How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing

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Published 06-05-2006
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.537
Murali RAMACHANDRAN

Abstract

This paper puts forward necessary and suffficient conditions for knowing, and addresses Timothy Williamson's claims (a) that knowledge is an un-analyzable mental state, and (b) that any such analysis is futile. It is argued that such an account has explanatory motivation: it explains when belief fails to be knowledge.

How to Cite

RAMACHANDRAN, M. (2006). How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 21(2), 185–194. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.537
Abstract 231 | PDF Downloads 254

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Keywords

knowledge, externalism, closure principle, Williamson.

Issue
Vol. 21 No. 2 (2006): Knowledge, Memory and Perception
Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION

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