Expertise and Intuitions about Reference
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Published
28-01-2012
Edouard Machery
Abstract
Many philosophers hold that experts' semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people's intuitions—a thesis commonly called "the Expertise Defense." Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.
How to Cite
Machery, E. (2012). Expertise and Intuitions about Reference. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 27(1), 37–54. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.3482
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Keywords
intuitions, reference, descriptivism, causal-historical theories, Kripke, expertise, bias, experimental philosophy
Issue
Section
ARTICLES
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