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Evidence from the Hungarian minority in Romania

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The Limited Impact of Supranational Integration on Ethnonationalism

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Summary

We set out to show that supranational integration has only a limited impact on ethnonationalism, a position that clearly contradicts established theories in the literature on power-sharing. Our explanation of why this might be has been straightforward. First, conflict between ethnic groups and divergent opinions on the merits of supranational integration are not the same. Because of this, supranational integration should be considered an additional issue dimension, instead of one that is subsumed into the nationalist issue dimension. Second, supranational integration proves rather irrelevant as a source of ethnonationalism—an observation that is in line with the expectations of structuralist approaches and theories of party system stability. However, this does not exclude the possibility that political elites could adopt a moderate nationalistic position in the short term for strategic reasons. In order to test our propositions we analyze levels of ethnic voting and nationalistic claims by the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) in parliamentary debates. The analysis shows that since supranational integration was an important preference for the Hungarian minority leaders, they were ready to moderate their claims until accession to the EU was guaranteed. Once accession was achieved, however, they returned to their 'real' preferences and readopted a more radical nationalistic agenda. Hence, based on this analysis we expect no important changes in the levels of ethnonationalism in Romania due to further supranational integration in the near future.

Keywords: Ethnonationalism, European Union, Romania, Hungarian minority, DAHR

INTRODUCTION

European integration can be regarded as one of those large-scale historical processes that have fundamentally restructured political life—comparable to historical junctures such as the Reformation, the emergence of the Westphalian nation-state, and the Democratic and Industrial Revolutions (Bartolini, 2005, pp. 24–30). European integration has profoundly changed the nature of authority within Europe by institutionalizing a new type of governance: one that involves multiple, interacting structural levels (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Today, national governments no longer hold a monopoly on decision-making. Instead, competencies are shared by participants at different territorial levels. Because of this, European integration decreases central states' power not only via the transfer of their sovereignty to the EU, but by permitting regional or local actors to bypass the organs of national government (Hooghe & Keating, 2006).

Since native ethnic minorities in Europe tend to be concentrated in some regions within their nation-states, divisions between ethnic minorities and majorities in the European member states cannot be viewed independently of the regionalization process immanent to European integration. Thus, conceptualizing the European Union as a process of supranational integration that goes together with a process of regionalization, the question arises as to whether European integration impacts ethnonationalism and, if so, how. It is, of course, not a new question. But, despite considerable attention to the topic, scholars' opinions on the issue remain divided (Hechter & Okamoto, 2001).[1] As our theoretical work will demonstrate, there are good reasons to believe that supranational integration in general, and European integration in particular, effects ethnonationalism along several vectors. First, supranational integration is assumed to weaken ethnonationalism, since it tends to pacify nationalist preferences, and can even transform them into more a moderate stance. Second, supranational integration is believed to trigger ethnonationalism by strengthening ethnic loyalties and by increasing the resources available to minority leaders. Still, few scholars advance hypotheses suggesting that supranational integration would neither pacify nor transform nationalistic preferences. Indeed, while this

[1] This is also true for the relationships between host and kin states. In the case of the relations between Hungary and Romania, for instance, Waterbury (2008) argues that European accession process even increased the salience of kin-state politics, while according to Galbreath and McEvoy (2010, p. 366) the "overall impact on the bilateral relations was positive".

third position is implicit in some theories of ethnonationalism, it is hardly ever defended. In the case of the European Union, supranational integration is considered a fundamental historic shift, and so this "null hypothesis" requires a theoretical defence. Hence, one aim of this article is to provide an argument for why supranational integration might ultimately have little effect on ethnonationalism.

Since there are good reasons to posit a relationship between supranational integration and ethnonationalism, the question becomes an empirical one. After all, so far the empirical literature has yielded little help in settling the debate, since it comes up with conflicting results (Hechter & Okamoto, 2001). As we argue in this article, this confusion might result from the fact that the existing literature has not distinguished carefully enough between the nature of the preferences at hand and attendant levels of mobilization. By contrast, in our empirical analysis of ethnonationalism among the Hungarian minority in Romania, we will use indicators for both of these dimensions.

The selection of the Hungarian minority as our case to study is motivated by the fact that it constitutes one of the most sizeable ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe. Also, the fact that the large bulk of the Hungarian minority members are represented by the same party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR), and that this party has made it into parliament in every election, since the end of communism, motivates the case selection. The hegemonic position of the DAHR among ethnic Hungarians in Romania facilitate the analysis of ethnonationalism among this group: It allows us to rely on a variety of sources related to this party, including public opinion surveys, election data, and parliamentary speeches by its representatives in order to study the ethnonationalism among the entire ethnic group. Hence, it is on the basis of these sources that we will empirically test our hypotheses for the period between 1989 and 2012.

As we will try to demonstrate, this empirical analysis supports our argument that supranational integration has but a relatively limited effect on the ethnonationalism of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Our results suggest that, in this case, supranational integration does not affect the preferences of the ethnic minority members in the long run. We find a strategic shift during the accession process—an outcome that challenges both prominent power-sharing theories and "new regionalism" perspectives.

This article is structured as follows: In the first section, we discuss three different sets of hypotheses regarding the relationship between supranational integration and ethnonationalism—all of which point in a different critical direction. In the second, we defend our research strategy and discuss the methods and data chosen for the empirical section. In the empirical analysis—the third section of this article—we describe and interpret the variance in our variables over time and address results that contradict our theory. Finally, we conclude by pointing to the strengths and weaknesses of our analysis, and discuss what it might reveal about the future of ethnic relations in Transylvania.

THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF ETHNONATIONALISM

The puzzle on the relationship between supranational integration and ethnonationalism has not yet been empirically solved. This deficit has possibly arisen from an imprecise definition of ethnonationalism in the research literature. In particular, the literature has largely failed to differentiate between two dimensions of ethnonationalism: mobilization and preferences. By contrast, we are convinced that, in order to empirically test competing hypotheses on the relationship between supranational integration and ethnonationalism, mobilization and preferences should be carefully distinguished from each other. By 'political mobilization', we refer to the mass involvement of people in the political sphere (Bartolini, 2000). Ethnic mobilization, more specifically may manifest itself in parliamentary or extraparliamentary politics. In the electoral arena, ethnic mobilization is institutionalized in the form of ethnic parties. What separates ethnic parties from all other parties is, of course, their attachment to one or a few ethnic groups.[2] More specifically, ethnic parties primarily promote the preferences that are specific to 'their' ethnic groups (see also Birnir, 2007, pp. 35–36; Brancati, 2006; Chandra, 2004, 2011, p. 151; Gunther & Diamond, 2003, p. 184; Ishiyama, 2009, p. 64; Reilly, 2006, p. 11; Van Cott, 2005, p. 3; Wimmer, 1997, p. 647).

The preferences that are specific to an ethnic minority can have many different forms: they may have individual or polyethnic rights as their content (Koopmans, Passy, Statham, & Giugni, 2005; Kymlicka, 1995), and can be directed at the host-state, kin-state, or a supranational entity

[2] We understand ethnic groups in a subjectivist form as groups of individuals that imagine to have a common descent. It is not the aim of this paper to engage in the debate about the pros and cons of different definitions of ethnicity.

(Jenne, 2007, p. 40). While studying ethnonationalism, what interests us here is how nationalistic the preferences are. Understanding nationalism as the idea that ethnic or cultural groups and states should be congruent, we understand preferences for secession and forced emigration as most radical forms of ethnonationalism.[3] This is followed by a preference for polyethnic rights directed towards the host-state (such claims might include measures of affirmative action or decentralisation). While these preferences also fall short of having as a goal the congruence of state and ethnic group, they favour a stronger coincidence between state and ethnic group than can be granted with individual rights. Preferences for individual rights are the most moderate form of nationalistic preferences, because they shape equality between different ethnic group members and point towards the integration of different ethnic groups within the same state. We also count preferences for integration in supranational institutions and the adoption of international norms among these moderate claims of ethnic minorities because they point towards the blurring of ethnic and state boundaries instead of their congruence.

Figure 1: A two-dimensional conceptualization of ethnonationalism



Source: self-elaboration

To summarize, we understand ethnonationalism as a concept composed of two dimensions (see Figure 1). One dimension contains the degree of radicalism of the nationalistic preferences. The other dimension contains political mobilization along ethnic lines. The two dimensions may coincide when nationalistic preferences trigger ethnic mobilization or vice versa. However, other situations are imaginable when nationalistic preferences

[3] We agree with that strand of literature that argues that in reality all nationalisms are cultural and/or ethnic to some degree (e.g. Eugster & Strijbis, 2011; Huntington, 2005; Wimmer, 2002).

remain latent or when ethnic mobilization takes place without being based on nationalistic preferences.

SUPRANATIONAL INTEGRATION AS AN ADDITIONAL ISSUE DIMENSION

If we believe that supranational integration lends itself to power sharing between the central state and its outlying regions by reducing the power position of the former relative to the latter, it can be assumed that power sharing's effects are similar to those of other power-sharing institutions. According to Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy, power-sharing institutions produce numerous stakeholders that can veto decisions and, by doing so, force the political elite to bargain and compromise (e.g. Lijphart, 1977; Tsebelis, 2002). In the case of European integration, several European institutions are important veto points. Due to the accession criteria of the EU, a government party must rely on coalition partners whose policy positions are acceptable to the European Union. This, in turn, restricts nationalist parties' influence on the majority group, which – since their policy positions are often at odds with those adopted by the EU – are not the first choice in coalition formation for moderate parties. The inclusion of parties that belong to the ethnic minorities in government coalitions, by contrast, is well suited to demonstrating the 'civic' character of a particular government.[4] Hence, with European integration, we can expect to see the increasing participation of parties who champion sympathetic positions towards the ethnic minorities in government coalitions.

Such broad alliances between political elites can help to balance out social segmentation at the mass level (Andeweg, 2000, p. 510). Indeed, on the one hand, bargaining and compromise force the elites to adopt moderate positions. On the other hand, access to power and related privileges works as an incentive to not defect from consociational arrangements. Hence, we can expect elites to stabilize their moderate policy positions in order to stay in power. However, this does not explain why the masses that these elites represent should follow them. Consociational theory merely assumes that elites have control over their social constituencies—that is, as long as the society in question remains segmented. This segmentation, which is itself a

[4] On the variance of preferences for European integration between majority and minority nationalists see also Csergo und Goldgeier (2004).

prerequisite for consociational democracy, may dissolve due to social progress induced by a well-functioning consociational democracy, however. Thus, while consociational democracy undermines itself, it may have the positive side effect of pacifying a political cleavage.

As mentioned above, supranational integration is commonly seen as a force that can mitigate ethnonationalism. But is also viewed as a force that can radicalize ethnic minority members' political preferences. It is believed to do this in at least two different ways:

First, in certain contexts, ethnonationalistic mobilization can be viewed as working against globalization and Europeanization. As has been shown in the realm of national politics, the losers of globalization may reorient themselves towards the nation (Kriesi et al., 2008). In the case of ethnic minorities, such a reorientation may take place on the ethnic group level: i.e., a deepening of supranational integration may well accompany stronger ethnonationalistic mobilization.

Second, the new institutional context created by supranational integration may give rise to new loyalties. One example of this phenomenon can be seen in the creation of the EU's Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), which reinforce the relevance and visibility of the regions. Furthermore, the EU's regional policies, with the Regional Fund as the second largest budget item, have greatly elevated the regions' economic relevance. With this strengthening, cultural and institutional regional boundaries subsequently reinforce each other. And so, assuming that ethnic identities are not exogenous to formal institutions but also shaped by them, institutions can create and strengthen ethnic identities. Consequently, if ethnic identities are congruent with increasingly salient regional boundaries, they too can be strengthened (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 601–622).

As we have touched on in the previous sections, there are good reasons to assume that supranational integration may lead to a pacification of ethnonationalistic preferences, or, alternately, render them more radical. This is probably why scholars aren't typically heard arguing that supranational integration has very limited effects on ethnonationalism. However, we will show—somewhat counter-intuitively—that there are also good reasons to assume that supranational integration actually has little to no impact on ethnonationalism (also Mabry, McGarry, Moore, & O'Leary, 2013; McGarry & Keating, 2006).

First, conflict over the merits of supranational integration are not the same across different ethnic groups and divisions. And there is no obvious reason why preferences on these two dimensions must be congruent. While it is true that most minority parties are in favour of supranational integration due to the relationship between supranational integration and regionalization discussed above (for a review see Elias, 2008, pp. 3–12), many parties of the ethnic majorities are as well. Furthermore, if members of the ethnic majority and minority in question are both in favour or opposed to supranational integration, it is likely to be for different reasons. Proponents of supranational integration who belong to the ethnic majority, for instance, could be in favour of economic integration while simultaneously being against any policies that further strengthen the regions. Similarly, members of the ethnic minority who favour supranational integration may support regional policies or common standards of minority protection while still being opposed to economic integration. Actors' policy preferences on supranational integration and on ethnonationalism can be very distinct. True, in some cases they may be compatible, e.g., favouring European Structure Funds while also arguing for decentralization at the national level. But in other cases, the two different preferences will be unrelated. For instance, being in favour of economic integration is quite distinct from supporting education in the mother tongue. Though the former might trigger the latter in some indirect way, these relationships are far from obvious and can even be adverse. Hence, arguing that supranational integration and ethnic conflict relate to the same territorial cleavage—and that the former therefore triggers the latter—is a gross oversimplification at best.

Second, supranational integration can be decidedly irrelevant to the sources of ethnonationalism in question. For instance, if ethnic minority members' preferences on ethnic issues are determined by ethnic division of labour (Hechter & Levi, 1979), supranational integration has no direct effect. Certainly, supranational integration may have an impact on ethnic division of labour in the member states and, in this way, indirectly affect ethnonationalism. However, the direction in which the effect points, and how relevant it is overall, are not always clear. Again, the same argument can be made at the elite level. The sources of political elites' desires to mobilize their constituencies on ethnic issues can be independent of supranational integration. Elites might, for instance, try to mobilize along ethnic lines if it allows control of the targeted community through patronage relationships (Chandra, 2005).

In sum, there is ample reason to believe that supranational integration may have little effect on ethnonationalistic preferences for both masses and elites. This does not exclude the possibility, however, that political elites may adopt a moderate position in the short run for strategic reasons. The argument for such a course is straightforward: The national government, usually comprised of the largest majority parties, must adjust to the conditionality mechanism according to which member states adopt the rules of the supranational institution (for the EU see Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, pp. 8–25; Schwellnus, 2005, pp. 57–59). Since supranational integration is typically a key preference for ethnic minority leaders, they are usually ready to enter a coalition with the goal of securing access to their supranational institutions. In order to be a potential coalition partner and to guarantee political stability during the accession process, elites will often be ready to moderate their ethnonationalistic claims. Once accession is achieved, however, minority leaders can return to their 'real' preferences, and readopt a more radical agenda.

RESEARCH STRATEGY

A longitudinal case study of the Hungarian minority's nationalistic claims and electoral mobilization will allow us to test the theoretical propositions put forward in the previous chapters. In order to measure how radical the nationalistic preferences of the Hungarian minority are, we analyze nationalistic claims in the discourse of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) between 1990 and 2012.[5] Claims are an important and rather basic form of making preferences explicit. In contrast to "ideology", "claims" do also refer to preferences that might be short-term and/or incoherent. The claims of the DAHR are of particular relevance for us since this party is the main actor of the Hungarian minority in Romania. The key feature of the party, which was founded in December 1989, is that it is simultaneously a political party and a conglomerate of social movements with the aim of representing all Hungarians (Kulcsár & Bradatan, 2007, p. 304).[6]

[5] While measuring DAHR's claims, we assume that the policy positions of the party are congruent with those of its electorate. We choose this second best option because there is no survey data available that would allow to measure policy preferences of the electorate on ethnopolitical issues systematically over time.

[6] Instances of violent confrontations between ethnic Romanians and Hungarians in Romania are largely restricted to the 1990-1992 period. For a detailed account of the dynamics of ethnic violence in 1990 see Stroschein (2011b).

Possible source documents for an analysis of DAHR's nationalistic claims include, among others, party leaders' public (and other) speeches, parliamentary interventions, and electoral program documents. However, not all of these sources satisfy the basic conditions they should fulfil, in order to be useful for our purposes. For instance, for our study, the documents in question must reflect the official discourse of the party that produced them, and should be of a relatively general nature. Because of this, we have chosen to analyze the DAHR's inaugural speeches in the Romanian parliament after each election and reorganization of the government coalition. These speeches were given by the party leader or his speaker in the parliamentary group. And they are of a decidedly general nature, which allows us to arrive at an unbiased measure of the salience of the political issues for the party at that time. Furthermore, because all elections and all major governmental changes since democratization have been covered, we can analyze the nature and change over time of nationalistic claims from a longitudinal perspective.

Since 1990, when the Romanian parliament was democratically chosen for the first time since World War II, there have been seven parliamentary elections and as many inaugural debates (1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012), plus six programmatic debates on the occasions of government reformations between elections (1991, 1998, 1999, 2009, February 2012, May 2012) (see Table 1). We complement our analysis of these parliamentary debates by drawing on previous studies.

In order to measure the second dimension of ethnonationalism—the political mobilization of the Hungarian minority in Romania—we focus on electoral mobilization of ethnic parties. Since ethnic parties primarily want to mobilize their co-ethnics, their levels of electoral mobilization should be measured as the share of ethnic group members at voting age voting for 'their' ethnic party. Hence, we divide the share of the Hungarian minority parties' vote by the share of ethnic Hungarians in Romania (Strijbis and Kotnarowski 2013, p. 5-8). The values for this indicator typically vary between 0 and 1. They can be higher than 1, however, in cases where members of an ethnic minority vote en bloc for 'their' ethnic party and have a higher turnout than the members of other ethnic groups. As Strijbis and Kotnarowski (2013) have shown, such an indicator is valid if the party can be clearly categorized as being of an ethnic type, which is true for our case. Since the DAHR is the only representative of the Hungarian minority at the national level, we can calculate the electoral mobilization at the national level as being determined by its vote share. At the local level, however, we

must also include the vote share of the Hungarian Civic Party and the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania.

A major advantage of the above mentioned indicator of electoral mobilization of ethnic parties is that it is based on actual voting behaviour. However, since only seven national and local democratic elections have taken place in Romania since the collapse of Communism, this measure restricts the number of cases considerably. Hence, we also calculate the electoral mobilization of ethnic parties on the basis of vote intentions. We were able to collect this data for 20 of the last 24 years. Here, we measured the share of self-defined ethnic Hungarians that intend to vote for the UDMR in the upcoming national election. We do not take into account variance in the levels to turn out among ethnic Hungarians and the members of other ethnic groups since these are dependent on the electoral cycle. Hence, when applied to survey data values on the measure for ethnic party mobilization cannot be higher than 1.

Table 1: Speeches of DAHR in general parliamentary debates under analysis

Debate	References to Europe	Nationalistic claims	Words	Speakers	Parliamentary position
1990	3	2	717	1	Opposition
1991	0	3	403	1	Opposition
1992	2	3	1357	1	Opposition
1996	1	4	1033	2	Coalition
1998	3	7	1155	2	Coalition
1999	4	2	653	2	Coalition
2000	5	6	1120	1	Opposition
2004	10	12	1805	2	Coalition
2008	1	8	979	1	Opposition
2009	2	8	1022	1	Coalition
Feb. 2012	1	4	1168	1	Coalition
May 2012	1	7	2186	2	Opposition
Dec. 2012	2	5	940	1	Opposition

Source: self-elaboration

Our analysis of ethnnonationalism in Romania complements those carried out by Birnir, Brubaker et al., Jenne, Bochsler and Szöcsik and others (Birnir, 2007; Bochsler & Szöcsik, 2013a, 2013b; Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox, &

Grancea, 2006; Jenne, 2007). While (some of) these authors base their analyses on an even broader set of sources, our analysis is more systematic in its choice of sources and indicators avoiding biases that might be caused due to the use of different sources for different time points. It also comes with clear advantages in terms of comparability and replicability. The empirical chapter will show, however, that the choice of sources and indicators has little effect on the results regarding the strength of ethnonationalism in Transylvania. Hence, our study reaffirms the results of similar analyses by other authors.

Since our main aim is to test the causal relationship between supranational integration and ethnic minority claims and mobilization, we also track the Romanian accession processes to the most important supranational institutions. In the context of this study, supranational integration refers foremost to integration into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In order to grasp the relationship between the integration process and the DAHR's claims-making, we also analyse whether and how references to supranational institutions are linked with nationalistic claims in the parliamentary speeches under consideration. Relatively speaking, we are more interested in how the DAHR's nationalistic claims are related to supranational integration than in claims on supranational institutions in their own right. This is to say, it is not our goal to describe the well-known, pro-European policy position of the DAHR, (e.g. Kántor & Bárdi, 2002, pp. 198–199) but to derive an indication of how the DAHR is relating nationalistic claims to supranational integration, and how salient the latter topic is for them over time.

HUNGARIAN ETHNONATIONALISM IN ROMANIA, 1989-2012

Regained national independence (1990-1996)

Immediately after the unexpected collapse of communism in Eastern Europe it became clear that most members of the Warsaw Pact – including Romania and Hungary – were orienting themselves towards the West. Just three months after the revolution, Romania applied for membership in the Council of Europe. While integration into the CoE followed in 1993, membership in the two most important international and supranational institutions – the NATO and the EU – remained a goal for the relatively distant future. Hence, pressure from European institutions was not enough

to force the Romanian government to work towards conciliation with the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Consequently, the DAHR did not become a coalition partner in the governments formed in 1990, 1991 and 1992. By contrast, Illiescu's National Salvation Front (NSF) had a nationalist agenda, and depended on the support of the right wing parties Greater Romanian Party (GRP) and the Romanian National Unity Party (PNUR) during the period following 1992. At that time, the government coalition made some attempts to assimilate the Hungarian minority. For instance, the government passed a law requiring certain exams at the primary and secondary level to be given in Romanian, and restricted teaching in Hungarian at universities.

At the very beginning of parliamentary democracy, in the debate after the 1990 elections, the DAHR denounced the fact that the needs of the minority had not been mentioned in the governmental programme, and drew a direct line between the importance of placing the minority problem on the political agenda and successful integration into European structures: "Now when Post-Helsinki Europe tends towards a general opening, ... when we all wish to get access to the Council of Europe, it would be a political mistake to disregard these [the minority] problems".[7] The DAHR highlighted the importance it attached to Europe by emphasizing the role of dialogue and cooperation in developing the Romanian society "as part of a new European community"[8] as the concluding words of its contribution.

[7] Speech by Ladislaus Pillich in general parliamentary debate, 04.07.1990. Monitorul oficial al României. Partea a II-a. Nr. 26/1990. Adunarea Deputaţilor. Sesiunea I. Şedinţa din ziua de 4 iulie 1990, pp. 2-3.
[8] Ibid.

Figure 2: Ethnic mobilization by Hungarian minority parties, 1990-2012



Notes: The values for electoral mobilization at the national level is based on intra- and extrapolated data on group size
Sources: Monitorul Oficial 121, 260, 432, 502, and 592; Hungarian national census 1992, 2002, and 2011; Constituency-election data archive (CLEA); Public Opinion Barometer (POB); Political and Social Research Program of the Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, Babeş-Bolyai University; Romanian Electoral Studies, Barometer on Ethnic Relations (BER); United States Information Agency (USIA); European Value Survey (EVS).

One year later, in October 1991, the FSN cabinet was replaced by a coalition of several parties. The DAHR did not join the new government allegedly because its demand for a Ministry of Minorities had not been accepted. In its contribution to the parliamentary debate over the new governmental programme, the DAHR explicitly expressed its disappointment with the decline of their request, but nevertheless assumed a pragmatic approach and advanced only very general and moderate nationalistic claims: pleading for peaceful living together and for more tact and responsibility on the government's side in handling the minority problem. Europe was

not mentioned at all in the DAHR's contribution to the programmatic debate.[9]

Reacting to the nationalistic policies and rhetoric of the Romanian government, demands for ethnic rights became more pronounced in 1992 (also Birnir, 2007, pp. 121–124; Jenne, 2007, p. 115). The elections held in September led to a new coalition dominated by the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN) and the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PDSR) that did not include the DAHR. In its inaugural speech, the Hungarian parliamentary group pressed for the "cultural autonomy" mentioned in the governmental programme, rejected the idea of "cultural assimilation", criticized centralism, and insisted on legal provisions to improve local administration—but they did not relate these claims to their desire for European integration, which was expressed in a separate paragraph (DAHR 1992).[10]

In the 1990 election, the DAHR garnered basically the entire vote of its targeted ethnic constituency.[11] Due to high turnout among its electoral constituency, it was able to achieve a vote that was relatively higher than its ethnic group size—explaining why the related value is higher than 1 (see Figure 1). This is a remarkable result, given that, in the first phase of democratization, the National Salvation Front (a large and heterogeneous pro-democratic alliance) was the uncontested democratic political force. The DAHR was also the unchallenged representative of ethnic Hungarians in the 1992 election. The nationalistic program of the government coalition and the now also more radical nationalistic claims of the DAHR further cemented the hegemonic position of the party among ethnic Hungarians as can be deduced from the vote intention data. Between 1992 and 1995, only about 20% of ethnic Hungarians intended to vote for a party other than the DAHR.

Conditionality and strategic moderation (1996-2000)

In 1995, the members of the NATO announced that they were willing to consider applications for full membership from former Warsaw Pact countries (Gallagher, 1997). This was an attractive perspective for both

[9] Speech by Borbély Ernö in general parliamentary debate, 16.12.1991. Monitorul oficial al României. Partea a II-a. Nr. 242/1991. Senatul, Adunarea Deputaţilor. Şedinţa comună din ziua de 16 octombrie 1991, p. 27.
[10] Speech by Attila Verestóy in general parliamentary debate, 18.11.1992. Monitorul oficial al României. Partea a II-a. Nr. 3/1992. Şedinţe comune ale Camerei Deputaţilor şi Senatului. Sesiunea a IV-a. Şedinţa din ziua de 18 noiembrie 1992, p. 9.
[11] A closer inspection of the voting intention data reveals that the non-Hungarian voters that intended to vote for DAHR belonged to the German minority.

Hungary and Romania, not the least because aligning with the West was popular among the electorate in both countries. NATO, however, made clear that NATO candidates needed to resolve their disputes with their neighbour countries in order to fulfil the criteria for accession. In addition to membership in NATO, Romania was aiming to achieve membership in the CoE, of which Hungary was already a member. The CoE demanded a bilateral treaty between Romania and Hungary (signed on 16 September 1996), giving the latter country a superior bargaining position over Romania. Furthermore, since Hungary also included the DAHR in negotiations, the Hungarian minority possessed some blackmail potential. The EU made use of the conditionality mechanism by demanding stronger anti-discrimination legislation (no demands for collective rights were made).

The Illiescu's NSF lost the parliamentary election in 1996. At this point, the Democratic Convention (CD) of Constantinescu occupied a position in which it could build a government coalition. By working with the Social Democratic Union (USD), Constantinescu could have fulfilled the minimal requirements to build a winning coalition. Instead of relying on such a narrow and fragile minority, however, he opted to bring the DAHR into government as well. Including the DAHR also made sense, since accession to the European Union and NATO were two of CD's top priorities (Birnir, 2007, p. 126; Kántor & Bárdi, 2002, p. 190). The DAHR's participation in the government was accompanied by several measures that provided additional rights for ethnic Hungarians to be trained in their mother tongue: instruction in Hungarian on all education levels was allowed, teaching in minority languages increased, and the organisation of universities and faculties in minority languages was made possible (Birnir, 2007, p. 125).

As part of the coalition government, the DAHR was quite balanced in its inaugural speech in 1996 (also Bochsler & Szöcsik, 2013b, p. 432). Its claim to "overcome the conscious perpetuation of strong [ethnic] inequalities" reflected a stance critical of the status quo, but the DAHR also strongly emphasized ideals of cooperation, partnership and the common interests of all Romanians. The relationship of the DAHR's moderation in its nationalism to the conditionality for access to supranational organisations is evident. The imperative of accelerating the European and NATO

integration processes was articulated directly alongside the need to strive for the peaceful coexistence of all communities.[12]

While integration into NATO was high on the political agenda in 1996, references to European integration became more frequent in the 1998 speech, along with a longer list of claims that emphasized cultural rights (mother tongue education without restriction), equal rights and administrative autonomy in terms of decentralization, the principle of subsidiarity, and local decision-making.[13] The attention to European integration grew further in 1999. At this time, the DAHR highlighted its inclusion in European structures ("we are members of the EPP") and its recognition in the European sphere ("we are appreciated by the EC for our realism, rationality, democratic attitude ...") right alongside its struggle for "elimination of [ethnic] discrimination"—though it mainly emphasized that it would work together with the Romanians towards European integration, "for a better life for all of us".[14]

The initial moderation of the DAHR during this period is perfectly mirrored in the vote intention trends during the time: the share of ethnic Hungarians intending to vote the DAHR at the upcoming national election strongly decreased, from a high of approximately 0.8 in 1996 to a low of about 0.5 in 1998 (see Figure 1). The subsequent swing of the DAHR to more radical nationalistic claims (though, it should be noted that they remain relatively moderate) is also reflected in the corresponding vote intention measures. Indeed, the level of electoral mobilization increased back to its previous level, of around 0.8, in 2000. The intermittent moderation of the nationalistic claims had no relevant effects on the electoral mobilization of the DAHR in the national and elections of 1996 and 2000Hungarian, thus there is less need for resolute claims, and the UDMR's hopes are rather concentrated on their own representatives (23.12.2009 pdf: 8)., suggesting that it did not suffer from its change in policy positions and its participation in the government coalition during elections. However, it shows that the conditionality of supranational integration had not only a moderating effect on the nationalistic claims but also reduced the (potential for)

[12] Speeches by Béla Markó and Iuliu Vida in general parliamentary debate, 11.12.1996. Şedinţa comună a Camerei Deputaţilor şi Senatului din 11 decembrie 1996.
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=1261&idm=3&idl=1, downloaded 01.11.2012.
[13] Speeches by Béla Markó and Iuliu Vida in general parliamentary debate, 15.04.1998. Şedinţa comună a Camerei Deputaţilor şi Senatului din 15 aprilie 1998.
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=1261&idm=3&idl=1, downloaded 01.11.2012.
[14] Speeches by Attila Verestóy and György Frunda in general parliamentary debate, 21.12.1999. Şedinţa comună a Camerei Deputaţilor şi Senatului din 21 decembrie 1999.
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=4886&idm=3&idl=1, downloaded 01.11.2012.

electoral mobilization of the DAHR. Hence, the conditionality of supranational integration went together with a reduction of levels of ethnonationalism.

Formal accession and re-radicalization (2000-2008)

The new Romanian government that rose to power in 2000 upheld the pro-Western foreign policy that the previous government had established. And in October 2003, the country held a constitutional referendum to pass several constitutional amendments necessary for EU accession, signed an accession treaty to obtain EU-membership, and ultimately joined NATO in spring 2004. Negotiations between the EU and Romania subsequently reached their final stage, and in 2007 Romania joined the EU. On its end, the EU insisted on the implementation of minority rights; it based its claims, however, on anti-discrimination legislation, and not on the establishment of collective group rights. The lack of clear, common rules and standards in the EU's stance on minority rights restricted minority protection to rather low standards (Deets & Stroschein, 2005, p. 290; Rechel, 2008). This made possible that Romania became a member of the EU without adopting a law on the status of national minorities that would include far reaching provisions for cultural autonomy (Christopher Decker, 2007). So, while the most important reforms pertaining to the accommodation of the Hungarian minority were initiated prior to 2004, relatively little happened afterwards. Among the few initiatives undertaken by the Romanian government was the ratification of the European Charter for Regional Minority Languages. Also, in 2005 a law was passed that gave members of an ethnic minority priority when applying for jobs in regions where they constituted an absolute majority, under condition of equal qualifications.

Considering domestic party competition, in 2000, the former government coalition lost the election against Illiescu. In order to prevent extremist parties such as GRP or PUNR from entering the government, the DAHR—likely remembering the post-1989 Romanian nationalist period—supported the Illiescu government without entering the coalition. Illiescu, on his part, decided in favour of a pro-European instead of a nationalistic agenda (Jenne, 2007, p. 118) and met several of the DAHR's demands.

Thus, in 2000, the DAHR was in opposition, but nevertheless supported the government in its accession to the EU. As the moment of truth on Romania's inclusion into Europe came closer, the DAHR acknowledged that "the Hungarian community has no other choices to go on than the

Romanian majority," which it expressed in the parliamentary debate on the governmental programme. Although the list of nationalistic claims became longer (regional infrastructure, decentralization, education, protection against Romanian ultranationalism), the phrasing was rather moderate: The DAHR asked for a legal and institutional framework "appropriate for the coexistence of ethnicities". The DAHR was certain that "the solution of the minority problem" was a condition to "regain the trust of Europe", and assured the government that it was ready to contribute to any necessary reforms, provided that the government would act "in a honest, concrete and profound way".[15]

Before accession to the EU, in November 2004, Romania held general elections. No party coalition gained an absolute majority. As a consequence, the DAHR was now in a position to turn the scale since only with the inclusion of the DAHR, the Democratic Party was able to form a coalition with the Liberals and the Conservatives.

The DAHR entered the Romanian parliamentary elections in 2004 with a party program that insisted on EU integration and the reconstruction of "independent cultural institutions" (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, 2004, p. §VII). Furthermore, it maintained its claim for some form of autonomy for the Hungarian minority. The parliamentary debate after the 2004 elections took place at about the time Romania was officially offered (conditional) EU access. The importance of this decision, and the hopes linked to this step by the Hungarian parliamentarians—by then part of the coalition in Bucharest—can be seen in the fact that both the frequency of references to Europe and the number of nationalistic claims in its 2004 speech were by far highest during the period under study. The evident links between Europe-related and nationalistic claims support an interpretation that the DAHR seemed confident Europe would help to solve several "national problems". Competition in education within the EU served as a reason to ask for more decentralization in this field; "securing national minority rights" was linked directly to "getting closer to the values of developed countries"; and the goal of reorganization and extension of regions of economic development was mentioned as a part of a "European vision" and related to "European provisions". While "European integration" was declared the "major goal" (and rephrased as "building a European Romania"), nationalistic claims were more explicit and included cultural,

[15] Speech by Béla Markó in general parliamentary debate, 28.12.2000. Dezbateri parlamentare. Şedinţa comună a Camerei Deputaţilor şi Senatului din 28 Decembrie 2000. Monitorul oficial al României. Partea a II-a. Nr. 11/2000, p.19-20.

educational, political and economic fields of action. The DAHR used the term "cultural autonomy", and requested several initiatives: state-funded tertiary education in Hungarian, a law on national minorities, less governmental influence, decentralization, and better infrastructure in Transylvania.[16]

This moderate position (Birnir, 2007, pp. 124–129) was regularly contested by a more radical wing of the party, which claimed for significantly more far-reaching reforms. In response to an attempted overthrow of the moderate DAHR leadership in 2003, other movements, such as the Szekler National Council (SZNT) and the Hungarian Civic Alliance, were formed (Bochsler & Szöcsik, 2013a; Kulcsár & Bradatan, 2007, p. 311). An important attempt to strengthen the more radical nationalistic fractions within the Hungarian minority was undertaken by the Szekler National Council, who organised a consultative plebiscite on autonomy from Romania. The plebiscite was a symbolic scrutiny, targeting about 15,000 persons. It solicited autonomy for two Transylvanian regions – Harghita and Covasna – where the majority of the ethnic Hungarians live (Agence France Presse, 2006). The referendum was criticised by the DAHR, which insisted that such a change in legislation be debated in the appropriate political arenas.

However, the fact that the majority of the DAHR's members supported the institution's moderate fraction, and that the DAHR did not lose electoral support, suggests that its position was shared by a majority of the members of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania—i.e. that the moderate nationalistic position of the DAHR had achieved broad acceptance. The DAHR decisively remained the most important political force of the Hungarian minority at the national level in 2004. Its vote share of 6.2% meant again that it was able to mobilize almost its entire targeted group of ethnic Hungarians. However, its somewhat weakened position in this period is revealed by the data on vote intentions which indicate that "merely" 70% of the ethnic Hungarians intended to vote for the DAHR at the upcoming election.

The new European normality (2008-2012)

After Romania's successful admission to the EU, Europe was no longer central as a point of reference for the DAHR. In their 2008 speech, the Hungarian parliamentarians, consigned to the opposition for the first time

[16] Speeches by Attila Verestóy and Hunor Kelemen in general parliamentary debate, 28.12.2004. Şedinţa comună a Camerei Deputaţilor şi Senatului din 28 decembrie 2004. http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5788&idm=4&idl=1, downloaded 01.11.2012.

since 1996, glancingly evoked their role in gaining EU access for Romania, but did not further relate their claims to European institutions. National minorities were no longer an explicit topic in the governmental programme, and the DAHR looked for political partners not at the European level, but among Romanian parties to support their nationalistic claims ("maintain and develop national, linguistic, educational and cultural identity", decentralization).[17]

One year later, the DAHR once again became a coalition party, proudly mentioning its membership in the European People's Party during the parliamentary debate, and proclaiming its goals for further European integration. Its nationalistic claims were rather moderate and not very specific ("further reforms in education and minority rights", "equality in relations between majority and minority", "maintain the … identities and values of each community"), and Europe was not linked to these requests. The reason for this modest expression of claims could be the fact that by then, the Minister of Culture was an ethnic Hungarian, and thus there was less need for more radical nationalistic claims; the DAHR's hopes were in the hands of its own representatives now.[18]

The Hungarians' contributions to the parliamentary debates on governmental programmes in February and May 2012—which took place due to changes in government—were overshadowed by their disappointment over a recent failure to open a bilingual faculty at the University of Tîrgu-Mureş. Europe was mentioned only briefly in connection with economic difficulties (in February) and in the context of successful past cooperation (in May), but it was clearly no longer a point of reference or hope for nationalistic claims (which mainly focused on educational rights, ethnic identity, further decentralization, and the adoption of a Law on the status of national minorities in Romania).[19]

After the elections in December 2012, the DAHR maintained its domestic focus: Although it remained in opposition, it appreciated the fact that the

[17] Speech by Béla Markó in general parliamentary debate, 22.12.2008. Şedinţa comună a Camerei Deputaţilor şi Senatului din 22 decembrie 2008.
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=6564&idm=4&idl=1, downloaded 01.11.2012.
[18] Speech by Béla Markó in general parliamentary debate, 23.12.2009. Şedinţa comună a Camerei Deputaţilor şi Senatului din 23 decembrie 2009.
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=6738&idm=3&idl=1, downloaded 01.11.2012.
[19] Speech by Attila-Zoltán Cseke in general parliamentary debate, 09.02.2012. Şedinţa comună a Camerei Deputaţilor şi Senatului din 9 februarie 2012.
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=7095&idm=3&idl=1, downloaded 01.11.2012; Speeches by Hunor Kelemen and György Frunda in general parliamentary debate, 07.05.2012. Şedinţa comună a Camerei Deputaţilor şi Senatului din 7 mai 2012.
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=7095&idm=3&idl=1, downloaded 01.11.2012.

minority problem was part of the governmental agenda, and declared the DAHR ready for partnership and political dialogue with Romanian parties, and said as much during the inaugural debates. It repeated its claims for decentralization; ethnic, cultural, and educational rights; and mother tongue use. But it did so without any link to European provisions or institutions. For the DAHR, Europe was relevant only as a joint historical achievement – and as a future task (with regard to budget priorities).[20]

In 2008, with 6.2% of the votes, the DAHR clearly remained the most important political force of the Hungarian minority. And in the local elections in 2008, it also remained the strongest faction within the Hungarian minority, receiving 5.4% of all votes against 1% of the Hungarian Civic Party. This is also true for the local elections in 2012 where the DAHR won 5.5% of the vote against 1% of its co-ethnic challengers. As Stroschein (2011a) observes, ethnic outbidding remained the luxury of ethnic enclaves. Together the parties mobilized the entire targeted vote of ethnic Hungarians. This shows that the constantly high levels of ethnic electoral mobilization in this period had changed little with Romania's integration into the European Union.

Summary

In the previous sections we described the most important processes of Romania's supranational integration, and the nationalistic claims and levels of ethnic mobilization made by the Hungarian minority during that time. We have summarized the claims made by the DAHR in the Romanian parliament in Table 2. The most radical nationalistic claims are on top, with claims becoming increasingly moderate as they descend towards the bottom. From a comparative perspective one might conclude that the DAHR was always rather moderate, since it never made secessionist or irredentist claims. This observation of a generally moderate nationalistic character fits well with the famous observation of Brubaker et al. (2006) that Hungarian nationalism plays a minor role in everyday life of Transylvanian inhabitants. The claims of DAHR, however, clearly radicalized over time. While more moderate and radical claims alternated during the period leading up to 1999, these claims did not moderate after 2000.

It should be noted that the moderate nationalistic claims observed in the speeches in the first years are partially at odds with the observations of

[20] Speech by Borbély László in general parliamentary debate, 21.12.2012. Şedinţa comună a Camerei Deputaţilor şi Senatului din 21 decembrie 2012. http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=7184&idm=3&idl=1, downloaded 24.01.2013.

other scholars (e.g. Bochsler & Szöcsik, 2013a). This is probably due to our use of different data sources. The fact that we observe more moderate positions during this period could be due to the fact that we analyze parliamentary speeches that were given after elections took place, and that are thus directed towards the entire population of Romania. It is reasonable to assume that, in the first period of the Romanian democracy, in the context of inaugural speeches, the groups in question would make more moderate claims than when addressing their own constituents during an electoral campaign. Such a hypothesis fits well with the observation that, at the time, the DAHR was in opposition and therefore could run adverse campaigns. Furthermore, the DAHR was quite divided between more radical and moderate wings within the party, which could also explain why in the parliament more moderate positions were hold than in other sections of the party.

The moderate claims observed in the speeches during the second half of the 1990s are in line with the analyses of other authors. And, as our analysis of their relation to claims involving supranational integration reveals, this phenomenon is closely linked to the European integration process. In 1999, DAHR made more claims related to supranational integration than it made claims related to minority politics. The moderate nationalistic claims and the emphasis on European integration in the second half of the 1990s coincide with low levels of electoral mobilization. We found a steady decrease in nationalistic electoral mobilization—measured with vote intentions—during the period from 1995 to 1998, and an increase after 1998. From 2000 onward, levels of ethnic electoral mobilization remain at high levels—a result that fits well with our observation that the DAHR did not moderate its demands in the 2000s.

Table 2: DAHR's nationalistic and supranational claims in general parliamentary debates

Claims	1990	1991	1992	1996	1998	1999	2000	2004	2008	2009	2012_02	2012_05	2012_12
Nationalistic claims													
Cultural+educational rights			1		3		1	4	1	2	2	3	3
Decentralisation			2		1		1	2	1	2	1		1
Regional development							1	3	1				
Protection				2	2	1	1	1	1			1	
Cooperation	1	2		2	1	1	1	(1)	3	3			1
Political attention	1	1					1	2	1	1	1	3	
Sum: Nationalistic claims	2	3	3	4	7	2	6	12	8	8	4	7	5
References to Europe	3	0	2	1	3	4	5	10	1	2	(1)	(1)	(2)
no of words	717	403	1357	1033	1155	653	1120	1805	979	1022	1168	2186	940
no of speakers	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1

Source: self-elaboration

While politics in Romania have been characterized by weak party organization and high party support volatility (Tavits, 2005, pp. 284–285), the DAHR proved itself to be a strong organisation with a constant level of voter support during the entire period we analysed. The DAHR's temporary moderation of its claims during the accession period did not affect its electoral mobilization in the long run.

CONCLUSIONS

In this article, we set out to show that supranational integration has only a limited impact on ethnonationalism. Our results indicate that supranational integration did not lead to a moderation of the ethnic party's nationalistic claims or a decrease in mobilization. This clearly contradicts established theories in the literature on power-sharing. While consociationalist theory seems to have correctly foreseen some developments in the case at hand—namely, that supranational integration would lead to frequent coalitions with an ethnic minority party—moderating effects are not obvious, since the ethnic party's claims were already quite moderate when it was not a member of a government coalition. Nor has supranational integration led to a radicalization of the Hungarian minority; indeed, while the process of supranational integration was a one-way process, the nationalistic claims did not radicalize and levels of mobilization did not increase with it.[21]

Instead, ethnonationalism among the Hungarian minority in Romania has remained rather stable over the past twenty years. Our explanation of why this might be has been straightforward. First, conflict between ethnic groups and divergent opinions on the merits of supranational integration are not the same. Because of this, supranational integration should be considered an additional issue dimension, instead of one that is subsumed into the nationalist issue dimension. Second, supranational integration proves rather irrelevant as a source of ethnonationalism—an observation that is in line with the expectations of structuralist approaches and theories of party system stability. However, this does not exclude the possibility that political elites could adopt a moderate nationalistic position in the short term for strategic reasons. In the case of the Hungarian

[21] More generally, theories that predict strong dynamics are clearly not among those that are potentially helpful for an explanation. For instance the argument that the discourse of the government in the "kin-state" is important for ethnonationalism by the minority in the "nationalizing state" (Brubaker, 1996) cannot explain the stability of Hungarian minority nationalism in Romania.

minority in Romania, the context for such a short-term strategic shift has been the conditionality mechanism that forces member states to adopt the rules of the supranational institution for accession. Since supranational integration was an important preference for the Hungarian minority leaders, they were ready to moderate their claims until accession was guaranteed. Once accession was achieved, however, they returned to their 'real' preferences and readopted a more radical nationalistic agenda. Hence, based on this analysis we expect no important changes in the levels of ethnonationalism in Romania due to further supranational integration in the near future.

Based on a single case, the potential to generalize from our study to other cases remains limited. In particular, generalizations are only possible for other cases where a single ethnic party represent the large bulk of the ethnic minority population and when supranational integration takes a similar form as in Romania. However, our analysis is applicable to other instances of ethnonationalism in Eastern Europe and beyond. Our very systematic choice of sources and indicators allows the replication of our analysis with other cases. A particularly stringent test for our explanation would be to apply it to a Western European context. In addition, future studies might wish to employ a broader perspective on the issue, by conceptualizing supranational integration as just one important dimension of globalization. From such a perspective, it would be interesting to see how other aspects of globalization—such as tertiarization and long distance migration—interact with institutional integration to create a joint impact on ethnonationalism.

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Short biographies

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