

Terrorism

Volume I

Edited by

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Introduction: Theorizing Terrorism

Rosemary H.T. O'Kane

The events in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 added a further drama of terrorism. The audacity of the plane hijackings, the transnational behind the planning, the scale of the targets, the suicide nature of the mission and of people killed, images circulating the globe within minutes, produced drama of proportions. The events of September 11 demonstrated the relationship between modernity. It highlighted the potential afforded by modern technologies. To modernity, together with motor vehicles, aeroplanes, telephones, now mobile, high-speed aeroplane used as a bomb. Terrorism today exploits technology planned way and through these technologies can do so on a global scale. Not phones, but also Internet technology, can be exploited to great effect. This demonstrated the potential afforded for terrorist acts to have such impact the nature of modern society, with its urbanization and consequent high density of high-rise buildings. As September 11 also showed, so clearly, the terrorism of exploits another major strand of modernity, global communications. News of hijacked aeroplanes crashing into twin towers in the most high-profile city guaranteed to be given coverage worldwide. Captured on film, it runs and reruns. Furthermore, the very freedom to carry those images reveals another facilitator modern society – not only access to information and to images, but also to expressions, the freedoms of democracy.

Terrorism: Ancient and Modern

Though terrorism today may exploit modernity to maximum effect, terrorism is as our modern use of 'zealot', 'thug' and 'assassin' shows. The earliest examples Zealots-Sicarii who around 2000 years ago opposed the Roman occupation of Judea Palestine for some 25 years. The Assassins existed for nearly 200 years undermining governments in areas now in Iran, Syria and Turkey. The Thugs certainly flourishing in the thirteenth century and continued for up to 600 years instrument of terror was strangulation, the zealot's the dagger, while assassins of strangulation, cudgel or sword (for the above see Rapoport, 1984, Chapter 1). Significantly, though lacking modern instruments of terror, the bomb, the gun, missile, what these early terrorist organizations share with al Qaeda, the p September 11, and also the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas is justification for

ETA: From Secret Army to Social Movement — The Post-Franco Schism of The Basque Nationalist Movement

FRANCISCO J. LLERA, JOSÉ M. MATA
AND CYNTHIA L. IRVIN

Under the Franco dictatorship, post-Civil War generations of Basques grew up in a climate of physical violence and symbolic repression. Through the imposition of controls on all manifestations of Basque cultural and linguistic expression, the Spanish state transformed even the simplest of actions into defiant symbols of Basque identity. Rejecting, as ineffectual, attempts by the existing Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) to defend Basque culture, the more militant members of the PNV's youth organization attempted to stimulate a radical ethnic movement through a new organization, *Euskadi 'ta Askatasuna* [Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA)]. From its founding in 1959, ETA's principal goals have been the achievement of Basque independence and the revival of Basque culture and language. Its principal strategy has remained armed resistance to Spanish rule. To date, ETA has been responsible for approximately 600 deaths. In this article, we focus on the strategic and organizational evolution of ETA from secret army to social movement in the post-Franco era. In particular, we seek to clarify the role that violence plays in the symbolic conflict of Basque/Spanish collective identities and to identify how the democratization process has influenced the strategies and tactics adopted by ETA as well as by those political organizations which have emerged from ETA and its numerous factions.

The Cultivation of Basque Ethnic Sentiment

The postwar generation of Basque nationalists are the children of a century and a half of civil wars and symbolic violence: first with the Carlist Wars (1833-76) leading to a rise of the nationalist discourse and the emergence of an ethno-nationalist movement led by Sabino Arana; and second, with the violent resistance of the young generations beginning in the 1960s in response to the political consequences of violent military measures imposed during the Dictatorship.

During 1956-75 industrial and social modernization produced much of the initial stress on Basque culture, threatening as it did to erase Basque traditions and to assimilate the Basque people into a homogeneous


population of Spain. The Spanish state itself further contributed to the perception of 'us' versus 'them' by distinguishing the Basque territory from the rest of Spain through the imposition of 12 'states of exception',¹ which, by specifically discriminating against the Basque provinces, delegitimated the social reality of a unified Spanish nation and, in turn, legitimated the social construct of a distinct Basque nation.² Once the State had singled out the Basque territory, it was natural that this discrimination should produce a tight social cohesion. With the concomitant legal repression of everything Basque, a gulf developed between public life and private expression. This dichotomization of public and private life would become a defining feature of Basque life, particularly as the Basque symbolic space became increasingly identified with ETA and its violent resistance to the Spanish culture and state.

For Basques, the essence of their identity revolved around a sacred world of values and beliefs, and occurred within a 'social space' with readily identifiable members and enemies. Warrior virtues and the sense of fraternity³ from shared participation, both in Basque civil wars and in Catholic ritual, became sanctified and gave rise to a structure of values which was broadly shared and hence morally unifying of the ethnic community. The impossibility of giving expression to the Basque symbolic universe,⁴ together with the physical repression to which Basques were subjected, contributed to the construction of a dense network of social relations in which violence, both physical and symbolic, permeated ever more deeply into Basque life.

Max Weber⁵ claimed that an ethnic group is not in itself a community but merely a 'moment' that facilitates the process of 'communalization'. Later, he noted that national identity is difficult to describe objectively in any generic sense. Nonetheless, Weber indicated that since such an identity is based on particular 'differential factors', the sharing of even subjective perceptions of such differences results in an objective differentiation between 'us' and 'them'. This symbolic universe of 'us' versus 'them' has penetrated widely through Basque society. It has served as the backdrop in which new generations of Basques have been socialized. Though politically ambiguous, and lacking strategic and structural rationalization, Basque nationalism has had a tremendous capacity for unilaterally mobilizing everything and everyone Basque against the state and the dictatorship.

The Basque dualism of public and private expression was reinforced by another cultural dualism whose emotional roots went even deeper, namely, the confrontation of Basque and Spanish identities which articulated competing symbolic universes. It is not surprising then that objective cultural attributes, such as language, shared by members of

FIGURE 1
TRENDS IN ETA VIOLENCE 1968-1988



Sources: EGIN 1989, Clark (1984).

the ethnic groups and reinforced by communal solidarity structures, became key factors in the mobilization of the Basque nationalist movement, particularly as embodied by ETA.

With all forms of public dissent denied to them, secrecy, activism, and exile bred a violence *fondatrice*⁶ among Basques which would serve as the foundation for the development of a subculture of violence in Basque society. During the Franco regime which, by its continuous and pervasive application of coercive force, effectively limited its discourse with Basques to one of violence, the dichotomization of 'us' versus 'them' combined explosively with actual individual experiences of violence to distort both the political and social environment. Indeed, during the final years of Franco's dictatorship, violence was no longer simply a political strategy or just one more ingredient in the rhetoric of Basque resistance, but rather had become the central point of reference in daily Basque life. At the time of Franco's death, therefore, the dichotomization of Spain versus the Basque country was not merely cultural but political, not merely organizational but conceptual.⁷ On both sides its roots were profound, reaching to deeply-held identities and competing symbolic universes which, when confronted one with another, generated serious social conflict. The process of social development of the post-1940 generation thus coincided with an environment in which everything that symbolized Basque identity, particularly the Basque language, was endowed with enormous value and emotional appeal. To the extent that this generation of Basques has internalized the collective

reality characterized by both the public and private dichotomization of 'us' versus 'them', it has come to view the confrontation between Basque and Spanish society as a radically conflictive situation in which each Basque must take sides.

It is not surprising that such a clash should yield violence. For the Basques, however, violence has not merely occurred incidentally; it has been deliberately adopted as a strategy.

Figure 1, which shows the annual distribution of ETA-authored assassinations between 1968 and 1988, clearly illustrates how ETA, through the strategic use of violence, sought to affect political outcomes. That the level of violence increased during the period of Spain's transition to democracy reflects ETA's awareness of its position as the primary obstacle to the consolidation of the Spanish state. Indeed, looking at Figure 1, we see that the rate of assassinations peaked during the most important events of the transition: the referendum to approve the Spanish Constitution in 1978 and the Basque Autonomy Statute in 1979, and the first regional election in the Basque Country in 1980.

To justify this violent activism, nationalists have relied heavily upon the collective memory of past state repression and current acts of coercive force. The strategy of the action-repression-action spiral, anti-repressive mobilization, amnesty demands, the role of prisoners and their families and organizations: all these have played important roles in maintaining the armed struggle and its social support. Further, Basque society, by providing support within the ethnic group, has helped to create and protect contemporary heroes and in doing so has contributed to the overall process of reproducing the ethnic myth.


As Table 1 illustrates, the majority of mass popular marches organized by members of the Basque Movement for National Liberation (MLNV) in support of ETA have been called to protest the repressive measures of the state, to support ETA and, in particular, to

TABLE 1
CONTENTS OF THE SLOGANS OF THE
MAJOR POPULAR MARCHES OF MLNV, 1978-1988 (%)

Content	1978-1981	1982-1985	1986-1988
Ethnonationalist	16	26	24
ETA and Prisoners	70	46	46
Anti-repression	5	10	6
Social movements	10	18	22
Total - Per cent	100	100	100
Total - Incidents	95	157	209

Sources: Data gathered from EGIN (1977-1988). Calculations by the authors.

FIGURE 2 SYSTEM OF THE BASQUE MOVEMENT OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (MLNV)



support the Basque prisoners since they represent the most visible image of Basque resistance and victimization by the Spanish state and yet are, at the same time, the most vulnerable pawns in the military and ideological struggle with Spain. By continuously emphasizing the role of armed struggle as a necessity and as a central feature of Basque existence, the MLNV serves to reaffirm the Basque symbolic universe and to help reproduce the paradigm of perpetual conflict with the central Spanish government.⁸ This symbolic universe remains an important source of ETA's ability to recruit new members and politically mobilize its supporters in the various organizations of the MLNV.


Figure 2 (opposite) illustrates the relationship between the secret army, ETA, and the MLNV. ETA is the top echelon commanding the social movement which divides the labour of political activities and social mobilization among 'legal' organizations. KAS (the Socialist Patriotic Coordinator) is the second level of command. Its components include the main political party, HASI (the Popular Party for the Socialist Revolution); the labour union, LAB (the Union of the Patriotic Workers); the youth organization, JARRAI (the Revolutionary Patriotic Youth); the prisoners' supporters (Pro-Amnesty Committees); and the popular committees, ASK (the Patriotic Socialist Committees). Each of these components has its own electoral and political platform, and their coalition is conceived as a 'popular front', *Herri Batasuna* ('Popular Unity'). On the periphery of the MLNV are specialized organizations including training program organizations such as IPES, and Basque language programs (AZKAGINTZA); mass media organs such as the daily EGIN, the weeklies EMEN and PHE, and the monthlies ARGIA and H2000E; special interest organizations for ecologists (EGUZKI), women (EGIZAN), students (IA and OMEV), and children (KIMUAK and *Champññon*); and groups for prisoners and refugees.

ETA, however, remains the leader of the overall Basque nationalist movement, and has, on important occasions, intervened in the affairs of the various political and social subgroups that fall within the MLNV.

ETA's current strategy of armed struggle and popular mobilization through the social and political organizations which comprise the broader MLNV represents the latest, and perhaps final, step in the long history of the Basque people's struggle for a collective identity and political sovereignty.

In the following sections we review the tumultuous history of ETA. We give particular attention to the role that competing ideologies and the conflict over the selection of means – social mobilization versus

FIGURE 3
ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF ETA AND PATRIOTIC LEFT.
1930s-1980s



secret army - have played in the organization's internal development. Fortunately, captured internal ETA documents allow us to describe ETA's organizational structure in considerable detail. With the organizational background in mind, we then investigate the changing characteristics of ETA's membership in terms of class, demography, and collectively-held images. Finally, we consider the role of democracy as a stimulus of violence in Basque nationalism.

ETA Strategies and Structures - A History of Turmoil

Ever since ETA's emergence in the 1960s as the protagonist in the Basque struggle for independence, its internal politics has been characterized by recurrent instability and, at times, outright conflict among its members. Ideologically, ETA factions have fought among themselves concerning the relative merits of the political versus the armed struggle - the social movement versus the secret army - and over the rightful function of the armed organization that emerged during the last two decades of Franco's dictatorship.

Organizationally, adjustments have been necessitated by several practical factors. The dynamic interplay between police and activists has forced repeated alterations of tactics, and consequently of the organizational structure to support them. Since the objectives of Basque nationalism, whether they were to be accomplished by secret army or political movement, would be unattainable if the party lacked some degree of popular support, it has been necessary to promote recruiting and social mobilization, and reorganization has been necessary to accommodate these requirements. Success, however, has proven organizationally disruptive as the induction of new members has injected heterogeneous opinions and goals that have led to internal structural modifications.

One can distinguish two main lines along which factionalism and dissent have occurred: first, the ideological discrepancies between principles of Basque ethnonationalism and socialism; and second, opportunity costs stemming from the type of struggle - armed or political - selected. The conflicts that have emerged from these issues can be grouped into four periods:

1. From ETA's beginning to the early 1960s;
2. Between 1964 and 1974;
3. From 1975 to 1981;
4. From 1981 to the present.

ETA: The Early Years to 1964

When ETA emerged in 1959, and during its early years, it had fewer than a dozen members, most of whom were in exile in France, and was involved in few activities. ETA thus required no formal organizational structure at this stage. The initial steps toward formalizing the organization came in 1962 when the French exiles, recognizing that some structure was needed to recruit new members and to respond to the continuing repression, created the first 'Executive Committee' (EC). The Executive Committee had a simple functional or operative structure of 'four fronts' for political, economic, military and cultural affairs, respectively. This specialization responded to more than simple organizational requirements: it was at the same time a consequence of the distance between the leaders in exile and the new activists in Spain, as well as of the increasing ideological and strategic diversification within the growing membership.

This generation's formalization and rationalization of ETA strategies and structures was consummated in July 1962 with the Executive Committee's decision to convene the First Assembly. The Assembly was authorized to formulate general policy and directions, while the Executive Committee was responsible for daily and operative policy. The four fronts were replaced with a command structure of five branches: publications and communications, local organization and study groups, mass propaganda, mass organization, and military actions. Although the Executive Committee remained in exile in France, operative needs forced the creation of an organization located in Spain. This was approved during the Second Assembly in 1963. The new geographical organization incorporated six zones (*herrialdak*) with a leader (*buruzagi*) who was a part-time member of ETA, and who participated in armed actions and coordinated the preparation of an infrastructure for a future guerrilla strategy.

In this early period, ETA's strategy relied on the use of symbolic violence to radicalize the nationalist movement and to distinguish ETA from, and to put pressure on, the old conservative and inactive nationalists. Soon, this strategy generated a climate of insurgence against the dictatorship. To encourage the growing nationalist sentiment and to broadcast its own strategic characterization of the conflict as a Basque revolutionary movement of national liberation, ETA issued the 'Principles' in 1962. These principles defined ETA's overall ideological and political programme.⁹ As its strategic model, ETA adopted the use of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as it had been applied in the anti-imperialist struggles in the Third World. ETA, however, quickly

learned it had underestimated the repressive capability of the state as it watched the police crush its organizational structures between autumn 1963 and spring 1964. ETA was forced to organize a highly secret army, led by full-time local leaders (*liberados*) whose principal work was in rebuilding activist insurgency.

ETA: Nationalist or Socialist? (1964-1974)

ETA's first forays into violence, together with the Police repression and ETA's struggles during these years, created a growing social movement, but one which gathered around rather ambiguous goals of ethnic mobilization. The Third Assembly continued the mobilization effort, ratifying a new structure and establishing 'Parallel Support Organizations' (OPAs) to provide the *liberados* with logistical support (transportation, money and shelter, among other things).

The internal situation worsened radically between 1964 and 1970. Amid continuing internal fragmentation, external repression also forced structural adjustments. In particular, the first French attacks on ETA activists severed the connection between the Executive Committee and the *liberados*. The latter, therefore, were left to act autonomously. This new situation necessitated a new structure. During the Fourth Assembly (1964), the old branch structure was replaced by four new functional levels: (1) the Political Office (PO); (2) the Information Branch; (3) the Parallel Support Organizations (OPA); and (4) the Activism Branch, that is, the military structure.

The specific structure established at the Fourth Assembly reflected not only the impact of the effectiveness of the police, but also the social and ideological diversity of the new members. During this period, ETA opened its doors to a new generation of members who held distinctly different views, both ideological and strategic. These new members were generally younger and leaned toward Marxism-Leninism, and they often found themselves at odds with the older, founding generation. At the same time, those favoring cooperation with moderate nationalists in a national front fought against those who supported the mobilization of workers into a leftist-style class front; and, finally, supporters of political activism fought against those who pressed for a radicalized, violent struggle. Despite the change in structures implemented during the Fourth Assembly, ETA was plagued by continuous internal ideological and political disagreements and the Political Office eventually lost its control over the local and operative organizations.

The Fifth Assembly, held during 1966 and 1967, grappled with the ever-increasing factionalism. The central strategic issues to be resolved during this period were the proper relationship between national and

TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

social liberation and the mobilization of popular support for the armed struggle. To further this mobilization, participants adopted a more complex and specialised structure. At the top was the National Assembly (*Biltzar Nagusia*), the supreme policy-making group. It included the Executive Committee, and the heads of the branches, zones (*herrialdak*), and sub-units and numbered, on average, between 40 and 50 ETA leaders. The second echelon was shared by two executive committees, each with its own autonomous chain of command: one, the Small Assembly (*Biltzar Txikia*), was composed of members exiled in France; the other, the Tactical Executive Committee (KET), located in Spain, oversaw the local operative structures. The third echelon represented the reorganization of the six old regions (*herrialdak*) into functional and geographical sub-units, the Four Fronts and Zones for Towns, respectively. Finally, the fourth echelon was a political office for ideological and political matters and a High Strategic Command to oversee armed operations.

Despite its efforts to develop public support, ETA remained isolated from broader Basque society, and thus found it difficult to engage successfully in mass mobilization against the dictatorship. In this second period, 1964-74, ETA developed its theory of the spiral of action-repression-action. Events conformed to theory in 1968. ETA assassinated its first policeman and the police responded in kind and created ETA's first martyr, Txabi Exebarrieta. ETA, however, now found it necessary to re-evaluate its action-repression-action theory as the repressive response from the state became increasingly severe and disrupted the operational capacity of the organization. Between 1968 and 1970, for example, the police effectively neutralized both the High Strategic Command and the Tactical Executive Committee. The Small Assembly, therefore, had to act in its place. With its military arm crippled, the effectiveness of ETA armed activities diminished sharply; however, police suppression played a key role in radicalizing the population, and thereby in stimulating ETA recruitment¹⁰ as well as popular mobilization in its support.

The outcome of the internal struggles during this difficult period was a relative triumph of the ethnonationalist group in coalition with the extreme militarists although the organization retained its leftist rhetoric and the struggle for national liberation was now explicitly linked to the struggle for social liberation.

ETA: *The Final Days of Franco (1973-1975)*

In December 1973 ETA assassinated Franco's Prime Minister, Admiral Carrero Blanco. This event inaugurated the end of Francoism and, with

ETA: THE POST-FRANCO SCHISM

its demise, a new period of heightened violence in Spain, and still greater conflict within ETA. With Carrero gone and Franco in decline, the initiation of the transition to democracy in Spain had begun. This transition would usher in another period of intense internal conflict for ETA.

The death of Franco opened a new range of possible options for the achievement of Basque nationalist objectives. At the same time, the central government made it clear that nondemocratic strategies would be discouraged. The Basques' pro-militarist leadership, although exiled from the country, continued to defend the priority and autonomy of its military strategy and, despite its isolation from the mass struggle continuing in Spain, succeeded in expelling that faction of the organization which promoted the labour front and the strategy of cooperation with other radical Spanish organizations. The expelled faction would later found its own *abertzale* (patriotic) party, the Trotskyite/Anarchist LAIA (Patriotic Revolutionary Workers Party).

Meanwhile, ETA was confronted with a highly mobilized population and new internal ideological conflicts concerning how to proceed. At the heart of this debate were two important strategic issues. The first related to the potential value and risks associated with increasing the relative autonomous the armed struggle. The second concerned the relative merits of participating in a national or class front. This debate would culminate in 1974 with the division of ETA into ETA-Militar (ETA-M) and ETA-Político-Militar (ETA-PM). Although both factions retained the same overall strategy of popular revolution aiming toward the same political objectives – independence, socialism and monolingualism for the Basque country – and continued to engage in armed activism, the Basque country – and continued to participate in the post-ETA-PM became increasingly committed to participation in the Franco Spanish democratic process. However, ETA attacks continued as armed struggle – waged through assassination and other violent actions – continued to have a mobilizing effect on the masses and promote the organization's revolutionary goals.

ETA in Transition (1975-1981)

The third period, 1975-81, commenced with a strongly militarist attitude within ETA. However, ETA recognized that it needed to define a new strategy suitable for democratic-style competitive politics, and at the same time capable of building popular support – something which ETA had just learned was effectively accomplished through terrorist actions. The fact that this lesson had been learned in a repressive political environment which would be quite different from the new situation of democracy perhaps escaped careful evaluation. Facing an unfamiliar

political environment, ETA-M and ETA-PM remained divided along the lines of two opposite strategies, the military and the political-military, both ostensibly aiming toward the same political objectives.¹¹

Despite their common goals, however, ETA-PM and ETA-M pursued a bitter and violent rivalry. ETA-M's 'Manifesto'¹² espoused the use of radical nationalist principles directed at mass organizations with the aim of establishing a 'Popular Front for Independence'. While the militarist leadership of the movement would maintain its own independence, the popular front would press forward with the final struggle against the dictatorship.

ETA-PM, by contrast, pursued a strategy that combined military and political tactics, calling for the unification of mass leadership with the military struggle.¹³ In 1976 ETA-PM decided at the Seventh Assembly to promote the creation of a leftist mass party that could participate in political competition. ETA-PM offered as its initial platform the *Oisagabria* document which proposed, first, the dependence of the military organization on the legal political leadership; and second, the eventual dissolution of the military organization.

This position was, to say the least, controversial within ETA: it provoked yet another struggle between ETA-PM and ETA-M, and touched off the secession of the *Bereziak* special commandos led by Argala, and of the Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commandos (CAA). It culminated in the assassination of Pertur, who, as leader of ETA-PM, was attempting to end the armed struggle. Meanwhile, ETA-M, predicting the failure of the democratic transition and the consequent development of a pre-revolutionary situation with its attendant opportunities, intensified the armed struggle.

As ETA-M and ETA-PM argued over the proper role of military activity in Basque nationalism under democracy, several splinter groups embraced the new pluralistic situation and decided to pursue the formation of electoral parties. This created further fragmentation, unstable coalitions, and conflict within Basque nationalist ranks.

The search for unity, the broadly-felt need to mobilize the population to achieve the aims of Basque nationalism, and the struggle for pre-dominance within ETA eventually would give rise to the Socialist Patriotic Coordinating Committee (KAS), which included, in addition to ETA-M and ETA-PM, the nascent radical Basque parties LAIA (the Revolutionary Party of Patriotic Workers), and ELI (the Basque Revolutionary Workers). This coalition was intended to serve as a coordinating body for the activities of the MLNV.

In 1976 another new revolutionary socialist and patriotic organization, EHAS, had emerged from the combination of the Popular Socialist

Party (HAS, itself a splinter from the radical Basque ENBATA movement in France) and the Basque Socialist Party (EAS). During the same period, some of the founders of the Solidarity of Basque Workers-Basque Socialist Movement (ELA-MSE, a splinter group derived from the old nationalist trade union, ELA-STV), created a new social-democratic and patriotic party, the Basque Socialist Assembly (ESB). At the same time, another moderate socialist party of young professionals founded the Organization for Basque Socialist Unification (ESEI). Both ESB and ESEI were created to participate in establishing a national front, and to enlarge the movement via competing in free elections.

By the end of 1976 the Socialist Patriotic Coordinator group (KAS) had decided to reject the *Oisagabria* document adopted by ETA-PM, and endorsed the so-called *Alternativa KAS* (KAS Alternative).¹⁴ The KAS Alternative's main points are:

1. Amnesty for all Basque prisoners.
2. Legalization of separatist parties.
3. Substitution of Basque police for Spanish police organizations in the Basque Country.
4. Recognition of the right to self-determination of the Basque Country.
5. Unification between the Basque administrative region and Navarra.
6. Declaration of the Basque language as official and having priority.
7. Political control by the Basque government of the Spanish Army in the Basque Country.
8. Improvement of workers' labour conditions.¹⁵

In 1977 profound divisions over the issues of amnesty and the appropriate character of participation in the first free general elections resulted in a decisive split within the 'Patriotic Left' (*Izquierda Abertzale*). ETA-M rejected the government's offer of amnesty as incomplete since it did not pardon those accused of the most serious attacks against the state. It also maintained that the political reforms of the Suarez government were more changes in style than substance and that armed struggle, therefore, remained necessary to effect a complete break with the Francoist state.

The members of ETA-M defended their own autonomy against the strategy of transforming the armed struggle into a merely political party, such as was proposed by ETA-PM. ETA-M became an increasingly secret army based on small secret cells (commandos), comprising three

or five members, operating in geographical areas where they normally lived, and connected directly to a simple operative leadership in France. By contrast, ETA-PM interpreted the period of democratic transition as signalling the end of the armed struggle. To meet the demands of the new period, ETA-PM expanded its influence by creating the popular and sectional committees [the Patriotic Socialist Committees (ASK), the Movements of the Patriot Students (IAM and EGAM), etc.] as well as a new patriotic Marxist-Leninist party [the Party for the Basque Revolution (EIA)]. These parties further subdivided, and two new organizations – the militaristic Popular Party for the Socialist Revolution (HASI) and the politically-oriented Party for the Basque Revolution (EIA) – arose respectively next to ETA-M and ETA-PM.

Once again, the situation began to polarize the nationalist movement between the extremes of purely political and violently military options. From this division there emerged two new groups. First came the 'Basque Left' (*Euskadiko Ezkerra* or EE), which was formed initially (1977) as an electoral coalition, and which later evolved into a socialist party comprising EIA and a section of the Communist Party (PCE), HASI, ANV and ESEI. EE was linked to ETA-PM. Second came the Popular Unity party, *Herri Batasuna*, which formed in 1978 and which incorporated HASI, the remaining mass organizations of KAS, and sections of LAIA, ESB, and ANV into a political coalition.¹⁶ *Herri Batasuna* was connected to ETA-M.

Although HASI, *Herri Batasuna*, EIA, *Euskadiko Ezkerra*, and the PNV rejected the Spanish Constitution in 1978 on the grounds that it did not address the issue of Basque self-determination, the PNV and EE viewed the 1979 Basque Autonomy Statute which emerged from the constitutional process as legitimate and opted to participate actively in both the Spanish and Basque parliaments.¹⁷ Once ETA-PM's political wing, EE, began participating in the new Basque Autonomous Government and its supporting institutions, the militarists within ETA-PM were increasingly pressured to reject violence, abandon the armed struggle, and accept the predominance of political action and the direction of the combined spinoff parties, EIA and *Euskadiko Ezkerra*.

While ETA-PM's EE grew increasingly committed to parliamentary politics, ETA-M's *Herri Batasuna* operated to mobilize popular support for ETA. Its primary goal was to promote broad participation in the MLNV in order to provide support for ETA's political objectives. This proved to be a continuous requirement.

In 1979 *Herri Batasuna*, in response to EE's success in the 1977 elections, also decided to participate in elections, but only on an abstentionist basis. Although *Herri Batasuna* continues to reject the

democratic institutional system, preferring to support the social and political mobilization efforts led by ETA-M in the organizational context of KAS and the MLNV, it has also become increasingly committed to a dual strategy of electoral and armed struggle.

ETA in Democratic Spain since 1981

Since 1981 ETA has focused its military and political strategy on securing a negotiated resolution of the current conflict. Both ETA-M and ETA-PM have participated in negotiations with the Spanish government, though each has viewed the process differently. ETA-PM participated in negotiating the so-called process of 'social reintegration' and in achieving freedom for some hundreds of prisoners and exiles. In 1981, for example, EIA and *Euskadiko Ezkerra* mediated between ETA-PM and the Spanish Minister of the Interior in order to stop the armed struggle and open a way for the social reintegration of former *etarra*.¹⁸ In 1981 ETA-PM, most of whose members were now active in EE and committed to parliamentary politics and nonviolent political change, chose to dissolve its own organization. Those ETA-PM members who remained convinced of the necessity of armed struggle merged with ETA-M which had always maintained its strategy of violent opposition to Spanish rule. Since 1981 the two names ETA and ETA-M have been used synonymously.

ETA-M, the MLNV, and *Herri Batasuna* continue to describe the current Spanish democracy as a disguised Francoism and the situation as a war between *Euskadi* (the Basque homeland) and the Spanish state. ETA-M views its own participation in political negotiation as guaranteeing an 'armistice' after the Spanish government accepts the political conditions specified in the KAS Alternative. Meanwhile, *Herri Batasuna* through its non-participation in the existing political institutions, seeks to delegitimize those institutions in Basque eyes. It acts specifically to polarize the political situation, presenting two opposed legitimacies: that of the Basques, represented by ETA, versus that of the Spanish state, represented by the constitution and the Autonomy Statute.

Herri Batasuna: A Party Against the State

Today, *Herri Batasuna* is a socio-political movement which represents the objectives of ETA. In a context of polarized pluralism,¹⁹ it operates as an anti-system party in electoral competition, even as it continuously attacks the institutional order through radical activism on the streets. In 1987 *Herri Batasuna* received over 250,000 votes and replaced the moderate Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) as the most popular Basque

nationalist party. However, following the ETA bombing of a supermarket in a working class district of Barcelona in summer 1987, and the introduction in January 1988 of an anti-ETA pact, signed by all the other Basque parties, *Herri Batasuna* experienced a significant erosion of its electoral support and the PNV regained its position of dominance in 1989.

ETA and *Herri Batasuna* remain, however, a significant political force within Basque society and their ability to mobilize mass demonstrations in support of amnesty, negotiation, and Basque self-determination reflects ETA's skill in identifying and expressing issues that evoke public support. It is this ability, above all others, that has sustained ETA throughout its continuous frenzied reorganizations and promoted its influence in Basque society. Indeed, despite the party's constantly changing form, ETA's leadership has been sufficiently outstanding that most political organizations in opposition have applauded not only its strategy but several of its principles including the right to self-determination and the incorporation of Navarra into the Basque Country.

In order to provide a better understanding of the ETA leaders and members which have sustained their position as the dominant voice of opposition to Spanish rule, we now turn to an examination of their individual characteristics.


Party Hierarchy, Membership Demographics and Psychological Characteristics

Although it is difficult to define ETA membership because there are several classes, levels and functions as well as phases in the gradual incorporation of new members,²⁰ we will try to draw a broad picture of the different generations of ETA activists who have participated in its operations. Because there exist only limited qualitative data documenting individual life histories from which motivational profiles could be derived, we rely primarily on indirect and fragmentary data. Fortunately, internal ETA documents obtained by the French in October 1987, the so-called 'Sokoa papers', give invaluable insights into ETA membership and command structure.

ETA Party Hierarchy and the Decision-Making Process

Once recruited, ETA members can assume several different roles, to which ranks are directly related. The 'liberados' or 'ilegales' (outlaws) are the leaders, whose ascendancy is manifest in their status as highest-

FIGURE 4
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ETA



Source: Done by authors

level decision-makers. This group is characterized by full-time dedication to ETA work and involvement in the most important violent actions. These members receive a salary from the organization and are well known to the police.

The second rank is the '*legales*', members who are unknown to the police and who maintain a normal life and job while exercising a variable degree of commitment to ETA. Members of this rank can be grouped into three different categories, depending on respective functions: '*enlaces*' (links), who perform communication activities; '*buzones*' (messengers), who serve as couriers for the organizations; and '*informativos*' (intelligence gatherers), who collect information related to organizational objectives.

Below the '*liberados*', '*legales*' and '*legales*' is the third rank, the 'supporters', whose function is to prepare and provide logistical support for organizational activities performed by members of the other ranks. This function includes provision of transportation, food, clothing, documents, shelter, or whatever else may be needed. After a period of training in the local headquarters and contact with higher level members responsible for recruitment, members in this rank also share responsibility for recruitment and for promoting a high degree of commitment to the organization.

The 'Sokoa' documents further reveal that the leadership actually consists of two echelons: the top decision-makers are eight acknowledged leaders who hold monthly executive meetings; evidently, each top-echelon member is responsible for a specific 'portfolio' of activities. The next echelon comprises approximately 18 people with their assistants (around 70 people). These members are also charged with specific activities, and are supervised by the top-echelon member responsible for that activity. Thus, in 1987, 10 second-echelon members were involved with special commando activities, 3 with legal commando activities, 1 with activities relevant to deported members and prisoners, 16 with refugees, 13 with providing technical support, 1 with international relations, 20 with political offices, and an indeterminate number with activities by illegal commandos. Figure 4 (p.123), which was found in the archives of Santiago ('Santi Potros'), one of ETA's top leaders when he was captured by the French police in 1987, shows this organizational structure.

ETA Membership Demographics

In terms of their social characteristics, the papers captured with Arrós-ride confirm the existence of generational differences among ETA members although origin has not always coincided with current status at

any particular point in time. The social origin of the old guard in the 1960s included members of the working class (44 per cent), middle class (40 per cent), and farmers (14 per cent). From their points of origin, these members of the old guard moved into different social classes: 18 per cent were working class and another 18 per cent were middle class, 47 per cent were students, and 16 per cent were upper class. In the 1970s the proportion of lower and middle class members rose (to 34.3 per cent and 45.6 per cent, respectively), while that of students and upper class members decreased to 11.4 per cent and 0 per cent, respectively.²² During this period, unemployed members also appeared. The 1980s show similar proportions: 42.8 per cent of members are middle class, 33 per cent are working class, 15.8 per cent are students, 6.4 per cent are unemployed, and 2 per cent are upper class.

Members from urban origins surpass members from rural areas in all periods (overall about 70 per cent versus 30 per cent), although this varies according to the province. ETA in Guipúzcoa, for example, drew 35 per cent of its members from rural areas in the 1960s, more than 40 per cent in the 1970s, and about 36 per cent in the 1980s. Available data reveal an inverse trend in Vizcaya, however: from 55 per cent to 30 to 40 per cent over the same periods. Navarra ranged from 3 per cent in the 1960s to 20 per cent in the 1970s and back to 10 per cent in the 1980s.

Further, if we compare the distributions of ETA membership in the 1960s and the 1980s, we notice changes in their respective places of territorial origin. Over this 20-year period, the proportion of members from Bilbao and surrounding areas decreased from 38 per cent to 26 per cent. However, membership from the San Sebastián area increased from 16 to 20 per cent between 1960 and 1980, and the proportion of *etarras* from Vitoria increased from 2 to 5 per cent while the proportion of *etarras* from Pamplona increased from 0 to 7 per cent. Overall, representation increased among members from Alava (5 per cent) and Navarra (3 per cent). The rest of the rural and semi-urban areas of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya maintained stable rates of representation in ETA membership (19 and 15 per cent, respectively).

In terms of ethnic origin, although much of the available information is fragmentary and emerges from police records or from indirect and secondary sources, there is strong agreement that more than 80 per cent of ETA members in the 1960s and 1970s were native Basques. In the 1980s the percentage of members born of immigrant parents increased slightly. However, there is a significant difference in ethnic origin between the *liberados* (the earliest group of full-time local leaders of ETA) in jail over 1980-81, and other members detained during the same years: 73 per cent of the former have Basque parents versus only 56 per cent of

the latter. This finding highlights the increasing recruitment of immigrants into ETA (rising from 15 to 23 per cent) in recent years. Interestingly, the latest police information has found that the *etarras* who were the most violent between 1983 and 1988 were immigrants who joined ETA after 1982: Juan Toledo, age 29, accused of 17 assassinations; Antonio Troitiño, age 31, accused of 32 assassinations; Domingo Troitiño, age 33, 24 assassinations; Ramón Caride, age 44, 27 assassinations. In effect, these men are in charge of, or are members of, the commando groups responsible for over 70 per cent of the people killed by ETA between 1983 and 1988.²³ These statistics would seem to confirm *Herrri Batasuna's* ability to appeal to second generation immigrants based on its record as the party which best defends their rights as workers.²⁴

Regarding age and gender, data from prisoners and from people detained by the police reveals a slight increase in the number of female members from fewer than 10 per cent in the earlier generations of ETA activists to slightly more than 20 per cent in the 1980s.²⁵ It also shows a slow decrease in the mean age of recruitment of ETA members: from 27.75 years in 1980-81, to 26.5 years in 1985-87, to 26.2 years in 1988. Recent police files indicate that the age distribution of those joining ETA changed between 1985-87 and 1988: 12.7 per cent were aged under 20 in 1985-87 compared with 21 per cent in 1988; 34.2 per cent were aged 20 to 24 in 1985-87 and 31.5 per cent in 1988; 31.5 per cent were aged 25 to 29 in 1985-87 and 22.8 per cent in 1988; 10.2 per cent were aged 30 to 35 in 1985-87 and 8.7 per cent in 1988; and 11.3 per cent were age 36 or over in 1988, and 15.6 per cent in 1988. The proportion of younger people and the increase in the number of students detained in 1988 could indicate difficulties in sustaining member activism, either as a result of increasingly effective security measures, or as a response to a reduction in popular support.²⁶

ETA Psychological Characteristics

On an individual level, data regarding the psychological orientation of specific ETA members is sketchy. Nonetheless, it has been determined that a difficult childhood is often a personal characteristic of the most violent activists. At a more general level, several statements can be made regarding the psychological orientation of ETA members. The role of woman (mother), for example, is particularly important in the reproduction of Basque culture²⁷ and, as Clark found, in forming the personal and emotional characteristics of the earliest generation of ETA members.

Fear of reprisals for abandoning the organizations has also certainly

been a significant component in the psychological make-up of the membership. Although specific sources have seldom been identified, it is clear that threats and intimidation have been used to forestall dissent, especially at critical moments, such as during the 1989 failure of the talks held in Algiers between representatives of ETA and the Spanish government. The assassinations of dissenting members such as 'Pertur' in 1976, Mikel Solauin in 1981, and Maria D. Gonzalez Catarain ('Yoyes') in 1986 proved that publicized threats against 'betrayals' and breaches in organizational discipline are not empty ones.

Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact size of ETA during any particular period in its evolution, Clark, relying on data from different sources, calculated that membership ranged between 6 and 70 during 1952-59, between 200 and 600 during the 1960s, between 100 and 400 in the 1970s, and increased to 2,000 in 1981. The latest calculations from police sources estimate ETA membership at around 200 or 300 before the French involvement in anti-ETA repression. Spanish police calculated that there were 20 operative commandos with around 90 activists in 1984. Nine of the commandos were *ilegales* (four in Guipúzcoa, two in Vizcaya, and one each in Alava, Navarra and Madrid); the other 11 were *legales*. In 1985 Spanish police estimated that 26 active leaders remained operative in ETA. At the end of 1988 the police estimated that only a dozen active leaders remained; the others were either dead (1), detained in France (5) or deported (8). Overall, ETA had fewer than 50 operative commandos, and of these at least 24 were put out of circulation.

ETA Decision-Making Process

Unfortunately, although material such as the 'Sokoa Papers' provides us with a glimpse of ETA's general organization, there is no direct data that permits us to confirm the real decision-making process inside the organization. Yet from ETA's history of crisis and change, we can derive some hypotheses about it.

First, it has evidently always been difficult for ETA to establish a very formal organization and a rationalized decision-making process. Both police repression and geographical separation of constituent parts have made it difficult to establish a permanent structure. Thus organizational instability has been a constant feature of the ETA.

Second, the priority accorded armed activities and the concomitant secrecy necessary for success effectively resulted in a distinct and autonomous chain of command, one which often worked at purposes contrary to those of other specialized branches of the organization.

Third, continuous discussion about ideological and political principles has often precluded the existence of any legitimate authority or leadership for any lengthy period. Throughout its history, most of ETA's

assemblies have been contested, unnecessarily prolonged, or duplicated by another part of the organization.

Still, amid this environment of instability, contradiction and interneine quarrelling, some consistent patterns still stand out: the presence of a charismatic leader who serves as the movement's 'general'; the supremacy of ethnic principles; and the desire to mobilize along nationalist lines to pursue successfully the ideological and strategic struggles necessary to force the Madrid government to enter into talks with ETA and to secure a negotiated settlement to the Spanish-Basque conflict on the basis of the KAS Alternative.

Conclusion: Democracy as a Stimulus of Violence

Democratization has legitimated the use of institutional means to achieve collective aims. At the same time, however, it raised new divisive issues for the Basques: how should Basque nationalists seek their goals in this new environment? Once the transition to democracy was initiated, tensions emerged. There was some trend toward rationalizing Basque political structures and institutions to function as an effective participant in this unfamiliar milieu. Yet this option was greatly complicated by the fact that many of those involved in Basque political life had organized themselves outside of, or in opposition to, this precise institutionalizing process. Radicalized nationalists therefore rejected any participation in the new institutions as a betrayal of the Basque cause and rejected the Spanish Constitution of 1978.²⁷

As the new political situation opened entirely different avenues for change, and popular perspectives changed, the process of democratization forced the enunciation of different goals among the various nationalist factions. Most recently, despite their retention of military tactics, many within ETA recognize that the only solution to the conflict is one of political negotiation not only between ETA and *Herri Batasuna* and the Madrid government, but also between the other Basque parties and Madrid. The adoption of such a position by ETA reflects in part the difficulties it faces in its decision-making process at a time of enormous political and strategic importance, while most of its leaders are either in jail or deported. It also reflects, however, ETA's recognition of the *de facto* acceptance of the Spanish political reform and the concomitant enhancement and entrenchment of the legitimacy of the central Spanish government within a considerable portion of the Basque electorate. In particular, the adoption of a strategy of political negotiation increases the importance of *Herri Batasuna* as ETA's institutional voice, and places an even greater responsibility on the

organizations within the MLNV to mobilize popular support for the negotiation process. The Spanish reform process has, therefore, provided ETA with new opportunities for action which have enabled it to pursue its violent campaign for independence. However, the democratization process has also confronted ETA with its most difficult task, to justify its continuing campaign of violence to those who have now accepted the alternative path of electoral politics and institutional reform. To what extent ETA can succeed in that justification depends not only on the mobilizing capabilities of the MLNV, but also on the extent to which policies and actions originating in Madrid provide the MLNV with cause for action. Clark (1990) has noted that negotiated settlements to insurgencies have rarely been achieved. But as the illusion of military victory fades for both participants, perhaps a negotiated solution is still possible.

NOTES

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1. Through the use of the state of exception the Franco government repeatedly set aside constitutional protections available to all Spanish citizens in order to free the police and Guardia Civil. The state of exception was one step short of martial law. It was a temporary abrogation by the government of the rights theoretically guaranteed by the *Fueros de los Españoles*: freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement and residence, privacy of the mails, the right of habeas corpus, and freedom from arbitrary house arrest. In the 178 months from Feb. 1956 through Franco's death in Nov. 1975, at least one Basque province was affected for 56 months or 31 per cent of the period. See Robert P. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1984), p.241.
2. See Alfonso Perez-Agote, *La reproducción del nacionalismo vasco* (The Reproduction of Basque Nationalism) (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1984).
3. Donatella Della Porta and Lborio Martina, 'Ciclos políticos y movilización étnica: el caso vasco' ('Political Cycles and Ethnic Mobilization: The Basque Case'), *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas* 35 (1986), p.130
4. Peter L. Berger, and T.H. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968), p.120.
5. Max Weber, *Economía y Sociedad* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1979), p.318.
6. Michel Maffesoli, *La violence fondatrice* (Paris: Champ Urbain, 1978).
7. William A. Douglass, 'A Critique of Recent Trends in the Analysis of Ethno-nationalism', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 11 (1988), p.198.
8. Soc Joseba Zulaika, *Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament* (Reno, NV: Univ. of Nevada Press, 1988) and Begoña Aretxaga, *Los funerales en el nacionalismo radical vasco* (Funerals in Basque Radical Nationalism) (San Sebastián: Baroja, 1988).

9. Federico Krutwig, *Vasconia* (Buenos Aires: Norbait, 1963).
10. Robert P. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1984), p.155.
11. Luciano Rincon, *ETA (1974-1984)* (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 1985).
12. José M. Garmendia, *Historia de ETA 2 vols.* (San Sebastián: Haranburu, 1980 and 1983), Vol.2, p.181ff.
13. Angel Amigo, *Periur: ETA 71-76* (San Sebastián: Hordago, 1978), p.207ff.
14. This platform - which remains the platform of ETA today - was derived from ETA-PM's manifesto of eight points, issued for *Aberrri Eguna* (Homeland Day) in 1975.
15. Naxo Arregi, *Memorias del KAS, 1975-1978* (San Sebastián: Hordago, 1981), p.99.
16. Francisco Llera, *Postfranquismo y fuerzas políticas en Euzkadi* (Post-Francoism and Political Forces in Euzkadi) (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 1985).
17. Mario Onaindia, *Euzkadiko Ezkerra arie el Estatuto* (EE before the Statute) (Bilbao: Euzkadiko Ezkerra, 1979).
18. *Euzarra* is the Basque term used to refer to members of ETA.
19. See e.g., Francisco Llera, 'El sistema de partidos vasco: distancia ideológica y legitimación política' ('The Basque Party System: Ideological Distance and Political Legitimation'), *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, pp.281-6; *Postfranquismo y fuerzas políticas en Euzkadi* (Post-Francoism and Political Forces in Euzkadi) (Bilbao: Univ. del País Vasco, 1985); 'Continuidad y cambio en el sistema de partidos vasco: 1977-1987' ('Continuity and Change in the Basque Party System: 1977-1987'), *Revista de Estudios Políticos* 59 (1988), pp.277-375.
20. Clark (note 10), p.142.
21. Peter Merkl, 'Approaches to the Study of Political Violence', in P. Merkl (ed.), *Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1986), p.3.
22. Clark (note 10), p.145.
23. *Tiempo*, 15 May 1989.
24. The ability of *Herri Batasuna* to attract the vote of non-ethnic Basques has, in general, been explained as a protest vote by radical workers affected by the rise in unemployment rates in the Basque country which have risen from 3.9 per cent in 1975 to 21.4 per cent in 1988 and have exceeded the Spanish average unemployment rate since 1978.
25. An interesting account by a female member is found in the biography by María D. Gonzalez Catarain ('Yoyes'), 'Yoyes was a militant member of the ETA Executive Committee during the 1970s and supporter of ETA-M; she was assassinated by her organization when she abandoned it in the 1980s.' (Yoyes 1987).
26. Police report on JARRAI (Youth Organization), published in *Tiempo*, 31 Oct. 1986.
27. Andrés Ortiz-Osés, and F.K. Mayr, *El matriarcalismo vasco* (Basque Matriarcalism) (Bilbao: Univ. de Deusto, 1980).
28. Clark (note 10), p.220.
29. Sec Cynthia L. Irvin, 'Parties Against the State: Sinn Fein and Herri Batasuna in Comparative Perspective', paper presented at the 1991 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, and Juan Linz, *Conflicto en Euzkadi* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1986).

APPENDIX

ETA clearly perceived violence as an effective way to communicate its own position of power. Its members, therefore, sought to use violence as a means to force the Spanish government to negotiate, a strategy which still continues. Indeed, during its 30 years of

existence, ETA has been responsible for over 500 assassinations, 60 kidnappings, innumerable bombings, countless armed assaults and robberies, more than 1,000 injuries, and an extended regime of extortionist 'revolutionary taxation', as well as numerous other violent actions. As shown in Table A1, ETA bears the responsibility for more than 70 per cent of all people killed in terrorist actions in Spain during 1968-88.

It is interesting to consider the victims of ETA violence over the 20-year period, 1968-88. As seen in Table A2, which lists deaths only, most of the fatalities are policemen and military officers (59.1 per cent of the total). This targeting reflects the ETA's perception of the situation as a military occupation of the Basque Country, and as a war of the Basque people against the Spanish state and capitalism.

Additional victims who helped to make this point included industrialists and politicians, both national and local. Between 1972 and 1983, Basque industrialists were the target of nearly 500 such attacks, as shown in Table A3. Kidnapping and personal attacks on Basque industrialists and their property are designed both to heighten the degree of fear among the class of potential victims as well as to inflict monetary damage on them as a result of bombing and sabotage of their property. These attacks also serve to reinforce ETA's position as the defender of the Basque working class.

A second target of this nature were the banks and firms with a conflict of interest in the Basque situation. Over the last few years, the latter group has come to include French firms, because the French police cooperate with the Spanish government against the ETA. During the last five years 500 attacks against this second group of targets have occurred. (De Arteaga 1971, pp.345-350; Casinello 1984, pp.299ff; Clark (main note 1), pp.123ff; Rincon (main note 11), pp.203ff; Pihuel 1986.)

TABLE A1
PEOPLE KILLED IN TERRORIST ACTIONS, SPAIN 1968-1988

Year	By ETA	By		By Others	Total
		Extreme Right	GAL		
1968	2	-	-	-	2
1969	1	-	-	-	1
1970	-	-	-	-	-
1971	-	-	-	1	1
1972	1	-	-	1	2
1973	7	-	-	1	8
1974	19	-	-	-	19
1975	16	-	-	10	26
1976	15	3	-	3	21
1977	12	6	-	10	28
1978	64	8	-	13	85
1979	78	22	-	11	111
1980	93	29	-	2	124
1981	30	4	-	4	38
1982	31	1	-	12	44
1983	34	-	2	8	44
1984	24	-	9	-	33
1985	31	-	11	1	43
1986	24	-	2	15	41
1987	49	-	1	8	58
1988	19	-	-	-	19
Total	550	73	25	100	748

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TABLE A2
CLASSIFICATION OF MORTAL VICTIMS OF ETA ACTIONS, 1968-1988

Type of Victim	Percentage of Total Victims
Policemen	45.1%
Military officers	14.0%
Citizens	33.8%
ETA members	3.2%
Local politicians	2.2%
Industrialists	1.5%
National politicians	0.2%

Source: Data gathered from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior. Calculations by the authors.

In the last two years covered by this study (1987-88), there has been a distinct qualitative shift in the type of violence inflicted. ETA actions have become more indiscriminate and more frequently fatal. They have been directed against collective targets, frequently in the largest Spanish cities, and they involve the use of more sophisticated arms - lethal shells, several surface-to-air missiles, and even two SAM-7 missiles. Thus, though 1987 was the year of the fewest (133) violent actions between 1968 and 1988, these acts produced a disproportionately higher number of fatalities, because they occurred in heavily populated cities (Madrid, Barcelona and Zaragoza), in zones in which

TABLE A3
ETA KIDNAPPINGS, 1970-1989

Year	Number of Victims
1970	1
1971	-
1972	1 (assassinated)
1973	1
1974	4 (2 assassinated)
1975	-
1976	-
1977	1 (assassinated)
1978	4
1979	13
1980	10
1981	6 (1 assassinated)
1982	6
1983	6 (1 assassinated)
1984	-
1985	3
1986	2
1987	1
1988	1
1989	1

Source: Data gathered from contemporary press reports. Calculations by authors.

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people were concentrated (supermarkets, police stations and buses), and involved use of weapons (such as car bombs) that affected a large area. In 1988, 290 violent actions occurred. The distribution of the targets of this violence is as follows: 104 attacks against enterprises (36 per cent of all victims) occurred, most (74) of them French or dealing with French products; 46 (16 per cent) against banks; 70 (24 per cent) against transportation targets; 33 (11 per cent) against police; 31 (11 per cent) against private citizens, and 6 (2 per cent) against public offices. As was the case with the overall period 1968-88, most of the fatalities (63 per cent) were either policemen or military officers.

Not surprisingly, ETA is the main victim of police repression in Spain, having had more than 90 of its members killed and more than 20,000 arrested as shown in Table A4; as of July 1991, 600 were in jail. ETA is also a principal target of opposition terrorist groups, a conflict which has led to the death of more than 100 Basque activists.

TABLE A4
PEOPLE DETAINED BY POLICE IN EUSKADI, 1968-1987

Year	Detained	Year	Detained
1968	434	1978	287
1969	???	1979	561
1970	831	1980	2,140
1971	???	1981	1,300
1972	616	1982	1,261
1973	572	1983	1,157
1974	1,116	1984	1,879
1975	4,625	1985	1,118
1976	???	1986	990
1977	Amnesty	1987	601

Source: Data gathered from EGIN (1988, p.163).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

- AAA = Armed Anticomunist Alliance
- ASK = Patriotic Socialist Committees
- ATE = ETA's antiterrorism section
- BVE = Spanish-Basque Battalion
- CAA = Anticapitalist Autonomous Commandos
- EAS = Basque Socialist Party
- EE = Left of Euskadi
- EGAM = Movement of Patriotic Students
- EIA = Basque Revolutionary Workers
- ELA-MSE = Solidarity of Basque Workers (Basque Socialist Movement)

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ESB = Basque Socialist Assembly

ESEI = Organization for the Basque Socialist Unification

ETA = *Euskadi 'ya Askatasuna* (Basque Homeland and Freedom)

ETA-M = Military arm of ETA

ETA-PM = Politico-Military of ETA

Euzkadi = Basque term for member of ETA*Euskadi* = Basque Homeland

GAL = Antiterrorist Groups of Liberation

GANE = Spanish National Action Groups

HAS = Popular Socialist Party

HASI = Popular Party for the Socialist Revolution

HB = *Herri Batasuna*. Popular Unity

IAM = Movement of the Patriotic Students

Iparriarrak = The Northern (Anti-ETA opposition)*Iraulza* = Revolution*Izquierda Abergziale* = Patriotic Left

JARRAI = Revolutionary Patriotic Youth

KAS = Socialist Patriotic Coordinator

LAB = Union of the Patriotic Workers

LALA = Revolutionary Party of the Patriotic Workers

LAK = Coordinator of the Patriotic Workers

MVLN/MLNV = Basque Movement of National Liberation

PCE/EPK = Communist Party

PNV = Basque Nationalist Party

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Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimation

EHUD SPRINZAK

The purpose of this article is to identify the distinctive features of right-wing terrorism and to develop an analytical typology of particularistic terrorist organizations. The article is based on the conceptual framework of the process of delegitimation developed earlier by this author. It argues that right-wing radicals usually reach terrorism through a trajectory of *split delegitimation*, which implies a primary conflict with an 'inferior' community and a secondary conflict with the government. Six sub-types of right-wing terrorism are identified: *revolutionary* terrorism, *reactive* terrorism, *vigilante* terrorist racism terrorism, *millenarian* terrorism and *youth counterculture* terrorism.

The Case of Particularistic Terrorism

Insurgent terrorism usually evokes the association of an anti-regime terror and claims for a universal message. The atrocities involved are committed against an established regime that is charged with a flagrant violation of the fundamental human rights of either its citizens or subject nations. There is, however, one common form of insurgent terrorism which is not directed primarily against governments and is not committed in the name of universal values: The terror organizations involved, usually right wing collectivities, vigilant groups or racist organizations, do not speak in the name of humanity. They are particularistic by their very nature and respond often to perceptions of insecurity and threats. They fight private wars against hostile ethnic communities; 'illegitimate' religious denominations, classes of undesired people or 'inferior races'. The enemies they feel threaten them are, variably, Jews, Arabs, Catholics, Blacks, Communists, homosexuals, foreign workers or other classes of 'inferior' human beings 'who want to get more than they deserve'.

The most significant political difference between 'universalistic' terrorist organizations and 'particularistic' ones lies in their relationship to the prevailing authority. While left wing and nationalist radical movements are usually involved in a *direct* conflict with the ruling government and their terror campaign is directed against its emissaries, the conflict of many right wing religious or vigilante groups with the regime is secondary. The government is