Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception

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Published 06-05-2006
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.533
Olga FERNÁNDEZ PRAT

Abstract

A significant part of perception is characterized by awareness of particular objects. Two ways of making precise this intuition have been proposed (Searle vs. Evans, Campbell and others). The dispute's argumentative context is reconstructed and a proposal is advanced that may be regarded as a compromise between the contenders.

How to Cite

FERNÁNDEZ PRAT, O. (2006). Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 21(2), 133–145. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.533
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Keywords

intentionality, perceptual content, perceptual attention.

Issue
Vol. 21 No. 2 (2006): Knowledge, Memory and Perception
Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION

Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons License.