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Spain: Identity Boundaries and Political Reconstruction

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The aim of this article is to look at the political implications of identity patterns in one case that is of exceptional interest, that of Spain. It begins by looking at the nature of identity, and the challenges it poses in the contemporary world. This is followed by a section examining the issue of collective identity in the Spanish context, exploring variation in forms of regional identity and relating this to new political structures in the regions. The two last sections look respectively at the manner in which the regional party systems reflect diverse patterns of identity and the challenges posed by these patterns for the system of government.

INTRODUCTION

The question of identity, whether of the individual or the group, is as old as civilization itself. Collective identity, as a component of the culture of a human group, defines its sense of *us*, distinguishing it from *them*, articulates its mechanisms of social and community cohesion and organizes group activities that bring about feelings of belonging, loyalty, and social control. Reflections on this topic are not new to modern sociology, since Tönnies, Weber, and Pareto each underscored the role of subjectivity as a source of social action. Yet, identity has gained a renewed academic interest in the last couple of decades and has been the subject of special focus, not only among sociologists but also anthropologists, historians, philosophers, economists, and political scientists.¹

The aim of this article is to look at the political implications of identity patterns in one case that is of exceptional interest—that of Spain. For more than three decades, the structure of the Spanish state has been subjected to a dramatic form of territorial reconstruction. While some of the momentum

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behind this derived from the new energy and enthusiasm for state building that followed the end of the dictatorship, it was in particular a response to a fascinating interplay between the social psychological domain (that of identity) and the political world (that of institutional organization). The article therefore begins by looking at the nature of identity and the challenges it poses in the contemporary world. This is followed by a section examining the issue of collective identity in the Spanish context, exploring variation in forms of regional identity and relating this to new political structures in the regions. The two last sections look respectively at the manner in which the regional party systems reflect diverse patterns of identity and the challenges posed by these patterns for the system of government.

IDENTITY AND IDENTITIES

One of the reasons for the renewed interest in the identity question in our contemporary societies lies in the very fragmentation associated with its growing complexity and the societal fatigue that has been accumulated by pressure from nations and markets to be homogeneous. In a very basic way, individuals and groups have a problem adapting to the social changes and superimposed models of mechanisms of control and social cohesion that define group and community structures within complex societies.² The impact of globalization on this phenomenon must also be taken into account—generally speaking, this includes the processes of internationalization and supra-state integration. Inevitably, the result is the manifestation of a plurality of loyalties that are in varying degrees concentric or eccentric, hierarchical or at odds, and intertwined or fragmented. This process also includes a weakening of some of the group's connections with respect to certain of its other attachments, thereby altering the structure of its hierarchy. Therefore, it is no mere coincidence, when faced with overall uncertainty and chaos, that renewal of the concept of “glocal” may take on the strength of an identity, in the same way that self-affirmation has gained strength in territorialized communities or in ethnic groups faced with the inefficiencies of nation-state homogenization. In this manner, social cohesion along with the language of solidarity and community are converted into a political topic.

It is the politicization of the identity question that interests us most here. The progressive contemplation of the nation-state paradigm of state building was created precisely in order to highlight the advantages of reinforcing state power in European societies.³ The state-centered view, according to the early Weberian approach, conceives of the state as a geographically sovereign political entity with a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, the ability to relate to other states in accordance with international law, and a series of social institutions that confer a monopoly in the legitimate use of

force over such a territory. State and nation are two sides of the same coin, although both may take on distinct shapes and models, not only in their structure but in their composition and also in their way of relating to each other. If the ability of the state refers to the strength and performance of its institutions, the nation brings us back to the population itself, unified and connected by identity links of history, culture, or language. States have been more or less efficient instruments in modernizing societies, bringing about economic development and social cohesion, and creating and stabilizing democratic institutions within stable borders. However, this has not always been designed to homogenize the population culturally, or otherwise convert it into a “national community.” In other words, state building needs and is complemented by nation building—the state needs its population to share, in its own way, what Benedict Anderson called the “imagined community,” an expression of the mutual dependence of state and nation.⁴

The process of constructing modern states, to the extent that they originate from or operate within sociodemographic and territorial realities or complex cultures and have played the lead role in histories that are more or less broken and laden with state-nation centralization, has generated a central-peripheral dynamic that is the source of conflicts that are often very difficult to resolve.⁵ Although this dynamic does not always have a practical translation that is spatial or geographical, as occurs in the Spanish case with its regional peripheries, we may associate it with the existence of a national political identity that is hegemonic or central, that integrates, competes with or opposes local identities that are more or less strong, and that is either preexisting or not. In the case of some nation-states, ethnocultural diversity, sociodemographic displacements, and the complexity of the territorial and productive model have to be considered in assessing the territorial tensions that drive political processes of decentralization or adjustment.⁶

Going back to Benedict Anderson, our national communities are, at the very least, *invented* social and cultural organizations, or constructed mentally, based on cultural materials derived from sharing histories, languages, land, traditions, and mythologies. That is how we build our community identities, whether they are inclusive or exclusive of one another, and with ethnocultural boundaries that are more or less clear or diffuse. In any case, we are now faced with one of the dimensions of identity construction: the cognitive dimension (necessary for imagining and understanding the community) that encodes, stores, processes and recycles information from the community heritage. However, one may easily verify the possible existence of two other dimensions that complement this and that make a lived reality out of that which was imagined: the emotional dimension (the interpretation of perceptions, information, and collective knowledge), and the motivational or voluntary dimension (the connection between knowledge, emotions, and behavior). Nevertheless, the imagined identities can, in

the end, be converted into lived realities, closing the circle of community identity.⁷

It is out of the materials of the ethnocultural domain that human groups begin to construct their collective identity, their sense of community cohesion, and eventually their national consciousness and their sovereignty, equipped with a state entity.⁸ The complexity and dynamics of the setting in which ethnic groups, nations, and states find their realities rooted is quite apparent if we bear in mind a few details.⁹ First, the number of states has multiplied considerably in the last century, particularly if we recall that the 44 states that were integrated into the United Nations in 1945 are about 200 states today, leaving aside states that had merged or unified. Second, more than 15,000 ethnic groups and 7,000 languages can be identified and recorded worldwide, although half of the world's population can be identified with the 10 most widely spoken languages.¹⁰ Third, globalization, while it produces supra-state integration, strengthens the migratory mobility of populations and the ethnic complexity of states. Fourth, many states feel obliged to decentralize or to adjust their way of exerting or organizing sovereignty, responding to ethnoterritorial or other types of demands.

Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, beginning with the bidirectional relationship or identification of "state = nation = language" as the heart of the question, reaches several important conclusions.¹¹ First, he argues, ethnic dispersion through political structures is apparent; second, the majority of states are characterized by ethnic plurality; and third, the romantic ideal of the nation-state as having a monoethnic character is an exception (no more than 5% of all ethnicities have achieved such an ideal). For that reason, it appears that languages, nations, and states can adjust easily, notwithstanding the romantic ideal of nationalism.¹² According to Manuel Castells, "the real question is how you build a form of social and cultural organization that calls itself a nation . . . any objective observation shows that, in the modern age, there are nations, there are states and different forms of relating among one another: nations with a state, nation-states, multinational states, and imperial nation-states that integrate various nations by force."¹³ Emilio Lamo de Espinosa himself, questioning the state-nation model, concludes that "if the state-nation model is not useful for us, then the nation-state model is even less useful for us," referring to the national secularization of the current state itself that rejects the cultural homogenization of its people, who have a plurality of sentiments and loyalties.¹⁴

SPAIN: A COMPLEX STATE AND A PLURAL NATION

Many of these dilemmas of identity are illustrated strikingly in the Spanish case. The Spanish political system that emerged from the Constitution of 1978 and the consociational politics of the democratic transition played a key part

in one of the major innovations in the political processes of the advanced democracies.¹⁵ It was described by Juan P. Fusi as “the greatest change that we have made here since 1700.”¹⁶ The intense and quick decentralization that the structures of the state underwent, right in the middle of a democratic consolidation, and its unusual form of territorial organization, have defined what we might call “Spanish exceptionalism.”¹⁷ This exceptionalism also articulates itself in the role that the territorial and identity dimensions play. There is no other advanced democracy in which between five and nine regional parties almost always obtain representation in the national parliament, and in which these parties, with no more than a total of 11% of the votes, are the key players in the national government. In addition, in 14 of the 17 regional parliaments, these parties typically obtain a level of representation that is more or less constant; they have been or currently are key players in regional governments, leading coalition governments (in five regions), forming part of them (in another five), lending external parliamentary support (in two), and maintaining a steady parliamentary presence (in another two).

The complexity and uniqueness of the Spanish political process are determined by the country’s swift and profound path towards territorial and regional decentralization, leading to the so-called *Estado de las Autonomías* (State of the Autonomies).¹⁸ This refers to a process by which four Spanish regions (“autonomous communities”) were initially (1979–81) granted autonomy (the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Andalusia). Autonomy was later (1983) extended on a symmetrical basis to the remaining 13 regions.¹⁹

In fact, this unique Spanish process of decentralization, since it began with the Basque elections of 1980, has brought about a second-level platform of competition of increasing importance. In reality, this platform has been diversifying along with the very dynamic of the electoral processes in the 17 Spanish autonomous communities, with their different subsystems of parties and their own guidelines regarding government—a process covered only superficially in the academic literature.²⁰ In the rest of this section we consider three aspects of this process: the implications of identity for the new territorial structures, the character of Spanish regional identity as revealed by survey data, and public opinion on Spain’s territorial restructuring.

Nationalism and Political Change

The data bank at the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), Spain’s most important public opinion research center, has accumulated a substantial number of sample and national quantitative studies since the beginning of the democratic transition. The earlier studies focused on the territorial, identity, and linguistic questions facing the Spanish.²¹ These were followed by studies of the structure of the Spanish autonomous communities.²² In addition, there are more than one hundred specific studies pertaining to each of the different autonomous communities, whether having to do with their

electoral processes, statutes, or individual or shared problems, particularly in the 1980s. More recently, opinion polls and studies of the political culture in each region have been carried out as a result of various academic initiatives, not to mention the official surveys conducted by some of the Spanish regional governments.²³

The Spanish constitution, as we have seen, is based on the integration of diverse nationalities and regions organized into autonomous communities.²⁴ To be precise, it reaffirms the coexistence of various national events within the same state framework, facilitating an array of shared loyalties and dual or plural identities. The citizenship of the political nation expresses and establishes its diversity in the plurality of cultural nationalities, which are, in turn, unavoidably plural in their loyalties and sentiments. Some of them are defined individually and by an exclusive nationalism of one type or another. The significance of this complexity was summed up on the bicentenary of the popular insurrection against the Napoleonic invasion on 2 May 1808 (the so-called “Independence War”) by Arturo Pérez-Reverte, who tells us that it is “key in order to understand the certainty of this nation, questionable perhaps in its modern arrangement, but unquestionable in its collective substance, in its culture and in its historic dimension.”²⁵ In fact, it is possible that a distinctive Spanish nationalist project has failed in its attempt to create a culturally homogeneous nation; the vigor of peripheral forms of nationalism illustrates this failure to homogenize the respective communities.²⁶

Today, the political nation exhibits itself in the plurality of cultural and linguistic identities, with feelings of belonging and loyalties that are also plural. The reforms of the statutes (the basic laws that define structures of government in the autonomous communities) that are underway illustrate this plural reality, as may be seen in the first new reformed statutes of six of these:

- The statute of Catalonia speaks of a definition of a “majority of Catalonia as a nation . . . and that the European Union recognizes the national reality of Catalonia as a nationality” without any mention of the Spanish nation;
- The statute of the Valencian Community speaks of its “identity as differing from the historic nationality,” but in reference to the “unity of the Spanish nation”;
- The statute of Andalusia refers to the description of Andalusia as a “national reality” in the Andalusian Manifesto of 1919, but in reference to the constitutional recognition of Andalusia “as a nationality within the framework of the inseparable unity of the Spanish nation”;
- The statute of the Balearic Islands speaks of “historic nationality” as a form of expressing the collective will of the islands and in the framework of the constitution;
- The statute of Aragón also speaks of “historic nationality” in reference to the constitution; and

- The statute of Castilla and León defines the national reality as “a historic and cultural community . . . that has contributed decisively to the shaping of Spain as a nation.”

These six examples reflect the process of identity and organizational self-affirmation that emerged as a result of the constitutional decentralization following nearly three decades of institutionalization.

Nation, Region, and Public Opinion

For the purposes of this analysis, we conducted a recent survey about these matters, in which we asked a Spanish sample their opinions about the autonomous communities defining themselves as a “nation” within the framework of the reform of their statutes. The results showed that almost two-thirds of the Spanish population over the age of 18 (64%) are against the idea, a little more than one out of four view it positively (29%), 5% of those surveyed were indifferent, and 2% did not offer an opinion.²⁷ An earlier series of similar questions dating back to 1990, asking citizens whether they prefer the label “national” or “regional” for their respective autonomous communities, revealed that almost eight out of every ten Spanish people (77%) preferred the term “region,” whereas a little more than one out of every ten (13%) chose the term “nation.”²⁸ Significantly, the Basques leaned towards the first term (44%) rather than the second (38%), while the Catalans were almost equally divided between the two (40% and 45%, respectively). This suggests a certain lack of internal homogeneity in each of these communities; and opinion is also volatile, if we take a look at the way this indicator has evolved over the period of time since we have been conducting such surveys.

In probing the matter further, in 2005 the CIS asked citizens about their feelings of pride in being Spanish, as well as Andalusian, Galician, Extremaduran, and so on. The results show 85% saying that they were very proud or quite proud to be both Spanish and regional in their identity (that is, also Basque, Catalan, Galician, Andalusian, Asturian, or other); a mere 13% said that they were not proud to be Spanish.

We also asked the Spanish sample to describe their idea of Spain.²⁹ The results are reported in Figure 1. This shows that for almost two out of three Spanish people (63%), the preferred option is “my nation or my country”; the idea of citizenship (“the state of which I am a citizen”) is supported by 16%; the notion of the multinational state by another 18%; and just 2% stated that they identified with “another state” or felt a sense of national alienation. Only in the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country is there a different distribution.³⁰ The Basques and the Catalans lean towards the multinational state idea (42% and 45%, respectively), followed by the idea of a Spanish




FIGURE 1 Spain: Perceptions of the Idea of Spain, 2007.

Note. The question asked “What does Spain mean to you?” “Nation” refers to “My country, my nation”; “State (citizen)” to “The country which I belong to as a citizen. *Source:* Eusko-barometro SEJ 2006-15076. Survey on Political Culture and Representation in Spain, 2007. Data from Andalucía, Galicia, and País Vasco come to their respective regional observatories from November 2006, Cataluña from 2005 (OPA 5, 2006).

nation (24% and 35%), that of citizenship (18% and 14%), and, to a lesser extent, they identify with a sense of national alienation (13% and 3%).

Finally, in our survey, we repeated a question that we have been asking for a long time, especially in the Basque Country; we specifically asked whether respondents feel or do not feel that they are “Spanish nationalists” and whether they feel or do not feel that they are Basque, Catalan, Galician, Asturian nationalists, and so on, as a way of exploring contradictory national sentiments.³¹ The results were extremely surprising: more than two-thirds of the Spanish sample stated that they do not feel like Spanish nationalists (68%), nor nationalists of any other place (69%), compared with almost one-third who state that they feel that they are Spanish nationalists (29%) or nationalists of their respective regional groups (30%). In the Basque case, the percentage of those who feel that they are nationalists versus those who feel that they are non-nationalists is practically the same, with a small slant towards being non-nationalist (51%). In the Basque case, furthermore, we asked about level of agreement with an emphatic declaration by a nationalist leader in 2002 (“The Basques are not Spanish, and we do not believe in the Spanish nation”), revealing a majority who disagree with the statement

(50%, or 78% among non-nationalists), versus a minority (28% or 59% among nationalists) who subscribe to that idea.

This handful of sample indicators shows that there is not only a national plurality in Spain but also a plurality of its most vital nationalistic components. At the same time, there is a strong regionalist tension in respect of what defines the Spanish nation, and a slight nationalist tint within the Spanish nation. Finally, Spanish national consciousness shows itself as being more inclusive of local sentiments and identities than the more exclusive pattern of certain peripheral nationalist movements, self-defined against the Spanish nation. Without a doubt, the leaders of the nineteenth-century liberal state, while they failed to modernize and democratize the country, were also misguided in their strategy of homogenizing and centralizing it; and this was especially true of their successors' attempt to impose a nationalistic and unified vision of the Francoist dictatorship after the civil war. There is very little doubt about the counterproductive effect of such strategies, and especially that of the dictatorship, but it is also clear that a national consciousness exists, even though it is without nationalists.³² These failures and political errors, which led to the so-called "two Spains" that clashed in the civil war (1936–39), offered a reactive opportunity to the regional cultures to reaffirm their differing consciousness, and, in some cases, the consolidation of forms of nationalism that have been nurtured exclusively of one another, especially feeding on an anti-Spanish victimization that is initially linked to an agonizing view of having lost the regional languages.³³

A good indicator of the dual reality of Spanish and regional identities is to be seen in Figure 2. This reports responses to a question widely used by the CIS and showing great consistency over time, one we usually call subjective national identity.³⁴ The dual identity of those who associate themselves with feeling just as Spanish as they do about the region they are from clearly prevails (56%), to which must also be added those who share a feeling of being Spanish with a national accent (9%) or a regional accent (12%), thus bringing the compatibility of identities up to more than three-fourths of the Spanish people. Compared with those figures, only 16% say they feel Spanish only, and another 4% say that they identify with their respective autonomous community only, with a significant increase in the first group over the years 2005–07. If we look at how Basques and Catalans responded to the same question, we find that the compatibility of identities is somewhat reduced in both cases but still continues to have majority support (76% in Catalonia and 61% in the Basque Country), with a very clear regional accent in both cases (23% and 22%, respectively). In the case of Catalonia, the percentage of those who are opposed to the Spanish (8%) and the Catalan identities (14%) are almost symmetrical, whereas in the Basque Country there is a clearly exclusive nationalistic slant (24%) and an extremely small percentage of those who identify with Spanish nationalism (6%).




FIGURE 2 Spain: Patterns of Dual Identification, 2007.

Note. See text for question wording. “*” refers to a regional identity, for example, Catalan, Basque. *Source:* Euskobarometro SEJ 2006-15076; Survey on Political Culture and Representation in Spain, 2007; evolution from CIS study 2610 (Dec. 2005); data from Cataluña and País Vasco come to their respective regional observatories from October and November 2006 (OPA 6, 2007).

Without a doubt, the case that is the most far-removed from the common pattern is the Basque one. Precisely for that reason, and in view of the intensity of nationalist motivated violence, we have tried to delve into its primordial or voluntaristic elements, according to the definition already mentioned by Juan J. Linz.³⁵ In Table 1, we show the relationship between subjective national identity and a sense of being nationalist in the Basque Country. As may be observed, there is a clear pro-Basque bias in the adult Basque population and in the core of the more radical nationalists (interpreted as nationalists who identify with being Basque only). “Basque only”

TABLE 1 Basque Country: Nationalist Feeling and Identity, 2006

Identity	Spanish only	More Spanish than Basque	As Basque as Spanish	More Basque than Spanish	Basque only	No answer	N
Basque nationalists	—	—	6	36	57	1	514
Basque non-nationalists	11	7	57	14	6	4	604
No answer	—	—	29	35	19	17	82
N	70	53	400	300	344	33	1,200

Note. Percentages total 100 horizontally.

Source: Euskobarómetro 2006/2.

Basque nationalists represent a little less than one-quarter of the sample; though they make up the vast majority of the electorate supporting militant nationalism, and less than half of the electorate of the moderate Basque nationalist parties. This is the hard core of the ethnic community of Basque nationalism and uses the identity clash as an element of cohesion. This is not replicated at the other end of the spectrum, where the pro-Spanish group lacks a similarly cohesive force.

The Basque case also stands out due to the confusion of perceptions of identity, probably caused by the impact of terrorist violence in the construction of the so-called “Basque problem.” In an effort to delve into the roots and characteristics of these attitudes, we asked the adult Basque population what they understand as “being Basque,” obtaining a series of results that are reported in Table 2. This shows a certain movement away from the “ethnic” conception of Basque identity (with declining minorities endorsing the importance of speaking Euskera or being of Basque descent), in favor of a more “civic” concept, with the subjective criterion of sharing “the will to be a Basque” enjoying consistently strong support, and a striking increase in 2005 in the proportion viewing living and working in the Basque Country as important. When we ask respondents to choose the most important of these criteria, half of the Basques support the last of these (residence; this breaks down into six out of every ten non-nationalists and one-third of nationalists).

Spanish history records the emergence of a plural nation, culturally rich, socially and politically complex, and difficult but viable. It has graduated into becoming one of the oldest European state-nations despite its repeated

TABLE 2 Basque Country: Conditions for Becoming Basque, 1979–2005

Condition	1979*	1989		1996		1999		2002		2005	
	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
1. Living and working in the Basque Country	69	54	31	46	50	55	36	63	35	85	14
2. Speaking Euskera	30	30	53	34	61	31	60	24	74	20	76
3. Descending from a Basque lineage	61	36	49	30	65	40	51	23	70	28	68
4. To be born in the Basque Country	62	41	44	49	45	53	39	52	46	57	40
5. Defending the Basque nation	—	57	23	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6. The will to be a Basque	—	79	8	86	8	82	8	85	11	73	23
7. Having nationalist feelings	—	—	—	42	49	36	52	32	65	23	71

*Only positive percentages are included for 1979.

Sources: For 1979, Linz, 1986: 31 et seq; for 1989, CIS, Study no. 1795; and for 1996–2005, Euskobarómetro.

failure to modernize and its delayed and dramatic democratization.³⁶ An essential trait of the new political culture is the dual identity of Spanish territories and the model of a plural nation. It is true that in the Spanish regions there are nationalist parties, and voters who place their confidence in them, and even governments that are predominantly nationalist, but there is no pattern of regional identity that extends to a predominantly nationalist sentiment of exclusion. This does not even occur in the most problematic and conflict-ridden part of the country, the Basque Country. We may conclude that after 30 years of implementing and developing a decentralized democratic system, Spain has clearly moved on to a new political and constitutional culture, with only the Basque case remaining atypical.

The Territorial Reshuffling of Identity

How has this plural nation been constructed? To what degree is it successful? We find the answers in the views of citizens themselves. These allow us to really see the reshuffling of this plural nation from each of the different corners of its heterogeneous territory, and the progressive materialization of a new political culture. The citizens of many autonomous communities may find their territorial identity in the very evolution of the “state of the autonomies,” as the Spanish state is sometimes described. In other cases, they find their identity by contrast or competition, and some citizens feel that their expectations have been frustrated because their leaders fail to resolve the grievances they have expressed.

In the autonomous communities in which political leaders have maintained an institutional stability or have consolidated a stable political leadership (for example, in Extremadura or Castilla-La Mancha), despite their inferior level of development and the traditional weakness of their identity, they have managed to generate a level of satisfaction with the current system that exceeds that of other communities that might surpass them in the other respects mentioned (for example, Asturias, Aragón, Cantabria, and Murcia). Almost three-fourths of the Spanish population expresses a satisfaction with the “state of the autonomies.” This figure is on the rise especially in Catalonia (77%) and in the Basque Country (74%), leaving the remainder of those who feel dissatisfied for various reasons as a minority that does not exceed 20%.³⁷ However, most importantly, according to the CIS, none of the communities express a dissatisfaction level that exceeds the maximum of 11% recorded in Catalonia.³⁸ Notwithstanding tensions emerging as a result of the new reforms of the statutes of the autonomous communities, the Spanish people appear to be mostly optimistic (53%) when evaluating how well the organization of the state functions right now, and only a small minority is pessimistic (8%).³⁹

How do citizens rate the decentralizing dynamic? The vast majority (73%), a proportion on the rise in almost all of the autonomous communities, believe that the autonomous communities have contributed to bringing the administration of public affairs closer to the actual citizens. On the matter of delivery of material benefits, views are more divided: 48% agree and 45% disagree with the view that the autonomous communities have contributed to an increase in spending without improving public services. There are also many doubts about whether the new territorial model has actually served to improve coexistence between the provinces, despite the fact that there are more who believe that they have helped than who say that they have not been helpful (48% versus 44%). This may be due in part to the fact that close to a majority (47%) thinks that the model has contributed to the growth of separatist groups. On the other hand, this may arise from an evaluation of the dynamic differences in regional development and wealth. A third factor that may have an influence on this popular perception of such a centrifugal dynamic may be related to comparative grievances at the perceived preferential treatment of the various autonomous communities by the central government.

In fact, after an evolution that has not been at all positive in the last few years, more than two-thirds (69%) of Spanish respondents continue to think that the central government does not treat the communities equally, but that it gives preferential treatment to some over others.⁴⁰ This may be attributed to the political leanings of the respective governments or to the ability of local leaders to put pressure on citizens, especially if they are nationalists who play a role in governing the state.⁴¹ In identifying regions that are perceived beneficiaries of such unequal treatment, the finger points at Catalonia (so regarded by 69% in 1992 and by 87% in 1996) and the Basque Country (38% and 57%, respectively), but with Madrid (27% and 18%) and Andalusia (48% and 12%) also appearing.

As may be observed in Figure 3, the current territorial model (represented by the top line, showing support for the current system of autonomy) has been gaining strength and legitimizing itself over the years (from 31% in 1984 to 57% in 2007), especially due to a weakening of the skepticism and resistance of the more centralist and homogenizing provincial models (from 29% to 12% during these same years). Nevertheless, it has not succeeded in winning over those who continue to be in favor of a greater degree of decentralization in the federal core (between 20% and 22%, almost consistently and with little fluctuation) and, to an even lesser extent, the supporters of regional independence, who continue to fight for the right of secession (represented by the bottom “confederal” line, always less than 10%). Even in Catalonia (73%) and in the Basque Country (63%), the integrationist options (either autonomous or federal) are predominant, with more of a slant towards autonomy-supporting groups in the case of the former than in the Basque Country. However, the Basque Country stands out due to the greater




FIGURE 3 Spain: Type of State Preferred, 1984–2007.

Note. The respective positions refer to (1) a state with one central government and no autonomous governments; (2) a state with regions and nationalities as at present; (3) a state with regions and nationalities with more autonomy than at present; and (4) a state acknowledging the right of nationalities to independent statehood. *Source:* CIS and Euskobarómetro SEJ 2006-15076. *Encuesta de Cultura y Representación Política en España, 2007.*

influence of secessionism (around 30%). Thus, the constitutional model of self-government, whether in its static version or favoring evolution towards a higher level of self-government, obtains overwhelming and growing support from all corners of the country. Neither those with centralist aspirations nor those (like the Basques and Catalans) with proindependence tendencies have much capacity to challenge the model.⁴²

This complex process of decentralization has been carried out asymmetrically and at a different pace from one autonomous community to another, and this has inevitably been the cause of political tensions, comparative grievances, financial dysfunctions or deficiencies in public services, and, especially, problems in achieving cooperation and social and regional cohesion.⁴³ The Spanish system of decentralization still needs to learn how to forge interregional cooperation and cohesion. If we exclude the Basque case and the tensions of the new autonomous public financial system (the so called *Concierto económico*), it is true that the initial tendency towards conflict has been reduced. In addition, the statutes of autonomy of the 13 autonomous communities of the common system were reformed by expanding their levels of self-government without increasing tensions (except in the case of Aragón), and by agreement between the dominant political forces, in cooperation with the independent plans of Ibarretxe, the president of the

Basque government (1998–2008). However, the recent reform of the statute of Catalonia has also intensified tensions.⁴⁴ In any case, the mechanisms of multilateral cooperation have yet to be institutionalized, and that is necessary for the system to progress efficiently and in a balanced manner. To be specific, as of today, two-thirds of the Spanish people (67%) advocate that the state reassign the authorities of the autonomous communities, and 60% believe that the central government should give top priority to the multilateral agreements with all of the autonomous communities (versus 35% of the population that advocates a bilateral model).⁴⁵

THE POLITICIZATION OF REGIONAL IDENTITIES AND DEMANDS

For more than two decades, Western political science literature has focused increasingly on territorial, nationalist, and regionalist parties.⁴⁶ Despite their asymmetrical foundation, trajectory, political impact, and ideological configuration, these are a reality in many Western democracies. Italy, France, Belgium, Canada, and the United Kingdom, among others, share this partisan mixture with Spain. These territorial parties have been changing the almost exclusively pro-state image of European party systems and are no longer viewed as something exceptional or as simple vestiges of the past.⁴⁷ The very decentralization in the regional core of states, and most especially the complex dynamics of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, have introduced a new cleavage in the definition of political identities and aggregation of interests, challenging the older, omnipresent ideological dimension with its classical and functional roots.⁴⁸

The Spanish party system, which was moderately pluralist at the beginning of the democratic transition, has been gradually moving towards an imperfect bipartisan model in the national arena, tempered only by the territorial axis.⁴⁹ This may be seen in Table 3, which shows its evolution since 1977. Only the Popular Party (PP, with its *de facto* predecessor, the Union of the Democratic Centre, UCD) on the right and the Socialist Party (PSOE) on the left have a strong presence throughout the country, and only they are in a position to alternate with each other in the national government, as well as in the majority of the autonomous communities. They form the core of the government in the other communities. Election after election, these two major parties have gradually extended their vote share. Only the former communists of the United Left (IU) fall outside this bipartisan model, with a minimal presence at the national level and a lack of representation in many of the provinces, but a limited political influence in the government of some of the autonomous communities or larger city councils. In addition to this national partisan model, a small number of voters, an average of approximately 10%, support territorial, nationalist or regionalist parties—some

TABLE 3 Spain: Votes and Seats in National Elections, 1977–2008

Year	PSOE/PSP	AP/PP	UCD/CDS	PCE/IU	Nationalists	Others	Turnout
1977	33.8 (124)	8.2 (16)	34.4 (166)	9.3 (19)	7.0 (24)	6.9 (1)	78.8
1979	30.4 (121)	6.1 (10)	34.8 (168)	10.8 (23)	9.1 (27)	8.5 (1)	68.0
1982	48.1 (202)	26.4 (107)	9.7 (13)	4.0 (4)	8.4 (24)	3.1 (0)	80.0
1986	44.1 (184)	26.0 (105)	9.2 (19)	4.6 (7)	10.5 (35)	4.9 (0)	70.5
1989	39.6 (175)	25.8 (107)	7.9 (14)	9.1 (17)	11.5 (37)	5.4 (0)	69.7
1993	38.8 (159)	34.8 (141)	1.8 (0)	9.6 (18)	11.2 (32)	3.0 (0)	76.4
1996	37.6 (141)	38.8 (156)	—	10.5 (21)	10.5 (32)	1.7 (0)	77.4
2000	34.2 (125)	44.5 (183)	—	5.4 (9)	10.6 (33)	3.5 (0)	68.7
2004	42.6 (164)	37.7 (148)	—	5.1 (5)	10.1 (33)	2.1 (0)	75.7
2008	43.6 (169)	40.1 (154)	—	3.8 (2)	7.7 (24)	3.4 (1)	75.3

Note. For each year, the first row indicates percentage of total votes cast (for turnout, votes as a percentage of electorate); the figures in parentheses refer to numbers of seats; the total number of seats was 350 in each year. “Nationalists” include Catalans (CiU, ERC), Basques (PNV, HB, EE, EA, NaBai), Galicians (BNG, CG), Aragonese (PAR, CHA), Canarians (UPC, AIC/CC), Andalusians (PA), and Valencians (UV); “Others” include CIC, UN, and UPD; see appendix for explanation of party abbreviations.

Source: Calculations by the author from data of the Ministry of Interior.

of which become key players in the central government of Spain when the winning party does not obtain an absolute majority.

As regards its party system, then, Spain is exceptional, though this phenomenon has attracted relatively little academic attention.⁵⁰ We make a distinction here between *nationalist* and *regionalist* parties, though it is not always accepted by the partisan actors themselves; we may use the broader label *territorial parties* to refer to the heterogeneous reality of almost 50 parties of this type. These compete or have a public presence that is more or less relevant in 14 of the 17 autonomous communities (the exceptions are Murcia, Madrid, and Castilla-La Mancha). In this they are assisted by the greater accessibility of the electoral systems at the regional level to local political forces.⁵¹ They collaborate with the major national parties while playing a hinge role linking government and society.

We may summarize the political influence and the parliamentary presence of these parties as follows. First, there are two autonomous communities where nationalist or regionalist parties together have a majority in the regional assembly. Catalan nationalism is led by *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC), to which we might add, although it plays a much less relevant role, *Estat Català*, the latter

also having a presence in the Valencian Community and in the Balearic Islands. In the Basque Country, the pro-statute or Alava regionalist party, Aleves Unity (UA), is added to the four surviving nationalist parties, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), *Eusko Alkartasuna (EA)*, Aralar, and the illegal Batasuna party.⁵² Second, there are other autonomous communities where regionalist or nationalist parties are significant. This will be clear from the appendix, which lists such parties, though it should be acknowledged that their presence is slight in certain communities, and some of the parties listed here are very small indeed. Third, there are three autonomous communities where parties of this kind are entirely absent. This pattern will also be clear from Table 4, which shows the balance between national-level parties and their regional and nationalist competitors in the regional assemblies and governments.

TABLE 4 Spain: Structure of Party Systems in Parliaments and Governments of Autonomous Communities, 2006–09

Autonomous Community	Composition of Assembly				Total	Composition of government
	PP	PSOE	IU	Nationalist/Regionalist parties		
Andalucía, 2008	47	56	6	0	109	PSOE
Aragón	23	30	1	13 (PAR-9, CHA-4)	67	PSOE-PAR
Asturias	20	21	4	0	45	PSOE-IU/BA
Baleares	28	20	0	11 (PSM-EN-5, UM-3, ExC-2, AIPF-1)	59	PSOE-UM-Bloc
Canarias	15	26	0	19 (CC-17, AHI-2)	60	CC-PP
Cantabria	17	10	0	12 (PRC-12)	39	PRC-PSOE
Castilla y León	48	33	0	2 (UPL-2)	83	PP
Castilla-La Mancha	21	26	0	0	47	PSOE
Cataluña, 2007	14	37	0	84 (CiU-48, ERC-21, ICV-12, Ciut.-3)	135	PSC-ERC-ICV
C. Valenciana	54	38	5	2 (Bloc-2)	99	PP
Extremadura	27	38	0	0	65	PSOE
Galicia, 2009	38	25	0	12 (BNG-12)	75	PP
Madrid	67	42	11	0	120	PP
Murcia	29	15	1	0	45	PP
Navarra	0	12	2	36 (UPN-22, NaBai-12, CDN-2)	50	UPN-CDN
País Vasco, 2009	13	25	1	36 (PNV-30, Aralar-4, EA-1, UPD-1)	75	PSE/EE
La Rioja	17	14	0	2 (PR-2)	33	PP

Note. The most recent elections for the “common statute” autonomous communities took place in 2007, with the four “special” communities following a separate cycle: Cataluña (2006), Andalucía (2008), and Galicia and País Vasco (2009). IU was in coalition with the regional group of the “Bloque por Asturias” (Asturias), with the PSM (Baleares), and with ICV (Cataluña). In Navarra, UPN has replaced PP in autonomous elections since 1991. The new national party (UPD) has one seat in the Basque Parliament. *Source:* Calculations by the author from data of the regional parliaments.

These regionalist and nationalist parties have also used elections to the European Parliament as mechanisms for organizing themselves into broader groups, thus maximizing their electoral interests. A number of such coalitions were obvious in the 2009 European election: the Coalition for Europe, formed mainly by three important center-right parties from Catalonia, the Basque Country, and the Canaries (CiU, PNV, and CC; see appendix for a list of abbreviations); a coalition of two small centrist parties of the Balearic Islands (UM and UMe) with two leftist parties, the Andalusian PA and the Valencian Bloc; and a progressive, republican tendency, the European Peoples (EdP), formed by the Basque EA and Aralar, the Catalan ERC, the Galician BNG, and the CHA from Aragón, as well as two small parties, ExM from the Balearic Islands and PB (Party of El Bierzo) from a region inside Castilla. Other nationalist and regionalist parties participated on their own, with the banned Basque party Batasuna supporting the “Internationalist Initiative” list.

GOVERNING COMPLEXITY AND INTEGRATING DIVERSITY

Paradoxically, the exchange of national and territorial support among the large national parties and the more important nationalist and regionalist parties described above has served to lend stability to the government of Spain, but at the expense of a lack of stability at the level of autonomous governments. It has also produced a dynamic of adversary politics among the large national parties and a disposition on the part of some nationalist parties to take advantage of this. The need to compete and to pursue government office at any price, especially by the regionalist or nationalist parties of the right, has been a stumbling block for the major national parties that seek unity and consensus about the idea of Spain. The question that arises is an obvious one. How is it possible that the two major national parties have not been capable of preserving a consensus where it is most needed—in respect of the territorial dilemma and its parallel terrorist violence?

It is true that efforts have been made to harmonize the system of autonomy in the communities where it was instituted at an early stage, and, more recently, there have been similar reforms in the statutes of the communities of a common regime. But during a period of over two decades there has been more discord than agreement between the PSOE and the PP.⁵³ This assists the negotiating position of the regionalist and nationalist parties, giving them an incentive to maximize territorial conflicts to bolster their own role. It also causes public unease: in 2007, 81% of Spaniards thought that the fact that PSOE and PP maintained confrontational positions on almost everything was negative for democracy. This idea was shared between socialist voters (84%) and conservative voters (77%). Moreover, this confrontation

between the two main parties' political elites affects the daily lives of citizens. In this same survey, 58% of Spaniards took the view that the current divisions between political parties generate more tensions and arguments in their social environment, as acknowledged by two out of three PSOE and PP supporters.⁵⁴

Yet, some degree of consensus between the large national parties is increasingly necessary, as the nationalist parties favor participation in coalition governments at the level of the central state. Catalan and Basque nationalism are clear cases: they are prepared to support incumbent governments, thus playing the role of territorial hinges in the national party system. However, the large national parties have not been able to develop a culture of coalition with the nationalists, which would mean allowing them to have more involvement, not only in the central government but in the national reconstruction of Spain. This arises from an absence of strategic consensus on matters of national or state policy, and a failure to overcome the adversary politics that has been imposed as a behavioral model for Spain's national partisan leaders. In 2007, 63% of the Spanish people indicated that they would prefer a coalition government to another minority government (29%), if, after the next national elections, neither of the two major parties should obtain an absolute majority.

Those who designed the democratic transition and their successors who planned its consolidation were agreed on the guidelines for democratic representation.⁵⁵ Their objective was to procure a mechanism for obtaining a system of party government that would be stable and efficient, avoiding partisan fragmentation while ensuring sufficient representation of minority demands. They did so knowing about the interwoven ideological and territorial tensions that could threaten the future of the democratic system with a weak partisan structure and a fragile democratic political culture following decades of the dictatorship. The result has been a country with a high level of government stability, unique in the continental European Union in combining proportional representation with stable majority or even minority government. This has been possible both because of Spain's particular form of proportional representation (with low district magnitude favoring large parties) and elite priorities (the willingness of political leaders to form a coalition or to tolerate minority governments).

After a process of political and administrative decentralization carried out in record time, as we have seen, there are now 17 regional parliaments in Spain, with their respective governments, autonomous administrations, superior courts, and networks of institutional organizations and public businesses that require a regional political leadership of more than 3,000 authorities for a country of 40 million inhabitants.⁵⁶ To this we may add about 1,100,000 public employees who are dependent on such regional administrations—more or less half of all of the personnel in Spain's public administration system

(completed by about 600,000 in the central administration and another 500,000 in local administration).⁵⁷ Regional and cultural diversity is reflected in the fact that at least eight regional languages are recognized (six of them with the status of coofficial language), along with Spanish, and in seven autonomous communities there is an official bilingualism that applies to almost half of the Spanish population, although the bilingual inhabitants amount to no more than one-fourth of the Spanish people. This new political-administrative reality has led to 17 health care systems, 17 educational systems, 3 autonomous police departments (in the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Navarre), various systems and methods of public communication (radio and television), and autonomous public infrastructures (highways and railways). Policies pertaining to agriculture, fishing, food, and tourism, and to industrial, commercial, urban, environmental, labor, and housing development, as well as territorial organization and social protection, are exclusively dependent on the new regional administrations. They account for about 33% of total public spending for all public administration in Spain (with the central administration accounting for 53% and the local administration for 14%).

Governance in Spain consists of making sure that this complexity operates efficiently, cooperates institutionally, maintains national cohesion and generates an output, both in democratic terms and in services for citizens. It is true that, generally speaking, we do not usually find the same governmental stability at the territorial level as we see in the national arena, although the political gains are unequal. The difference, however, is that the ability to form a coalition is more developed in the autonomous communities in which there is a greater variety of party subsystems (in Table 4, we saw the actual format of the regional party systems; Table 5 shows how these have been translated into governing coalitions).⁵⁸

Thus, we do not encounter the national two-party system in a more or less pure state, but some autonomous communities come close to this model: Castilla, Madrid, Extremadura, Murcia, La Rioja, now the Valencian Community, and, with a little more variation, Andalusia and Asturias. Moderate pluralism is to be found in Catalonia, the Canary Islands, Aragón, the Balearic Islands, and Galicia, though with a strong bipartisan tendency. Finally, extreme pluralism occurs, though in very different forms, in the Basque Country and Navarra.⁵⁹ Local actors tend to play a limited role in territorial parliaments and politics. The cases of Catalan, Canarian, and Basque nationalism are exceptions: their main actors (CiU, CC, and PNV), in addition to being in charge of government responsibilities in their respective communities, have been occupying a hinge role in the national arena, usually sharing reciprocal parliamentary support or coalition governments on a territorial level, and parliamentary agreements in the national arena. Once again, the exception to this dynamic of progressive moderation, stability, and adjustment is the Basque Country with its deeply divisive politics.

TABLE 5 Spain: Coalition Governments in Autonomous Communities, 1983–2009

	Only Left	Mixed	Only Centre-Right
Only Territorial Parties		Cataluña: CIU-ERC (1984–87) País Vasco: PNV-EA-EE (1990–91) País Vasco: PNV-EA (1998–2001)	Canarias: CC-AHI (1993–95) Navarra: UPN-CDN (2003–)
Territorial and state-wide parties	Andalucía: PSOE-PA (1996–2004) Asturias: PSOE-IU-BA (2003–07/2008–) Balears: PSOE-PSM-EN-IU-EV (1999–2003) Cataluña: PSC-ERC-ICV (2003–) Galicia: PSOE-BNG (2005–09)	Aragón: PSOE-PAR (1999–) Balears: PSOE-UM-Bloc* (2007–) Cantabria: PSOE-PP-PRC-CDS (1990–91) Cantabria: PRC-PSOE (2003–) Canarias: PSOE-AIC (1991–93) Galicia: PSOE-CG-PNG (1987–89) País Vasco: PNV-PSE (1987–90) País Vasco: PNV-PSE-EE (1991–94) País Vasco: PNV-PSE/EE-EA (1994–98) País Vasco: PNV-EA-IU (2001–09) La Rioja: PSOE-PR (91–95) Navarra: PSOE-CDN-EA (1995–96)	Aragón: PAR-PP (1989–93) Aragón: PP-PAR (1995–99) Balears: AP/PP-UM (1987–95) C. Valenciana: PP-UV (1995–99) Canarias: CDS-AIC-AP-AHI (1987–91) Canarias: CC-PP (1996–) Cantabria: UPCA-PP (1991–95) Cantabria: PP-PRC (1995–2003) Galicia: PP-CdeG (1989–93)
Only State-wide Parties			Galicia: AP-GPI/UCD (1983–85) Castilla y León: PP-CDS (1990–91)

*Coalition formed by PSM-EN, EU, EV, and ERC.

CONCLUSION

The dynamic of competition and partisan alignment in Spain has a double dimension. On the one hand we have the traditional left-right cleavage, which is the most important one, above all in national elections.⁶⁰ On the other hand, we find the center-periphery dimension, which is secondary at the national level but gains more relevance in regional elections and is even more important than the left-right one in certain communities such as the Basque Country.⁶¹ This dynamic of complex governance has had some influence on party culture; according to our 2007 survey, more than one out of three Spaniards (36%) reject the view that the decisions of the central headquarters of the big national parties prevail over their territorial organizations (while almost half of them, just under 50%, agree with this).⁶² This internalizes the competitive impact and the blackmail potential of the territorial parties, on the one hand, and the relevance of the territorial powers in the distribution of the national political power, on the other.

The current model of territorial organization in Spain has enjoyed some success, but it also has a few deficiencies that require correction or modification. Areas of particular challenge include the following:

- the dynamics of state consensus for matters related to the definition and coordination of national cohesion;
- the institutionalization and effective implementation of multilateral inter-governmental cooperation, as well as interterritorial solidarity;
- the reciprocal constitutional loyalty in the plural definition of the nation and in the application of the principles of equality, distinctiveness, and solidarity that integrate the model of self-government;
- the motivation of shared nationalist responsibility and the ability of the state government to form a coalition;
- the institutional expression of regional participation in shaping the Spanish position in the context of the institutions of the European Union;
- the top-down decentralization, which implies that the local entities and, above all, the cities must play a larger and more central role in creating a network that will offset the centrifugal tensions from the center and periphery; and
- the implementation of a reform mechanism that anticipates the dysfunctional features of the model and implements the necessary corrections, such as the overhaul and reform of the Senate.

We may conclude by returning to our central questions. Cohesion, centripetal dynamics, and competition are the dominant patterns in the political culture and behavior of Spanish political leaders and parties, even taking account of the fact that there are powerful centrifugal tensions, center-periphery conflicts, partisan fragmentation, and patterns of adversary politics, features with the capacity to threaten the stability of the decentralized model in the future. A critical issue is the point at which the impact of separatist dynamics, encouraged by certain leaders of peripheral nationalism, establishes itself within the structure of social pluralism in the political culture, with big implications for territorial cohesion and for the coherence of the national ideological families and their social supports.

After 30 years of the new decentralized democratic system, Spaniards have clearly moved on to a new political and constitutional culture, which, for the most part, whatever the region, allows them to share the plural identity of the Spanish common nation alongside strong local sentiments and identities (with the Basques as the major exception). The process of reconstruction of the Spanish plural nation and governance of the complexity of this renewed old state-nation has achieved positive political results. Yet, nowadays, the ability to govern affects not just the central government but also the territorial governments, defining a national arena that is both complex and plural.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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NOTES

1. For an update of the old problem of identity, see Jonathan Friedman, *Cultural Identity and Global Process* (London: Sage, 1994), and Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (eds.), *Questions of Cultural Identity* (London: Sage, 1996).

2. See Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969).

3. For an updated view of the vast scientific production on the state-building paradigm, see Aidan Hehir and Neil Robinson (eds.), *State Building: Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2007); see also Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

4. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), defines the nation as an “imagined political community,” such that it is idealized as inherently limited, sovereign, and distinct from a specific community based on the daily interaction of its members, because what they really share is the mental image of their identity affinity and of their fellowship. See also Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

5. See Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967), and Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, *Economy, Territory, Identity* (London: Sage, 1983). See also Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Jennifer Todd, N. Rougier, and L. Canas Bottos (eds.), *Political Transformation and National Identity Change: Comparative Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2008); Christian Deschouwer, Michael Keating, and John Loughlin, *Culture, Institutions and Developments: A Study of Eight European Regions* (London: E. Elgar, 2002), among others.

6. See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1983); John Coakley (ed.), *The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements* (London: Sage, 1992); Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflict* (London: Routledge, 1993); Andrés de Blas, *Nacionalismo y naciones en Europa* (Madrid: Alianza, 1994); On comparing the management of such tensions and the role of the partisan leaders, see Kurt Richard Luther and Christian Deschouwer (eds.), *Party Elites in Divided Societies: Political Parties in Consociational Democracies* (London: Routledge, 1999); John Coakley (ed.), *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict*, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

7. The distinction between “fundamentalism” and “nationalism” made by Juan Linz is very appropriate in describing the national sentiments in Spain; see Juan Linz, “From Primordialism to Nationalism,” in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski (eds.), *New Nationalisms of the Developed West* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 203–53.

8. We may recall the definition in Fredrick Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), of ethnic groups as organizational types that are based on associating oneself with a certain category, or being associated with such a category, based on the perception of others, which allows the ethnic groups to define collective identities and to establish limits to interaction.

9. See Gunnar P. Nielsson, “States and Nation-Groups: A Global Taxonomy,” in Tiryakian and Rogowski, *New Nationalisms* (1985), pp. 57–86, who analyzed the distribution of the 575 ethnicities that were recorded in 1985, and more recently Wsevolod W. Isajiw, *Understanding Diversity: Ethnicity and Race in the Canadian Context* (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 1999).

10. Raymond G. Gordon (ed.), *Ethnologue: Languages of the World*, 15th ed. (Dallas, TX: SIL International, 2005); also available at www.ethnologue.com.

11. Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, “¿Importa ser nación? Lenguas, naciones y Estados,” *Revista de Occidente*, No. 301 (2006), pp. 118–39.

12. Elie Kedourie in *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960) identified the three supposed ideals of this type of nationalism as the only source of legitimacy: the natural division of humanity into nations; the simple and empirical identification of the nations; and the right of these nations to have their own state.

13. In "Inventar naciones," *La Vanguardia*, 26 Jan. 2008.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

15. Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 21.

16. Interview published in *El País*, 28 May 2006.

17. This borrows the concept of American exceptionalism coined by S. M. Lipset in *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1996) to highlight the most unique aspects of Spanish democratic dynamics. The historical roots and peculiarities of the "Spanish case" were first discussed in international comparative studies by Juan J. Linz, "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State: The Case of Spain," in S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Building States and Nations: Models, Analyses, and Data across Three Worlds* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 32–112; "Politics in a Multi-Lingual Society with a Dominant World Language: The Case of Spain," in Jean-Guy Savard and Richard Vigneault (eds.), *Les Etats multilingues: Problèmes et solutions* (Quebec, Canada: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1975), pp. 367–444; "La política en sociedades multilingües y multinacionales," in Fundes, *Como articular las autonomías españolas* (Madrid: Fundes, 1980), pp. 83–107; "The Basques in Spain: Nationalism and Political Conflict in a New Democracy," in Phillips Davison and Leon Gordenker (eds.), *Resolving Nationality Conflicts: The Role of Public Opinion Research* (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 11–52; "Peripheries Within the Periphery?" in Per Torsvik (ed.), *Mobilization, Center-Periphery Periphery Structure and Nation Building: A Volume in Commemoration of Stein Rokkan* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1982), pp. 335–89.

18. See Juan J. Linz, "La crisis de un Estado unitario, nacionalismos periféricos y regionalismo," in Ramon Acosta (ed.), *La España de las autonomías (pasado, presente y futuro)* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1981), Vol. II, pp. 651–751; Eduardo García de Enterría, "El futuro de las autonomías territoriales," in E. García de Enterría (ed.), *España: un presente para el futuro* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Económicos, 1984), vol II; *Estudios sobre autonomías territoriales* (Madrid: Civitas, 1985); *La revisión del sistema de autonomías* (Madrid: Civitas, 1988); Andrés de Blas, "Instituciones, procesos de decisión y políticas en el Estado Autonómico: hacia un nuevo modelo de Estado de las Autonomías," *Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales*, No. 4 (1989), pp. 255–67. See also Robert Agranoff and Rafael Bañón (eds.), *Publius*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1997), pp. 99–120.

19. The Spanish Constitution refers in Art. 2 to the Spanish Nation as composed of "nationalities" and "regions," and Title VIII distinguishes two pathways for autonomy: the four historical communities that established this status during the Second Republic (1936–39) with special status, and the remaining regions.

20. Exceptions include Pilar Del Castillo (ed.), *Comportamiento político y electoral* (Madrid: CIS, 1994), and Manuel Alcántara and Antonia Martínez (eds.), *Las elecciones autonómicas en España, 1980–1997* (Madrid: CIS, 1998), which refer to the electoral processes, and Francisco J. Llera, "La opinión pública: la diversidad de una nación plural," in Joan Subirats and Raquel Gallego (eds.), *Veinte años de autonomías en España. Leyes, políticas públicas, instituciones y opinión pública* (Madrid: CIS, 2002), pp. 321–76; "Las arenas autonómicas de 2003," in Juan Montabes (coord.), *Instituciones y procesos políticos. Libro homenaje a José Cazorla Pérez* (Madrid: CIS, 2005), pp. 273–308; "La dimension territorial e identitaria en la competición y la gobernabilidad españolas," in F. Murrillo, J. L. García de la Serrana et al. (eds.), *Transformaciones políticas y sociales en la España democrática* (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanc, 2006), pp. 239–317; and José R. Montero, Francisco J. Llera, and Mariano Torcal, "Sistemas electorales en España: una recapitulación," *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, Vol. 58 (1992), pp. 7–56, which evaluates the electoral systems in the Spanish autonomous communities. See also *Equipo ERA*, In ERA: "15 años de experiencia autonómica. Un balance" in CECS, *Informe España 1996* (Madrid: Fundación Encuentro, 1997), pp. 371–576.

21. See also studies no. 1109 (in 1976, with 6,340 interviews), 1174 (in 1978, with 10,971 interviews), and 1190 (in 1979 with 8,800 interviews). These are analyzed in Salustiano Del Campo, Manuel Navarro, and José F. Tezanos, *La cuestión regional española* (Madrid: Edicusa, 1977); Jiménez Blanco, García Ferrando, López-Aranguren, and Miguel Beltrán, *La conciencia regional en España* (Madrid: CIS, 1977); and Manuel Garcia Ferrando, *Regionalismo y autonomía en España, 1976–1979* (Madrid: CIS, 1982).

22. See also studies no. 2025 to 2041 (in 1992, with 27,357 representative interviews and samples conducted on a provincial level), 2123 (in 1994, with 2,993 interviews), 2228 (in 1996, with 4,932 interviews), and 2286 (in 1998, with 9,991 interviews), referring only to those included in such publications. These are analyzed in Eduardo Lopez-Aranguren, *La conciencia regional en el proceso autonómico español* (Madrid: CIS, 1983); José R. Montero, Francisco J. Llera, and Francesc Pallares, *Autonomías y Comunidades Autónomas: actitudes, opiniones y cultura política* (Madrid: CIS, unpublished report, 1992); Manuel García Ferrando, Eduardo López-Aranguren, and Miguel Beltrán, *La conciencia nacional y regional en la España de las autonomías* (Madrid: CIS, 1994); José L. Sangrador, *Identidades, actitudes y estereotipos en la España de las Autonomías* (Madrid: CIS, 1996); Francisco Moral, *Identidad regional y nacionalismo en el estado de las Autonomías* (Madrid: CIS, 1998).

23. Among the pioneers are those of the Political and Social Sciences Institute (ICPS) of the Autonomous University of Barcelona for Catalonia; the Basque barometer of the Political Science research team of the University of the Basque Country (www.ehu.es/euskobarometro); the surveys of the Institute for Advanced Social Studies (IESA) of Cordoba for Andalusia; the Political Science research team of the Department of Political Science and Sociology at the University of Granada; in Galicia, the barometer of the Political Science research team of the University of Santiago de Compostela; and most recently, the barometer of the region of Murcia, carried out by the Political Science research team of the University of Murcia. The first four have just finished creating the Observatory of Autonomous Politics (OPA), www.opa151.com, which tries to synchronize and offer combined products about the respective regional opinions.

24. "Nación y nacionalidad," *El País*, 2 Dec. 2004; Andrés de Blas defends the sense of belonging and the profound meaning of such a distinction.

25. "Cólera de un pueblo, certeza de una nación," *El País*, 24 Jan. 2008.

26. See José Alvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa. La idea de España en el s. XIX* (Madrid: Taurus, 2001); Clare Mar-Molinero and Angel Smith (eds.), *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula* (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1996); Juan Pablo Fusi, *Identidades proscritas. El no nacionalismo en las sociedades nacionalistas* (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 2006).

27. Carried out by our Basque barometer team of the University of the Basque Country, based on a random sample of 1,035 interviews conducted in Nov. and Dec. 2007 for the project SEJ 2006-15076 (See www.ehu.es/euskobarometro [accessed 1 January 2008]).

28. Study no. 2610, 2005 (See www.cis.es [accessed 1 January 2008]).

29. As the CIS has also been doing for many years in reference to the question: "What does 'Spain' mean to you?"

30. We took the data from our Observatory of Autonomous Politics, referring to the year 2005 (for Catalonia) and 2006 (for Andalusia, Galicia, and the Basque Country); see www.opa151.com [accessed 1 January 2008].

31. For the Basque Country, we usually ask, "Would you say that you identify with being a Basque nationalist, or not?" and the results can be consulted in the survey series of the Basque barometer (www.ehu.es/euskobarometro [accessed 1 January 2008]).

32. As Emilio Lamo de Espinosa ("Importa ser nación?", p. 130) eloquently states, "Spain is one of the countries that has the strongest and most pronounced regional identities in the world, yet a smaller Spanish nationalism."

33. The postwar generation of Basque nationalists comprises the children of a century and a half of civil wars and symbolic violence; this was manifested first in the Carlist Wars (1833-76), leading to a rise in nationalist discourse and the emergence of an ethnonationalist movement headed by Sabino Arana (the founder of the Basque Nationalist Party) a century ago; and second, in the violent resistance of the younger generations beginning in the 1960s in response to the political consequences of the civil war of 1936-39 and Francoist dictatorship. For Basque nationalism, see Stanley Payne, *Basque Nationalism* (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1975); Antonio Elorza, *Ideologías del nacionalismo vasco* (Madrid: Guadarrama, 1978); Javier Corcuera, *Orígenes, ideología y organización del nacionalismo vasco, 1876-1904* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1979); Jon Juaristi, *El linaje de Aitor. La invención de la tradición vasca* (Madrid: Taurus, 1987); Jon Juaristi, *El bucle melancólico. Historias de nacionalistas vascos* (Madrid: Espasa, 1997); Jon Juaristi, *Cambio de destino* (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 2006); Mikel Azurmendi, *La herida patriótica* (Madrid: Taurus, 1998); J. De Pablo, J. L. De la Granja, and L. Mess, *Documentos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1998); Alfonso Perez-Agote, *La reproducción del nacionalismo vasco* (Madrid: CIS, 1984); Alfonso Perez-Agote, *El nacionalismo vasco a la salida del Franquismo* (Madrid: CIS, 1987); Ander Gurutzaga, *El código nacionalista vasco durante el Franquismo* (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1985).

34. The question is: "Of the phrases below, which one best expresses your own feelings? (1) I only feel Spanish; (2) I feel more Spanish than ... ; (3) I feel as Spanish as ... ; (4) I feel more ... than Spanish; (5) I only feel" (where the blanks refer to the corresponding regional group).

35. We are referring to ETA's radical nationalism, terrorism, and its social and political backing. Unfortunately, violence continues to be one of the sad characteristics of the Basque polity. See José M. Garmendia, *Historia de ETA* (San Sebastián, Spain: Haranburu, 1979); Gurutz Jauregui, *Ideología y estrategia política de ETA. Análisis y evolución entre 1959 y 1968* (Madrid: S. XXI, 1981); Joseba Zulaika, *Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament* (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1988); John Sullivan, *ETA and Basque Nationalism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988); Robert P. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952–1980* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); Robert P. Clark, *Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975–1988* (Reno, NV: University Of Nevada Press, 1990); José M. Mata, *El nacionalismo vasco radical. Discurso, organización y expresiones* (Bilbao, Spain: Universidad del País Vasco, 1993); Francisco Llera, José M. Mata, and Cynthia L. Irvin, "ETA: From Secret Army to Social Movement: The Post-Franco Schism of the Basque Nationalist Movement," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1993), pp. 106–34; Goldie Shabad and Francisco Llera, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), *Terrorism in Context* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), pp. 410–69; Florencio Dominguez, *De la negociación a la tregua. ¿El final de ETA?* (Madrid: Taurus, 1998), among others. Juan J. Linz and his team spoke very poignantly about the Basque case during the early stages of the democratic transition; see Juan J. Linz, Manuel Gomez Reino, Francisco A. Orizo, and D. Vila, *Conflicto en Euskadi, Estudio sociológico sobre el cambio político en el País Vasco 1975–1980* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1984), continued by Francisco J. Llera, "Conflicto en Euskadi revisited," in Richard Gunther (ed.), *Politics, Society and Democracy. Vol. I The Spanish Case* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 169–95; and Francisco J. Llera, "Basque Polarization: Between Autonomy and Independence," in William Safran and Ramón Maiz (eds.), *Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies* (Boulder, CO: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 101–20.

36. Linz, "Early State Building" (1973) gave a very correct and early diagnosis of the difficulties and the role of nationalism in the national construction of identity.

37. Study no. SEJ 2006-15076, Dec. 2007; see www.ehu.es/euskobarometro [accessed 1 January 2008].

38. Study no. 2610 of the CIS (2005); see www.cis.es [accessed 1 January 2008].

39. Study no. SEJ 2006-15076, Dec. 2007; see www.ehu.es/euskobarometro [accessed 1 January 2008].

40. Study no. SEJ 2006-15076, Dec. 2007; see www.ehu.es/euskobarometro [accessed 1 January 2008].

41. Study no. 2228 of the CIS (1996); see www.cis.es [accessed 1 January 2008].

42. On the regulatory or contextual question of the succession, based on a comparative perspective, see Bruno Coppieters and Richard Sakwa (eds.), *Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003); Michel Huyseune, *Modernity and Secession: The Social Sciences and the Political Discourse of the Lega Nord in Italy* (Oxford, UK: Berghahn, 2006).

43. On the asymmetry and institutional diversity acquired in the process of constructing the territorial model, see the excellent contributions found in the essays of Eliseo Aja, *El Estado Autonomico. Federalismo y hechos diferenciales* (Madrid: Alianza, 1999).

44. The critical view of this moment is offered by Francisco and Igor Sosa, *El Estado fragmentado: modelo austro-bungaro y brote de naciones en España* (Madrid: Trotta, 2007).

45. Study no. SEJ 2006-15076, Dec. 2007; see www.ehu.es/euskobarometro.

46. See Daniel-Louis Seiler, *Les Parties autonomistes* (Paris: PUF, 1982); Daniel-Louis Seiler, *Sur les parties autonomistes dans la CEE* (Barcelona: ICPS, 1990); Rokkan and Urwin, *Economy, Territory, Identity* (1983); Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Geoffrey Pridham (eds.), *Small Parties in Western Europe* (London: Sage, 1991); Lieven De Winter (ed.), *Non-State Wide Parties in Europe* (Barcelona: ICPS, 1994); Michael Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998); Lieven De Winter and Hüri Türsan (eds.), *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe* (London: Routledge, 1998); Joseph Ruane, Jennifer Todd, and Anne Mandeville (eds.), *Europe's Old State in the New World Order: The Politics of Transition in Britain, France and Spain* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2003).

47. Hans Daalder and Peter Mair (eds.), *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change* (London: Sage, 1983); Rokkan and Urwin, *Economy, Territory, Identity* (1983).
48. Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems* (1967).
49. Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, *Spain after Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986); Llera, "Dimension Territorial" (2006).
50. Exceptions include the pioneering essay written by Isidre Molas, "Los partidos de ámbito no estatal y los sistemas de partidos," in Pedro de Vega (ed.), *Teoría y práctica de los partidos políticos* (Madrid: EDICUSA, 1977), or the more recent studies by Juan Montabes, "Non-State Wide Parties within the Framework of the Spanish Party System," in De Winter, *Non-State Wide Parties*, pp. 117–61; and Francesc Pallarés, José R. Montero, and Francisco Llera, "Non State-Wide Parties in Spain: An Attitudinal Study of Nationalism and Regionalism," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1997), pp. 135–69.
51. Francisco J. Llera, "The Performance of the Autonomous Communities' Electoral Systems: The Predominance of the Imperfect Two-Party System," *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (1999), pp. 93–123.
52. *Batasuna* ("Unity") was one of the different forms (HB, EH, EHAK, ANV) of representation and competition from 1979 of the so-called *patriotic left*; Batasuna, EHAK, and ANV were made illegal by the Spanish Supreme Court because of their support for and dependence on the ETA terrorist organization.
53. José Tornos, *Informe sobre las autonomías* (Madrid: Civitas, 1988).
54. Study no. SEJ 2006-15076, Dec. 2007; see www.ehu.es/euskobarometro [accessed 1 January 2008].
55. Juan Montabes (ed.), *El sistema electoral a debate* (Madrid: CIS, 1998).
56. A good study of the statutes of autonomy, and of their legal system, contents, and chronology can be found in Ignacio Torres, *Los Estatutos de Autonomía* (Madrid: CEPACO, 1999).
57. Registro Central de Personal, *Boletín Estadístico*, Jan. 2009.
58. Jordi Matas (ed.), *Coaliciones políticas y gobernabilidad* (Barcelona: ICPS, 2000).
59. Francisco J. Llera, *The Construction of the Basque Polarised Pluralism* (Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, 1993).
60. Isidre Molas and Oriol Bartomeus, *Estructura de la competencia política en España (1986-2000)* (Barcelona: ICPS, 2001).
61. Llera, "Basque Polarisation", pp. 101–10.
62. Study no. SEJ 2006-15076, Dec. 2007; see www.ehu.es/euskobarometro [accessed 1 January 2008].

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APPENDIX

LIST OF SPANISH POLITICAL PARTIES

National Parties

AP	Alianza Popular/People's Alliance
CD	Coalición Democrática/Democratic Coalition
CDS	Centro Democrático y Social/Democratic and Social Center

IU	Izquierda Unida/United Left
PCE	Partido Comunista de España/Spanish Communist Party
PP	Partido Popular/People's Party
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español/Spanish Workers Socialist Party
UCD	Unión de Centro Democrático/Unity of Democratic Center
UN	Unión Nacional/National Unity
UPyD	Unión, Progreso y Democracia/Unity, Progress and Democracy

Territorial Parties

Andalucía

PA	Partido Andalucista/Andalusist Party
PSA	Partido Socialista de Andalucía/Socialist Party of Andalusia (left)

Aragon

CHA	Chunta Aragonesista/Aragonesist Council (nationalist; left)
PAR	Partido Aragonés Regionalista/Regionalist Aragonese Party (regionalist; right)

Asturias

AA	Andecha Astur/Asturian Coalition (nationalist; left)
BA	Bloque por Asturias/Bloc for Asturias (nationalist; left)
PAS	Partíu Asturianista/Asturianist Party (regionalist; left)
URAS	Unión Renovadora Asturiana/Asturias Renewal Union (regionalist; right)

Baleares

AIPF	Agrupació Independent Popular de Formentera/Popular Independent Association of Formentera (right)
Bloc	Bloc/Nationalist Balearic Left Bloc
EN	Entesa Nacionalista/Nationalist Coalition (left)
EC	Estat Catalá/Catalan State (nationalist; left)
ExC	Eivissa pel Canvi/Ibiza for Change (left)
PSM-EN	Partit Socialista de Maiorca-Entesa Nacionalista/Mallorcan Socialist Party-Nationalist Coalition (left; nationalist)
UM	Unió Mallorquina/Majorcan Unity (regionalist; right)

País Vasco

Aralar	Aralar (nationalist; left)
EA	Eusko Alkartasuna/Basque Solidarity (nationalist; left)

EE	Euskadiko Ezkerra/Basque Left (nationalist; left)
EH	Euskal Herritarrok/We the Basques (nationalist; left)
HB	Herri Batasuna/People's Unity (nationalist; left)
PCTV/EHAK	Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas/Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista/Communist Party of Basque Lands (nationalist; left)
PNV	Partido Nacionalista Vasco/Basque Nationalist Party (nationalist; right)
UA	Unidad Alavesa/Alavese Unity (regionalist; right)

Canarias

AC	Asamblea Canaria/Canarian Assembly (left)
AHI	Agrupación Herreña Independiente/Independent Association of El Hierro (right)
AIC	Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias/Canarian Independent Associations (right; regionalist)
CC	Coalición Canaria/Canarian Coalition (right; regionalist)
CNC	Congreso Nacional de Canarias/National Congress of Canarias (right)
FNC	Federación Nacionalista Canaria/Canarian Nationalist Federation (right)
INC	Izquierda Nacionalista Canaria/Canarian Nationalist Left (left)
PCN	Plataforma Canaria Nacionalista/Nationalist Canarian Platform (right)
PNC	Partido Nacionalista de Canarias/Canarian Nationalist Party (nationalist)
UPC	Unión del Pueblo Canario/Union of Canarian People (left)

Cantabria

CNC	Consejo Nacionalista de Cantabria/Cantabrian Nationalist Council (nationalist)
PRC	Partido Regionalista de Cantabria/Cantabrian Regionalist Party (regionalist; right)
UPCA	Unión para el Progreso de Cantabria/Unity for Cantabria's Progress (right)

Cataluña

CiU	Convergència i Unió/Convergence and Unity (nationalist; right)
ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya/Republican Left of Catalonia (nationalist; left)
ICV	Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds/Initiative for Catalonia—Greens (left)

PSA	Partido Socialista de Andalucía/Socialist Party of Andalusia (left)
EC	Estat Catalá/Catalan State (nationalist; left)

Castilla y Leon

PRPL	Partido Regionalista del País Leonés/Regionalist Party of the Leonese Country (regionalist)
SI	Solución Independiente/Independent Solution (left)
TC-PNC	Tierra Comunera/Commoner Land (nationalist; left)
UPL	Unión del Pueblo Leonés/Leonese People's Unity (regionalist; left)

Extremadura

EU	Extremadura Unida/United Extremadura (regionalist; right)
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Galicia

BNG	Bloque Nacionalista Galego/Galician Nationalist Bloc (left)
CG	Coalición Galega/Galician Coalition (right)
EG	Esquerda Galega/Galician Left (left)
UPG	Nos-Unidade Popular/We—Popular Unity (nationalist, left)
PNG	Partido Nacionalista Galego/Galician Nationalist Party (right)
PSG	Partido Socialista Galego/Galician Socialist Party (left)

Navarra

AEM	Agrupación de Electores de Merindad/Navarrese Association of Electors (left)
Aralar	Aralar (nationalist; left)
CDN	Convergencia de Demócratas de Navarra/Convergence of Navarrese Democrats (regionalist; right)
EA	Eusko Alkartasuna/Basque Solidarity (nationalist; left)
EE	Euskadiko Ezkerra/Basque Left (nationalist; left)
HB	Herri Batasuna/People's Unity (nationalist; left)
IFN	Independientes Forales Navarros/Navarrese Foral Independents (left)
NaBai	Nafarroa Bai/Navarra Si/Navarre Yes (nationalist; left)
PNV	Partido Nacionalista Vasco/Basque Nationalist Party (nationalist; right)
UDF	Unión Demócrata Foral/Navarrese Democratic Unity (right)
UNAI	Unión Navarra de Izquierdas/Left Navarrese Unity (left)
UPN	Unión del Pueblo Navarro/Navarrese People's Unity (regionalist; right)

La Rioja

PR	Partido Riojano/Riojan Party (regionalist; right)
PRP	Partido Riojano Progresista/Progressive Riojan Party (regionalist; right)

Valencia

Bloc	Valencian Nationalist Bloc (nationalist; left)
EC	Estat Catalá/Catalan State (nationalist; left)
UV	Unió Valenciana/Valencian Unity (regionalist; right)