-DET \) \(DET \) \(boy-DET\)
'The boy will/might be able to hit the ball'

*The boy will/might be hitting the ball accidentally'*

(b) \(ka - kwis - a \) \(kelh ti k'et'h'-a\)
\(OOC - fall - OOC MOD DET rock-DET\)
'The rock will/might drop'

*The rock will/might drop accidentally'*

This time, the unavailability of the accidental reading does not follow from the generalization in (20): (24) does not describe an atelic event (that is, either a process or a state). It describes an irrealis event, an event that will either necessarily or possibly culminate at some future time. Accordingly, (20) must be revised as in (25a).

(25a) The accidental reading obtains in sentences which describe telic events that have culminated at some past time \(t\). The ability reading obtains elsewhere.

Note, however, that it is not surprising that the accidental reading is uniformly lost under the scope of either a modal, negation or the progressive if, as argued by Dowty (1996), any sentence under the scope of the progressive, negation or a modal is aspectually stative. In particular, Dowty argues that sentences with either the progressive, negation or a modal are aspectually stative because they have the criterial property of stative sentences: the subinterval property (see footnotes 7 and 9). Adopting Dowty’s criteria for defining aspectual classes, we could replace the generalization in (25a) with (25b).

(25b) The accidental reading obtains in sentences which describe accomplishment/achievements. The ability reading obtains elsewhere (i.e. in sentences which describe activities or which are aspectually stative).

Let’s recapitulate. We first established that the accidental reading can only be defined for those predicates whose inherent temporal structure includes a culmination point —that is, for verbs denoting either a change of state or causation of a change of state but not for verbs denoting activities (e.g. unergatives). We then established that the distribution of the two out of control readings is not *solely*...
determined by the inherent temporal structure of the predicate to which ka...a is affixed: it is determined by the temporal contour of the sentence as a whole. In particular, the accidental reading is lost in a sentence with either the progressive, negation, an adverb of quantification or a modal because such a sentence is aspectually stative —no matter what the aspectual class of it lexical verb (Dowty 1986). Aktionsarten —in particular, whether the lexical meaning of the verb itself makes available a culmination point— determines to a large extent the semantics of out of control morphology merely because it determines to a large extent the aspectual structure of the sentence. In sum, the distribution of the accidental reading is also determined by VP-external operators because aspect is not solely a property of verbs or verb phrases but a property of the entire sentence, determined compositionally by the aspectual structure of the predicate in combination with predicate-external operators (cf. Dowty 1986 or Smith 1983).

Before closing this section, I would like to emphasize that the distribution of the accidental reading in ST’ is not surprising, as the following English paradigm is intended to illustrate. The contrast between (26a) and (26a’) illustrates that the adverb accidentally cannot occur—or yields a very strained interpretation— in sentences describing states, activities or characteristic properties but occurs freely in sentences describing telic events. (26b-e) show that the accidental reading is lost (or strained) under the scope of the progressive, negation or the future.

(26) (a) * Max hates asparagus accidentally vs. (a’) Rosa hit Max accidentally
   * Max walks accidentally
   * Max accidentally walked
   Rosa fell accidentally
   Max accidentally walked to the store
(b) * Rosa is breaking her leg accidentally vs. (b’) Rosa broke her leg accidentally
   * The vase is falling accidentally
   The vase fell accidentally
   Max punched Gerald deliberately
   Max fell deliberately
(c) √ Max didn’t accidentally punch Gerald
   √ Max didn’t accidentally fall
   Max punched Gerald
   Max fell
(d) * Max accidentally didn’t punch Gerald
   * Max accidentally didn’t fall
   Max accidentally punched Gerald
   Max accidentally fell
(e) */√ Max will accidentally punch Gerald
   */√ Max will accidentally fall
   OK only if speaker is clairvoyant
   OK only if speaker is clairvoyant

In sum, only events which are asserted to have happened can (easily) be presented or viewed as accidental —be it in ST’ or in English. Finally, support for the generalizations presented in this section comes from Soh (1994). Soh analyses the meanings associated with the verbal prefix ter in Malay. This prefix yields either an adjectival passive reading, an accidental reading or an abilitative reading. Soh states that the accidental reading occurs in transitive sentences with perfective aspect and is incompatible with negation; in contrast the ability reading is imperfective and common in
negative statements. The distribution of out of control in ST', thus, subsumes the
distribution of ter- in Malay.10

5. What is 'Out of Control'?

I now turn to the core question that out of control raises: what is it? In
particular, why can the same morphological operation suppress agent control with
verbs that have an external argument and at the same productively apply to
predicates which denote actions which are never under the control of an agent in
the first place —since they lack an external argument altogether? Why does it yield
precisely the readings that it yields and how do we formally derive these readings?

Hovav & Levin (1995) distinguish between morphological operations which
operate on the lexical representation of verb meanings (in their framework, derive
new Lexical Conceptual Structures) and morphological operations which solely affect
the argument structure of predicates. They define passive and reflexivization as
morphological operations which only affect argument structure. For instance,
reflexivization in French derives an intransitive verb from a transitive verb. As such
it affects the number of arguments that a predicate projects (the verb is syntactically
monadic) but it does not affect the aspectual classification of a predicate: Gerald hit
Max and Gerald hit himself in French describe the same type of event. In contrast,
morphological operations which affect lexical meanings alter either the aspectual
template associated with a predicate or the pairing of a name with an aspectual
template.

I propose that the range of readings that out of control yields in ST' can be
uniformly derived from the hypothesis that out of control is a passive defined on the lexical
meaning of a predicate. More precisely, I will define out of control as a morpho­
logical operation which alters either the aspectual template associated with a predicate
or the pairing of a name with an aspectual template, as proposed in Hovav & Levin.

5.1. The Syntax of Events (Pustejovsky 1988, 1991)

The analysis developed here is based on the model of lexical meaning proposed
aspectual properties of verbs —and then sentences— are configurationally and
compositionally defined in terms of recursive event structures. In particular, he
proposes that events are not atomic entities: they are decomposed into recursive
subeventual structures. There are three primitive event types whose terminal

(10) Soh (1994a) derives the three readings of ter- from a novel model of argument structure with two tiers
—a thematic tier and an aspectual tier (see also Soh 1994b, Grimshaw 1990 and Ritter & Rosen 1993)— and a
linking/delinking mechanism. The adjectival passive reading is derived by delinking both the aspectual role and the
thematic role associated with an external argument; the accidental reading is derived by delinking solely the
aspectual role of the external argument; and the abilitative reading is derived by delinking the aspectual roles of
both the external and the internal arguments.
elements are atomic events. I restrict the term \textit{eventuality} to atomic events. A state (S) is defined as in (27a): it is a single eventuality that is viewed or evaluated relative to no other eventuality. A process (P) is defined as in (27b): it is a sequence of identical eventualities. Finally, a transition (T) is defined in (27c): it is as a single event evaluated relative to another single event. Note that E in (27c) is an event meta-variable which stands for any of the three basic event types in (27), allowing recursion of event structure.

(27) \textit{Event types}

\begin{align*}
&\text{(a)} \quad S \rightarrow [e] \\
&\text{(b)} \quad P \rightarrow [e_1 \ldots e_n] \\
&\text{(c)} \quad T \rightarrow [E_1 E_2] \\
&\quad E = \{ S, P, T \}
\end{align*}

In both Pustejovsky and van Hout, every verb in the lexicon is associated with an event type. For instance, a stative verb is lexically specified with the event type of a state whereas an activity verb is associated with the event type of a process, as illustrated in (28a-b) respectively. Transitions can be recursive or non-recursive. In particular, a causative predicate is a recursive transition consisting of two subevents: the causative process (E1) and the resulting change of state (E2). E2 is itself analysed as a (non-recursive) transition: an eventuality is evaluated relative to its opposition (\textasciitilde p becomes p), as illustrated in (28c).

(28) \textit{Atelic event types} \hspace{1cm} \textit{Telic event type}

\begin{align*}
\text{Stative verbs} & \quad \text{Activity verbs} & \quad \text{Recursive transition} \\
(a) \quad \text{e.g. know, love} & \quad (b) \quad \text{e.g. walk, run, sleep} & \quad (c) \quad \text{e.g. break, melt} \\
S & \quad P & \quad T \\
| \quad \downarrow & \quad \downarrow & \quad \uparrow \\
e & \quad e_1 \ldots e_n & \quad [e_1 e_n] \quad [\text{\textasciitilde e e}]
\end{align*}


The event structure of a predicate specifies its default aspectual class. Recall however that the event type of a sentence need not match the event type of the main verb. As was discussed in section 4.2, VP-external operators such as adverbials, the progressive or negation shift the aspectual class of the verb. Aspectual shifts can also be triggered by the syntactic or semantic type of an internal argument (e.g. whether or not it is a PP or whether or not it is a bare plural). In Pustejovsky (1991), aspectual shifts which derive from the syntactic combination of a verb with either a PP or a resultative phrase are derived via event composition. Event composition is a generative procedure which constructs complex events from the three primitive event types defined in (27). The output of event composition must conform to (27).
In van Hout (1994, 1996), event composition derives shifts in the aspectual properties of verbs triggered by morpho-syntactic operations on the base form of the verb. In particular, she proposes that all predicates—that is, verbs, prefixes, particles and prepositions—are lexically associated with an event type. The event-type of a morphologically complex verb is compositionally derived by combining the event structure of the base verb with the event structure of the particle (or prefix). For instance, Dutch *eten* ‘eat’ by itself denotes an atelic event (the activity of eating) whereas *eten op* ‘eat up’ denotes a telic event: the particle *op* adds a resulting state to the meaning of the base verb (the state of being eaten up). This event type shift (from atelic to telic) is derived by combining the basic event type of the verb with the event type of the preposition, as in (29).

(29) Atelic-telic event type shifting
(a) *eten* ‘eat’          (b) *op* ‘up’

\[ \text{P} \quad \text{S} \Rightarrow \text{T} \]

\[ \text{P} \quad \text{S} \]

In sum, aspectual classes—be it of morphologically complex verbs, verb phrases or sentences—are compositionally derived by assuming a level of event structure and a generative procedure for composing events. Having thus set the stage, I will now turn to the question of how to formally define out of control.

5.3. ‘Out of Control’ and Event Decomposition

Following van Hout and Pustejovsky, I assume that certain morpho-syntactic processes operate on event structures. In particular, aspectual affixes (including (in)transitivizers) in ST' will be analysed as the equivalent of the event-type shifting particles or prepositions discussed by these authors—that is, they are event functors, applying to a given event type to derive a different event type—see Davis & Demirdache (1995).

Note that the event functors discussed by van Hout and Pustejovsky apply to a given event type to yield a higher event type: they apply to the primitive event types defined in (27-28) to yield complex (recursive) event types. For instance, the particle *op* in (29) applies to a process to yield a transition between a process and a resulting state. I will also assume that *ka...a* is a type-shifting functor. However, unlike the functors discussed above, it does not apply to a given event type to yield a higher event type but applies to a given event type to yield a lower event type. More precisely, I make the following preliminary hypothesis,

(30) When *ka...a* is affixed to a predicate, it shifts the event-type associated with this predicate into a lower event-type by suppressing the initial subevent in its event structure.

We will now see how the hypothesis in (30) derives the ability reading of out of control *ka...a*. 
6. Deriving the ability reading

Recall that the ability reading obtains whenever out of control is affixed to a bare or derived unergative, as was illustrated in section 2.4.1 above. Any analysis of out of control must thus provide answers to the following two questions.

(31) (a) Why does a sentence with an activity verb no longer assert the occurrence of an event once the verb is affixed with out of control morphology?
(b) Why does a sentence with an activity verb affixed with out of control assert the ability of the external argument to perform an action?

Note that (31a) and (31b) are correlated but independent questions: prima facie, it is not clear why suppressing the event reading of a verb should yield an ability reading — as opposed to say a generic habitual reading or an irrealis event reading, as I will argue shortly.

6.1. Type-Shifting an Activity Verb into a Stative Verb

(Derived) unergatives denote activities and as such have the event structure of a process:

(32) Event type of (derived) unergatives

\[
\text{WORK (x)}
\]

The out of control morpheme \textit{ka}...\textit{a} was defined as an event type-shifting functor that applies to a given event type to yield a lower event type by suppressing its initial subevent. Thus, when \textit{ka}...\textit{a} applies to a process, it will suppress the temporal interval that defines the beginning of the event (e1 in (32)), yielding the derivation in (33).

(33) (a) \textit{áלקסט} ‘to work’ \hspace{1cm} (b) \textit{ka-áלקסט-a} ‘to be able to work’

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{WORK (x)} \\
\end{array}
\]
As shown in (33b), when the event functor \( ka ... a \) applies to a verb denoting an activity, it yields a verb with the event structure of a stative-verb such as ‘know’ or ‘love’. Recall that the event structure associated with a stative verb is a state (a single eventuality evaluated relative to no other eventuality, as in (2Sa) above). Activity verbs like ‘work’ are similar to stative verbs like ‘know’ in that they describe episodes that lack a culmination point. However, the temporal schema of an activity verb differs from that of a stative verb in one crucial respect: whereas an activity verb describes an event that starts at an initial boundary, a stative verb does not describe any kind of change and thus has no natural boundaries. We now have a very simple answer to (31a). A sentence with an activity verb affixed with out of control morphology no longer asserts the occurrence of an event because out of control suppresses the temporal edge that defines the beginning of the event.

The notion of agent is associated with the participant that identifies the initial subevent of an event structure since the agent is the causer or the instigator of an event (cf. Grimshaw 1990, Pustejovsky 1989, 1991, Ritter & Rosen 1993 and van Hout 1994, 1996). A passive suppresses an external argument position (or the agent role in the thematic grid of the verb —depending on the theory). In contrast, out of control does not suppresses the external argument. It suppresses the agentivity of the external argument by suppressing the subevent in an event structure that defines the beginning of the event and is, thus, associated with the notion of agent / instigator.

6.2. Stative Verbs have an inherent ability reading (Vendler 1967)

I now turn to the question of why out of control yields precisely an ability/capacity reading. Note that generic/habitual sentences are aspectually stative and further can express capability or ability, as illustrated in (34) by the fact that the sentences in (a/b) can be paraphrased as in (a'/b').

(34) (a) John runs 50 miles without ever stopping’
(b) ‘The program parses complicated questions’
(a') ‘John can run 50 miles without ever stopping’
(b') ‘The program can parse complicated questions’

(Chierchia & McConnel-Ginet 1992: 234)

So why does type-shifting an activity verb into a stative verb yield a sentence which asserts that Bucky has the ability or the capacity to perform the activity of working as in (35a), but not a sentence that asserts that working is a characteristic or generic property of Bucky; that Bucky frequently or habitually works, as in (35b)?

(35) \( ka\) álkst - a s Bucky
OOC work OOC NOM Bucky
(a) ‘Bucky is able to work’ or ‘Bucky can work’
(b) * ‘Bucky works’ (i.e. Bucky habitually/regularly/frequently works)

That suppressing the event reading of an activity verb in ST” (with out of control morphology) yields a reading with the modal force of can is not surprising since
suppressing the event reading of activity verbs in English (with present tense) yields a range of readings which includes a deontic modal reading, as illustrated in (36a) from Zagona (1990: 390). What is surprising is that suppressing the event reading of an activity verb in ST' yields only a reading with the modal force of can but not a generic (habitual activity) reading or a reading with a future-oriented modal force (e.g. Bucky might/will work).

(36) (a) Deontic modal reading
What can she do? She sings
She walks already
She writes poetry

Habitual activity reading
Mary (always) sings
The chimney smokes
She eats very little

Future reading
Mary sings tomorrow
We eat at 7:00
We watch TV tonight

The answer to these questions is provided by Vendler (1967: 104-5) who argues that stative verbs have an inherent able to reading,

(37) Still, I think it might be useful to mention, by way of digression, a surprising feature about states which is not strictly connected with considerations of time.
... while to be able to run is never the same thing as to run or to be able to write a letter is by no means the same thing as to write it, it seems to be the case that, in some sense, to be able to know is to know, to be able to love is to love...
... Hence the airy feeling about I can know, I can love, I can like, and so forth. This also explains why I can believe it is very often used instead of I believe it.

Indeed, Vendler uses the inherent ability reading of statives as a test for classifying a verb as stative: ‘run’ and ‘write’ are not stative because ‘to be able to run’ and ‘to be able to write’ are not (respectively) equivalent to ‘to run’ and ‘to write’. Conversely, ‘to know’ is stative precisely because ‘to be able to know’ is equivalent to ‘to know’.

I have argued that out of control ka...a is an event functor that type-shifts an event type into a lower event type. When it applies to a process verb like ‘work’, it suppresses the eventuality that defines the beginning of the event and, as such, is the equivalent of a passive defined on event structure. The output of event decomposition is a verb associated with the same constant WORK—which represents the aspects of the meaning of ‘work’ that distinguishes it from other verbs with the same event structure—and the same argument structure. Crucially, however, this verb has the aspectual structure of a stative verb, such as know or love.\(^\text{11}\) We now have an answer to the question in (31b). The resulting sentence asserts the

---

(11) Note that the event structure proposed in (28a) for stative verbs such as know or love is clearly unsatisfactory: (28a) does not distinguish between a monadic predicate denoting an individual level property (e.g. tall) and a dyadic stative verb such as know. We cannot, thus, derive the addicity of a stative predicate from its
ability of the external argument to perform the action specified by the verb because stative verbs have an inherent ‘able to’ meaning.

In sections 9-10, I will show that the proposal that out of control is the equivalent of a passive defined on event structure uniformly derives the ability, the accidental reading and the spontaneous occurrence reading of out of control. However, in order to do so, we must first define the event structures of unaccusative and causative predicates.

7. Why does out of control apply to unaccusatives?

Recall that when out of control applies to causatives, it yields a subset of the readings that it yields with unaccusatives. In particular, out of control yields an accidental reading with both causatives and unaccusatives but an ability reading with unergatives. This reading is lost when either the unaccusative or the causative is under the scope of negation, the progressive, *papt* ‘always’ or modality — and an ability/capacity reading surfaces. With unaccusatives, out of control further yields a suddenly, spontaneous occurrence reading. This set of facts raises the following questions.

First, why can the same morphological operation suppress agent control with verbs that have an external argument and at the same time productively apply to predicates which denote events or states which are never under the control of an agent in the first place —since they lack an external argument altogether? How can such a morphological operation exist?

Second, why can out of control applied to an unaccusative yield an ‘it accidentally (suddenly) happened’ reading since accidentally is an adverb of volition or intentionality. Note, however, that “adverbs which relate to control” occur freely in inchoatives (Smith 1985: 489). As Smith argues, this is the case because they can be associated with the coming into existence of the change a state denoted by the predicate (Smith further observes that a control adverb can even occur in statives in so far as one can “associate the adverbiaal with the inception or maintenance of the state by an unnamed agent.”)

I believe that the answer to these questions is that unaccusatives have underlying causative semantics, as proposed in Chierchia (1989), Levin & Hovav (1995) Pustejovsky (1995) and Reinhart (1991) among others. This conclusion is surprising since ST’ is a language where unaccusatives are morphologically ‘primitive’ —that is, a language where all transitives and unergatives are morphologically derived (Davis, this volume). I by no means dispute this analysis: I merely claim that the semantic representation of a morphologically unaccusative predicate is causative. I will argue that the underlying causative hypothesis explains why control is an opposition that cuts across all aspectual classes and, thus, pervades the grammar of Salish languages,
as Thompson (1995) emphasizes. In particular, both controlled events (actions) and
non-controlled events (states and changes of states) can all be marked as out of the
control of an agent. Indeed, recall that for Thompson (1995: 420), out of control
suggests “the spontaneous happening or result of some unspecified agent’s act [emphasis
added]”.

The hypothesis that unaccusatives have underlying causative semantics will
explain 1) why out of control can apply to unaccusative predicates, 2) why out of
control applied to an causative yields a subset of readings that it yields with an
unaccusative, and 3) why it yields a spontaneous occurrence, all at once, suddenly
reading. I first spell out this hypothesis.

7.1. Unaccusatives are underlyingly causative

I propose that unaccusative and causative (be it control or non-control)
predicates share the same underlying event structure, as in Pustejovsky (1995). In
particular, both unaccusatives and causatives have the event type of a recursive
transition, as shown in (38). The complex event structure in (38) is constituted of
two subevents: a process P which brings about a resulting change of state T.

(38) Event structure of unaccusatives and causatives

\[
\begin{array}{c}
T \\
/ \ \\
P \\
\quad [e_1, e_n] \\
- e_e \\
\end{array}
\]

For Pustejovsky, the difference between an unaccusative and a causative
predicate is, as is standardly assumed, syntactic and aspectual. Aspectually, a
causative is an accomplishment: the event denoted by the verb is viewed as a whole,
is presented in its entirety; the “focus of the interpretation” thus includes the natural
endpoints of the event (the causing event P and the resulting event T). In contrast,
an unaccusative is an achievement predicate: the focus of the interpretation is on
the temporal interval that defines the end point of the event (the change of state T)
but not on the temporal interval that brings about this change of state. In sum,
both unaccusatives and causatives have the same underlying subeventual structure.
The aspectual difference between a causative and an unaccusative lies in the relative
prominence of the two subevents in (38): in an unaccusative predicate, only the final
subevent (T) is foregrounded (focussed on) whereas in a causative, the initial
subevent (P) is also foregrounded (focussed on). Event foregrounding (or focusing)
is achieved via a mechanism called event-headedness, which I will not be assuming
here (event-headedness indicates the relative prominence of a subevent).

Syntactically, a causative projects two arguments whereas an unaccusative
projects only one (internal) argument. Arguments correspond to participants in an
event structure: the participant associated with the first subevent (the process) is the
external argument of a predicate whereas the participant identifying the second subevent (the change of state) is the internal argument (see also Grimshaw 1990, van Hout 1994, 1996, or Ritter & Rosen 1993). Finally, syntactic projection of arguments is constrained by the relative prominence of the two subevents in (38). Informally, an unaccusative verb only projects an internal argument position because only the second subevent in (38) is foregrounded. When the first subevent is also foregrounded, as is the case with a causative, the verb will project two argument positions.

Turning to unaccusative roots in ST', I propose that roots such as $\sqrt{\text{sek}}$ 'be(come) hit with a stick (or a whip)' or $\sqrt{\text{k'ac}}$ 'be(come) dry' are lexically associated with the following event-representations:

(39) (a) T
    P [e₁ e₂] T
    [¬e e]
    HIT WITH A STICK (x)

I will refer to the aspects of the meaning of the predicate that distinguishes it from other predicates with the same event structure, as the name of the predicate and use the name of the predicate in capital letters to represent this constant. Thus, HIT WITH A STICK or DRY (respectively) represent the essence of 'hit with a stick' and 'dry'. Following Pustejovsky (1995), I assume that only subevents that are foregrounded project an argument position in the syntax. I will assume, however, that an event is foregrounded iff it is associated with a name. Under this proposal, the roots 'hit with a stick' and 'dry' have the patient-oriented interpretations 'get hit with a stick or whip' and 'become dry' because HIT WITH A STICK and DRY (respectively) identify the subevent in (39) that denotes a change of state. That is, the subevent in (39) that is foregrounded or focused is the subevent that is associated with a name. The only subevent that is foregrounded in (39) is the change of state $T$, thus only the participant that is associated with the change of state $T$ can be projected onto an (internal) argument position in the syntax. In sum, roots in ST' have a fundamentally unaccusative meaning because the name of the root is associated solely with the final subevent in an event structure.¹²

¹² Note that some roots are ambiguous between either a stative interpretation or a change of state interpretation, as is the case with $\sqrt{\text{k'ac}}$ 'become dry' or 'be dry'. Thus, (i) can be translated as either (ii), (iii) or (iv).

(i) $\sqrt{\text{k'ac}}$ ti s-ts'wan-a
  dry DET NOM-salmon-DET
  "The salmon is dry"

(ii) "The salmon dried" (iii) "The salmon got dried"

To capture this ambiguity, I assume that certain roots can be lexically associated with either of the following event-representations:
7.2. Remarks on the meaning of Unaccusative Predicates

There are over two thousand unaccusative predicates in ST’ —see Davis (this volume) and van Eijk (1985) for a semantic classification of these predicates. I am not claiming that (39) is the event-structure of all unaccusative predicates in ST’. van Eijk (1985: 167) states that agent control could be relevant for non-control predicates and, in particular, suggests a distinction between “states that preclude volition” and those that do not. This distinction is subsumed by the distinction between externally caused verbs and internally caused verbs, proposed in Levin & Hovav (1995). The latter argue that only unaccusative predicates that can be externally caused by an agent, an instrument or a natural force have underlying causative semantics. (39) will, thus, not be the semantic representation of roots which describe events which cannot be externally caused —such as nominal predicates (e.g. √gwu7, ‘water’); or alternatively cannot be externally caused by a human agent (that is, which preclude volition) such as weather predicates (e.g. √kwis, ‘to rain’). (39) will be the semantic representation of the subset of unaccusative roots in ST’ that can be externally caused, be it by a human agent or not; or alternatively of those roots which do not preclude volition. I surmise that these would include those roots which Davis (this volume) classifies as either 1) change of state predicates (e.g. √k’ac ‘become dry’ or ‘be dry’; cf. (1a-b) and footnote 12); 2) as change of location predicates (√tsicw ‘get there, arrive’); 3) as patient oriented predicates (√sek ‘be(come) hit with a stick or whip’ or √tup ‘be(come) punched’); and 4) as psychological predicates (√páguy ‘be afraid’).

It goes without saying that only a careful investigation of the semantics of aspectual classes in ST’ (and, in particular, how they are compositionally derived) can establish to what extent the above proposal is correct; this, however, is well beyond the scope of this paper. I will, nonetheless, provide three arguments (independent of our control) in support of the proposal that unaccusatives that can be externally caused are underlingly causative in ST’.

\[
\begin{align*}
(v) & \quad T \\
& \quad P [c_1, c_2] \quad T \quad \text{DRY (x)} \\
(vi) & \quad T \\
& \quad P [c_1, c_2] \quad S \quad e \quad \text{DRY (x)}
\end{align*}
\]

In (v), a process P brings about a resulting change of state T; this yields the change of state interpretation of \( k'ac \) ‘become dry’ in (iii-iv). In (vi), a process P brings about a resulting state S; this yields the stative interpretation of \( k'ac \) ‘be dry’ in (ii).

The predicates associated with the event structures in (v) and (vi) are unaccusative because 1) only foregrounded subevents can project an argument position in the syntax and, 2) an event is foregrounded iff it is associated with a name (cf. discussion of (39)). Thus, only the participant (respectively) associated with the resulting change of state T in (v) and the resulting state S in (vi) can be projected onto an (internal) argument position in the syntax.
7.2.1. Verb + instrument meanings

Beck (1995) states that unaccusative verbs can have the schema [verb + instrument], as illustrated by the Lushootseed examples in (40a) quoted from Beck, or the ST" examples in (40b) (cf. (1c)). Note, crucially, that the instrument—which brings about the change of state specified by the predicate—is incorporated into the meaning of the root.

(40) (a) pus ‘be struck by a flying object’, c’ax" ‘be struck by a stick’, t’uc’ ‘be shot’
(b) jsek ‘be(come) hit with a stick or whip’, jqam’ ‘be(come) hit by thrown object’

One of the central arguments for assigning an underlying causative structure to unaccusatives comes from the fact that a sentence with a change of state predicate can make reference to the event that caused the change of state to come about (see Chierchia, Pustejovsky 1995 or Levin & Hovav 1995). For instance, the PP in The package arrived with the postman makes reference to the initial event that causes the package to arrive. Reference can be made to this initial event E1 precisely because E1 is part of the semantic representation of ‘arrive’. (In contrast, *The package arrived by the postman is ungrammatical because the by-phrase does not make reference to the initial event itself but rather to the agent of E1—which in turn cannot be projected since E1 is not foregrounded). By the same reasoning, we can explain why roots such as those in (40) exist in Salish: the instrument that is incorporated into the meaning of the root reflects the presence—in the semantic representation of the root—of the causing event E1 with which the instrument (e.g. ‘with a stick or whip’, ‘by a flying object’ or ‘by a stick’) must be construed.13

7.2.2. Get passive readings

The causative hypothesis, moreover, explains why certain unaccusative verbs yield what I will refer to as a get-passive reading, as illustrated in (41). (42) shows that this reading also surfaces with roots suffixed with the INchoative suffix -p, which according to van Eijk (1985: 86) expresses a change in progress or “that a state is maintained over a certain period of time” (Note that roots can be bound to the inchoative -p, see footnote 4).

(41) (a) jqam’t ti sqáycw-a ‘The man got hit’
    hit DET man-DET
(b) jxan’ ti sqáycw-a ‘The man got hurt’
    hurt DET man-DET
(g) jrup ‘to get punched’
(h) jlepinitas ‘to get punished’
(i) jtsem ‘to get burnt’

(13) Note that the possibility of an instrumental PP is often used in the literature to motivate the presence of an implicit agent. On the basis of the meaning of certain roots, I am making the same argument to motivate the presence of an implicit causing event.
(c) \(\sqrt{\text{pulh}}\) ‘to get boiled’
(d) \(\sqrt{\text{kwelh}}\) ‘to get spilled’
(e) \(\sqrt{\text{us}}\) ‘to get thrown out’
(k) \(\sqrt{\text{up}}\) ‘punched - face, to get punched in the face’
(l) \(\sqrt{\text{ketcw}}\) ‘to get one’s throat cut’

(p) \(\sqrt{\text{qwelh}}\) ‘to get burnt, scalded’
(q) \(\sqrt{\text{kwem}}\) ‘to get dull (blade)’
(b) \(\sqrt{\text{kwes}}\) ‘singed - INC’
(d) \(\sqrt{\text{tses-p}}\) ‘to get stretched’

Thompson (1985) explicitly correlates the range of meanings that non-control predicates in Salish yield with the range of meanings associated with the verb *get* in English, citing Lakoff (1971) who states that,

(43) (a) *Get* sometimes suggests responsibility on the part of the underlying (not superficial) subject.
   [16a] How did this window get opened?
   [16b] How was this window opened?
   [16a] might be used if the speaker were indignant that the window had been opened: it often means something like, ‘Who had the nerve to open this window?’...
   [17a] How did this window get opened? Sir, I cannot tell a lie: I did it
   [17d] ? How was this window opened? Sir, I cannot tell a lie: I did it (Lakoff 1971: 155)

(b) [11a] The program has been pre-recorded
[11b] The program has gotten pre-recorded
[11b] is not likely to be heard on television whereas [11a] is a frequent utterance. If it were used, [11b] would imply that ‘something was done to the program [emphasis added] to its detriment’.
   (Lakoff 1971: 154)

The relevant observation that emerges from (43) is that a *get*-passive reflects the presence of a causing event in the lexical meaning of the predicate: reference is made to the implicit initial event that caused the window to be opened in [16a], or the program to be recorded in [11b].

We can explain the *get*-passive reading that surfaces in (41-42), if we assume that unaccusative predicates such as \(\sqrt{\text{qwelh-p}}\) ‘to get burnt, scalded’ have the underlying causative structures in (44) (Note that since morphological inchoatives in ST” describe an ongoing change, I assume that the resulting change of state \(T\) in (44b) does not culminate, as indicated by the subscript \(n\) on the final eventuality.)
The unaccusative predicates illustrated in (41-42) can make reference to an implicit initial event—the event that caused x to get hit in (41a), x to get hurt in (41b) or x to get scalded in (42a/44b)—because this causing event is part of the sub-eventual structure of the unaccusative predicate. Since, however, the causing event is backgrounded (that is, is not identified by the name of the predicate), the participant identifying this initial event cannot be projected into the syntax.

7.2.3. Unaccusative and causative lexical reflexives

Finally, the causative hypothesis explains why there are two classes of so-called ‘medio reflexives’ in ST’. Medio-reflexives are (formally) intransitive predicates that have a self-directed (inherently reflexive) reading; they are derived by suffixation of lec/ile to a root.14 There are two classes of medio-reflexives: control (i.e. agentive) reflexives as in (45a) and non-control (i.e. with an inchoative meaning) reflexives as in (45b); see Davis (1996) for discussion and Davis (this volume).

(45) (a) legw - ile ‘to hide oneself’, k’ac - lec ‘to dry oneself’,
    kwis - lec ‘to lower oneself’,
    (b) t’up-lec ‘to get twisted’, k’wuc’ - lec ‘to get crooked’,
    emp’ - lec, ‘to get tangled’

Davis & Demirdache (1995) analyse the control reflexives in (45a) as inherently reflexive causatives: the participant identifying the initial process (P) and the participant identifying the resulting change of state (T) in the bi-eventual substructure of a causative are lexically identified (cf. footnote 16). Once we assume that unaccusatives are underlyingly causatives, we can extend this analysis to the unaccusative medio-reflexives in (45b): inchoative medio-reflexives are also inherently (that is, lexically) reflexivized causatives. Following Chierchia (1989), I assume that the causing event in a lexically reflexivized unaccusative verb is interpreted statively—that is, (45b) is interpreted as ‘a property of x caused x to become twisted, crooked, tangled’. In section 7.4, we will see that event focusing is responsible for the difference in control between these two types of lexical reflexives.

(14) The alternation between lec/ile is conditioned by stress.
8. Transitive predicates

Assuming that both unaccusatives and causatives share the same underlying event structure, what then is the difference between an unaccusative and the causative which is morphologically derived from it by suffixation of the CAU transitivizer -s-? The answer is straightforward: suffixation of the CAU transitivizer does not alter the aspectual structure of the predicate. Suffixation of this transitivizer to a root merely serves to foreground the initial subevent in the event structure of the root. Recall that event foregrounding determines projection of argument positions in the syntax. Hence, once the causing event E1 is foregrounded, the participant that identifies this initial subevent can be projected onto an external argument position in the syntax.

Evidence for the claim that the CAU transitivizer -s- does not contribute aspectually to the meaning of root is provided by its distribution (cf. Davis & Demirdache 1995). -s- can co-occur with all other aspectual markers — that is, with the stative s-, the inchoative -p, the medio-reflexive -ler, and the active intransitive -cal. In contrast, all other aspectual morphemes are in strict complementary distribution. The derivation of a syntactically causative predicate such as [\textit{Vsek-s}] 'to hit with a stick or a whip' from an unaccusative predicate (\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{nsek}}} get}}} with a stick or a whip') is illustrated in (46).

(46) (a) \textit{Event structure of the stem}  
\[ \begin{array}{c} 
\text{T} \\
[\vdash e_1, e_n] \\
\text{HIT WITH A STICK (y)} 
\end{array} \]

(b) \textit{Event structure of [stem + cau]}  
\[ \begin{array}{c} 
\text{T} \\
[\vdash e_1, e_n] \\
\text{V (x)} \\
\text{HIT WITH A STICK (y)} 
\end{array} \]

In (46a), only the change of state (T) is foregrounded. The predicate is, thus, syntactically monadic: it can only project the participant which identifies this change of state (T). Once the CAU transitivizer is added to the stem, both subevents are foregrounded. The predicate is, thus, syntactically dyadic: it projects both an external and an internal argument. I have associated the initial subevent P with an unspecified name (V) to indicate that P is foregrounded. Crucially, however, the name associated with P in (46) lacks any lexical content whatsoever: it is merely a variable ranging over predicates. Now, recall that the CAUSATIVE is used to describe situations in which the subject lacks full control over the action denoted by the predicate (see section 2). In particular, only causatives derived by suffixation of -s- allow event descriptions in subject position, as was illustrated in (15) repeated below.

(47) (a) sek'w - p - s - ás ti nk'wan'ústen-a ti k'éxem-a 
\textit{broken - INC - CAU - ERG DET window-DET DET wind-DET} 
\textit{The wind broke the window}
(b) sek'w - p - s - ás ti nk'wan'ústen-a ti qvl-alh-tmícw-a
broken - INC - CAU - ERG DET window-DET DET bad-CON-land-DET
'The storm broke the window'

The event causatives in (47) have the following event representations.

(48)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{T} \\
\text{P} \quad \text{T} \\
\text{[e₁ eₙ]} \quad [\neg e \ e] \\
\text{WIND (x)} \quad \text{BREAK (w)}
\end{array}
\quad \begin{array}{c}
\text{T} \\
\text{P} \quad \text{T} \\
\text{[e₁ eₙ]} \quad [\neg e \ e] \\
\text{STORM (x)} \quad \text{BREAK (w)}
\end{array}
\]

In (48), the lexical content of the event nominal in subject position —the wind or the storm in (47)— has been mapped onto the causing sub-event P. This means that the process that causes the window to become broken is the event nominal the wind or the storm itself, as Parsons (1994) argues in his discussion of event causatives such as The explosion broke the window:

(49) We certainly do not want to say that the explosion is the agent of some event that caused the breaking of the window; the explosion did this by itself. (Parsons 1990: 139)

In other words, the change of state (the window becomes broken) is not caused by a subevent of which the wind is the agent: the wind does not DO something which causes the breaking of the window. We have captured this by mapping the lexical content (the name) of the event nominal the wind or the storm onto the causing sub-event P, as in (48). Crucially, this is possible only because the name associated with P in a CAusative event structure (e.g. (46b)) lacks any lexical content whatsoever (it is merely a variable ranging over predicates). In sum, the event structure proposed for CAusative predicates in (46b) can elegantly explain why they allow event nominals in subject position.

8.1. Full Control vs. Neutral Control Causatives

Recall that there are two primary transitivizers in ST: the CAusative and the DIRective. As was discussed in section 2.3, both the CAusative and the DIRective transitivizers combine with an unaccusative predicate ('be hit' or 'be dry' in (4-5)) to yield a predicate with an inherent causative meaning —e.g. 'x caused y to be dry' or 'x caused y to be hit'. The difference between the CAusative and the DIRective lies in the degree of control of the agent over the action denoted by the predicate. In particular, suffixation of the DIRective yields a full control predicate whereas suffixation of the CAusative yields a neutral control transitive. More precisely, the CAusative differs from the DIRective in two correlated respects. First, it can (but need
not) be used to describe a situation in which the subject lacks control over the action denoted by the verb. Second, there is no restriction on the subject of a causative: it can be a participant that is capable of willful agency or an external instigator such as ‘the wind’ or ‘the storm’ (cf. (47)). In section 3, we concluded that the causative merely specifies causation: the resulting event in (46b) could have been either accidentally/deliberately caused by a human participant, or non-accidentally caused by an external instigator such as the wind or the storm in (47). In contrast, an out of control causative only specifies accidental causation. Finally, the directive specifies causation that is under the full control of a participant capable of willful agency.

8.2. Davis & Demirdache (1995): Agentive Predications

I now turn to the question of how to derive full-control—that is, agentive causatives. The analysis of transitive predications proposed here differs significantly from Davis & Demirdache (1995; henceforth D&D) who do not assume that unaccusatives and transitives share the same underlying causative representation. I believe, however, that it preserves the core idea underlying their analysis of agentive (full-control) causatives.

How do we derive the agentive interpretation of (50a)? In Pustejovsky (1987, 1991), melt has the event structure in (50b). It is a recursive transition consisting of two subevents (a process P and a simple transition T (change of state). Event structure is then mapped onto a level of Lexical Conceptual Structure (LCS, Jackendoff 1990) which introduces a causal agent. The agent is the argument of the predicate ACT. CAUSE links ACT and BECOME MELTED, ensuring that in (50c) whatever action Rosa performs on the ice causes the melting of the ice.

\[
(50)\quad \begin{align*}
(a) & \text{Rosa melted the ice} \\
(b) & \text{T} \\
(c) & \text{CAUSE ([ACT (R, the ice)], (BECOME ([melted (ice)])))}
\end{align*}
\]

The LCS in (50c) builds the theta-role agent into the meaning of a primitive predicate ACT, MOVE or DO (cf. Dowty 1979). D&D argue that we can dispense with higher predicates such as CAUSE, ACT, MOVE or DO—and thus, with the LCS in (50c). We can dispense with CAUSE because causation is defined as a structural entailment between the two subevents in (50b) (i.e. P causes T if P c-commands T; cf. Pustejovsky 1987). We can dispense with ACT, MOVE or DO if the causative and agentive reading of the verb melt are projected from different event structures—as clearly must be the case in languages like ST* which morphologically distinguish causatives from agentive causatives (causatives are neutral with respect to control whereas agentive causatives require full-control of the subject over the action). The core idea underlying D&D’s analysis is that Rosa in (50a) is a causal agent iff Rosa performs some action of melting which causes the ice to be melted. In contrast, Rosa
is a causer (but not an agent) when there is no intrinsic relation between the causing event (E1) and the resulting change of state (E2) —e.g. Rosa accidentally turns off the refrigerator and the ice melts. This idea is summarized below:

(51) (a) The participant identifying E1 is a causal agent iff there is an intrinsic relation between the causing event and the resulting event —that is, if the resulting (change of) state be(come) $V$ is caused by a process of $V$-ing.
(b) In contrast, the participant identifying E1 is a causer (but not an agent) when there is no intrinsic relation between the causing event and the resulting (change) of state.

8.3. The Event Representation of Full Control Causatives

Although I am assuming contra D&D (1995) that unaccusatives are underlyingly causative, the analysis I present here is a reformulation of their analysis of agentive causatives. Recall that the core idea underlying their analysis is that Bucky in (52) is an agent iff Bucky performs some action of drying which causes the salmon to be(come) dry, as stated in (51b) above.

(52) [\[k'ac - an' - as] ti s-ts'wán-a s-Bucky
\[dry - DIR - ERG DET NOM-salmon-DET NOM-Bucky
‘Bucky dried the salmon’

The event structure lexically associated with the root $k'ac$ ‘be(come) dry’ is given in (53a). To ensure that the resulting change of state become dry is caused by a process of drying, D&D map the name DRY associated with the final subevent (T) onto the initial subevent (P) in (53a) which is itself not associated with a name, yielding the event structure in (53b).

(53) (a) Event structure of the root
(b) Event structure of the [root + DIR]

The operation that maps the lexical meaning DRY associated with the change of state in (53a) onto the initial process is called Predicate Cloning. Predicate cloning is an operation on event structure equivalent to syntactic incorporation of the lexical meaning of a lower verb onto a higher light (or empty) verb — e.g. [vP1 [v1 (do)] [vP2 [v2 laugh]]] > [vP1 [v1 laugh] [vP2 [v2 t]]], as in Hale & Keyser (1993). Its effect is illustrated in (54): the name dry identifying the transition in (54a) is copied onto the initial subevent, as in (54b). Its formalization is given in (55): predicate cloning is a
function that takes the intransitive predicate in (55a) and yields a conjunction of two predicates with the same name, as in (55c).

\[(54)\]

\[(55)\]

\[(a)\] Event structure of the root
\[
\begin{array}{l}
\{T \bar{p} \bar{e}_1 \bar{e}_n\} \\
\{T \neg \bar{e} \bar{e}\}
\end{array}
\]

DRY (y)

\[(b)\] Predicate cloning
\[
\begin{array}{l}
\{T \bar{p} \bar{e}_1 \bar{e}_n\} \\
\{T \neg \bar{e} \bar{e}\}
\end{array}
\]

DRY (x) DRY (y)

\[(c)\] From (a) and (b), by lambda conversion
\[
\lambda \bar{v} \lambda \bar{e}_2 \lambda x \lambda y \{V (x, \bar{e}_1) \& V (y, \bar{e}_2)\}
\]

Alternatively, I could follow D&D and assume that the DIRective transitivizer, like any lexical item, has its own event structure: its event type is a process. Crucially, it has no name only aspctual content, as represented in (56a) where \(V\) is a variable ranging over predicates. When the DIRe combines with a root, its event structure merges with the initial subevent in the event structure of the root, as in (56c). Event merger, as defined in van Hout (1996), composes two event types without creating a new event structure: the process in (56a) merges with the initial process in (56b), yielding (56c). Finally, predicate cloning substitutes DRY for the predicate variable \(V\) itself associated with the initial process in (56c), yielding (56d).

\[(56)\]

\[(a)\] Event structure of the DIReactive
\[
\begin{array}{l}
\{p \bar{e}_1 \bar{e}_n\} \\
V(y)
\end{array}
\]

\[(b)\] Event structure of the root
\[
\begin{array}{l}
\{T \bar{p} \bar{e}_1 \bar{e}_n\} \\
\{T \neg \bar{e} \bar{e}\}
\end{array}
\]

DRY (x)

\[(c)\] Event merging
\[
\begin{array}{l}
\{T \bar{p} \bar{e}_1 \bar{e}_n\} \\
V(x) \\
\{T \neg \bar{e} \bar{e}\} \\
\text{DRY (y)}
\end{array}
\]

\[(d)\] Predicate cloning
\[
\begin{array}{l}
\{T \bar{p} \bar{e}_1 \bar{e}_n\} \\
\{T \neg \bar{e} \bar{e}\}
\end{array}
\]

DRY (x) DRY (y)

Note that both subevents in a DIReactive causative are associated with (the same) name DRY. Consequently, both subevents in (53b/56d) are foregrounded, and the predicate ‘dry’ projects both an external and an internal argument. Why does directive yields an agentive predication? Because there is an intrinsic relation between the process and the resulting (change) of state: the change of state ‘be(come) dry’ is caused by a process of drying of which Bucky is the agent.

8.4. Summary

To recapitulate, I have proposed the following event representations.15

---

(15) What about derived unergatives? Derived unergatives are syntactically intransitive, as the obligatory absence of ergative marking in (i) vs. (ii) (or iii) indicates.
In (57a), only the resulting change of state is foregrounded. The predicate associated with this event structure is, thus, syntactically monadic: it can only project an internal argument in the syntax. In contrast, both subevents are foregrounded in (57b-c). Thus, both the Causative and the Directive yield syntactically dyadic predicates. (As for the event structure of derived unergatives, see note 15.)

The directive yields an agentive predication because there is an intrinsic relation between the process and the resulting (change) of state: the change of state ‘be(come) broken’ is caused by a process of breaking. More generally, an agentive reading ensues whenever there is an intrinsic relation between the process and the resulting change of state — whenever the resulting (change of) state be(come) \( V \) is caused by a process of \( V \)-ing.

Note finally that the control lexical reflexives illustrated in (45a) and discussed in section 6.3.3 are derived from the Directive in (55c) via lexical reflexivization, following D&D.16

(i) Derived unergatives

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{k'ac} & \quad \text{cal} & \quad \text{Ø} \quad (^{\text{as}}) \\
\text{dry} & \quad \text{ACT} & \quad \text{ABS} \quad (^{\text{ERG}}) \\
\end{align*}
\]

‘She dries (stuff)’

(ii) Derived transitive

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{k'ac} & \quad \text{in'} & \quad \text{Ø} & \quad \text{as} & \quad \text{ti} & \quad \text{sts'wan-a} \\
\text{dry} & \quad \text{DIR} & \quad \text{ABS} & \quad \text{ERG} & \quad \text{DET salmon-DET} \\
\end{align*}
\]

‘She dried the salmon’

Note that although derived unergatives are syntactically intransitive, they are agentive and semantically transitive. In particular, derived unergatives permit a \textit{with object} (van Eijk 1985). A ‘with object’ is a weak object in de Hoop’s (1992) sense: it is a generic/non-specific theme, requiring either the collective determiner \( ki \) as in (i) or the non-specific determiner \( ku \). Following de Hoop (1992) and van Houw (1993), D&D analyze the weak object in (iii) as either an incorporated theme or a predicate modifier.

(iii) \textit{k'ac} \quad \text{cal} \quad \text{Ø} \quad (^{\text{as}}) \quad \text{ki} \quad \text{sts'wan-a}

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{dry} & \quad \text{ACT} & \quad \text{ABS} \quad (^{\text{ERG}}) \quad \text{COLL-DET} & \quad \text{salmon-DET} \\
\end{align*}
\]

‘She did some salmon-drying’

Assuming that (in)transitivizers in ST' background or foreground a subevent in an event structure, we can recast D&D’s analysis as follows. Unergatives are derived from directive transitives which have a causative event structure: a P process causes a change of state T. Suffixation of the intransitivizer \textit{-cal} in (iii), backgrounds the resulting change of state T in the causative event frame of the verb. Backgrounding/foregrounding determines projection of arguments into the syntax. Once the resulting change of state T is backgrounded, the participant that identifies T can no longer be projected as an internal argument — it can, however, be syntactically realized as an adjunct.

(16) D&D derive the control reflexives illustrated in (45a) from directive transitives via a process of lexical reflexivization. Their analysis is illustrated by the derivation in (i-ii).
In contrast, the causative yields a predicate that is neutral with respect to control because there is no intrinsic relation between the causing process and the resulting transition. This is the case because the process which caused the breaking of the window is unspecified (unnamed): the wind could be the causing event or Bucky could have engaged in a process of breaking in order to deliberately bring about the breaking of the window; but Bucky could just as well have broken the window by singing or by accidentally bumping into it.

Finally, I assume (following D&D) that the agentive and causative reading of a given predicate are universally projected from distinct event frames. In other words, the English sentence in (58a) is not ambiguous between an agentive and a causative reading. These two readings are projected from different event frames—as is clearly the case in languages like ST which morphologically distinguish these readings. In particular, the DIRECTive event frame in (57c) yields the agentive reading of (58a), illustrated in (58b), whereas the CAUSative event frame in (57b) yields both the causative reading of (58a), illustrated in (58c), and the event causative in (58d).

(58) (a) Rosa broke the window (c) Rosa fell and broke the window
(b) Rosa broke the window (accidentally) (d) The wind broke the window

Having defined the event structures associated with unaccusative and transitive predicates, we can now go back to the question of how to derive the spontaneous occurrence and/or accidental readings that out of control morphology yields.

9. Deriving the spontaneous occurrence/accidental reading

When out of control is applied to an unaccusative, it yields a reading which has been described as 'it happened spontaneously, suddenly, unexpectedly, all at once, accidentally' (cf. van Eijk 1983, 1985, Thompson 1985 or Davis this volume). Examples are provided in (59).

(i) Control/ DIRECTive causative

```
   T
   /\    
  P  T
  /\    
 e1 e2 e
```

add loc

```
   T
   /\    
  e1 e2 e
```

dry (x) [¬dry(y) dry(y)]
Bucky dried the salmon

(ii) Control reflexive

```
   T
   /\    
  P  T
  /\    
 e1 e2 e
```

dry (x) [¬dry(x) dry(x)]
Bucky dried himself

The participant identifying E1 in either of the above event structures is a causal agent since the resulting change of state become dry in (i/ii) is caused by a process of drying (cf. (51) in the text). Hence, the lexical reflexives in (45a) require control of the agent over the action denoted by the verb.
Recall our analysis of out of control \( \text{ka}...\text{a} \): it is an event functor that type-shifts an event type into a lower event type, as was defined in (30) repeated below. I will now show how this proposal uniformly derives the ability reading of out of control applied to unergatives and the spontaneous occurrence/accidental reading of out of control applied to unaccusatives.

(60) When \( \text{ka}...\text{a} \) is affixed to a predicate, it shifts the event-type associated with this predicate into a lower event-type by suppressing the initial subevent in its event structure.

The derivation of the ability reading is repeated in (61) (cf. section 6). The event type associated with an activity verb is a process. Out of control suppresses the initial subevent in this process (the eventuality \( e_1 \)), yielding a verb with the event structure of a stative verb, as illustrated in (61b). The ability reading then arises because stative verbs have an inherent ability meaning, following Vendler (1967).

(61) *Event type shifting applied to a process*

(a) \( \text{ålkst} \ 'to work' \)  \hspace{1cm}  \hspace{1cm}  (b) \( \text{ka-ålkst-a} \ 'to be able to work' \)

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{P} \\
\text{e}_1 \\
\text{e}_n \\
\Rightarrow \\
\text{S} \\
\text{e}
\end{array} \]

Now, when out of control applies to an unaccusative, it also suppresses the initial subevent in its event structure, just as it does in (61). However, whereas the initial subevent in the event structure of an unergative is an atomic event \( e_1 \), the initial subevent in the event structure of an unaccusative is not an atomic event but a Process —since unaccusatives have an underlyingly causative structure. Therefore, the initial subevent that is suppressed by the event functor \( \text{ka}...\text{a} \) will be this complex subevent P. This is illustrated in (62). When \( \text{ka}...\text{a} \) applies to the recursive transition in (62a), it suppresses the causing event P and, thus, type shifts the causative into a simple change of state predicate:
Suppression of the initial (causing) event in (62) yields the ‘it happened spontaneously, suddenly, unexpectedly, all at once, accidentally’ reading of out of control. More precisely, the change of state specified by the root must be construed as coming into being suddenly, all at once, spontaneously —once the causing event in the event structure of the predicate has been suppressed. This analysis captures Thompson’s (1995) idea that out of control - whether it applies to controlled events (actions) or to non-controlled events (states and changes of state) —suggests “the spontaneous happening or result of some unspecified agent’s act [emphasis added]”.

We have seen that the hypothesis that out of control is the equivalent of a passive defined on the event structure of a predicate together with the assumption that unaccusatives are underlyingly causative explains why out of control yields precisely an ability reading with unergatives but a spontaneous occurrence reading with unaccusatives. More generally, the hypothesis that unaccusatives have causative semantics explains why a morphological operation that suppresses agent control with verbs that select an agent can productively apply to predicates which denote events or states which can never be under the control of an agent in the first place —since they lack an external argument altogether.

I now turn to the accidental reading of out of control transitives.

10. Deriving accidental causation

An out of control transitive describes an action that is not under the control of an agent. Crucially, however, the subject of an out of control transitive cannot be an extrinsic instigator (e.g. the storm), as the contrast between (63a) and (63b) illustrates (repeated from (15), section 3). It must be a participant that is capable of willful agency. Out of control morphology signals that the action denoted by the verb is not under the control of this human agent. In section 3, we concluded that out of control causation specifies accidental causation: the subject of an out of control causative must be a human participant because only participants capable of willful agency can accidentally cause an event. Thus, (63b) is ungrammatical because it can only have the illicit interpretation in (63b').
(63) (a) CAUsative transitive
sek'w - p - s - ás ti nk'wan'ústen-a ti qvl-alh-tmicw-a
broken - INC - CAU - ERG DET window-DET DET bad-CON-land-DET
The storm broke the window'
(b) Out of control transitive
* ka - sek'w - s - ás - a ti nk'wan'ústen-a ti qvl-alh-tmicw-a
OOC broken-CAU - ERG - OOC DET window-DET DET bad-CON-land-DET
'The storm broke the window'
(b') *The storm broke the window accidentally'

But how do we derive the ungrammaticality of (63b)? I assume, following D&D, that the generalization in (64) explains the paradigm (63).

(64) Out of Control only applies to DIRECTive transitives

If the input to out of control is never a neutral control (CAUsative) transitive, then (63b) will never be generated in the first place and, hence, will never have to be ruled out. Conversely, if the input to out of control is always a full control (DIRECTive) transitive, then the ungrammaticality of (63b) reduces to the ungrammaticality of (65).

(65) DIRECTive transitive
* sek'w - an - ás ti nk'wan'ústen-a ti qvl-alh-tmicw-a
broken - DIR - ERG DET window-DET DET bad-CON-land-DET
'The storm broke the window'

With this in mind let's see what happens when out of control is applied to a neutral control causative.

10.1. Out of Control applied to a Neutral Control Causative

Applying out of control to a CAUsative transitive yields the derivation in (66). Note that the input to event-type shifting in (66a) is a dyadic predicate: it projects an external and an internal argument since both subevents in its event structure are foregrounded. Crucially, however, the output of event-type shifting in (66b) is a monadic (change of state) predicate: the participant which identifies the initial subevent can no longer be projected into the syntax since this initial subevent has itself been suppressed.

(17) Recall that an event nominal such as the storm cannot be interpreted as the 'agent' of the event (process) that causes the window to become broken in (63) or (65) (see (49) and discussion in section 8). The event nominal the storm can only be interpreted as the process itself—that is, as the event that causes the window to become broken. In other words, the lexical content of the event nominal in (65) must be mapped onto the causing subevent P in the event structure of the verb break. This is impossible because the causing event P in a DIRECTive transitive is itself already associated with a name (compare the event structure of a DIRECTive transitive illustrated in (57c) with that of CAUsative transitive illustrated in (57b)). (65) will, thus, be ungrammatical.
(66) Event type shifting applied to a neutral control transitive

(a) sek- s 'to hit something with a stick'

hit- CAU

P

T

add ka...a

⇒

c_1 c_e e

V (x) HIT WITH A STICK (y)

(b) *ka -sek -s -a

OOC hit CAU OOC

*‘to hit something accidentally with a stick’

T

-e e

V (x) HIT WITH A STICK (y)

In other words, applying out of control to the dyadic predicate ‘to hit something with a stick’ could never yield the dyadic predicate ‘to hit something accidentally with a stick’, since the output of event type shifting in (66) is not a dyadic causative predicate but a monadic a change of state predicate. The output of event type shifting in (66) is the unaccusative predicate: ‘to become hit accidentally with a stick’. At this point, we have two options. We can rule out the derivation in (66) altogether: suppression of the initial subevent P would be incompatible with the presence of the transitivizer -s- in the input (e.g. sek-s) since the function of -s- is precisely to foreground E1. Alternatively, we could assume that the output of event-type shifting is an out of control unaccusative: applying out of control to sek-s would yield ka-sek-a (and not ka-sek-s-a). In other words, applying out of control to the CAUsatives in (67) would yield (respectively) the out of control unaccusatives in (67').

(67) CAUsative transitives

(a) kwis - (t)s

fall CAU

‘to drop something’

(b) sék’wp - s

broken CAU

‘to break something hard’

(67') Out of control unaccusatives

(a') ka- kwis - a

OOC fall OOC

‘to fall suddenly, accidentally’

(b') ka- sék’w - a

OOC broken OOC

‘to break all of a sudden’

Whether we should rule out the derivations in (67) altogether or allow event-type shifting of a CAUsative into an (out of control) unaccusative, I leave as an open question in this paper. At this stage, I do not see what empirical evidence could decide between these two options.\(^{18,19}\)

\(^{18}\) For instance, the absence of the inchoative suffix -p in (67b') could be taken as evidence that (67b') is not derived from (67a) (see footnote 4).

\(^{19}\) Note, however, that out of control unaccusatives cannot be uniformly derived from morphological CAUsatives. This is the case for two reasons. First, there are out of control unaccusatives which do not have a transitive counterpart —e.g. ka-giy’-a ‘to fall asleep suddenly’, ka-lshek-a ‘to feel pooped, to conk out (suddenly)’,
In sum, applying out of control to causatives is either ungrammatical (if the derivation in (66) is illicit) or vacuous (we never see its output since it never yields an out of control causative; rather, it yields an out of control unaccusative). This is precisely the result that we wanted: we can now explain the contrast in (63) repeated below. The out of control transitive in (63b) can never surface (be generated) since applying out of control to (63a) yields either an ungrammatical output or an out of control unaccusative.

(63)

(a) *CAusative transitive
sek'w - p - s - ás ti nk'wan'ústen-a ti qvl-ah-tmícw-a
broken - INC - CAU - ERG DET window-DET DET bad-CON-land-DET
The storm broke the window'

(b) Out of control transitive
*ka - sek'w - s - ás - a ti nk'wan'ústen-a ti qvl-ah-tmícw-a
OOC broken - CAU - ERG - OOC DET window-DET DET bad-CON-land-DET
'The storm broke the window'

(b') *'The storm broke the window accidentally'

To recapitulate, (63b) is ungrammatical because it can never be generated. Applying out of control to a causative transitive is illicit because the output of event-type shifting is a (syntactically) monadic predicate. In contrast, applying out of control to either an unergative or an unaccusative (as in (61)-(62) above) is grammatical since both the input and the output of event-type shifting is a (syntactically) monadic predicate.

10.2. Accidental Causation: Applying Out of Control to a Full Control Causative

Let's now see what happens when we apply out of control to a full control (directive)transitive. A full control transitive will have the event representation in (68).

(68)

T

P T

ci e a e

BREAK (x) BREAK (y)
sék'w- an
broken DIR
'to break something'

ka-qiiv-a 'to rise to the surface', ka-nim'-a 'to go blind suddenly', ka-ttíq-p'-a 'to pass away', or ka-nim'-a 'to pass out'. Second, there are out of control unaccusatives which do not have a causative counterpart; for instance, ka-ttíq-a 'to get stabbed accidentally, suddenly', or ka-qiiv-a 'to get torn accidentally, suddenly' have a directive counterpart but not a causative counterpart.
Once again, out of control cannot licitly suppress the causing subevent in (68): suppression of P would either be blocked by the DIR transitivizer -an- (which foregrounds P) or be vacuous (that is, yield a monadic/unaccusative predicate). But then, how do we ever derive an out of control transitive? The answer comes from Hovav & Levin (1995) who propose that morphological processes which operate on the lexical representation of verb meanings (in their framework, derive new Lexical Conceptual Structures) either alter the aspectual template associated with a predicate or the pairing of a name (a constant) with an aspectual template. Adopting this proposal, I redefine out of control as in (69). Applying out of control to a full control transitive then yields the derivation in (70).

(69) When ka...a is affixed to a predicate, it suppresses the initial subevent in its event structure or the name that is associated with this initial subevent.

(70) (a) 'to break something'  (b) 'to break something accidentally'

This time the derivation in (70) is licit: the input to out of control is a dyadic predicate and the output of out of control is a dyadic predicate. Recall, however, that out of control transitives always surface with the causative transitivizer -s- (and not with the full control transitivizer, see (11) above). Why is this the case? Because the output of out of control in (70b) is precisely the event structure proposed for a neutral control causative (see section 8 and compare (70b) with (46b)).

Now, recall D&D's analysis of agent control in (51), repeated below.

(71) (a) The participant identifying E1 is a causal agent iff there is an intrinsic relation between the causing event and the resulting event — that is, if the resulting (change of) state be(come) V is caused by a process of V-ing

(b) In contrast, the participant identifying E1 is a causer (but not an agent) when there is no intrinsic relation between the causing event and the resulting (change) of state.

Why does out of control suppress the control of an agent over the action denoted by the predicate? Because once out of control suppresses the name that is lexically associated with the initial subevent in an event structure, there is no longer an intrinsic relation between the causing event (P) and the resulting change of state (T), as the derivation in (70) illustrates. Whereas, in (70a), the breaking of the window is caused by an activity of breaking of which x is the agent, in (71b), the
breaking of the window is caused by some unspecified event of which $x$ is the agent (for instance, $x$ bumped into the window).

We can now explain why out of control causation specifies accidental causation, as argued in section 3. There are in fact two questions that need an answer. First, why must the subject of an out of control transitive be a participant that is capable of willful agency? Because out of control can only licitly apply to directive transitives and the subject of a directive must be a participant that is capable of willful agency. In particular, applying out of control to a causative transitive yields either an ungrammatical output or an out of control unaccusative—but never an out of control causative (see section 10.1). Second, why does out of control morphology suppress the control that this human agent has over the action denoted by the verb? Because when out of control suppresses the name associated with the initial subevent in (70a), it de facto suppresses agent control (as defined in (71a)): there is no intrinsic relation between the causing event and the resulting change of state in (70b).

To conclude, note the telling translation that Van Eijk (1983) gives to illustrate the interpretation of the out of control transitive derived from the root $\verb|kwis|$ ‘to fall’: the St’át’imcets sentence has not been translated as ‘I accidentally dropped it’ as expected, but rather as ‘I bumped into it and it dropped’.

$\begin{array}{llllll}
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 \\
(72) & ka & -kwis & -(t)s & -kan & -a \\
& OOC & FALL & CAU & 1SG:SUB & OOC \\
& ‘I bumped into it and it dropped’
\end{array}$

As the translation in (72) illustrates, an out of control transitive specifies accidental causation: there is no intrinsic relation between the process, ‘I bumped into it’, and the resulting change of state, ‘it dropped’.

11. Conclusion

I have proposed that the ability reading, the spontaneous occurrence and the accidental readings that out of control yields in ST can be uniformly derived from the hypothesis that out of control is a passive defined on the lexical meaning of a predicate. A passive suppresses an external argument position or the agent role in the thematic grid of the verb (depending on the theory). In contrast, out of control does not suppress the agent. When out of control applies to verbs denoting activities, it suppresses the agentivity of the agent by suppressing the subevent in an event structure that defines the beginning of the event and, as such, is associated with the notion of agent or instigator. When out of control applies to causative verbs, it suppresses the agentivity of the agent by suppressing the name that is associated with the initial subevent.

The assumption that causatives and unaccusatives share the same underlying semantic structure explains why a morphological operation that suppresses agent control whenever there is an agent can also productively apply to predicates that lack an external argument altogether and, thus, why control is an opposition that cuts across all aspectual classes in Salish.
## Appendix - Key to St'át'imcets (van Eijk) orthography

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References


——, (this volume), “Deep Unaccusativity and Zero Syntax in St’át’imcets”.


