Semantic Epistemology: Response to Machery

Michael Devitt

Abstract


Machery argues: (1) that “philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s —if anything, they are probably worse”; (2) that “intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference”. (1) lacks theoretical and empirical support. (2) cannot be right because usage provides the evidence that intuitions are reliable.

Keywords


methodology; theory of reference; experiments; linguistic intuitions; linguistic usage; corpus; elicited production; Expertise Defense; bias

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.6225

 

 

 

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