Defending the structural concept of representation

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Published 06-01-2006
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.550
Andreas BARTELS

Abstract

The paper defends the structural concept of representation, defined by homomorphisms, against the main objections that have been raised against it: Logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, the objection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. Homomorphic representations are not necessarily 'copies' of their representanda, and thus can convey scientific insight.

How to Cite

BARTELS, A. (2006). Defending the structural concept of representation. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 21(1), 7–19. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.550
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Keywords

(structural concept of) representation, homomorphism, content.

Issue
Vol. 21 No. 1 (2006): Scientific Representation
Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION

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