Description

Workshop. Friday May 13, 2022. 3 p.m. (At the Carlos Santamaria Zentroa)

Knowledge and control

Joshua Shepherd (Carleton University)

Abstract:

Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? Some have recently argued that control is non-accidental in virtue of requiring knowledge. I will argue that knowledge-centered accounts of control do not work, and that it is rather control that explains the presence of knowledge in intentional action.

Thoughts about the Ethics of Use and Mention

Adam Sennet (UC Davis) 

Abstract:

Anderson and Lepore have used a puzzle about slurring language to argue that the general offensiveness of slurs is grounded in their form, not their meaning. If correct, this undermines a great deal of motivation for current views regarding the semantics of slurring language. The puzzle stems from the observation that the derogatory properties of slur term seem to be present even in indirect and quoted contexts. The paper will consider the other cases of quoted offensive language to consider the soundness of their argument and will try to offer some preliminary thoughts about the ethics of referring to rather than using, offensive language.