A note on science and essentialism
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Published
06-09-2004
Alice DREWERY
Abstract
I argue that Bird's extension of Kripke-Putnam style essentialist arguments fail against Humeanism fail because a) they rely on controversial intuitions about the natures of substances which no Humean would accept and b) neither scientific practice nor particular empirical facts can determine the nature of causal necessity.
How to Cite
DREWERY, A. (2004). A note on science and essentialism. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 19(3), 311–320. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.584
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Keywords
philosophy of science, metaphysics, essentialism, laws of nature, Humeanism, dispositions.
Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION
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