The Case against Evaluative Realism
##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.main##
##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.sidebar##
Published
06-09-2006
Dan LÓPEZ DE SA
Abstract
In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.
How to Cite
LÓPEZ DE SA, D. (2006). The Case against Evaluative Realism. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 21(3), 277–294. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.521
##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.details##
Keywords
evaluative realism, flexibility, metaethics, internalism, causal efficacy.
Issue
Section
ARTICLES
Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons License.