Traditional Economics has argued that economic evidence has to originate from the observation of behavior of economic agents (individuals, firms, states, etc.) in their natural environments and the statistical analysis of such data. However, the research of many economists such as Vernon Smith, Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Charlie Plott, or Reinhard Selten during the 80's and 90's has proved that it was possible to generate relevant, rich data on a number of economic phenomena of interest in a controlled laboratory environment. Experimentation has become a standard research tools in the field of Economics ever since.



This course introduces the current state of the art of the field Experimental Economics. On the one hand, this course is linked to courses of Microeconomics and Game Theory. In particular, Experimental Economics provides a critical perspective on certain assumptions and aspects of "traditional" Microeconomics and Game Theory, mostly regarding the assumptions of perfectly rational selfish economic agents and other assumptions behind the solution concepts employed in these two fields. On the other hand, the course introduces students to numerous issues relevant for other subfields, such as Development or Labour Economics.

Competences specífic to the course:

1.- Understanding of experimental methodology and its role in Economics.

2.- Ability to design an experiment.

3.- Ability to analyze statistically and econometrically experimental data.

4.- Understanding of the limits of classic economic theory.



Transversal competences of this course:

C3. Problem analysis and problem solving.

C4. Innovation, creativity, and entrepreneurship.

C5. Design and project.

C8. Communication.

C9. Critical thinking.

SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE:



1. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY

2. SELFISH PREFERENCES VS. SOCIAL PREFERENCES

3. STRATEGIC SITUATIONS AND LEARNING

4. COORDINATION

5. MARKETS AND INCENTIVES

6. FIELD AND NATURAL EXPERIMENTS.

The first half of the course is mostly composed of master classes, which encourage strongly students' participation. In the practical sessions in the second half of the course, the students present their work resulting either from their reading of a selected article or from a proposal of their own experiment.

• Continuous Assessment System
• Final Assessment System
• Tools and qualification percentages:
  • Individual works (%): 60
  • Exhibition of works, readings ... (%): 40

The final exam represent 100% of the final grade. However, the students can participate in a continuous-evalution system, consisting of presenting and writing a small essay on a topic selected by the student from the class material. In such a case, the presentation would represent 40% of the final grade and the final written work would represent 60% of the grade.

The final exam represents 100% of the final grade.

In Spanish:
[1] Brañas-Garza, Pablo (2011). Economía Experimental y de comportamiento, Antoni Bosch Editores.
[2] Theodore Bergstrom, John H. Miller (2009). Experimentos con los principios económicos, 2ª edición, Antoni Bosch Editores.
In English:
[3] Colin Camerer (2003) Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interactions. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press.
[4] D.D. Davis and CH. A. Holt (1993) Experimental Economics. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press.

Basic bibliography

A large number of research articles introduced in the class and distributed via the course platform eGela.

Web addresses

Charles A. Holt. http://people.virginia.edu/~cah2k/
Ariel Rubinstein. http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/