
Politics, Society,
and Democracy

The Case of Spain

EDITED BY

Richard Gunther

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Politics, Society,
and Democracy
The Case of Spain

Essays in Honor of Juan J. Linz

*H. E. Chehabi, Richard Gunther,
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Essays in Honor of Juan J. Linz

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CHAPTER NINE

Conflicto en Euskadi Revisited

Francisco J. Llera

Translated by Richard Gunther

Ten years after Juan J. Linz and his collaborators from DATA completed their survey of the Basque country, which culminated in publication of *Conflicto en Euskadi*,¹ the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas presented me with the opportunity to undertake a new public opinion study. This 1989 survey was based on a questionnaire whose design and contents were greatly enriched by advice from Prof. Linz. The earlier of these two studies was undertaken during the process of democratic institutionalization in Spain; and it included within its geographical scope the Basque areas of Spain and France.² My 1989 survey, in contrast, was undertaken within a fully consolidated democratic system, and was restricted to respondents living in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country.³ Given the passage of time, we are in a position to analyze continuities and discontinuities in the basic political characteristics of Basque society that have emerged since the 1979 DATA survey, and to address questions posed by Linz and his collaborators concerning the minimal preconditions for peaceful and democratic politics in Euskadi.⁴

¹ Juan J. Linz, with Manuel Gómez-Reino, Darío Vila and Francisco A. Orizo, *Conflicto en Euskadi* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1986).

² For Basque nationalists, the Basque Country or Euskalherria is an ethno-linguistic unit made up of the Spanish provinces of Álava, Guipúzcoa, Navarra and Vizcaya, and by the French Departments of Labourd (Lapurdi, in Basque), Soule (Zuberoa) and the Lower Navarra portions of Pyrénées Atlantiques.

³ The Spanish Constitution of 1978 establishes a regionalized state structure called the *Estado de las Autonomías*. The Basque Autonomous Community consists of the provinces of Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, while Navarra is a separate *Comunidad Foral*.

⁴ This is the name given to "the fatherland of all Basques" by Sabino Arana Goiri, the founder of Basque nationalism in the late 19th century.

Stages in the Formation of the Basque Party System

The transition from an authoritarian political system to a pluralistic regime began with approval in December 1976 of the Law for Political Reform and ended with ratification of the Spanish constitution in the December 1978 referendum and of the Autonomy Statute for the Basque country in October, 1979. In the periods following these referenda, the institutionalization of new governmental structures took place, leading to a third process that we can refer to as the consolidation of the democratic system.

In order to better understand the evolution of the Basque party system, we can differentiate four periods: the first, from the general election of 1977 to the autonomy referendum at the end of 1979, is the Basque political transition; the second, from 1980 to 1984, is one of internal institutionalization; the third, from 1984 to 1986, is one marked by the crisis of hegemonic nationalism and the schism within the PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco); and the fourth, from 1986 to 1990, is one of democratic consolidation in Euskadi. The fragility and lack of crystallization of the Basque party system was apparent from the very beginning of the transition.

1977-1979: The Basque Transition

Basque nationalist parties did not receive a majority of votes cast in the first democratic election, although the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) did emerge as the largest party. Statewide parties had significant electoral support, to the extent that a Socialist, Ramón Rubial, was appointed as president of the "pre-autonomy" Consejo General Vasco, made up of all parties with parliamentary representation (PNV, Unión de Centro Democrático, Partido Socialista Obrero Español and Euskadiko Ezkerra). During this period, there occurred a definitive split within the *abertzale* left, provoked by disagreements over whether or not to go along with reformist (as opposed to revolutionary) politics. As a result, two nationalist parties emerged to the left of the PNV, both of them born out of ETA.⁵ One of these, Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE--"the Left of Euskadi") was

⁵ This stands for Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Fatherland and Liberty), the principal Basque terrorist organization, which in 1976 underwent a schism between the so-called *militares* (ETAm), who preferred to continue with the armed struggle, and the *político-militares* (ETApm), who were disposed to enter into the political game and put an end to the strategy of political violence. See Goldie Shabad and Francisco J. Llera, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context*, forthcoming. Also see Francisco J. Llera, "Los Partidos de la Izquierda Abertzale," paper presented at the conference on Los Partidos Políticos en España, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Madrid, 1985; and Llera, *Posfianquismo y fuerzas políticas en Euskadi: Sociología electoral del País Vasco* (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 1985).

linked to ETApam, while the other, Herri Batasuna (HB--"Popular Unity") supported the policies and violent strategy of ETAm.

This period of pluralism and party development was also characterized by the politics of pacts, as manifested in the participation of the moderate nationalist PNV in the debate over the text of the Spanish constitution (the PNV's abstentionist stand on the referendum notwithstanding), as well as acceptance by Euskadiko Ezkerra of amnesty and political reform, and its participation in the "preautonomy" government and the consensus in support of the autonomy statute. The only party not sharing in this consensus was Herri Batasuna, which rejected all reformist efforts.

The second parliamentary elections (March, 1979) produced a nationalist majority, as a result of both the decline of Spanish parties and the appearance of an HB electoral coalition (joining the efforts of HASI, ESB, ANV and other groups). The local and provincial elections of April confirmed the nationalist hegemony and the dominant institutional position of the PNV, as well as the weak territorial implantation of Spanish parties, especially of the center-right. This electoral outcome required the restructuring of the Consejo General Vasco, which was subsequently headed by Carlos Garaikoetxea. HB participated in these elections, but subsequently refused to participate in provincial institutions, thereby giving the PNV an absolute majority within these regional bodies.

1980-1984: Institutionalization

Elections to the first Autonomous legislature implemented the institutional design of the statute, but not without tensions. This period began following the elections of May 1980, in which the PNV's predominant status was confirmed. (See Table 9.1) Due to the institutional boycott of HB, the PNV was able to form a single-party majority government.⁶ Thus, the period began with nationalist control of all local government institutions, thereby accelerating the initial decline of all statewide parties and the decomposition of the UCED in the Basque country. With the PNV competing with the governing party on the center-right, and with HB challenging statewide parties on the left and exacerbating the nationalist conflict, there was a temporary demobilization of the non-nationalist electorate, leading to the reduction of voting turnout in the regional elections of 1980 to 52 percent.

PNV control of Basque institutions, a weakened PSOE and a UCED in crisis in Madrid put an end to the first steps towards a consociational form of politics. The attempted coup of February 23, 1981, the Calvo Sotelo government and the new autonomy policy of the LOAPA (Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process), strongly supported by the rising Socialist party, signalled

⁶ Francisco J. Llera, "Caracterización sociopolítica del sistema de partidos de las Comunidades Autónomas vasca y navarra," *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 20, 1981.

TABLE 9.1 Popular Votes and Seats in Basque Regional Elections, 1980-1990

Party	1980		1984		1986		1990	
	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
PNV	38.0%	25	42.0%	32	23.7%	17	28.5%	22
PSOE	14.2	9	23.0	19	22.0	19	19.9	16
HB	16.6	11	14.6	11	17.5	13	18.4	13
EE	9.8	6	8.0	6	10.9	9	11.4	6
EA	--	--	--	--	15.8	13	11.4	9
UCD	8.5	6	--	--	--	--	--	--
AP/CP/PP	4.8	2	9.3	7	4.8	2	8.2	6
PCE	4.0	1	--	--	--	--	--	--
CDS	--	--	--	--	3.5	2	--	--
UA	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.4	3

a reactivation of the nationalist conflict against the state in the very midst of the process of institutionalizing regional government institutions.

Between 1979 and 1980 there occurred the most chilling phase of terrorist violence, especially by ETA. A total of 242 persons were killed—one third of all of those killed since the beginning of the transition. Nonetheless, we must not overlook the fact that in its final days the UCD government undertook negotiations (between the Minister of Interior and ETApm) that culminated in abandonment of the armed struggle by ETA-politico-militar, in exchange for the so-called "policy of social reintegration" [*reintegración social*]. This, in turn, radicalized and aggravated relations between HB and EE in the very heart of the *abertzale* left. The process ended with the constituent congress of Euskadiko Ezkerra as a party, born through a merger among EIA, the majority faction of the PCE/EKP (the Basque branch of the Partido Comunista de España), some of the founders of HASI, independents, and socialists from the ANV and ESEI who abandoned their Marxist-Leninist self-designation.

The Socialist triumph of 1982, in addition to opening up a new era for Spain, implied a reorientation of the statist vote within Euskadi, as well as a redefinition of relations between Basque institutions and the central government. This change was notable in the local and provincial elections of 1983, in which

the nationalist hegemony was confirmed.⁷ The rise of the PNV and EE, and the recovery of the PSOE reflected a more pluralist panorama, especially in the larger industrial cities.

Disputes over provincial electoral laws, the blocking of the Ley de Territorios Históricos (LTH)—which was to have delimited the respective jurisdictions of the Government in Vitoria [the regional capital] and of the provincial governments (*diputaciones forales*)—as well as over the Ley de Normalización del Euskera (the new language law) and certain symbols (such as the flying of the Spanish national flag), exacerbated the center-periphery conflict. These disagreements also gave rise to new tensions within the nationalist community itself.

1984-1986: Nationalist Crisis

The second regional election in 1984 coincided with the outbreak of considerable intra-party conflict within the PNV over the institutional model for the Basque Autonomous Community. This conflict involved party/government relations, representation and decision-making procedures within the party, a leadership struggle between Xabier Arzalluz and Carlos Garaikoetxea, and a dispute over coalition possibilities in the aftermath of the 1983 regional elections in Navarra. To this combustible mixture (which led to the withdrawal of Garaikoetxea as candidate for Lendakari [President] of the Basque regional government), one must add the violent behavior of some ETA terrorist cells, which assassinated the Socialist Senator Casass in the midst of the election campaign, the first nine assassinations by the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación), and the first deportations and extraditions of ETA militants by the French government. Despite all of this, the PNV repeated its electoral success. With the rise of the PSOE and the declining effectiveness of Herri Batasuna's institutional boycott, however, this led to a parliamentary deadlock in which government and opposition parties each had 32 seats. Given the impossibility of forming another single-party government, the PNV was forced to negotiate a coalition agreement (the first *pacto de legislatura*) with the PSOE.

Shortly thereafter, the cleavage within the PNV deepened, leading to Garaikoetxea's resignation in 1985 as Lendakari. He was replaced by José Antonio Ardanza. The electoral reverse suffered by the PNV in the general election of June 1986 precipitated a break-up of the party and its parliamentary group, culminating in the appearance of a new nationalist party headed by Garaikoetxea, Eusko Alkartasuna (EA).

The year 1986 was a critical point in the evolution of Basque political

⁷ Francisco J. Llera, "La estructura electoral y el sistema de partidos en las Comunidades Autónomas del País Vasco y Foral de Navarra después de las elecciones generales de 1982," *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 34, 1983; and Francisco J. Llera, "La estructura política vasca en 1983," *Papers*, 22/23, 1984.

institutions.⁸ It was marked by the lack of a clear demarcation of the structure of the party system, its patterns of electoral support and its ideological characteristics. At this crucial turning point, the previous model of "adversary politics"⁹—characterized by the intensification of conflict, permanently confrontational stands, a primordialist exclusivism and domination by artificially manufactured single-party majorities—came to an end.

1986-1991: Democratic Consolidation

This final period began in November 1986 with the convening of early elections to the third Basque legislature, following the PNV schism.¹⁰ It was characterized by increased fragmentation of the party system (with the PNV and EA dividing up the Basque-nationalist centrist electorate), and by the resulting electoral victory of the PSOE.

The new structure of partisan competition brought about a total transformation of Basque politics: henceforth, only coalition governments were possible. Accordingly, the new regional government was a PNV-PSOE coalition headed by Ardanza. At this same time, there was widespread agreement that only a broad pact among democratic forces and a political atmosphere of consensus could put an end to terrorist violence. This led to a new "politics of consensus" as manifested in the Pacto de Ajuria-Enea (the residence of the Basque president), signed in January 1988 by all parliamentary Basque parties (PNV, PSOE, EA, EE, Partido Popular and Centro Democrático y Social) except HB.

The local and provincial elections of May, 1987 also reflected an increased pluralism in party representation in these governmental institutions, with considerable variation from one province to another. In Guipúzcoa, the Diputación Foral was headed by an EA-EE coalition, for example, while in Álava and Vizcaya provincial governments were formed by PNV-PSOE coalitions.

The regional elections of 1990 (the fourth since the establishment of the *estado de las autonomías*) defined a new political panorama, but also revealed considerable continuity with the past, insofar as the PNV reemerged as the largest party, given electoral setbacks by other parties, especially EA. Only the Partido Popular was able to marginally increase its share of the vote. Another significant development was the appearance in parliament of Unidad Alavesa, a repository of traditionalist provincial sentiments in Álava.

⁸ Francisco J. Llera, "Las elecciones generales de 1986 en Euskadi," *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 53, 1986; and Francisco J. Llera, "Euskadi 86: la encrucijada de la transición," *Cuadernos de Alzate*, 4, 1986.

⁹ S.E. Finer, *Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform* (London: Clive Wigram, 1975).

¹⁰ Francisco J. Llera, "Las elecciones generales de 1986 en Euskadi," *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 25, 1988.

In the aftermath of these elections, the party system could be regarded as consisting of seven partisan groups: four were Basque nationalist (PNV, HB, EA and EE), two were statewide parties (PSOE and PP), and one was provincialist (UA). Examined from a different perspective, partisan politics within the region was dominated by four parties on the center-right (PNV, EA, PP and UA) and three on the left (PSOE, HB and EE). Finally, it is important to note that one of them, Herri Batasuna, was an anti-system party. After difficult post-election negotiations, it proved to be impossible to revive the previously successful PNV-PSOE coalition. Instead, a nationalist coalition consisting of the PNV, EA and EE—widely regarded as precarious, given the intense PNV-EA rivalry—formed the regional government. This coalition was, indeed, short-lived. In the aftermath of electoral setbacks suffered by the EA and EE in the May 1991 local and provincial elections, the PSOE once again entered into coalition with the PNV with formation of a new PNV-PSOE-EE government supported by a larger majority in parliament. One unforeseen consequence of this cabinet crisis was a schism within EE (whose origins could be traced back to its party congress at the beginning of 1991), pitting those who favored a merger with EA (representing a majority within Guipúzcoa, but with only minority support elsewhere) against those adhering to what they regarded as the party's original "political project" and preferred alliance with the PNV and PSOE.

The Party System: Fragmentation and Polarization

Rarely is there such unanimity among scholars as there is in classifying the Basque party system as one of "polarized pluralism."¹¹ There are numerous indicators that justify such a designation: an average of seven significant parliamentary parties, the two largest of which did not receive 49 percent of valid votes cast in the last regional election; an index of parliamentary fragmentation of .81; ideological tensions; and an anti-system party openly supporting violence that receives 15 percent of the vote. Fragmentation would not be so significant if it were not linked with an ideological polarization between parties, which affects the dynamics of competition, acceptance or rejection of political institutions, and basic conceptions of the social system. This polarized pluralism has exacerbated confrontations over identities and symbols.

¹¹ See Linz, et al, *Conflicto en Euskadi*, p. 317; Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabbad, *Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1986), p. 312; and Francisco J. Llera, "Caracterización sociopolítica del sistema de partidos de las Comunidades Autónomas vasca y navarra," *Revista de Estudios Políticos* (hereafter, *REP*), 20, 1981; "El sistema de partidos vascos: distancia ideológica y legitimación política," *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, 28, 1984; and "Continuidad y cambio en el sistema de partidos vasco: 1977-1987," in *REP*, 59, 1988.

Fragmentation

One of the first indicators of fragmentation is the number of relevant parties, defined either through their coalition-formation ability or their blackmail potential.¹² Given the roles played by various parties and the level of electoral support they have received since the first regional parliament, we can conclude that there are seven relevant parties. (See Table 9.2.) This is one of the pre-conditions for classification as a case of extreme pluralism.

TABLE 9.2 Indicators of Fragmentation in the Basque Regional Parliaments of 1980, 1986 and 1990

Indicator	1980	1986	1990
Parliamentary Fragmentation Index	.81	.81	.81
Corrected Parliamentary Dispersion	.87	.94	.95
Electoral Volatility Index	--	25	11
Number of Parliamentary Parties	7	7	7
Pct. of Seats for Largest Party	41.7	25.3	29.3
Pct. of Seats for Second Party	18.3	22.7	21.3
Difference Between the Two	23.3	2.7	8.0
Pct. of Seats for Two Largest	60.0	48.0	50.6
Min. # of Parties for Parl. Majority	2	3	2
Largest Party	PNV	PSOE	PNV
Number of Parties in Govt.	1	2	3

As can be seen, in spite of changes in the internal structure of the Basque party system, its high degree of fragmentation remained almost constant throughout this period. The dispersion of parliamentary forces has increased slightly, virtually precluding the reemergence of an absolute majority in support of any one party, let alone the establishment of a hegemony by any party. The successful experience of the PNV-PSOE coalition government slightly increased the parliamentary strength of the two largest parties (to the extent that they received an absolute majority of seats in the 1990 legislature). Given this distribution of parliamentary seats, there were only six possible coalition combinations: PNV-PSOE, PNV-EE-PSOE, PNV-EE-EA, PNV-EE-EA-PP,

the transitory PNV-EE minority, and the most unlikely PNV-EE-PP. Given its anti-system stance, HB was left out of all of these coalition scenarios. UA has replaced the CDS in the regional parliament, although it has much stronger prospects for performing a significant role within the provincial parliament of Álava, especially in light of the consolidation of its position in the local and provincial elections of 1991.

The PNV, having recovered from its crisis of 1986, has returned as a central political force, not as a dominant actor. It governs the three Diputaciones Forales (provincial governments), as well as the majority of municipalities within the region through a wide variety of alliances. The most common of these is the PNV-PSOE coalition (Álava and Vizcaya), to which the EE is joined at the regional level. But in Guipúzcoa, the PP serves as a coalition partner. Indeed, it was a dispute over alliance policies following the local and provincial elections that exacerbated the PNV-EA rivalry and led to a breakdown of the PNV-EA-EE coalition in Vitoria, leading to the replacement of EA by the PSOE. This was, in turn, the spark that ignited the internal schism within EE. If we compare the party systems of Euskadi, with those of other Autonomous Communities and Spain at the national level, we reach several conclusions:

- (1) Its seven parliamentary parties make its index of the effective number of parliamentary parties 5.3--the highest among all the Autonomous Communities. Indeed, it is only surpassed by Belgium (6.4) among all European party systems.¹³
- (2) According to Douglas Rae's index of parliamentary fragmentation, the Basque party system also occupies first place.
- (3) The percentage of seats held by the largest party (29 percent) is the lowest, as is the combined total of the two largest parties (51 percent).
- (4) The share of parliamentary seats held by regionalist or nationalist parties (71 percent) is the highest to be found in any Spanish region.

Most of these characteristics are related to the Basque electoral law. This system has several other distinguishing features as well: First, the largest constituency has over four times as many voters as the smallest--the highest level of inequality among all regions, with the exception of the insular Canarias districts. Nevertheless, the overall index of disproportionality is just 1.3, much less than the 6.6 index for national elections, the lowest among the Autonomous

¹² See Giovanni Sartori, *Partidos y sistemas de partidos* (Madrid: Alianza, 1980).

¹³ Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "Effective number of parties. A measure with application to west Europe," *Comparative Political Studies*, 12, 1979, pp. 3-27; and José R. Montero, "Elecciones legislativas en España: preferencias electorales y dimensiones de voto" (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1991).

Communities, and lower than most European countries.¹⁴ Finally, fewer votes are cast without electing representatives to parliament (five percent) than in most regions.

Polarization

Although we lack survey data concerning perceived ideological positions of parties in the 1990 legislature, it appears that there have been significant changes since the completion of our 1986 postelection survey. We suspect that a centripetal shift has occurred among many voters and that this, coupled with the significant changes in relations and discourse among parliamentary parties, has facilitated the pacts and coalitions of the most recent period and reduced the overall level of polarization. It is also possible that this increased moderation has reduced the level of voter turnout. These speculations notwithstanding, let us turn our attention to survey data collected in the aftermath of earlier elections.

As can be seen in Table 9.3, the "political space" occupied by each party in 1986 was very similar to that occupied at the beginning of the autonomy process in 1980, although the disappearance of the UCD and the schism within the PNV have given rise to some changes. These figures reveal that the PNV's electorate stands at the center of the political spectrum, and that there has been

TABLE 9.3 Mean Self-Placements of Party Supporters on the Ten-Point Left-Right Continuum in 1980 and 1986 Regional Elections

Party Supported in Regional Elections of	1980	1986
Coalición Popular (AP, PP)	6.40	7.95
Centro Democrático y Social	--	5.60
Partido Nacionalista Vasco	4.56	4.95
Eusko Alkartasuna	--	4.28
Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSOE)	3.85	4.04
Partido Comunista de Euskadi (PCE)	3.07	--
Euskadiko Ezkerra	3.07	3.50
Heri Batasuna	2.29	2.25

¹⁴ Arend Lijphart, "Degrees of proportionality of proportional representation formulas," in B. Grofman and A. Lijphart, eds., *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences* (New York, Agathon Press, 1986); and José R. Montero, F. J. Llera, and M. Torcal, "Electoral Systems in Spain: An Assessment," Paper presented at XV Congreso Mundial de Ciencia Política, Buenos Aires, 1991.

considerable instability in the ideological self-designations of supporters of the two statewide parties struggling with each other to the right of center (UCD-Coalición Popular in 1980, and Centro Democrático y Social-CP in 1986). EA emerges as a party, with a center-left electorate located between those of the PNV and the PSOE. And supporters of EE and the PNV both appear to have shifted towards the center between these two elections.

On the centralism vs. independence dimensions, we lack data from the 1980 elections, and must therefore rely on survey evidence collected in conjunction with the 1982 general election. Although it should be pointed out that we are mixing data from two different kinds of elections, we believe that it is safe to infer that significant real change did take place along this fundamental dimension of Basque political behavior. (See Table 9.4.)

TABLE 9.4 Mean Self-Placements of Party Supporters on the Ten-Point Independence-Centralism Continuum in 1982 and 1986 Elections

Party Supported in Regional Elections of	1982	1986
Coalición Popular (AP, PP)	7.6	7.7
Centro Democrático y Social	--	6.6
Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSOE)	5.5	5.7
Partido Nacionalista Vasco	3.2	3.4
Euskadiko Ezkerra	3.1	3.4
Eusko Alkartasuna	--	3.0
Heri Batasuna	1.6	1.8

These data reveal that there is a gap of a full two points on this scale between nationalist and statewide parties, which is not even partially narrowed by the slight centripetal movement of the PNV, since, during this same time, the autonomy policies of the PSOE shifted its electorate an equivalent distance towards the "centralism" end of the continuum. We suspect that the successful experience of the PNV-PSOE regional government coalition has reduced this gap and produced a generalized centripetal tendency, but lacking the necessary data, this remains only a working hypothesis. However, during the four-year period examined above, it is noteworthy that EE voters adopted a more moderate stance. In addition, the appearance of EA and the CDS filled gaps on either end of the continuum. On the other hand, supporters of Coalición Popular and Herri Batasuna were virtually unchanged in maintaining their extreme positions in isolation from the rest of the polity. This stand is exacerbated in the case of HB voters by their anti-system stands and sympathy towards ETA terrorists.

Indices of polarization, as measured by the distance between the mean self-placements of supporters of the parties at either extreme, reveal that high levels of political division have been maintained or even exacerbated. The disappearance of the UCD and the restructuring of the right produced an increased polarization on the left-right dimension. At the same time, the extent of polarization on the independence-centralism continuum remained virtually unchanged. This was the net product of the autonomy policies pursued by the PSOE government in Madrid, the appearance of EA following the schism within the PNV, and anti-system radicalization. (See Table 9.5)

TABLE 9.5 Indices of Polarization on the Left-Right and Independence-Centralism Dimensions in the 1980, 1982 and 1986 Elections

Dimension	1980	1982	1986
Left/Right	.46	.55	.63
Independence/Centralism	.66	.69	.65

Electoral competition is a function of these cleavage dimensions, the manner in which they interact with each other, and how they are dealt with in parties' electoral strategies. The data indicate that, in the aggregate, there was no significant reduction of polarization on the independence-centralization dimension, and only slight changes in left-right polarization. But it is also apparent from these data that there has been a certain convergence towards the middle of the two continua, especially with movement towards the political center on the part of the PNV, EE and PSOE. This has had the effect of further isolating the extremes (HB and PP), as well as facilitating relations among the more moderate parties. As they converge, however, one unanticipated consequence may be an increase in volatility, as distances between parties are narrowed.

Basque Political Geography

Among the more important historical and political characteristics of the Basque country which have been analyzed in detail by Juan Linz and his collaborators¹⁵ are the substantial provincial variations in electoral behavior and the structure of the Basque party system. This phenomenon was most notable in the

¹⁵ Juan J. Linz, M. Gómez Reino, F.A. Orizo, and D. Vila, *Atlas electoral del País Vasco y Navarra* (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1981); and Juan J. Linz and J.R. Montero, eds., *Crisis y cambio: electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1986).

regional elections of 1986 and in the local and provincial elections of the following year, especially with the schism within the PNV and the appearance of EA. In the most recent elections in Álava, this phenomenon was made even more acute given the unexpected success of Unida Alavesa (UA), following a schism within the Partido Popular and the departure of some of its leaders.

These changes have resulted in different configurations of political groups in each province. This diversity and the increase in electoral fragmentation at the provincial level can be seen in the election results presented in Table 9.6. In Álava, the PNV recovered its first-place position by beating the PSOE by a narrow margin. Other parties are considerably farther behind, with the gap widening in the cases of Garaikoetxea's Eusko Alkartasuna and Euskadiko Ezkerra. Guipúzcoa reveals a higher level of fragmentation, given the more equal distribution of votes among the four largest parties. It is also noteworthy that in this province the radical nationalist Herri Batasuna moved from second to first place among all parties, while EA fell from first to fourth. In Vizcaya, there was no change in the rankings of the larger parties, and only EA and EE suffered noteworthy setbacks, while the Partido Popular gained significantly, moving into fourth place. What is most striking in this province is that the gap between the PNV and the PSOE widened very substantially, from six to over fourteen percentage points, while at the same time the gap between the Socialists and Herri Batasuna narrowed to less than four percent.

There are also considerable intra-provincial variations in electoral support. In general, there is a major distinction between urban-industrial areas with high in-migration (San Sebastián, the industrial areas of Deba, Oria, Golherri and Durango, greater Bilbao, Vitoria and the industrial zone of the Ayala valley)

TABLE 9.6 Popular Votes in Basque Regional Elections, 1986-1990 (in vertical percentages)

Party	Álava		Guipúzcoa		Vizcaya		Total	
	1986	1990	1986	1990	1986	1990	1986	1990
PNV	20.2	22.6	16.0	20.6	28.9	34.6	23.7	28.5
PSOE	25.0	21.3	20.0	19.1	22.6	20.1	22.0	19.9
HB	12.9	12.8	21.7	23.9	16.0	16.4	17.5	18.4
EA	14.6	8.2	23.2	18.2	11.8	8.1	15.8	11.4
EE	11.0	6.7	11.9	8.9	10.3	7.3	10.9	7.8
PP (CP)	6.9	10.9	3.6	6.5	5.2	8.7	4.9	8.2
U.Alavesa	--	11.2	--	--	--	--	--	1.4
CDS	8.0	2.0	2.4	.4	3.2	.5	3.5	.7

and other parts of the region within which there is overwhelming support for Basque nationalist parties. The urban-industrial zones are marked by lower levels of voter turnout, as well as higher levels of political pluralism and electoral fragmentation, and more frequent changes in relative strengths of political parties. Other variations in the geographical distribution of electoral support include the disproportionate strength of HB in Guipúzcoa and of the PSOE in Vitoria.

Politics in the Daily Lives of Basques

Juan Linz and his DATA collaborators began their study of Euskadi with an examination of the fear of political participation in the region, referring to this as a "spiral of silence."¹⁶ With the passage of time, it is interesting to return to this theme by exploring the extent to which respondents talk about politics, using this as an indicator of interest in politics, as well as of individual freedom.

As can be seen in Table 9.7, only one third of Basque citizens talk about politics with any frequency. Supporters of HB and EE are the most politicized, and feel the most free to speak out, while PP and PSOE voters are those who talk least frequently about politics. This is the same basic pattern as was noted by Linz and his associates in their 1979 study.

TABLE 9.7 Frequency of Political Discussions, by Vote in 1986 Regional Election (vertical percentages)

	CP	CDS	EA	EE	HB	PNV	PSOE	Total
Frequently	16	--	7	9	30	8	6	7
Sometimes	28	42	33	50	46	40	34	31
Almost Never	16	30	44	34	17	33	36	33
Never	40	24	15	6	7	19	24	28
No Answer	--	4	1	1	--	--	--	1

Source: 1989 CIS survey #1795, directed by F.J. Llera.

¹⁶ Juan J. Linz and J.R. Montero, eds., *Crisis y cambio: electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1986), p. 16; and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, *Die Schweigespirale: Öffentliche Meinung - unsere soziale Haut* (Munich: Piper, 1980).

The Problem of Identity

One of the central foci of studies of ethnicity is subjective self-identification.¹⁷ This is based on the hypothesis that subjective elements weigh more heavily than "primordial" factors in explaining the resurgence of ethnic demands in industrialized societies. Linz and his colleagues have studied this phenomenon in considerable detail. Let us examine the evolution of the self-identifications of two key groups, natives and immigrants, over the past decade. (See Table 9.8.)

TABLE 9.8 Self-Identification of Natives and Immigrants in Euskadi, 1979 and 1989 (vertical percentages)

	Natives		Immigrants		Total	
	1979	1989	1979	1989	1979	1989
Spanish Only	3.5	6.1	34.7	43.4	14.5	16.4
More Spanish than Basque	2.4	2.6	12.3	17.2	5.8	6.5
Basque and Spanish	23.2	20.9	35.3	30.5	27.4	23.4
More Basque than Spanish	14.7	22.3	8.4	5.7	12.6	17.8
Basque Only	56.2	48.1	9.3	3.2	39.7	35.9
N =	625	1676	334	667	973	2386

Sources: For 1979, Linz, *et al*, *Conflicto en Euskadi*, for 1989, CIS survey #1795. In 1989, the overall level of No Answer or Don't Know responses was 10 percent, with higher levels among immigrants (13 percent) and the children of immigrants (15 percent), and with lower levels among those whose parents were Basque (6 percent).

Overall, the stability of these self-identifications is most notable. There has been a slight decline in the percentage of those defining themselves as Basque only, both among natives and immigrants, and a slight increase in *españolismo*, which is pronounced among immigrants.

Change is more notable with respect to the manner in which respondents define themselves and others as "Basque." The most frequently selected criterion (especially among supporters of nationalist parties), "to live and work in the Basque country," declined from 69.2 percent in 1979 to 54.4 percent over the

¹⁷ Erik Allardt, "Implications of the Ethnic Revival in Modern Industrialized Society. A Comparative Study of the Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe," *Commentationes Scientiarum Sociarium*, 12, 1979.

following decade. "To speak Basque" remained constant, at 30 percent, as a basis for defining one's nationality. This option was preferred by a majority only among supporters of HB (53 percent) and EA (44 percent), and was explicitly rejected as a criterion by 71 percent of PP voters and 68 percent of those who had cast ballots for the PSOE in 1986. Support for the notion that it is necessary to have been born in the Basque country in order to be considered Basque fell from 60 percent in 1979 to 41 percent ten years later. About half of those who had voted for EA, PNV, HB and CDS selected this criterion as a defining characteristic. "Descent from a Basque family" also declined, from 60 to 36 percent, as a preferred option, with EA supporters giving the highest levels of support for this criterion (43 percent). In the 1989 survey, we added two additional options: "the will to be Basque" was supported by 79 percent of respondents (with even higher levels among Basque nationalists); and "the defense of the Basque nation" was selected by 56 percent of all respondents (with support ranging from 85 percent of HB voters down to 19 percent among those who had cast ballots for the CDS), especially among Basque nationalists. In general, the subjective criteria increased at the expense of the primordial factors in defining Basque nationality.

Natives, Immigrants and the Language Question

The preceding discussion raises an important question: how do immigrants from other parts of Spain fit into the cultural, social and political systems of modern Basque society? Rapid industrialization has brought about such massive population movements that almost half of the current population of Euskadi are either first- or second-generation immigrants. Let us examine some survey data to explore the evolution of the attitudes of immigrants and natives towards several relevant issues.

One set of issues, concerning which there has been little change since 1979, involves the perception of differences between the two population groups. In both 1979 and 1989, over one third of respondents believed that Basques and non-Basques were either very different (7 percent) or somewhat different (27 and 28 percent, respectively). There were no substantial variations in the extent of such perceptions among native and immigrant sample subgroups; only a slightly higher percentage of Basques born of Basque parents holding such opinions represented a statistically significant exception to this overall pattern of uniformity (with about 40 percent of these respondents regarding immigrants as very or somewhat different from Basques).¹⁸ Substantial majorities among all sample subgroups (ranging from 59 to 78 percent) believed that Basques and

¹⁸ The other subgroups examined separately with regard to attitudes towards this issue were native-born Basques born of mixed marriages, respondents born in Euskadi of immigrant parents, and first-generation immigrants.

immigrants were very similar or somewhat similar.

As can be seen in Table 9.9, however, there has been considerable change concerning attitudes towards the rights and obligations of citizenship. Respondents were asked whether they believed that "Immigrants should be able to remain in Euskadi, with equal rights, and without having to identify themselves as Basques," or that "Immigrants must identify with Basqueness [*lo vasco*], and must make an effort to learn Euskera [the Basque language]." Between the two surveys, there was a substantial shift towards the more demanding of these two statements, although a majority of respondents continued to believe that all residents of the region should enjoy full citizenship rights irrespective of their linguistic preferences or nationalist identities. This change was most pronounced among native-born Basques, while, for obvious reasons, immigrants tended overwhelmingly to support full citizenship rights without these other conditions.

TABLE 9.9 Attitudes Towards the Rights and Obligations of Citizenship in 1979 and 1989, by Place of Birth and Family Background

	Equal Rights	Learn Euskera + Identify	N	
Native, Basque Parents	1979	62%	29%	446
	1989	37	53	1,228
Native, Mixed Parents	1979	86	11	95
	1989	55	37	178
Native, Immigrant Parents	1979	76	13	374
	1989	66	25	270
First-Generation Immigrant	1979	79	12	97
	1989	75	15	667
All Respondents	1979	72	20	1,011
	1989	52	38	2,386

Sources: For 1979, Linz, *et al*, *Conflicto en Euskadi*; for 1989, CIS study #1795. Relatively few respondents (ranging between 3 percent and 11 percent) either refused to answer or said they did not know the answers to these questions.

Given the symbolic importance of Euskera in the Basque national identity and nationalist culture, and taking into account the fact that it is spoken by only one quarter of Basques, it is important to examine survey data concerning the use or mastery of this language. As can be seen in Table 9.10, there were no

significant changes in the self-reported use of this language among the adult Basque population. Thus, we can conclude that the Basque government's intensive campaign to teach and encourage the use of Euskera [*reakalunizazio*] has been a relative failure, although one must acknowledge that perhaps these educational efforts have not had sufficient time to bear fruit. One significant finding from our 1989 study concerning this language policy is that those who most frequently say they are learning Euskera are native-born respondents with immigrant parents (15 percent) or from a mixed marriage (11 percent). Less involved in the learning of the Basque language are native-born children of Basque descent (6 percent) and first-generation immigrants (1 percent). A similar rank-ordering is produced when we array those who say that they have tried but failed to learn Basque (9, 7, 4 and 4 percent, respectively).

TABLE 9.10 Evolution of Mastery of Euskera, 1979-1989, by Place of Birth and Family Background

	Speak		Understand		Neither	N
	Euskera	Euskera	Euskera	Euskera		
Native, Basque Parents	1979	50%	13%	37%		446
	1989	46	11	43		1228
Native, Mixed Parents	1979	23	13	64		95
	1989	16	16	68		178
Native, Immigrant Parents	1979	6	12	82		97
	1989	7	11	82		270
First-Generation Immigrant	1979	5	8	87		374
	1989	1	4	95		667
All Respondents	1979	27	11	62		1011
	1989	26	9	65		3386

From the standpoint of linguistic conflict, what is important is not so much the effective use of a language as its symbolic and political utilization by various groups. In our 1989 survey, we asked respondents what they considered to be the language or languages of Basques: Spanish and Euskera, or Euskera only. In the aggregate, the two-language response was selected by 52 percent, while 36 percent preferred Euskera only. Those who regarded themselves as Basque nationalists, however, responded quite differently from those who did not. Among Basque nationalists, only 38 percent of respondents said that Spanish and

Euskera were both languages of the Basque people, while 54 percent opted for Euskera only. Seventy-five percent of Herri Batasuna voters, 60 percent of EA supporters and 47 percent of those who had cast ballots for the PNV in the previous election favored the exclusive use of Euskera. Among non-nationalists, the results were even more skewed, but in the opposite direction: fully 69 percent said that the two tongues served as languages of Basques, while only 19 percent selected Euskera only. The "Spanish and Euskera" option was preferred by huge majorities of those who had voted for the CDS, PP and PSOE (85 percent, 85 percent and 82 percent, respectively), as well as by 50 percent of EE supporters. Thus, this question of linguistic preference is a fundamental political question that divides the Basque population.

Autonomy and Independence

Over ten years have passed since approval of the Basque autonomy statute. It can be said that Basque political institutions are in very good health, they have performed efficaciously and garnered popular support from the great majority of the population, and they have been successful in notably reducing the level of political conflict between regional and central levels of government. Nevertheless, the utopian call for independence still issues forth from certain sectors of Basque society. When asked about the strength of their desire for independence, respondents replied in 1989 in much the same way as they did in 1979: eleven percent (vs. 12 percent ten years earlier) said that they had a "very great" desire for independence, while another 20 percent said that their pro-independence aspirations were "rather great" (vs. 24 percent in 1979). Not surprisingly, those who regarded themselves as Basque nationalists in 1989 responded very differently from those who did not: eighteen percent of Basque nationalists (vs. 4 percent of non-nationalists) said that they had "very great" ambitions for independents, while another 32 percent of nationalists (as compared with 8 percent of other respondents) said that their desires for independence were "rather great." Thus, exactly half of self-described Basque nationalists said that they had "very great" or "rather great" desires for independence from Spain.

When broken down by partisan groups and compared with parallel data from the 1979 Linz, *et al*, study, we find that very strong or rather strong pro-independence sentiments have actually increased among Herri Batasuna supporters, from 76 percent to 84 percent. Among all other groups, however, the desire for independence has declined, especially among those who voted for Euzkadi Ezkerra (from 64 to 36 percent) and, to a lesser extent, the PNV (from 46 to 41 percent). By way of comparison, 47 percent of EA voters favored independence. Again, not surprisingly, supporters of statewide Spanish parties opposed the idea of independence by wide margins.

It is logical that the establishment of autonomous regional government institutions and democratic consolidation, in combination with more information about the various alternatives, have led to changes in the preferences of Basque

citizens regarding the form of the state. Surveys have at various intervals since the early stages of the transition to democracy asked Basques (and other Spaniards) about whether they preferred a centralized state structure, some regional autonomy, considerable autonomy or outright independence. The responses of Basque respondents over this period are summarized in Table 9.11.

TABLE 9.11 The Evolution of Preferences Concerning the Form of the State Among Basque Respondents, 1977-1987

	1977	1981	1982	1983	1987/1	1987/2
Centralism	9%	4%	7%	2%	3%	3%
Some Autonomy	29	33	37	34	29	34
Much Autonomy	32	13	18	24	15	20
Independence	24	21	17	26	29	31
Don't Know	4	22	17	10	19	10
No Answer	2	7	4	4	5	2

Support for centralism appears to have stabilized at very low levels, although it is possible that the extent to which this alternative has been stigmatized in Euskadi may have discouraged some respondents from expressing their true feelings. The "limited autonomy" model is supported by about one third of all respondents, while support for "much autonomy" or federalism has fluctuated over this period around a mean of about 20 percent. Support for independence, which had been declining throughout the transition, increased following the election victory of the PSOE in 1982.

Loyalty and Legitimacy

One of Juan Linz's central concerns about the Spanish transition was the breakdown of legitimacy in Euskadi concerning the Spanish constitution and the Basque autonomy statute. A comparison of our 1987 survey data with those of Linz, *et al*, reveals that two thirds of Basques favorably evaluated the Spanish political transition, while 29 percent held the opposite opinion. Even among HB voters, there were as many positive as there were negative evaluations.¹⁹

¹⁹ These data were derived from a survey, *La Población vasca ante el nacionalismo*, undertaken by Francisco Llera in December 1987, with financial support from the Basque Government. It utilized a sample of 1500 residents of the Basque Autonomous Community. Some of these results were published in Francisco J. Llera, "Continuidad y cambio

One empirical indicator of the lack of full legitimacy in Euskadi is the stance of the Basque population towards the Spanish constitution. Nearly ten years after its ratification, 39 percent of Basques had internalized the nationalist message and rejected it. Among HB voters these levels of rejection reached 78 percent, and substantial numbers of supporters of the other nationalist parties also shared these negative opinions (levels of rejection of the constitution among EA, EE and PNV voters were 53 percent, 50 percent and 46 percent, respectively).²⁰ In the December 1987 survey, when respondents were asked to express their attitudes towards the current constitution, their opinions were almost evenly divided, with 30 percent evaluating it positively, 33 percent regarding it as "the least of all possible evils," and 26 percent rejecting it. Only among HB supporters was there a majority (63 percent) of negative sentiments. Although some moderation of stands has taken place, as well as a pragmatic adjustment towards loyalty to the constitution, it is clear that in addition to outright rejection among radicals, the bulk of nationalists have maintained strategic reservations regarding ratification of the constitutional document. Only EE has publicly renounced this stance (in 1989).

In contrast with the constitution, the statute of autonomy was explicitly endorsed by 53 percent of those interviewed in December 1987. Linz, *et al*, have claimed that this represents an *a posteriori* legitimization of the Spanish constitution.²¹ Evaluations of the degree of success of the still unfinished autonomy process divide the Basque population among those who are fully satisfied (28 percent), those partly satisfied (31 percent), and those dissatisfied (26 percent). Supporters of the PP, CDS, PSOE and PNV are the most satisfied, followed by those who voted for EA and EE. At the other extreme, 70 percent of HB voters claim to be dissatisfied with the autonomy process. The constitution and the autonomy statute are two sides of the same coin. Satisfactory political development within the region are dependent on their legitimacy and the political loyalties they inspire.

Political Violence

Unfortunately, violence continues to be one of the sad characteristics of Basque political life. Of the various forms of violence that occur in Euskadi, we are most interested in those initiated by ETA's radical nationalist terrorism—the cause of most of the violent deaths that have occurred in Spain over the last


en la política vasca: notas sobre identidades sociales y cultura política," *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, 47, 1989.

²⁰ These data were derived from an April 1987 survey, "La Imagen de los partidos en Euskadi," also directed by Francisco Llera, utilizing a sample of 1,800 residents in the region.

²¹ *Conflicto en Euskadi*, p. 672.

thirty years.²² The passage of time appears to validate the hypothesis of Martha Crenshaw that terrorism can be a temporary occurrence within an otherwise stable society.²³ Although we shall not undertake an analysis of the trajectory or sociology of Basque terrorism, it is important to note that ETA's destabilizing and delegitimizing strategy is clearly reflected in the numbers of persons killed at various stages in the transition. (See Figure 9.1.) By far the highest levels

FIGURE 9.1 Deaths From Terrorist Violence, 1968-1990



²² Joseba Zulaika, *Basque Violence* (Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1990); Guntuz Jauregui, *Ideologia y estrategia politica de ETA* (Madrid: S.XXI, 1981); Luciano, Rincón, *Eta (1974-1984)* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 1985); Robert P. Clark, *Negotiating with ETA. Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975-1988* (Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1990); and Francisco J. Llera, "ETA: from Secret Army to Social Movement or Political Parties," Paper presented at the XII Congreso Mundial de Sociología, Madrid, 1990.

²³ As excerpted by Linz, *et al* (*Conflicto en Euskadi*, p. 619), she contends that "Terrorism occurs precisely when the passivity of the mass coincides with the discontent of an elite. This discontent is not sufficiently generalized and serious to provoke the population into action against the regime, but a small minority, without access to the bases of power that would enable it to topple a government through a coup or subversion, aspires to radical change. Thus, terrorism could be a sign of a stable society, rather than a symptom of fragility or impending collapse" (from Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, 13, July, 1981, pp. 379-400).

of ETA violence occurred during the 1978-1980 period, when the constitution and Basque autonomy statutes were being negotiated and ratified, and the first elections to the regional parliament were being held. A second significant upsurge in terrorism also coincided with a key political turning point, the formation of the first PNV-PSOE coalition government.

In light of the reaction of Basque society, ETA's terrorism campaign can be regarded as a failure. This is particularly obvious in the case of the "Pacto de Ajuria Enea," in which all democratic parties in Euskadi reached a consensus on the need to coordinate their policies against terrorism. One indicator of the level of legitimacy achieved by the democratic system is the response to a survey item in which respondents are asked to agree or disagree "with those who say that in Euskadi today it is possible to defend all political aspirations and objectives without recourse to violence." The results, broken down by partisan preference, can be seen in Table 9.12.

TABLE 9.12 Agree/Disagree That Violence is not Necessary to Achieve Political Goals, by Vote in 1986 Elections

	Very Much Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Very Much Disagree	DK/NA	N
CP (PP)	53%	28%	13%	6%	--	28
CDS	38	62	--	--	--	16
EA	48	39	7	1	5	132
EE	44	50	4	--	2	179
HB	15	29	28	12	16	171
PNV	49	40	3	1	7	358
PSOE	52	39	4	--	5	291
Total	42	38	7	2	11	2386

Source: CIS study #1795

Eight of every ten Basques expressed confidence in the current democratic system and rejected violence. This is the majority opinion of all partisan groups except that of Herri Batasuna, which is strategically allied with the terrorists. Nonetheless, even its electorate is divided on this issue, which partly explains its electoral decline since 1990.

Finally, let us examine the evolution of Basque attitudes towards those "persons who are involved with terrorism," comparing our 1989 results with those of two earlier surveys, one of them undertaken in 1978 and the other in

the aftermath of the Basque autonomy referendum in 1979. Respondents in both studies were asked if they regarded terrorists as "patriots," "idealists," "manipulated by others," "crazy," or "criminals." The results are presented in Table 9.13.

TABLE 9.13 Evolution in Attitudes Towards Terrorists, 1978-1989

Terrorists Are...	1978	1979	1989
Patriots	13%	17%	5%
Idealists	35	33	18
Manipulated	33	29	11
Crazy	11	8	16
Criminals	7	5	16
Don't Know/NA	1	8	34
N =	1140	1011	2386

Sources: For 1978 and 1979, Linz, *et al*, *Conflicto en Euskadi*; for 1989, CIS study #1795.

The generally favorable attitudes of Basques towards terrorists in the first years of the transition had turned to rejection and disgust ten years later. During this period, the percentage of respondents who considered terrorists to be "patriots" or "idealists" declined from 50 to 23 percent, while those who regarded them as "crazy" or "common criminals" rose from 13 percent to 32 percent. Equally noteworthy is the increase in those without an opinion, who amounted to over one third of all respondents in the 1989 study.

On closer examination, these respondents tended to be those without political identification or supporters of nationalist parties, as can be seen in Table 9.14. Comparing these data with those of Juan Linz and DATA, the change within each partisan group is striking. With doubt, the most significant changes are those among supporters of the PSOE and EF, although shifts among Basque nationalist voters in general are quite substantial. Positive opinions among Socialist voters declined from 46 percent to 10 percent, while negative assessments increased from 47 to 74 percent. The greatest stability was among center-right voters: the overwhelmingly negative attitudes of CP and CDS (74 percent and 80 percent, respectively) were almost identical to those of UCED voters in 1979 (76 percent). Among PNV supporters, the percentage of negative assessments remained stable, at 54 percent of respondents in both surveys, but positive evaluations declined from 40 percent to 16 percent. In this respect, the

TABLE 9.14 Perceptions of Terrorists, by Vote in 1986 Regional Election

	CP	CDS	EA	EE	HB	PNV	PSOE	Total
Patriots	--	--	3%	5%	31%	1%	--	5%
Idealists	13	--	24	26	40	15	10	18
Manipulated	20	19	17	8	5	17	12	11
Crazy	16	23	18	18	2	22	26	16
Criminals	38	38	18	13	--	15	36	16
Don't Know/NA	13	20	20	30	22	30	16	34
N =	28	16	132	179	171	358	291	2386

Source: 1989 CIS survey #1795, directed by F.J. Llera.

relatively positive stance of EA voters (among whom 27 percent held favorable opinions) stands in contrast. EE was intensely involved with the dramatic change of 1981, when ETApm abandoned the armed struggle, especially since it integrated many ex-activists into its ranks; hence, the decline in positive opinions of terrorists from 85 percent to 31 percent, and the increase in negative assessments from 6 percent to 31 percent. Among Herri Batasuna supporters, meanwhile, negative attitudes remained stable at 7 percent, and positive evaluations declined from 85 percent to 71 percent. Perhaps more important, there was an apparent decline in the intensity of positive attitudes, as the term "patriots" was displaced by the somewhat less favorable "idealists" as the modal perception of terrorists; HB voters selecting "patriots" declined from 60 percent to 31 percent, while those preferring the term "idealists" increased from 25 percent to 40 percent.

Conclusions

This chapter-length overview does not do justice to the richness and detailed analysis of the many themes explored by Juan Linz and his DATA collaborators in *Conflicto en Euskadi*. Despite the fact that our questionnaires were not identical, we are nevertheless in a position to evaluate some of the conclusions from that earlier study in light of data collected ten years later.

As Linz, *et al*, suggested, we are in the midst of a process of consolidation of the Basque autonomy.²⁴ The political climate is increasingly characterized

²⁴ *Conflicto en Euskadi*, p. 674.

by the consociational patterns of consensus, pact and coalition.²⁵ In the midst of a growing and widely accepted pluralism, the Weberian ethic of reality is emerging victorious over that of principles, and the nationalist utopia is pragmatically adapting to accepted political responsibilities. Political pluralism, volatility and heterogeneity of the political geography have increased in Euskadi, giving rise to a greater party-system fragmentation. Nevertheless, ideological tensions have moderated, putting an end to "adversarial politics." The stage of political normalization or consolidation, led by the governing PNV-PSOE coalition and by the EA-EE opposition, as well as by the "Pacto de Ajuria-Enea," has revitalized the left-right axis, and at the same time has reinforced centripetal tendencies within the system.

The fear of expressing oneself politically has still not disappeared from Basque society, and the conflict of identities remains alive. The nationalist hegemony, however, has shifted to a more "voluntaristic" model,²⁶ implying the predominance of assimilationist attitudes towards immigrants and those natives who do not regard themselves as nationalists. Given that immigration has given way to emigration in recent years, this redefinition of the basis of identity has made more viable the prospects for successful "nation-building" over the medium term. The linguistic conflict, which until recently has precluded consensus over education policy, has moderated in political terms, but remains alive. The nationalist policy of "positive discrimination" in favor of Euskera may have been a political success, but from a strictly linguistic sense it has not, given its stagnation among the population. To this date, consensus over this theme has been impossible, and the linguistic conflict has been internalized within the nationalist community itself, pitting those who only understand Spanish and those who are bilingual against those favoring a Basque monolingual policy [*leuskaldunizazio*] and those who prefer bilingual coexistence.

Autonomy has been consolidated, and *independentismo* has not only lost much of its political power but (given various interpretations of the concept of independence) has become an object of conflict within the nationalist community itself. On the one side are the moderates of the PNV and EE, who support loyalty to the constitution and the autonomy statute, and on the other are radicals represented by the increasingly isolated supporters of ETA and HB. EA has oscillated between these two positions, as manifested, on the one hand, in its stand on the parliamentary agreement of 1990 on self-determination, and, on the other, in the breakdown of the PNV-EA-EE coalition over the debate on

²⁵ Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, 21, 2, 1969, pp. 207-225; Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1975); and Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

²⁶ Linz, *et al*, *Conflict en Euskadi*, p. 679.

independence in 1991. Rather than the East-European syndrome of micronationalist disintegration, it has been the political integration of Western Europe that, for the moment, has exerted influence on the political climate in Euskadi, moderating center-periphery tensions and encouraging the policy of pacts and coalitions in the Basque country. It has also led to a reduction of political conflict with Madrid, which had been so apparent in the first regional legislative sessions.

The greatest change, however, concerns attitudes towards violence, now overwhelmingly rejected by Basque society. Indeed, following the inter-party consensus on this issue established in 1988, the citizenry has been mobilized in its opposition to violence. Terrorism continues, as shown by an increase in deaths in 1991, but Basque society has progressively isolated the perpetrators of violence and their supporters. This consensus and the overall legitimacy of the democratic system have taken root among Basques, leading them not only to abandon violence as a political method, but also to an abandonment of the political goals of the terrorists.

Levels of consensus and legitimacy are still inadequate among Basques, but a significant reduction in the intensity of conflict, in combination with consolidation of the autonomy process have made it much more possible for Euskadi to conform to consociational patterns of political behavior.