Hilary Putnam on the philosophy of logic and mathematics

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Published 20-06-2018
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17626
José Miguel Sagüillo Fernández-Vega
Universidad de Santiago de Compostela

Abstract

I discuss Putnam's conception of logical truth as grounded in his picture of mathematical practice and ontology. i begin by comparing Putnam's 1971 Philosophy of Logic with Quine's homonymous book. Next, Putnam's changing views on modality are surveyed, moving from the modal pre-formal to the de-modalized formal characterization of logical validity. Section three suggests a complementary view of Platonism and modalism underlying different stages of a dynamic mathematical practice. The final section argues for the pervasive platonistic conception of the working mathematician.

How to Cite

Sagüillo Fernández-Vega, J. M. (2018). Hilary Putnam on the philosophy of logic and mathematics. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 33(2), 183–200. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17626
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Keywords

Putnam, Quine, Logic, Indispensability, Ontology, Scientific Language, Mathematical Practice

Issue
Vol. 33 No. 2 (2018): Updating indispensabilities: Putnam in memoriam | From basic cognition to mathematical practice
Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION

Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons License.