Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible

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Published 15-07-2013
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.7102
Mark Richard
Harvard University

Abstract

I review but don't endorse Marcus' arguments that impossible beliefs are impossible. I defend her claim that belief's objects are, in some important sense, not the bearers of truth and falsity, discuss her disposition- alism about belief, and argue it's a good fit with the idea that belief's objects are Russellian states of affairs. 

How to Cite

Richard, M. (2013). Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 28(3), 407–420. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.7102
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Keywords

Belief, truth, dispositionalism, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Kripke's puzzle about belief

Issue
Vol. 28 No. 3 (2013): Ruth Barcan Marcus (1921-2012)
Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION

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