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Identity and Territorial Autonomy
in Plural Societies

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13. For the socioeconomic evolution of Galicia in the nineteenth century, see Ramón Villares, *La propiedad de la tierra en Galicia* (Madrid: Ed. Siglo XXI, 1982) and Xan Carmona, *El atraso industrial de Galicia* (Barcelona: Ed. Ariel, 1990).
14. See Justo G. Beramendi, Brocán en Numancia. 'Sobre los orígenes y peculiaridades del galleguismo decimonónico', in Anguera, *Orígenes i formació*, pp.81–120; and Ramón Máiz, *O Rexionalismo galego. Organización e ideoloxía, 1886–1907* (Sada: Ed. do Castro, 1984).
15. On Basque nationalism, see Javier Corcuera, *Orígenes, organización e ideoloxía del nacionalismo vasco* (Madrid: Ed. Siglo XXI, 1979); and José Luis de la Granja, *El nacionalismo vasco: un siglo de historia* (Madrid: Ed. Tecnos, 1995).
16. On Catalan nationalism, see Borja de Riquer, *Lliga Regionalista: la burguesía catalana i el regionalisme* (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1977); Enric Ucelay, *La Catalunya populista. Imatge, cultura i política en l'etapa republicana* (Barcelona: La Magrana, 1982); and Albert Balcells, *Història del nacionalisme català* (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 1992).
17. On Galician nationalism, see Justo G. Beramendi, *El nacionalismo gallego* (Madrid: Arco Libros, 1997).
18. On the effects of the Disaster and regenerationism on Spanish nationalism, as well as the evolution of the national question in Spain during this period, see Andrés de Blas, *Tradición republicana y nacionalismo español* (Madrid: Ed. Tecnos, 1991); S. Balfour, 'The Lion and the Pig: Nationalism and National Identity in the Fin-de-siècle Spain', in Mar-Molinero and Smith, pp.107–18; Inman Fox, *La invención de España* (Madrid: Ed. Cátedra, 1997).
19. On the national question during the Second Republic, see Justo G. Beramendi and Ramón Máiz (eds), *Los nacionalismos en la España de la Segunda República* (Madrid: Ed. Siglo XXI, 1991).
20. See, for instance, Javier Corcuera, 'Nacionalismo y clases en la España de la Restauración', *Estudios de Historia Social*, Nos.28–29 (1984), pp.249–82; and Borja de Riquer, 'Nacionalidades y regiones'.
21. These would be:
 - Multiethnic states where another national identity emerges which then separates, or states that are deprived of an ethnically different territory by a foreign power: the Netherlands (→Belgium), Denmark (→Schleswig-Holstein), Sweden (→Norway);
 - The creation of previously non-existing multiethnic states: Belgium, Yugoslavia, Rumania;
 - The creation of more or less mono-national states, constructed as result of a unifying process: Germany, Italy, Poland.

Basque Polarization: Between Autonomy and Independence

FRANCISCO J. LLERA

Twenty years have elapsed since the Spanish constitution of 1978 established the new territorial decentralization system in Spain (the so-called 'State of the Autonomies') and 19 since the Basque country began the road that in 1983 would culminate in the formation of 17 autonomous communities. The transition from an authoritarian political system to a pluralistic regime began with the approval in December 1976 of the Law for Political Reform and ended with the ratification of the Spanish constitution in the December 1978 referendum and of the autonomy statute for the Basque country¹ in October 1979. The political transition from dictatorship to democracy between 1976 and 1978 led to a second transition, longer in time, from a centralized state to a multicultural and decentralized polity. In the periods following these referenda, the institutionalization of new governmental structures took place, leading to a third process that we can refer to as the consolidation of the democratic and decentralized system. The national and regional factor² has been converted into a cleavage of the first order in Spanish politics, so that the political behaviour of élites and citizens, the party system³ and standards of governability cannot be understood if they are not attuned adequately to the splits of identity between citizen and territories in Spain.⁴

The Cultivation of Basque Ethnic Sentiment

The post-war generation of Basque nationalists comprises the children of a century and a half of civil wars and symbolic violence. This was manifested first in the Carlist Wars (1833–76) leading to a rise of the nationalist discourse and the emergence of an ethnonationalist movement headed by Sabino Arana⁵ a century ago,⁶ and second, in the violent resistance of the younger generations beginning in the 1960s⁷ in response to the political consequences of the Spanish civil war of 1936–9 and the violent military measures imposed during the dictatorship of Francisco Franco.

The industrial revolution began in Euskadi⁸ in the middle of the nineteenth century, changing the demographic composition and social and cultural structures of a traditional, religious, rural and conservative society. Between 1956 and 1975, industrial and social modernization produced much of the initial stress on Basque traditional culture, threatening to erase Basque traditions and the Basque language (*Euskera*) and to assimilate the Basque people into a homogeneous Spanish population. The Spanish state itself further contributed to the perception of 'us' versus 'them' by distinguishing the Basque territory from the rest of Spain through the imposition of 12 'states of exception' during the dictatorship which, by specifically discriminating against the Basque provinces, delegitimated the social reality of a unified Spanish nation and, in turn, legitimated the social construct of a distinct Basque nation.⁹ Once the authoritarian state had singled out the Basque territory, it was natural that this discrimination should produce tight social cohesion. With the concomitant legal repression of everything Basque, a gulf developed between public life and private expression. This dichotomization of public and private life would become a defining feature of Basque life, particularly as the Basque symbolic space became increasingly identified with the nationalist movement and, specifically with ETA and its violent resistance to Spanish culture and state.¹⁰

For Basque nationalists, the essence of their identity revolved around a sacred world of values and beliefs, and developed within a 'social space' with readily identifiable members and enemies.¹¹ Reflecting warrior virtues and the sense of fraternity derived from extensive participation, both Basque civil wars and Catholic ritual became sanctified and gave rise to a structure of values that was broadly shared and hence morally unifying of the ethnic community. The impossibility of giving expression to the Basque symbolic universe, together with the physical repression to which Basques were subjected, contributed to the construction of a dense network of social relations in which violence, both physical and symbolic, permeated ever more deeply into Basque life.

Max Weber¹² claimed that an ethnic group is not in itself a community but merely a 'moment' that facilitates the process of 'communalization'. Later, he noted that national identity is difficult to describe objectively in any generic sense. Nonetheless, Weber indicated that since such an identity is based on particular 'differential factors'; the sharing of even subjective perceptions of such differences results in an objective differentiation between 'us' and 'them'. This symbolic universe of 'us' versus 'them' has penetrated widely through Basque society. It has served as the backdrop in which new generations of Basques have been socialized. Though politically ambiguous and lacking strategic and structural rationalization, Basque

nationalism had a tremendous capacity for unilaterally mobilizing everything and everyone Basque against the state and the dictatorship.

The Basque dualism of public and private expression was reinforced by another cultural dualism whose emotional roots went even deeper, namely, the confrontation of Basque and Spanish identities,¹³ which articulated competing symbolic universes (Table 1). It is not surprising, then, that objective cultural attributes, such as language, shared by members of the ethnic groups and reinforced by communal solidarity structures, became key factors in the mobilization of the Basque nationalist movement, particularly as embodied by ETA.

TABLE 1
SUBJECTIVE NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION OF BASQUE NATIVES AND IMMIGRANTS, 1998

	Natives %	Immigrants* %	TOTAL %
Spanish Only	1.9	15.1	7.1
More Spanish than Basque	1.4	13.3	6.0
Basque and Spanish	24.8	44.7	32.9
More Basque than Spanish	27.9	14.0	22.3
Basque Only	36.0	4.5	23.4
DK/NA	8.0	8.4	8.3

N =

839

550

1,389

Source: Francisco J. Llera (EUSKOBAROMETRO).

*Including the children of immigrants.

One of the central foci of studies of ethnicity is subjective self-identification. This is based on the hypothesis that subjective elements weigh more heavily than 'primordial' factors in explaining the resurgence of ethnic demands in industrialized societies.¹⁴ Overall, both identities, Basque and Spanish, are compatible for the majority (61 per cent) of Basque population, but more among immigrants (72 per cent) than natives (54 per cent); secondly, the extreme groups of exclusivist identities are a minority (30.5 per cent) and higher among natives (36 per cent) than immigrants (15 per cent). An examination of the evolution of the self-identification of both key groups over the past two decades shows a significant decline in the percentage of those defining themselves as Basque only (-12 per cent) or Spanish only (-6 per cent), increasing the compatibility of identities among both groups.

Change is more notable with respect to the manner in which respondents define themselves and others as 'Basque'. The most frequently selected criterion, 'the will to be Basque', was supported in the 1998 survey

TABLE 2
PREFERENCES CONCERNING THE FORM OF THE STATE AMONG BASQUE (1998)
AND SPANISH (1996) RESPONDENTS

	Basques (1998) %	Spaniards (1996) %
Centralism	4	16
Regional Autonomy	37	44
Federalism	25	21
Independence	25	8
DK/NA	9	11

N = 1,600 2,500

Sources: EUSKOBAROMETRO (1998) and CIS, No.2,228 (1996).

stages of the transition to democracy asked Basques (and other Spaniards) about whether they preferred a centralized state structure, some regional autonomy, federal status or outright independence. The responses of Basque and Spanish respondents are summarized in Table 2.

Support for centralism appears to have stabilized at very low levels, although it is possible that the extent to which this alternative has been stigmatized, especially in Euskadi, may have discouraged some respondents from expressing their true feelings. The 'State of the Autonomies' model is supported by over one third of all Basque respondents (increasing ten points from 1977) and seven more points among the Spaniards, while support for federalism or 'much autonomy' is supported by about one quarter in both cases and has fluctuated in Euskadi from 1977 around a mean of about 24 per cent.¹⁷ Support for independence, which had been declining through the transition in Euskadi (from 24 per cent in 1977 to 17 per cent in 1982), increased following the election victory of the PSOE (the Spanish Socialist Party) in 1982 and stabilized around a mean of 25 per cent (17 points higher than that for Spaniards in 1996)

Loyalty, Legitimacy, and Satisfaction

One of Juan J. Linz's central concerns about the Spanish transition was the breakdown of legitimacy in Euskadi in relation to the Spanish constitution and the Basque Autonomy Statute.¹⁸ Our 1987 survey data revealed that two-thirds of Basques favourably evaluated the Spanish political transition, while 29 per cent held the opposite opinion. Even among the independence-seeking and violent HB or *Herri Batasuna* (Popular Unity) voters, there were as many positive as there were negative evaluations.¹⁹

An other empirical indicator of the lack of full legitimacy in Euskadi is the stance of the Basque population towards the Spanish constitution.²⁰

104 IDENTITY AND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES (EUSKOBAROMETRO⁵) by 82 per cent of those interviewed, remaining constant from our 1989 survey. Secondly, 'to live and work in the Basque country' also remained constant, at 55 per cent. Thirdly, support for the notion that it is necessary 'to have been born in the Basque country' in order to be considered Basque increased from 41 per cent (1989) to 53 per cent. Fourthly, 'descent from a Basque family' also increased four points (to 40 per cent). 'To feel Basque nationalist' declined from 56 per cent (1989) to 36 per cent, but was selected by a majority (53 per cent) of nationalist voters. Finally, 'to speak *Euskera*' remained constant, at 31 per cent, from 20 years ago as a basis for defining one's nationality. In general, subjective criteria increased at the expense of primordial factors in defining Basque nationality, after 20 years.

Between Autonomy and Independence

It can be said that Basque political institutions (parliament, government, administration, own treasury, fiscality and police, high court of justice, public television and full control over education and health systems and in the cultural, welfare, commercial, agricultural, tourist and infrastructural fields, among others) are in very good order; they have performed efficaciously and garnered popular support from the great majority of the population, and they have been successful in significantly reducing the level of political conflict between regional and central levels of government. Nevertheless, the radical and primordial call for independence still issues forth from an important sector of Basque society. When asked about the strength of their desire for independence, respondents replied in 1995 (EUSKOBAROMETRO) in much the same way as they did in 1979:¹⁶ the same 12 per cent said that they had a 'very great' desire for independence, while another 19 per cent (compared to 24 per cent in 1979) said that their pro-independence aspirations were 'rather great'. Not surprisingly, those who regarded themselves as Basque nationalists in 1995 responded very differently from those who did not: 69 per cent of Basque nationalists (against 12 per cent of non-nationalists) said that they had 'very great' or 'rather great' ambitions for independence. Thus, two-thirds of self-described Basque nationalists said that they had 'very great' or 'rather great' desires for independence from Spain, which reflected an increase of 19 points from 1989.

It is logical that the establishment of autonomous regional government institutions and democratic consolidation, in combination with more information about the various alternatives, have led to changes in the preferences of Basque citizens regarding the form of the state and its territorial organization. Surveys have at various intervals since the early

Nearly ten years (1987) after its ratification by referendum, 39 per cent of Basques had internalized the message of rejection from nationalist radicalism. In the 1998, survey,²¹ when respondents were asked to express their current vote towards the constitution, 46 per cent were affirmative (31.3 per cent of the census and 69 per cent of the voters in the 1978 referendum), including 57 per cent among PNV voters, and 15 per cent were negative (10.5 per cent of the census and 24 per cent of the voters in 1978). Only among HB supporters was there a majority (63 per cent) negative vote. Although some moderation of stands has taken place, as well as a pragmatic adjustment towards loyalty to the constitution, it is clear that in addition to outright rejection among radicals, the bulk of nationalists have maintained strategic reservations regarding ratification of the constitutional document.

In contrast with the constitution, the statute of autonomy was explicitly endorsed by 53 per cent of the census (91 per cent of the voters) and only 3 per cent (5 per cent of the voters) were negative. It can be said that this represents an *a posteriori* legitimation of the Spanish constitution.²² Evaluations made in 1998 of the degree of success of the autonomy process, which began 20 years ago and is still unfinished, divide the Basque population among those who are fully satisfied (43 per cent), those partly satisfied (30 per cent) and those dissatisfied (25 per cent). The responses of Basque population over this period are summarized in Table 3.

TABLE 3
EVOLUTION OF SATISFACTION WITH THE STATUTE OF AUTONOMY AMONG
BASQUE RESPONDENTS, 1987-98

	1987 %	1993 %	1998 %
Fully satisfied	28	31	43
Partly satisfied	31	25	30
Dissatisfied	26	26	25
DK/NA	15	18	2
N =	1,800	1,400	1,400

Sources: Surveys directed by F.J.Llera.

The proportion of those fully satisfied increased significantly (+15 points), mostly during the last five years, while the proportion of those partly satisfied appears to have stabilized around a mean of about 30 per cent with slight fluctuations. Supporters of PSOE (Socialist Party, 66 per cent), PP (Popular Party 66 per cent), and PNV (50 per cent) are the most satisfied in the 1998 survey, while partly satisfied are the 'overcoat' voters of IU (United Left 50 per cent) and EA (Basque Solidarity 45 per cent). At

the other extreme, those dissatisfied are stabilized in one quarter of the Basque population and account for a majority among HB supporters (83 per cent). The constitution and the autonomy statute are two sides of the same coin. Satisfactory political development within the region is dependent on their legitimacy and the political loyalties they inspire.

Political Violence

Unfortunately, violence continues to be one of the sad characteristics of the Basque polity. Of the various forms of violence that occur in Euskadi, we are most interested in those initiated by ETA's radical nationalist terrorism, the cause of most of the violent deaths that have occurred in Spain over the last 30 years.²³

With all forms of public dissent denied to them, secrecy, activism and exile bred a *violence fondatrice* among Basques, which served as the foundation for the development of a subculture of violence in their society.²⁴ During the Franco regime which, by its continuous and pervasive application of coercive force, effectively limited its discourse with Basques to one of violence, the dichotomization of 'us' versus 'them' combined explosively with actual individual experiences of violence to distort both the political and social environment. Indeed, during the final years of Franco's dictatorship, violence was no longer simply a political strategy or just one more ingredient in the rhetoric of Basque resistance, but rather had become the central point of reference in daily Basque life.²⁵ At the time of Franco's death, therefore, the dichotomization of Spain versus Euskadi was not merely cultural but political, not merely organizational but conceptual. On both sides its roots were profound, reaching to deeply-held identities and competing symbolic universes which, when confronted one with another, generated serious social conflict. The process of social development for the post-1940 generation thus coincided with an environment in which everything that symbolized Basque identity, particularly the Basque language, was endowed with enormous value and emotional appeal. To the extent that this generation of Basques has internalized the collective reality characterized by both the public and private dichotomization of 'us' versus 'them', it has come to view the confrontation between Euskadi and the Spanish state as a radically conflictive situation in which each Basque must take sides.²⁶

It is not surprising that such a clash should yield violence. For the radical Basque nationalists, however, violence has not merely occurred incidentally; it has been deliberately adopted as a strategy. The passage of time appears to validate the hypothesis of Martha Crenshaw that terrorism can be a temporary occurrence within an otherwise stable society and occurs

precisely when the passivity of the mass coincides with the discontent of an élite.²⁷ Although we shall not undertake an analysis of the trajectory or sociology of Basque terrorism, it is important to note that ETA's destabilizing and delegitimizing strategy is clearly reflected in the numbers of persons killed at various stages in the transition.²⁸ By far the highest levels of ETA violence (31 per cent of all assassinations and 41 per cent of all kidnappings) occurred during the period 1978–80, when the Spanish constitution and Basque autonomy statute were being negotiated and ratified, and the first elections to the regional parliament were being held. A second significant upsurge in terrorism also coincided with a key political turning point, the formation of the first PNV–PSE coalition government.

ETA clearly perceived violence as an effective way to communicate its own position of power. Its members, therefore, sought to use violence as a means to force the Spanish government to negotiate, a strategy that still continues. Indeed, during its 30 years of existence, ETA has been responsible for almost 800 assassinations, over 60 kidnappings, innumerable bombings, countless armed assaults and robberies, more than 1,000 injuries and an extended regime of extortionist 'revolutionary taxation',²⁹ as well as numerous other violent actions, counting on assistance of its supporters of the MLNV (Basque National Movement of Liberation), especially during the last three years (35 per cent of violent actions). ETA bears the responsibility for more than 80 per cent of all people killed in terrorist or police actions in Spain during the last 30 years. It is interesting to consider the victims of ETA violence; most of the fatalities are policemen and military officers (over 60 per cent of the total). This targeting reflects ETA's perception of the political situation as a military occupation of the Basque country, and as a war of the Basque people against the Spanish state and capitalism. Additional victims who helped to make this point included industrialists and politicians, both national and local. Between 1972 and 1983, Basque industrialists were the target of nearly 500 such attacks. Kidnapping and personal attacks on Basque industrialists and their property are designed both to heighten the degree of fear among the class of potential victims as well as to inflict monetary damage on them as a result of bombing and sabotage of their property. These attacks also serve to reinforce ETA's position as the defender of the Basque working class. Finally, during the last few years, politicians, especially of the PP (the Popular Party, in the Spanish government from 1996), were the victims and preferred target of their attacks.

Not surprisingly, ETA is the main victim of police repression in Spain, having had more than 90 of its members killed and more than 20,000 arrested; as of October 1998, over 600 activists and supporters were in jail in Spain or France. ETA was also a principal target of opposition terrorist

groups (AAA, ATE, BVE, GANE, and GAL, among others), a conflict which has led to death over 90 Basque activists and which has had an important political impact, because of the implication of the state apparatus during the Socialist government.

To justify this violent activism, nationalists have relied heavily upon the collective memory of past state repression during the civil war and the dictatorship, and continuous acts of coercive force. The strategy of the action-repression-action spiral, anti-repressive mobilization, amnesty demands, the actions of prisoners and their families and organizations – all these have played important roles in maintaining the armed struggle and its social support. Further, Basque nationalism, by providing support within the ethnic group, has helped to create and protect contemporary heroes and in so doing has contributed to the overall process of reproducing the ethnic myth.

The democratic process has legitimated the use of institutional means to achieve collective aims. At the same time, however, it has raised new divisive issues for the Basques: how should Basque nationalists seek their goals in this new environment? Once the transition to democracy was initiated, tensions emerged. There was some trend towards rationalizing Basque political structures and institutions to function as effective participants in this unfamiliar milieu. Yet this option was greatly complicated by the fact that many of those involved in Basque political life had organized themselves outside of, or in opposition to, this precise institutionalizing process. Radicalized nationalists therefore rejected any participation in the new institutions as a betrayal of the Basque cause and rejected the Spanish constitution of 1978, preferring to organize as an anti-system movement.³⁰

As the new political situation opened entirely different ways for change, and popular perspectives changed, the process of democratization forced the enunciation of different goals among the various nationalist factions. Most recently, despite their retention of a military strategy, many within ETA recognize that the only solution to the conflict is one of political negotiation not only between ETA and HB on the one hand and the Madrid government on the other, but also between the other Basque political parties, whether nationalist or not. The adoption of such a position by ETA reflects in part the difficulties it faces in its decision-making process at a time of enormous political and strategic importance, while most of its leaders are either in jail or deported. It also reflects, however, ETA's recognition of the *de facto* acceptance of Spanish political reforms and the concomitant enhancement and strengthening of the legitimacy of the central Spanish government within a considerable portion of the Basque electorate. In particular, the adoption of a strategy of political negotiation increases the importance of

HB as ETA's institutional voice, places an even greater responsibility on the organizations within the MLNV to mobilize popular support for the negotiation process. The Spanish reform process has, therefore, provided ETA with new opportunities for action, which have enabled it to pursue its violent campaign for independence. However, the democratization process has also confronted ETA with its most difficult task, to justify its continuing campaign of violence to those who have now accepted the alternative path of electoral politics and institutional reform.

In the light of the reaction of Basque society, ETA's terrorism campaign can be regarded as a failure. This was particularly obvious in the case of the *Pacto de Ajouria Enea* (1988-98), in which all democratic parties in Euskadi reached a consensus on the need to coordinate their policies against terrorism. One indicator of the level of legitimacy achieved by the democratic system is the response to a survey item in which respondents are asked to agree or disagree 'with those who say that in Euskadi today it is possible to defend all political aspirations and objectives without recourse to violence'. The results of 1997 survey, broken down by partisan preference, can be seen in Table 4.

TABLE 4
AGREE/DISAGREE THAT VIOLENCE IS NOT NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE
POLITICAL GOALS, BY VOTE IN 1996 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN EUSKADI
(HORIZONTAL PERCENTAGES)

	Very Much Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Very Much Disagree	DK/NA
EA	66	21	10	-	3
HB	9	26	29	30	6
IU	68	30	2	-	1
PNV	66	31	2	-	3
PP	81	15	1	-	-
PSE	74	26	-	-	-
TOTAL	56	32	6	3	3 (1400)

Source: Francisco J. Llera (EUSKOBAROMETRO, 1997).

Nine out of every ten Basques expressed confidence in the current democratic system and rejected violence, an increase of 10 points from eight years ago. This is the majority opinion of all partisan groups except that of HB, which is strategically allied with the terrorists. Nonetheless, even its electorate is divided on this issue, which partly explains its electoral decline since 1990 and its radicalization (+19 points) from a 1989 survey.³¹ Finally, let us examine the evolution of Basque attitudes towards those

'persons who are involved with terrorism', comparing our 1997 survey results with those of four earlier surveys. Respondents in all studies were asked if they regarded terrorists as 'patriots', 'idealists', 'manipulated by others' ('fanatical' in 1996), 'crazy' ('terrorists' from 1996), or 'criminals' ('killers' in 1996). The results are presented in Table 5.

TABLE 5
EVOLUTION IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS ETA ACTIVISTS, 1978-96

ETA activists are...	1978 %	1979 %	1989 %	1993 %	1996 %
Patriots	13	17	5	9	8
Idealists	35	33	18	13	16
Manipulated/Fanatic*	33	29	11	25	12
Crazy/terrorists*	11	8	16	14	32
Criminals/killers*	7	5	16	21	21
DK/NA	1	8	34	18	11
N =	1,140	1,011	2,386	600	1,800

Sources: For 1978-9, J.Linz (1986); for 1989-96, F. Llera (CIS, No.1,795; CICYT, 1993, and EUSKOBAROMETRO, 1996).

* Categories have changed from 1996 survey.

The generally favourable attitudes of Basques towards terrorists in the first years of the transition had turned to radical rejection and disgust ten years later. During this period, the percentage of respondents who considered activists to be 'patriots' or 'idealists' declined from 50 to 24 per cent, very similar to the evolution of the percentage of respondents for 'manipulated/fanatical' (from 33 to 12), while those who regarded activists as 'crazy/terrorists' or 'common criminals/killers' rose from 13 per cent to 53 per cent. Equally noteworthy is the increase in those without an opinion, who amounted to over one third of all respondents in the 1989 study, showing the great change of Basque public opinion against ETA at the end of the 1980s. On closer examination, these respondents tended to be those without political identification or supporters of nationalist parties.

Studying these perceptions of terrorists by vote in Spanish legislative elections of 1993 (EUSKOBAROMETRO, 1996) and comparing these data with those of Juan Linz for 1979,³² one notices a striking change within each partisan group. Without doubt, the most significant changes are those among supporters of the PSE, although shifts among Basque nationalist voters in general are quite substantial. Positive opinions among Socialist voters declined from 46 per cent to 9 per cent ('idealists'), while negative assessments increased from 47 to 87 per cent. The smaller change was among Spanish centre-right voters: the overwhelmingly negative attitudes

of PP (91 per cent) were almost identical to those of former UCD voters in 1979 (76 per cent), while positive opinions show the greatest stability from 17 to 4 per cent ('idealists'). Among PNV supporters, the percentage of negative assessments also increased from 54 to 74 per cent of respondents in both surveys, and positive evaluations declined from 40 to 21 per cent. In this respect, the relatively positive stance of EA (the radical nationalist split in the PNV in 1986) voters (among whom 41 per cent held favourable opinions) stands in contrast. Among HB supporters, meanwhile, negative attitudes remained stable between 7 and 4 per cent, and positive evaluations declined from 85 to 75 per cent, while those without an opinion increased from 10 to 20 per cent.

The Basque Party System: Polarization and Fragmentation

The fragility and difficult crystallization of the Basque party system become clear as soon as we take a backward glance to what has happened since the beginning of the Spanish political transition.³³ In order to better understand the evolution of the Basque party system, we can differentiate five periods: the first, from the inaugural election of 1977 to the autonomy referendum at the end of 1979, is the Basque political transition; the second, from 1980 to 1984, is the first Basque regional legislature and is one of internal institutionalization; the third, from 1984 to 1986, is one marked by the crisis of hegemonic nationalism and the schism within the PNV; the fourth, from 1986 to 1998, is one of democratic consolidation in the Basque country; and the fifth is beginning and could be one of pacification (see Tables 6 and 7).

TABLE 6
POPULAR VOTES IN BASQUE REGIONAL ELECTIONS, 1980-98

Parties	1980 %	1984 %	1986 %	1990 %	1994 %	1998 %
PNV	38.0	42.0	23.7	28.5	29.8	27.6
EA	-	-	15.8	11.4	10.3	8.6
PSE/EE	14.2	23.0	22.0	19.9	17.1	17.4
EE	9.8	8.0	10.9	7.8	-	-
PCE/IU	4.0	-	-	1.4	9.1	5.6
HB/EH	16.6	14.6	17.5	18.4	16.3	17.7
UCD/CDS	8.5	-	3.5	-	-	-
AP/CP/PP	4.8	9.3	4.8	8.2	14.4	19.9
UA	-	-	-	1.4	2.7	1.2
Nationalists	64.4	64.6	67.9	66.1	56.4	53.9
Turnout	59.8	68.5	69.6	61.0	59.7	70.0

Calculations by the author.

TABLE 7
SEATS IN BASQUE PARLIAMENT, 1980-98

Parties	1980	1984	1986	1990	1994	1998
PNV	25	32	17	22	22	21
EA	-	-	13	9	8	6
PSE/EE	9	19	19	16	12	14
EE	6	6	9	6	-	-
PCE/IU	1	-	-	-	6	2
HB/EH	11	11	13	13	11	14
UCD/CDS	6	-	2	-	-	-
AP/CP/PP	2	7	2	6	11	16
UA	-	-	-	3	5	2
TOTAL	60	75	75	75	75	75

All regional elections from 1980 produced a nationalist majority in a very pluralistic arena, in which the PNV's predominant status was confirmed. This last period is just beginning, and is characterized by the political manifesto of the nationalist front (*Declaración de Estella*) and the truce announcement by ETA in September. The increase of terrorism against the Popular politicians, and the extension of street violence by the radicalized nationalists during the last two years produced social mobilization³⁴ and more tension between nationalist and autonomist political parties. The government's anti-terrorist policy of firmness and the agreement of Socialists and Populares to isolate HB provoked a reaction from PNV for a radicalized strategy change. From the beginning of 1998 PNV had secret talks with HB and ETA in order to find a peaceful way together; the first result was the so-called 'Ardanza's peace plan', rejected by the PP and PSE, and the second consequence was the rupture of the *Pacto de Ajuuria Enea* after its ten years of existence. This new polarized political scene also produced a coalition split and the regional government Socialists' exit at the end of the last legislature.

After a stressful and polarized electoral campaign, but without terrorist violence for the first time, the high voting turnout (70 per cent) in these sixth regional elections of October 1998³⁵ reproduced the same political pluralism, and the radicalized PNV repeated its electoral success. Small but significant changes are the polarization of electoral support for extreme options (PP and HB/EH), the thin Socialist recovery, and decline of all others, especially the smaller parties. The great change could be a new coalition government of all nationalist parties (PNV, EA and HB/EH), which could lead to the end of ETA's terrorism, the pacification process and the integration of HB/EH into the democratic game, but showing respect to the Basque political pluralism.³⁶

Rarely is there such unanimity among scholars³⁷ as there is in classifying the Basque party system as one of 'polarized pluralism'.³⁸ There are numerous indicators that justify such a designation: an average of seven significant parliamentary parties, the two largest of which only received 47.5 per cent of valid votes cast in the last regional election; an index of parliamentary fragmentation of .79;³⁹ important ideological tensions; and an anti-system party openly supporting violence during the last 20 years and receiving 17.7 per cent of the vote. Fragmentation would not be so significant if it were not linked with an ideological polarization between parties, which affects the dynamics of competition, acceptance or rejection of political institutions, and the basic conceptions of the social system. This polarized pluralism has exacerbated confrontations over identities, symbols, territoriality, and integration/secession.

In the aftermath of these last regional elections, the party system could be regarded as consisting of seven partisan groups: three are Basque nationalist (PNV, HB/EH and EA), three others are statewide parties (PP, PSE-EE and IU), and one is provincialist (UA). Examined from a different perspective, partisan politics within the region is dominated by four parties on the right (PNV, PP and UA), one on the centre (EA), and the other three on the left (HB/EH, PSE-EE and IU). Finally, it is important to note that one of them, HB (with a new denomination after these elections, *Euskal Herriarrok* or 'we the citizens of *Euskal Herria*'), is an anti-system party.

Fragmentation

One of the first indicators of fragmentation is the number of relevant parties, defined either through their coalition formation ability or their blackmail potential. Given the roles played by various parties and the level of electoral support they have had since the first regional parliament, we can conclude that there are seven relevant parties. This is one of the preconditions for classification as a case of extreme pluralism. Table 8 shows the party system format and its evolution.

As can be seen, in spite of changes in the internal structure of the Basque party system, its high degree of fragmentation remained almost constant throughout this period. The dispersion of parliamentary forces has increased slightly, virtually precluding the re-emergence of an absolute majority in support of any one party, let alone the establishment of a hegemony by any party. The PNV, having recovered from its crisis of 1986, has returned as a central political force, not as an hegemonic actor, but as a dominant one. The successful experience of the centripetal and basic PNV-PSE alliance has moderated Basque political life for 14 years. Given the great complexity of Basque territorial institutions and this distribution of parliamentary seats, coalition governments have been the way to governability in Euskadi.⁴⁰

Most parties shared coalition experiences at different institutional levels (PNV-PSE, PNV-EE-PSE, PNV-EA-PSE in the regional, provincial and local governments; PNV-EE-EA in the regional government; EA-EE in Guipúzcoa; PNV-EA-(PP) in Alava; PNV-PP in Bilbao; PNV-UA in Vitoria; and PNV-PSE-IU also in Bilbao). Given its anti-system stance, HB has been left out of all these coalition scenarios so far, but this situation could change with the new nationalist policy, and next regional coalition government could be formed by a minority alliance PNV-EA and parliamentary supported by EH(HB).

TABLE 8
FORMAT OF THE BASQUE PARTY SYSTEM, 1980-98

Indicators	1980	1984	1986	1990*	1994	1998
Parliamentary Fragmentation Index	.81	.72	.81	.81	.82	.79
Corrected Parliamentary Dispersion	.87	.90	.94	.94	.96	.92
Electoral Volatility Index	-	13	25	11	15	8
Number of parliamentary parties	7	5	7	7	7	7
Percentage of seats for largest party	41.7	42.7	25.3	29.3	29.3	28.0
Percentage of seats for second party	18.3	25.3	22.7	21.3	16.0	21.3
Difference between the two	23.3	17.4	2.7	8.0	13.3	6.7
Largest Party	PNV	PNV	PSE	PNV	PNV	PNV
Second party	PSE	PSE	PNV	PSE	PSE-EE	PP
Percentage of seats for two largest	60.0	68.0	48.0	50.6	45.3	49.3
Min. no. of parties for party majority	2	2	3	2	3	3
Parties in Government	PNV	PNV	PNV/ PSE	PNV/ EE/EA	PNV/ EA/PSE	PNV/ EA/PP

Calculations by the author.

*1991-94: PNV-EE-PSE

Polarization

Two main dimensions of polarization have characterized Basque electoral behaviour in the course of 20 years of elections: left-right identification and nationalist sentiment. Both ideological dimensions have been operationalized as self-placement scales of ten-point continua: the classical left(1)/right(10) and the new independence(1)/centralism(10) one. Although we lack survey data concerning perceived ideological positions of party supporters in every election, both regional (1980, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998) and general (1982, 1986, 1989, 1993 and 1996), since 1980 it is possible to get an idea of their ideological evolution from some post-electoral surveys. We have chosen the first regional election (1980), a more recent regional election (1994), and the most recent (1996) general election (see Table 9). Although it should be pointed out that we are mixing data from two different kinds of elections, we believe that it is safe to infer that

TABLE 9
MEAN SELF-PLACEMENTS OF PARTY SUPPORTERS ON THE TEN-POINT LEFT-
RIGHT AND INDEPENDENCE-CENTRALISM CONTINUA IN 1980, 1994 AND 1996
ELECTIONS IN EUSKADI

Party Supported	Left-Right		Independence-Centralism	
	1980	1994	1980	1994
Partido Popular (AP,1980)	6.4	6.8	7.6	6.9
Unidad Alavesa	-	6.5	-	7.0
Partido Nacionalista Vasco	4.6	4.8	3.2	3.1
Eusko Alkartasuna	-	4.0	-	2.4
Partido Socialista de Euskadi	3.8	4.1	5.5	5.7
Euskadiko Ezkerra	3.1	-	3.1	-
Izquierda Unida (PCE,1980)	3.1	3.2	-	4.9
Euskal Herritarrok (HB,80/94)	2.3	2.4	1.6	1.7

Sources: Surveys directed by F.J. Llera.

significant real change did take place along these fundamental dimensions of Basque political behaviour.

As can be seen, a centripetal shift has occurred among many voters and this, coupled with significant changes in relations and discourse among parliamentary parties, has facilitated the pacts and coalitions of the most recent period and reduced the overall level of polarization. It is also possible that this increased moderation has reduced the level of voter turnout.

Indices of polarization (see Table 10), as measured by the distance between the mean self-placements of supporters of the parties at either extreme,⁴¹ reveal that high levels of political division have been slowly reduced. The disappearance of the UCD and the restructuring of the right produced an increased polarization on the left-right dimension in 1986; conversely, the electoral realignments among the state-wide parties reduced it since 1993. At the same time, the extent of polarization on the independence-centralism continuum remained virtually unchanged until 1990, while it declined from 1993, both by the centripetal political dynamics of PNV-PSE coalitions and by the more moderated PP.

TABLE 10
EVOLUTION OF THE INDICES OF POLARIZATION ON THE LEFT-RIGHT AND
INDEPENDENCE-CENTRALISM DIMENSIONS IN EUSKADI, 1980-96

Dimension	1980	1982	1986	1989	1990	1993	1994	1996
Left/Right	.46	.55	.63	.61	.62	.50	.49	.42
Independ'ce/centr'ism	.66	.67	.65	.57	.63	.53	.59	.55

Sources: surveys directed by F.J.Llera.

Electoral competition is a function of these cleavage dimensions – the manner in which they interact with each other, and the way they are dealt with in partisan electoral strategies. The data indicate that, in the aggregate, there was no significant reduction of polarization on the independence-centralization dimension, nor in left-right polarization.

However, it is also apparent from these data that there has been a certain convergence towards the middle of the two continua, especially with movement towards the political centre on the part of the PNV, PSE and PP, in addition to the fusion between PSE and EE (PSE-EE) and the solid alliance of reconciliated PNV-EA. This has had the effect of further isolating the extremes (HB and UA), as well as facilitating relations among the moderate parties. As they converge, however, one unanticipated consequence may be an increase in competitive tensions and volatility, as distances between parties are narrowed.

Conclusions

During the last 12 years Basque politics and society have undergone a solid process of consolidation for the autonomy institutions and their plurality. The political climate was increasingly characterized by the consociational patterns of consensus, pact, and coalition. In the midst of a growing and widely accepted pluralism, the Weberian ethic of reality is emerging victorious over that of principles, and the nationalist utopia has been pragmatically adapting to accepted political responsibilities.

Political pluralism, volatility, and the heterogeneity of the political geography have increased in Euskadi, giving rise to a greater party-system fragmentation. Nevertheless, ideological tensions have moderated, putting an end to 'adversarial politics'. The stage of institutional consolidation, led by the moderate governing PNV-PSE alliance, as well as by the *Pacto de Ajuuria Enea*, has reinforced centripetal tendencies within the system.

In spite of ETA's truce, however, the fear of expressing oneself politically has still not disappeared from Basque society, and the conflict of identities remains alive. Basque public opinion remains immured between longings for peace and freedom and the fear of the political consequences of a collective failure. The nationalist hegemony, however, has shifted to a more 'voluntaristic' model, implying the predominance of assimilationist attitudes towards immigrants and those natives who do not regard themselves as nationalists. The linguistic question, which has found a solution in the education system and the national policy of 'positive discrimination (affirmative action)' a way for its solution, has moderated tensions in political terms, but it remains alive.

Autonomy has been consolidated, and independence demands have not

- España* (Madrid: Euramérica, 1981); also Francesc Pallarés, José R. Montero and Francisco J. Llera, 'Non State-wide Parties in Spain: An Attitudinal Study of Nationalism and Regionalism', *Publicus: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol.27, No.4 (1997), pp.135-69.
5. The founder of the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party).
 6. Javier Corcuera, *Orígenes, ideología y organización del nacionalismo vasco, 1876-1904* (Madrid: S.XXI, 1979).
 7. Goldie Shabad and Francisco J. Llera, 'Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain', in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), *Terrorism in Context* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), pp.410-69.
 8. This is the name given to 'the fatherland of all Basques' by Sabino Arana Goiri, the founder of Basque nationalism in the late nineteenth century. For Basque nationalists, the Basque country or *Euzkaldherria* is an ethno-linguistic unit made up of the Spanish provinces of Alava, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya and Navarra, and by the French Districts of Labourd, Soule and the Lower Navarre in the département of Pyrénées Atlantiques.
 9. Alfonso Pérez-Agote, *La reproducción del nacionalismo vasco* (Madrid: CIS, 1984).
 10. Robert P. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).
 11. See Ion Juaristi, *El linaje de Aitor. La invención de la tradición vasca* (Madrid: Taurus, 1987) and *El bucle melancólico. Historias de nacionalistas vascos* (Madrid: Espasa, 1997); also Mikel Azurmendi, *La herida patriótica* (Madrid: Taurus, 1998).
 12. Max Weber, *Economía y sociedad* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1979), p.318.
 13. See the evolution in Juan J. Linz *et al.*, *Conflicto en Euskadi* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1986) and in Francisco J. Llera, *Los vascos y la política* (Bilbao: Univ. del País Vasco, 1994).
 14. Juan J. Linz, 'From Primitivism to Nationalism' in E.A. Tiryakian and R. Rogowski (eds), *New Nationalisms of the Developed West* (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp.203-53.
 15. It is the name for periodical surveys conducted by Francisco J. Llera at the Basque Country University.
 16. Linz *et al.*, *Conflicto en Euskadi*, p.89.
 17. *Ibid.*, p.98.
 18. *Ibid.*, pp.669ff.
 19. Francisco J. Llera, 'Continuidad y cambio en la política vasca: notas sobre identidades sociales y cultura política', *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, Vol.47 (1989), p.118.
 20. See Linz *et al.*, *Conflicto en Euskadi*, pp.226ff.
 21. Francisco J. Llera, 'Conflicto en Euskadi Revisited', in R. Gunther (ed.), *Politics, Society, and Democracy. The Case of Spain* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p.189.
 22. Linz *et al.*, *Conflicto en Euskadi*, pp.258ff.
 23. See its evolution in Gurutz Jauregui, *Ideología y estrategia política de ETA. Análisis y evolución entre 1959 y 1968* (Madrid: S.XXI, 1981); Luciano Rincón, *ETA (1974-1984)* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 1985); Joseba Zulaika, *Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament* (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1988); Robert P. Clark, *Negotiating with ETA. Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975-1988* (Reno, NV: Univ. of Nevada Press, 1990); Florencio Domínguez, *De la negociación a la tregua. ¿El final de ETA?* (Madrid: Taurus, 1998).
 24. Michel Maffesoli, *La violence fondatrice* (Paris: Champ Urbain, 1978).
 25. Ander Gurrutxaga, *El código nacionalista vasco durante el Franquismo* (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1985).
 26. Alfonso Pérez-Agote, *El nacionalismo vasco a la salida del Franquismo* (Madrid: CIS, 1987).
 27. Martha Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.13 (1981), pp.379-400.
 28. Llera, *Los vascos y la política*, p.99.
 29. The name used by ETA when collecting money from employers to finance organizational activities.
 30. José M. Mata, *El nacionalismo vasco radical. Discurso, organización y expresiones* (Bilbao: Univ. del País Vasco, 1993).

only lost much of their political power, but with current nationalist radicalization have become an object of conflict and political tension between national and state-wide parties. The nationalist front and its coalition government are conditioned by the ETA's truce and its goal is to achieve peace. The peace process needs political normalization and consensus, but one runs the risk of going back to 'adversary politics', which could be a serious difficulty for that process.

Rather than the East-European syndrome of micronationalist disintegration, it has been the political integration of Western Europe (and the Irish peace process) that, for the moment, has exerted influence on the political climate in Euskadi, moderating centre-periphery tensions and encouraging the policy of pacts and coalitions. It has also led to a reduction of political conflict with Madrid, except in the area of antiterrorist policies. The greatest change, however, concerns attitudes towards violence, now overwhelmingly rejected by Basque society. Indeed, following the inter-party consensus on this issue established in 1988, the citizenry has been mobilized in its opposition to violence. This consensus and the overall legitimacy of the democratic system have taken root among Basques, leading them not only to abandon violence as a political method, but also to abandon the political goals of the terrorists. However, nationalist parties are changing their moderate strategy and are trying to convert their electoral decline and the political defeat of terrorists into a more nationalist institutional status for the Basque country.

Levels of consensus and legitimacy are still inadequate among Basques, but a significant reduction in the intensity of conflict, in combination with consolidation of the autonomy process, have made it much more possible for Euskadi to conform to consociational patterns of political behaviour.

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NOTES

1. The Basque Autonomous Community consists of the provinces of Alava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, while Navarra is a separate *Comunidad Foral*, both with 'historical rights' recognized by the Spanish constitution.
2. Juan J. Linz, 'Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State', in S.N. Eisenstadt and S. Rokkan (eds), *Building States and Nations: Models, Analyses and Data Across Three Worlds*, Vol.2 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1973), pp.32-112.
3. Richard Gunther, Giacomo Santi and Goldie Shabad, *Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System* (Berkeley, CA, and London: University of California Press, 1986).
4. See, among others, Juan J. Linz *et al.*, *Informe sociológico sobre el cambio político en*

31. Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), Study No. 1795.
32. *Ibid.*, p.639.
33. Francisco J. Llera, *Postfranquismo y fuerzas políticas en Euskadi* (Bilbao: Universidad de País Vasco, 1985) and *Los vascos y la política*.
34. Maria Jesus Funes, *La salida del silencio. Movilizaciones por la paz en Euskadi, 1986-1998* (Madrid: Akal, 1998).
35. Francisco J. Llera, 'Las elecciones autonómicas vascas de 1998', *Cuadernos de Alzate*, Vol.19 (1998), pp.177-98.
36. Dominguez, pp.105ff.
37. See Francisco J. Llera, *Postfranquismo y fuerzas políticas*, pp.112ff; Linz et al., *Conflicto en Euskadi*, p.317; and Gunther, Sani and Shabad, p.312.
38. Giovanni Sartori, *Partidos y sistemas de partidos* (Madrid: Alianza, 1980), pp.166ff.
39. Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), pp.47ff.
40. Francisco J. Llera, 'Pluralismo y gobernabilidad en Euskadi (1980-1994)' in M. Alcántara and María A. Martínez (eds), *Las elecciones autonómicas en España, 1980-1997* (Madrid: CIS, 1998), pp.413-43.
41. S.C. Flanagan, 'Models and Methods of Analysis' in G.A. Almond, S.C. Flanagan and R.J. Mundt (eds), *Crisis, Choice and Change* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1973), pp.682-96.

Autonomist Regionalism within the Spanish State of the Autonomous Communities: An Interpretation

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The role played by *regionalisms* and *regionalist movements* in Spanish history is ambiguous. The development of regional identities contributed to the formation of the nineteenth-century Spanish nation-state, in a similar fashion to other nation-building processes. But the strong survival of the so-called 'historical regions', and therefore of territorial identities forged in the course of the Middle Ages and the early modern period, also resulted in a necessary precondition for the emergence of several peripheral nationalisms during the last third of the nineteenth century (Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalisms). These nationalist movements denied the existence of a Spanish nation occupying the entire territory ruled by the state, and sought to achieve self-determination for their respective territories. In fact, peripheral nationalisms usually have regionalist forerunners, and have also been accompanied by the emergence or development of regionalism in various forms.

This makes Spain a good case for examining the ambiguities of the processes of region-building and nation-building. A scientific definition of a region seems as elusive as providing a definitive answer to the question: what is a nation? Geographers, economists and social scientists coincide in pointing out that no single definition of region is sufficient: regions are economic entities, historical territories, frontier areas and geographical units delimited by natural elements. But they are also a form of collective identity, with uncertain limits that vary according to the spatial representation imagined by the inhabitants of a given territory.¹ Similar problems arise when defining the term regionalism. According to M. Hroch, in the Central European context, regionalism meant a form of supra-ethnic territorial loyalty similar to *Landespatritismus*, which was not infused with ethnic content and hence could be shared by linguistically or ethnically diverse segments of the population, to the point of becoming an alternative concept to ethnonationalism.² Nevertheless, this definition cannot be