Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to Devitt

##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.main##

##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.sidebar##

PDF
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.6223
Edouard Machery

Abstract

In this article, I argue that philosophers' intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people's and that intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference.

How to Cite

Machery, E. (2012). Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to Devitt. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 27(2), 223–227. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.6223
Abstract 618 | PDF Downloads 475

##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.details##

Keywords

semantic epistemology, semantic intuitions, expertise, reference

Issue
Vol. 27 No. 2 (2012): Causality and Explanation in the Sciences
Section
ARTICLES

Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons License.